

Some pages of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions.

If you have discovered material in AURA which is unlawful e.g. breaches copyright, (either yours or that of a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation, libel, then please read our [Takedown Policy](#) and [contact the service](#) immediately

The Making of an Ideology of the Third Way.

**The Evolution of Christian Democracy
in Germany (with special reference to 1945-49)**

Michelle Cupples
Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Aston in Birmingham
October 1999

This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement.

*For Neil and
my family*

The University of Aston in Birmingham

**The Making of an Ideology of the Third Way.
The Evolution of Christian Democracy
in Germany (with special reference to 1945-49)**

Michelle Cupples
Doctor of Philosophy
1999

Summary

This study investigates the search for the third way in the history of German Christian Democracy. Today, in the United Kingdom, the 'third way' is seen as a new phenomenon, a synthesis of post-war belief in the welfare state and neo-liberal conservatism. Yet it insufficiently acknowledges that the origins of third way thinking, the marriage of social justice with free market economics, of individualism with collective responsibility, are found in the early philosophies of Catholic Social Theory and Protestant Social Ethical Teaching in Germany.

This study shows that in the hundred years from the 1840s to the end of the 1940s, there were Catholic and Protestant socio-ethical thinkers and political reformists in Germany who attempted to bridge the philosophical differences between liberalism and socialism, to develop a socio-economic order based on Christian moral values.

It will focus on the period 1945-1949, when the CDU was founded as the first interdenominational, Christian party. The study provides the first comprehensive account of the political debates in Christian democratic groups in the Soviet, British, French and American allied occupied zones, also giving equal attention to the contribution from the Protestant wing, alongside the more widely acknowledged role of Catholics in the birth of the CDU.

It examines how Christian Democrats envisaged correcting the aberrations of German history, by uniting all social classes and Christian religions in one all-embracing *Volkspartei*, and transforming party politics from its earlier obsession with sectarian and ideological interests towards a more pragmatic 'third way' programme. The study argues that through the making of its ideology, the CDU modified the nation's understanding of its history, re-interpreted its traditions, and redefined the meaning and perception of established political philosophies. This reveals how the ambiguity of political terminology, and the flexible practice of 'third way' politics, were an invaluable political resource in the CDU's campaign for unity, ideological legitimisation and political power.

Five keywords

Politics
Religion
Social
Economic
CDU

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to the University of Aston for granting a research scholarship and to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Germany for awarding a scholarship to carry out research in Germany.

I also wish to thank the following people who in many different ways have given me help and encouragement in writing this thesis; Professor Dr. Otto Kleinmann from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Sankt Augustin and the library and archive staff, in particular Helena Döffner. I am grateful to my supervisor Professor Nigel Reeves and to the staff in the School of Languages and European Studies of the University of Aston.

My very special, personal thanks go to my friends, to Dr. Katryn Bradshaw, and finally to Neil Hilton and my family, especially my mother.

Contents

INTRODUCTION	7
TRADITIONS AND <i>WELTANSCHAUUNG</i>	31
1. Political Catholicism before 1918	31
1.1. The Centre Party before and during the Weimar Republic	55
2. Political Protestantism before 1918	66
2.1. Liberal and Conservative Parties before and during the Weimar Republic	88
3. Ordo-liberalism in the Third Reich	102
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 1945-1947	114
4. British Zone	114
4.1. Rhineland and Westphalia	114
4.2. The North - Lower Saxony, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen	143
5. Russian Zone	152
5.1. Berlin (Brandenburg)	152
5.2. Berlin and the Soviet zone <i>Länder</i>	190
5.3. Mecklenburg - West Pomerania	194
5.4. Thuringia	196
5.5. Saxony	204
6. American Zone	213
6.1. Hesse	213
6.2. North Baden	235
6.3. North-Württemberg	238

7. French Zone	240
7.1. Rhineland-Palatinate	240
7.2. Palatinate	241
7.3. Rhinehesse	243
7.4. Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau	247
7.5. Baden-Württemberg	248
7.6. South Baden	249
7.7. Württemberg-Hohenzollern	254
PROGRAMMES, POWER AND PERSONALITY 1947-1949	256
8. Consolidation in the CDU	256
8.1. CDU in the Bizone	256
8.2. <i>Excursion</i> - Ludwig Erhard	275
8.3. Erhard, the CDU and the Social Market Economy	283
CONCLUSION	299
BIBLIOGRAPHY	313
APPENDICES	390

Introduction

The politics of the third way can appear a nebulous notion, yet it is gaining currency among parties of the centre and centre-left across Europe. World economic crises and the devastating collapse of national economies and financial infrastructures, particularly in Asia and Latin America, have generated some disillusion with capitalism. The belief that the free market can offer a panacea for society's inequalities and act as a guarantor of universal welfare and prosperity has been eroded. Whilst few of the centre and centre-left governments in Europe seek a collectivist style socialism to restore social and cultural cohesion and full-employment, or to deal with the challenges of globalisation, many agree that politics has to become more meaningful, inspirational and idealist to tackle modern issues. The free market continues to be praised for its positive contribution to democracy and for respecting the freedom of the individual, but the consensus is growing that the more disruptive and exploitative effects of the global market must be tamed by standards and rules of good state practice, with a return to the pursuit of high ideals and public purpose. This is the essence of the current debate on the third way.

That debate¹ however is misguided in its narrow belief that the origins and the principles of the third way reside in Social Democracy. Social Democracy may in future choose to aspire to these ideals (in many European Union countries such as England and Germany the indication is that it is) but this study will show that the core values of the third way thinking, such as solidarity, subsidiarity, rights with responsibility or joint stakeholding, more accurately belong to Christian Democracy, which in turn relies on the Christian

¹ Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way - The Renewal of Social Democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge 1998. Social Democracy, has historically been associated with collectivist, Marxist-Socialism. Reference to a 'renewal' of Social Democracy indicates that it must in fact align itself with Christian Democracy, where the roots of Conservative liberalism and social responsibility are traditionally found. Other works on the Third Way include David Halpern and David Mikosz, *The Third Way, Nexus*, London 1998. Richard Gillespie and William E. Paterson, *Rethinking Social Democracy in Europe*, Cass, London 1993. John Blundell and Brian Gottschalk, *Beyond Left and Right*, Institute of Economic Affairs, London 1997. Lothar Funk, *The Economics and the Politics of the Third Way. Essays in Honour of Eric Owen Smith*, Lit Verlag, Münster-Hamburg-London 1999.

teaching of social ethics and Catholic Social Teaching. It is Christian Democratic conservatism that has placed the greatest emphasis on the inviolable political and economic freedoms of the individual, not the historically collectivist approach of Social Democracy.

Despite Germany's turbulent past, the search for the political centre runs like a *Leitmotiv* through the nation's history. From the 16th century Reformation, to the social and political repercussions of the French Revolution in the 18th century, to the rise of capitalism in the industrial revolution of the 19th century, and finally to the 20th century search for a social form of market economy, Germany sought to reconcile the opposing forces of conservatism and liberalism. An individual's confessional allegiance as well as their socio-economic status, were references for an individual's either more conservative or liberal personal philosophy. With the advent of the German party system in the mid-19th century, political parties translated deep-rooted religious conviction into pronounced, political interest and defended their beliefs as socialist, conservative, nationalist or liberalist ideologies. Since the semi-absolutist nature of the regimes of Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm prevented political parties from holding any real political responsibility however,² parties primarily defended regional and sectarian interests. Bismarck's alliance with Protestant liberals during the latter half of the 19th century instigated the systematic discrimination of Catholics in the *Kulturkampf*, inciting bitter antagonism between the Christian confessions and inflicting irreparable and interminable damage on the political system.

Protestant and Catholic differences were related to how they approached solving '*die soziale Frage*' or 'social question'. Industrialisation and the rise of capitalism were blamed for society's ills and injustices, for a loss of faith and social cohesion. The need to restrain the excesses of the capitalist system and to enfranchise the alienated and exploited working classes, became the chief motive of the burgeoning Catholic social movement in particular. Catholics looked for a way to resolve the conflict between capital and labour, either by completely abolishing capitalism or alternatively by seeking

² "Es ist selbstverständlich, daß alle Parteien mangels praktischer politischer Erfahrung von theoretischen Überlegungen ausgehen mußten." Günter Olzog, *Die Politischen Parteien*, Günter Olzog Verlag, München 1964.

a synthesis to reconcile capitalism with social equality, thereby ensuring welfare *and* prosperity for all classes. There were contributions to ethical, social and political reform from the Protestant community too, but liberal-Protestant visions for achieving social harmony with prosperity were sadly too often clouded by nationalist endeavours. Deep-seated mistrust of the other's confessional interests also prevented the development of a united Christian front of Catholics and Protestants, to jointly address the social question. Third way observers sought in vain to develop an alternative to hostile sectarianism and ideological extremism, and to conduct more meaningful and less confrontational politics, based on moral values, religious tolerance and inclusiveness.

It is the nature of this inextricable link between religion and politics in German society, succinctly expressed in the untranslatable and peculiarly German concept of *Weltanschauung*, that provides the key to understanding Germany's socio-political history and goes to the very heart of an investigation into Germany's century-old search for a third way.³

The legacy of '*die soziale Frage*' persisted into the post Second World War period as Christian democratic groups wrangled over the most appropriate form of socio-economic policy to adopt to solve social injustice. It soon became the most controversial issue in post-war German party politics, when the decision to adopt a planned economy, a free-market economy, or something in-between, looked set to determine Germany's entire future economic direction. It was also a choice that directly influenced the political fate of Germany.

Recognising that confessional interests had been the root cause of intolerance and conflict in German society, nascent Christian democratic groups in 1945 aimed explicitly at modifying and correcting some of Germany's early traditions and most notably of forging unity and co-operation between Protestants and Catholics. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) did not seek to remove religion from politics, but simply to redefine their relationship to each other. By bringing autonomy to the spheres and

³ "Im Gegensatz zu den meisten anderen Ländern wird Deutschland bestimmt durch einen konfessionellen Zwiespalt, der ein ausschlaggebendes Moment grundlegender Differenzierungen ist." Sigmund Neumann, *Die Deutschen Parteien*, Junker und Dünhaupt Verlag, Berlin 1932, p.17.

institutions of religion and politics, the CDU hoped to avoid state involvement in Church affairs, and so prevent sectarian interests exerting a direct influence on political decisions. In future religion should assume a peripheral, but nevertheless important moral function in society. An interdenominational party built on the basis of shared Christian values would provide the impulse in 1945 for a socially inclusive and classless *Volkspartei*. This, they hoped, would replace the multiplicity of narrow, class-based 'interest parties', that had brought down Weimar and opened the door to National Socialism.

The demoralising experience of National Socialism shared by Protestants and Catholics alike, had undoubtedly generated a powerful catalyst for forging a new consensus between *Weltanschauungen* in 1945. Regional groups were in spirit committed to the Christian Democratic cause, adamant that never again would religious divisions allow a repeat of 1933. Yet whilst the potential to unite Catholics and Protestants in a new third way existed, the social, political and cultural abyss that accompanied the end of the war, meant the allegiance to former *Weltanschauungen* and entrenched traditions remained problematic. It was over-optimistic to expect a century of religious conflict and bigotry to disappear overnight. It soon emerged, that many of those individuals who were involved in establishing the CDU, were not of one mind in drafting party manifestos. Historical political traditions dominated the formulation of socio-economic policy. Religious tolerance and consensus - the cornerstone of the CDU's new programme - were adopted only very gradually by party members and conceded only on account of the fact that it was the only way to secure the *Volkspartei's* long-term political survival. Without the formal constraints imposed by the allies and their policy of installing a stable democracy, German-led political discussions risked ending in turmoil. Consolidation of disparate Christian democratic parties throughout the regions progressed slowly and unenthusiastically. Even at the occasion of the first elections in west Germany in 1949, the CDU was still unable to stand as a united party. This did not occur until 1950 when the party finally convened at Bad Godesberg to unite the CDU as a party for the entire Federal Republic of Germany.⁴

⁴ Bavaria was to form its own Christian Social Union (CSU). Owing to this unique party political development of the CSU, Bavaria has been excluded in this analysis.

Despite clear evidence of political continuity of programmes and traditions before 1945, it has been common practice amongst historians writing about the CDU, to present the CDU as a 'new' party in conception, an organic development which emerged across Germany in the closing stages of the war. This view was consistent with the metaphor of 'Hour Zero,' connotating a new beginning or a *tabula rasa*. The concept of 'new' however demands qualification. The differing interpretations given to socio-economic policy by regional groups and individuals not only reflected diverse regional traditions and confessional background of the German states, but they are also an indication of the eclectic nature of Christian Democracy, owing its existence to conservative, socialist, liberalist and nationalist influences. Far from being something entirely new, the CDU was an amalgamation of traditions and ideologies from the past, but all earlier initiatives for a Christian, democratic, interdenominational *Volkspartei* had simply failed.

Only by investigating the genesis and the evolution of Christian Democracy's core ideas, can the study demonstrate how in 1945, the Christian Democratic Union found the third way among Germany's diverse political and sectarian traditions. The CDU succeeded where others had failed, by modifying the nation's understanding of its history, re-interpreting its traditions and its ideas and creatively redefining their meaning and their public perception. In the course of programme discussions, the CDU exploited the stylistic ambiguity of political concepts as a useful party political resource in the campaign for ideological legitimisation and political power. Both objectives of the study, tracing first the genesis and then the modification of Christian democratic ideas by the CDU, underpin an intellectual and a political history of the development of Christian Democracy's third way programme and illustrate how historical tradition combined with pragmatic skill to modify ideas where politically expedient, were important requisites for the formation of a successful new party.

The post-war period was necessarily a period of ideological stock-taking that compelled the CDU first to analyse the mistakes of past ideas and *Weltanschauung*, before embarking on the definition of a new identity. Their programmes thus confronted the causes of National Socialism, and the dangers of Materialism, Marxist-Socialism and Liberalism. Finally, the study argues that only with the culminating development of the Social Market Economy in 1948, concluding a whole century of philosophical socio-

economic discussions, were efforts towards a third way manifested in policy and in practice. The Social Market Economy succeeded in providing a viable political and socio-economic synthesis of the major political and religious traditions in the previously divided German party system.

This study aims to provide the first comprehensive account of the socio-economic debates that took place in individual Christian democratic groups in the German states of the Soviet, British, French and American allied occupied zones between 1945 and 1949.⁵ As regional discussions were often held without any knowledge of Christian democratic developments in other parts of Germany, their content reflects the historical, political and sectarian idiosyncrasies of individual regions in north, south, east and west Germany. These manifestations of a new Christian democratic political identity across Germany's regions, reveal where former patterns of ideological continuity remained and where they were disrupted. The study can be read in two ways, either with a specific regional focus, or as a comprehensive overview of the CDU's emergence as a national party and the consolidation of one social and economic programme. This approach illustrates how the differing forces in the party were politically reconciled, and why certain programme ideas superseded others in the quest to form a united party. The study also seeks to correct some previous assumptions about the early development of the CDU in the regions.

Among these is the influence of political Protestantism. Previous studies that have investigated the CDU's development have largely focused on the influence of political Catholicism, overlooking the party's other liberal-Protestant roots. It is worrying that this very significant area of the Christian democratic ideology has been neglected, since it was precisely the aim of the CDU party, to embrace Catholics and Protestants equally in one united party, whether they were liberals or socialists, conservatives or nationalists. The bias shown in the literature towards the Catholic contribution to Christian Democracy fuels the suspicion that the CDU was a Catholic dominated movement and even a continuation of the Catholic Centre party, a suggestion that the CDU consistently rebutted in the late 1940s. Many regional Christian democratic groups

⁵ Whilst every effort has been made to cover Germany's main towns and regions, some have been ignored where no substantial archival sources or published records exist.

were custodians of liberal values and quietly endorsed a liberal economic programme. This study provides the first formal recognition of the role of political Protestantism in instilling liberal values in German society, and seeks to redress the balance in the history of the CDU by acknowledging the importance of liberal Protestantism in the development of the party's programme. It is particularly alarming that the Social Market Economic programme has been neglected in respect of its liberal Protestant roots.

There are many reasons why political Protestantism has not received the same attention as political Catholicism. Historically 'Political Protestantism' did not even exist as a concept and is an indication of Protestant bourgeois passiveness in 19th century political affairs and its apathy towards joining the social debate or to co-operate with Catholics in instigating social reform. Internal Protestant disunity was a chief reason for this lack of social and political engagement, and it should not overshadow very worthwhile individual endeavours by Protestants to undertake social reform. The initial reluctance shown by liberal Protestants in 1945 to co-operate actively in social reform debates is also understandable in view of the shame many liberal Protestants felt in facilitating National Socialism. Perhaps more significant, *laissez-faire* economic liberalism, the preserve of liberal Protestantism, was wholly discredited in 1945 and made Protestants reticent to support the free market, for fear of accusations that they were restoring former capitalist practices and structures.

The post-war mood had swung decisively to the left, to embrace Socialism as the new, most favoured alternative. Yet ironically, Germany had had no direct experience of a Socialist system, apart from its failed National Socialist experiment. Liberal-capitalism was in fact a more familiar system to both Protestants and Catholics. Significant trade union efforts to develop a Christian Socialism in the 19th century notwithstanding, Christian Socialists in 1945 found that they could not easily define their 'Socialist' objectives, relying more on negative definitions of what Socialism was not, but not what it actually was. Christian Socialism was also ambiguous about its attitude to capitalism, which under specific conditions it clearly endorsed. This meant that although old style liberalism would be unacceptable to Christian Socialists in the new Germany, the possibility for a new interpretation of capitalist-liberalism was not inconceivable. This neo-liberalism would not focus on the pursuit of narrow economic goals but would

recognise its responsibilities to society as well as the individual. But liberalism's more notable cultural and political values could also be resurrected to guarantee individual freedoms and promote democracy.⁶

In part one, chapter one and chapter two lay the foundations for the study through an investigation of the main tenets of Catholic and Protestant thinking and their social reform movements in the 19th and early 20th centuries, exploring how sectarian interests and political ideas were communicated in the emerging party political spectrum. Whereas the Centre Party was the focus for Catholicism's political expression between 1870 and 1933, the many conservative and liberal parties in the same period became the main political representatives of political Protestantism. Chapter three then devotes its attention to the neo or ordo-liberal movement which began to actively develop third way theories in a period of exile during the Third Reich. Neo-liberals looked ahead to a post-war socio-economic programme that would combine both elements of market forces and state regulation. This historical backdrop leads into the core of the study, namely the immediate post-second world war period. By examining the long gestation of Christian Democratic thinking, it is possible to appreciate the origins of the CDU's political ideas and to understand the motives of individuals in continuing to defend them in political programmes and discussions after the Second World War. Chapters four to seven investigate these key political debates between 1945 and 1947 across the regions and zones of Germany, when Christian groups first assembled to found Christian Democratic parties and draft political manifestos. Discussions reveal how former political ideas and historical traditions resurfaced, underwent mutation or where new thinking emerged. The period from 1947-1949, the focus of chapter eight, was a period in which diverse programme suggestions were consolidated. Fierce battles were fought between the main centres of Christian democracy to defend the supremacy of regionally established ideas. Here the study analyses which programmes and ideas were accepted and why others were sidelined. 1947 was the first time theoretical programme formulations were tested for their practical relevance, as the CDU was called upon to take responsibility for

⁶ In the decades following the birth of the Federal Republic, the CDU was often criticised for having restored former capitalist-liberalist structures and for reneging on implementing genuine social reform. Whilst this study does not seek to endorse or refute this allegation, it must be acknowledged that this angle of criticism was partly derived from the fact that the socialist agenda of some Christian Socialist groups was frustrated.

shaping its own political and economic destiny as a member of the all-German Economic Council, or *Wirtschaftsrat* in Frankfurt. It is here that we witness the change underway in the tone and the role of the political programme and accompanying discussions. The philosophical, spiritual and hypothetical tone of programmes and statements - characteristic of the late 19th and early 20th centuries - gives way to a new confidence and pragmatism, and the extrapolation of policy from principles. The sudden transformation of programme to practice however, rapidly exposed the true level of conflict and disunity in the party. The chapter is dominated by the figure of Ludwig Erhard, who appears from relative political obscurity in 1947 to take centre stage in the emerging political arena. He dramatically impacts on the CDU's prevailing objectives and its policy line in the American and British Bizone Economic Council, steering the CDU's programme discussions to their conclusive end in the Social Market Economy and to election victory in 1949.

The existing literature on the CDU's programme discussions is fragmented. There are a number of very good regional studies and some incisive analyses that have considered the ideological aspect of the CDU's programme discussions, but no single, comprehensive historical study on the early CDU in all regions of Germany exists. The consequences of the division of Germany and the ensuing Cold War meant that post-war history was written from separate east and west German perspectives with ideological bias. The dominant figure of Adenauer and his skilful management of events in the CDU, moreover led to the British zone - and specifically the state of North Rhine-Westphalia - becoming the most dominant and most researched region, with the result that alternative initiatives in other regions and other zones, deserving specific acknowledgment, have been ignored. Developments of the CDU in the Soviet zone for example have, with some notable exceptions, been restricted to Berlin, and whilst there have been some worthwhile regional studies on the CDU in states in the American and French occupation zones, there are no studies that cover these zones as a whole or indeed, to undertake a single study of the Christian Democratic programme debates in all four zones. This gap in the research has become all the more important to fill since the unification of east and west Germany in 1990. It is timely therefore after a decade of national unification, in the 50th anniversary year since the birth of the Federal Republic

and the 10th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, that a national German history of the early development of the CDU is written.

The research for this study is based on a reading of a wide range of primary literature sources from the archives for Christian Democratic politics at Sankt-Augustin in Germany. These include programmatic statements, manifestos, speeches, memoirs, contemporary newspapers, periodicals and journals, plus many unpublished archival sources and private papers, year books and annals. Full acknowledgement has also been given to all existing secondary literature on the rise of Christian Democracy and the early CDU, for which a comprehensive list of bibliographical details is included.

Ideology, Programmes and Theory

The party programme forms both the focus and the backdrop for the investigation. The 'programme' is understood here in its widest sense, to include not only written and verbal statements but also ideological statements concerning the party's ethos and the doctrines on which its policies were based. The party political manifesto is the principal vehicle for expressing a party's political objectives, its philosophy and identity, enabling it to compete with other parties for votes and political power as well as generate internal cohesion and identification in the party by dissemination of its aims and principles across society. A programme's statements anticipate the future, justify the present and evaluate the past. Since this study argues that the CDU learnt to re-invent the meaning of traditions using the ambiguity of political language, it is essential in the prelude to this study to consider the political programme as an ideology and as a party political resource. Only by recognising the theoretical framework in which programmes operate, is it possible to investigate how the political programme, consciously or subconsciously, served the internal and external political ambitions of the embryonic CDU between 1945 and 1949.

The existing theoretical framework nevertheless reveals limitations for programme analysis. Early empirical sociological research into parties and politics by figures such as Weber,⁷ Michels⁸ and Osgorski⁹ at the beginning of the century was overtaken after the

⁷ Max Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie*, Hrsg. Johannes Winckelmann, 4. Auflage, Band 2, Mohr, Tübingen 1956.

Second World War by political stabilisation, pluralism and faith in the western democratic system. This led research in the 1950s and 1960s to adopt a 'de-ideologised' approach, championed by thinkers such as Duverger¹⁰ and Satori.¹¹ Daniel Bell's¹² 'The End of Ideology' argued that the general consensus that grew among the new post-war *Volksparteien* on factors such as the welfare state, the mixed economy, democracy, individual freedom and *Gemeinwohl*, made former ideologies entirely superfluous. Party political research no longer focused on beliefs or party values but on institutional structures. Klotzbach¹³ writes;

"Programmatik der Parteien, ihre soziale Basis, überhaupt gesellschaftliche und ökonomische Umweltbedingungen, Geschichte, Kultur usw. treten dahinter zurück oder verschwinden ganz."

A party's role became primarily functional. Parties were seen as no more than constituent elements in the social and political system. This trend characterised the direction of Duverger's institutional research theory, that Klotzbach summarises as an 'Isolierung der Parteien von ihrer Umwelt.' From the mid 1960s however, some studies, such as those by S.J. Eldersveld,¹⁴ began to re-include the social, political and environmental conditions in which a party exists, thereby helping to put the party back into the social system from which it had been separated. But the increasing segmentation of social research disciplines soon led to a loss of overview¹⁵ and prevented clear methodological guidelines being established for party research.

⁸ Robert Michels, *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie. Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens*, 4. Auflage. (1. Auflage 1910). Mit einer Einführung versehen von Frank R. Pfetsch, Kröner, Stuttgart 1989.

⁹ Moisey Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties*, Band 2, Macmillan, New York/London 1922.

¹⁰ Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London 1954.

¹¹ Giovanni Satori, *Parties and Party Systems, A Framework for Analysis*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1976.

¹² Daniel Bell, *On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties. The End of Ideology*, The Free Press, New York 1962.

¹³ Kurt Klotzbach, *Der Weg zur Staatspartei. Programmatik, praktische Politik und Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1945-1965*, J.H.W. Dietz, Berlin/Bonn 1982, p.21.

¹⁴ S.J. Eldersveld, *Political Parties. A Behavioural Analysis*, Rand McNally, Chicago 1964.

¹⁵ Richard Stöss/Oskar Niedermayer, *Stand und Perspektiven der Parteienforschung in Deutschland*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1993, p.9.

Klaus von Beyme¹⁶ has noted that the lack of a general theory for party research is not disastrous. Any one theory risks compromising and oversimplifying the diversity of inquiry into an otherwise complex subject area. It is entirely questionable whether a single framework for analysis can adequately be applied to any one part, since its origins and characteristics are highly individual; circumstantial and historical events will always challenge the parameters of a fixed model. A party is the product of its history and its present environment and will orientate its organisational structure, ideology and behaviour according to the prevailing socio-economic and political circumstances.¹⁷ The need to evaluate ideas in their context has been endorsed by a number of political scientists. Ware¹⁸ believes;

“Attempts to impose single approaches on political science are misguided. The causal factors involved in producing outcomes in politics are so complex that the dominance of any single approach will surely lead to distortion and oversimplification in an attempt to explain the political world.”

Any analysis of a party programme should then include an analysis of the prevailing social, political and economic situation to which the programme is responding. Raschke¹⁹ argues;

“einerseits Programme nicht im Rahmen einer abstrakten Ideengeschichte, sondern in ihrer Abhängigkeit von sozialen und politischen Realfaktoren untersucht werden müssen und daß sie andererseits nur ein Element neben anderen im System einer Partei sind.”

Flechtheim²⁰ also insists on an inclusive approach to programme analysis;

¹⁶ “Für die Zusammenfassung des bisherigen Wissens über Parteien schließlich ist eine allgemeine Partientheorie wünschenswert, aber ...schwer zu erreichen. Unerläßlich ist sie auch nicht ... Für die großen Systeme werden wir weiter damit leben müssen, daß nicht alles von der Wahlwerbung bis zur Parteienfinanzierung in einer sich schlüssigen Theorie untergebracht werden kann, es sei denn, sie riskierte als gesetztes Leerformelgebilde in die Arena der Wissenschaft zu treten.” Klaus von Beyme, “Theoretische Probleme der Parteienforschung” in; Politische Vierteljahresschrift. Jg 24, 1983, H3. p.250f.

¹⁷ Johannes Gross cited in Wolfgang Jäger, (Hrsg.), Partei und System. Eine kritische Einführung in die Parteienforschung. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1973. p15.

¹⁸ Alan Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, Oxford University Press, New York 1996, p.20.

¹⁹ Joachim Raschke, “Parteien, Programme und “Entideologisierung”. Zur Analyse von Parteiprogrammen” in; Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B8/70, 21.2.1970, p.9, (3-23).

²⁰ O.K Flechtheim, Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945, Band 1, Dokumenten Verlag, Berlin 1962, p.1 of introduction.

“Man wird - so schwierig das sein mag - nicht umhin können, den Zusammenhang zwischen der Programmatik einer Partei, ihrer organisatorischen, sozialen usw. Struktur und ihrem gesamten Verhalten im politischen Alltag zu untersuchen. Alle drei Ebenen stehen in Wechselwirkung miteinander.”

Finally Rudolf Hars²¹ study on the CDU's education policy confirms that programmes cannot be analysed in isolation, but must be reviewed in the context of their political implementation, since it is only possible to tell if discrepancy exists between programme and practice once an overview of a party's world view has been gained. A narrow investigation, he says, obscures the vision of the propaganda function of political programmes. Ideological interference will always affect political reality. The idea that universal values and truths exist is denounced by current social research theory as 'myths,' 'prejudices' or 'ideologies' themselves.²² Social science instead turns to the agents who disseminate ideas and the structures of influence which allow ideas to be acquired, to ask if the existing power relationship is legitimate. A purely philosophical, absolute approach is inadequate, because it is too abstract and so mistakenly deals with ideal conditions for consent but not actual ones.

Ware²³ further observes that although a programme is a party's public face, outlining what the party intends to do in government, there are many aspects of a party's beliefs, values or ethos which may not be stated in its manifesto. The programme reveals only a fraction of the ideas generated by a party whilst possibly also concealing or suppressing an equal number of divergent views. A programme generally represents compromises reached between different internal views held by sub-groups, left or right wings and party factions within the party.²⁴ Part of the methodology therefore in examining a party and its programmes must surely be to investigate the breadth of viewpoints held within the party. Narr's²⁵ study on the CDU chose not to concentrate on individual and regional

²¹ “Die Reichweite und Stoßrichtung jedweder Parteiprogrammatik läßt sich nur abschätzen, wenn man die realisierte politische Praxis mit in die Betrachtung einbezieht.” Rudolf Hars, *Die Bildungsreformpolitik der Christlich-Demokraten Union in den Jahren 1945-1954. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Konservatismus in der deutschen Bildungspolitik*. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1981, p.16.

²² David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power Issues in Political Theory*, Macmillan London 1991. p.11f.

²³ Alan Ware, op. cit. p.20.

²⁴ Joachim Raschke, op. cit, p.8

²⁵ Wolf-Dieter Narr, *CDU/CSU Programm & Praxis seit 1945*. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1966.

programmes of CDU groups across Germany, preferring a thematic approach that distinguished between the main political strands only. Although this method has perhaps facilitated a simpler overview of the subject, and thereby also the task of critical analysis, as Narr himself concedes, it has given unfair emphasis to certain political viewpoints over others. The best example is Christian Socialism, which has received over-inflated relevance in the literature on the CDU's development. Opposing strands to Christian Socialism and advocates of alternative programme directions have, as a result, been neglected or sidelined in critical analyses. In an attempt to simplify the subject of analysis, many other interesting programme suggestions from CDU groups across the country risk being ignored. The very federal nature of the CDU's development plus the obvious logistical obstacles to regional political integration and merger, such as geographically divided allied zones and poor communication, meant that until 1946, programme developments *were* predominantly isolated developments. The method applied here thus works on the basis of actual historical circumstances as evidenced in the material and does not seek to impose artificial conceptual structures, which may seem to solve the social scientist's methodological dilemmas.

Reflecting on the correct methodological approach for party political research, Bergsträsser²⁶ insisted that research into *Geistesgeschichte* must be distinguished from research into *Parteigeschichte*. He warns against combining both types of research, party history with the history of political ideas, since the history of ideas is criticised as too isolated from actual political events and therefore unreliable. An investigation into the origins of a party's world view, such as conservatism or socialism, would not adequately account for a party's change in image and policy direction as political events unfolded. It is not the 'idea' that is important, but the consequences of that idea, when it is translated into political action. The history of ideas transforms into party history when politicians seize those political ideas and apply that vision to political reality.²⁷ Attempting to distill the essence of a politician's ideology from his political speeches or written drafts therefore, is for Bergsträsser a false theory. A politician must clearly not be judged by their theory but by their behaviour in real situations. It has already been established here

²⁶ Ludwig Bergsträsser, *Geschichte der politischen Parteien in Deutschland*. Deutsches Handbuch der Politik 2, Günter Olzog Verlag, München 1960, p.13.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p.17.

that ideas are not to be discussed in isolation from their political context and impact on reality, yet Bergsträsser's advice to separate the research discipline, *Parteiengeschichte* from *Ideengeschichte* undermines the importance of a party's manifesto pledges and the commitment it owes to voters. It would imply that there is no relation between a party's declared principles and policy objectives and its responsibility to fulfil its promises in government. If a party's political theory has no intrinsic basis in reality, then the programme is flawed and insincere. If the political programme or a politician's statements and world view are no longer considered sacrosanct or are rendered worthless in the face of a politician's practical conduct, the voter is denied the power to hold that party to account once it is in power. Programmes are thus important instruments of criticism and control, and symbols of democracy. Bergsträsser does however partly concede that a party is not simply a product of changing political circumstances;

"Jeder Einzelne zieht aus politischen Ereignissen bestimmte Folgerungen, je nach seiner Weltanschauung und seiner gefühlsmäßigen Einstellung"²⁸

In the final analysis he is unable to deny that a party's world view does also determine the way that a party responds to political events and decisions.

Recognising the need for both an empirical and a pragmatic approach to the subject matter is therefore important here. This study avoids narrowing the CDU's ideology to a study of its programme ideas alone and broadens the view by incorporating the historical dimension, the real-life social and economic context, the drive for power and the dynamics of political personalities into the analysis. The party programme - in its broadest sense - will nevertheless provide the point of departure for this study and continue to occupy a central position since it is the most constant and accurate reflection of how a party wishes to be seen. It provides the closest barometer for an objective analysis of a party's declared ideology and a strong point of reference from which deviations, modifications and disparities to that ideology can be measured as a party develops and matures. Duverger believed that greater emphasis is placed on the programme in the early stages of a party's existence before it is superseded by party interests and organisational matters. Since this study is concerned with the early

²⁸ Ibid., p.18.

development of the CDU, focus on the programmatic discussions is justified. It avoids the danger of overtheorising party programmes, which Stammen²⁹ also warns, usually results in the use of jargonistic terminology and complicated theoretical social scientific explanations, which lead more to confuse than to clarify a party's programme. The statements which academic theorising constructs around the ideological content of programme statements are themselves to be criticised for their incomprehensible and esoteric nature! The risk is that the same criticism which is levelled at politicians for their failure to simplify and clarify their political rhetoric for the purposes of general comprehension, might be more appropriately directed at social scientists themselves.

Having considered the methodological difficulties of analysing a party's ideology via its programme, it is necessary briefly to identify what factors are relevant in the analysis. The approach must assess the value a party itself places on its programme, the form the programme takes, its internal and external functions and finally the language and programmatic style of political programmes - essential for communicating policies and for manipulating the political process. These factors are all intertwined.³⁰ When we ask why a party needs a programme, what function it fulfills, whether its declared intentions bear any relation to subsequent reality, we are inquiring into the purpose and meaning of a programme's statements. Because a programme is multifunctional, it is also reasonable to find variation in its form. Traditionally there has been more than one type of party programme in the German party system.³¹ In the immediate post-war years, parties not only had no mandate to govern their own affairs, but were called upon to provide moral explanations for the evils of National Socialism and give spiritual guidance for the future. Programmes therefore by nature constituted ideas and philosophy in so-called

²⁹ Theo Stammen, *Programme der politischen Parteien in der Bundesrepublik* in Rainer Kunz, Herbert Maier, Theo Stammen (Hrsg.), *Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit*, München 1975, p.33.

³⁰ Hans Bachem, "Programme sind kurzlebig" in; Dr Lothar Kraft / Gerhard Reddemann (Hrsg.), *Mit der Union in die Zukunft. Grundlagen, Kritik, Aufgaben, Vorschläge, Perspektiven*. 'Die Entscheidung' Verlag, Bonn 1969.

³¹ Heino Kaack defined these as the Grundsatzprogramm, a basic programme with the most long term validity, setting out a party's core principles, the 'Aktions-', 'Wahl-' and 'Regierungsprogramme' define more specific, short term objectives and are aimed at specific election campaigns. Heino Kaack, *Geschichte und Struktur des deutschen Parteiensystems*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1971.

Grundsatzprogramme. A party's *Grundsatzprogramm* is like a state's constitution.³² The political language of *Grundsatzprogramme* is by definition abstract. It is emotive, value-laden, characterises ideas, values, aims and interests, and is kept deliberately vague. Flohr³³ explains, a *Grundsatzprogramm* is discursive and 'expressed' "in der Sprache der Begriffe." Kaack³⁴ adds that;

"Die Grundsatzprogramme müssen so allgemein gehalten und damit im Grunde genommen unverbindlich sein, daß sie für längere Zeit gültig blieben, aber dennoch offen sind für Veränderungen in den strukturellen Grundbedingungen der Politik und in den konkreten politischen Entwicklungen."

Kaack correctly denoted that programmes fulfil internal and external functions and distinguished between the advertising function which aims at recruiting new members and gaining votes and the 'profile function' which aims at distinguishing a party from its rival parties. Internally a programme acts to integrate differing points of view and engender identification within the party. During the formulation of a manifesto, these integrative and identification functions offer the party the opportunity to discuss and question its inherited values, the future direction of its policy and to formulate an agreed party response to changes in the social and political environment. Once consolidated, the programme provides the party leadership with an '*innerparteiliches Herrschaftsinstrument*' to compel members to toe the agreed party line.

Political events further rely on language to explain the meaning of events on behalf of individuals for whom the reality of the incident may be too complex or remote and beyond their personal experience. Many studies thus point to the importance of myths and metaphors in political language, to the creation or suppression of certain forms of perception;

³² Wulf Schönbohm, "Funktion, Entstehung und Sprache von Parteiprogrammen," in; *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*. B34/35, 1974, p.27.

³³ Flohr is sceptical of pragmatists who believe parties could do away with the 'ideologischen Ballast' of programmatic statements and focus on practical politics, warning that these people disguise the lack of principles as realism; "sie preisen als Realismus, was in der Wahrheit bloße Konzeptionslosigkeit ist." Heiner Flohr, *Parteiprogramme in der Demokratie*, Otto Schwarz & Co. Göttingen 1968, p.62.

³⁴ Kaack, op. cit. p.402.

“Die Sprache *spiegelt* nicht eine objektive ‘Realität’, sondern *schafft* sie, indem sie von einer komplizierten und verwirrenden Welt bestimmte Wahrnehmungen abstrahiert und sie zu einer Sinnstruktur organisiert.”³⁵

Empty value statements such as ‘freedom’, ‘equality’ and ‘justice’ frequently found in party programmes serve to enhance integration and identification within the party or to conceal internal party conflicts and misunderstanding.³⁶ Unlike individual words, fixed terms and concepts contain symbols, triggering a range of related responses. In isolation such concepts often demand explanation but employed in the context of a political programme, many things can be implied through the use of only one term, aiding orientation and our perception of historical and political events. It is not important whether the programmes defines such terms as democracy, equality, freedom, socialist, but merely whether these concepts elicit negative or positive responses from voters. From this it follows that parties increasingly reduce their election campaigning to a combination of clever and positive soundbites. A party’s discourse is an essential political resource.³⁷ Bergsdorf even maintains ideologies are no other than ‘*sprachliche Gebilde*,’ comprised of specialist economics, legal and technical jargon and opinion forming language or ‘*Meinungssprache*.’ A party lends its politics legitimacy by mixing value statements with technical jargon. Indeed the lack of precision in ideological language is not a deficiency but a condition of its effectiveness.³⁸ The less meaning a phrase conveys, the easier it is for party leaders to later claim continuity in policy. A party often develops its own branded concepts such as the CDU’s ‘Social Market Economy’ or ‘*Politik aus christlicher Verantwortung*’, that become characteristic of that particular party. Brand names nevertheless risk becoming hollow and meaningless over

³⁵ Murray Edelmann, “Politische Sprache und politische Realität” in; Martin Greiffenhagen, Kampf um Wörter? Politische Begriffe im Meinungsstreit, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn 1980. p.39.

³⁶ “Leerformeln dieser Art dienen eben durch ihre Allgemeinheit und Vagheit der Integration von Personen in einer Gruppe, sie haben Symbol- oder Signalwert für soziale Aktionen.” Theo Stammen, op. cit. p.30.

³⁷ “Die Politik wirkt ein auf die Inhalte der Begriffe und ist bemüht, sie zu verändern und durch neue Begriffe abzustützen, damit ihre Wertgrundlagen und Ziele sich in der Sprache niederschlagen.” Wolfgang Bergsdorf, Herrschaft und Sprache, Neske, Pfullingen 1983, p.28f.

³⁸ “Die Ideologisierung der zentralen Begriffe der politischen Terminologie ist Voraussetzung ihrer Wirksamkeit.” Bergsdorf, op. cit. p.65.

time if their relevance is not reaffirmed and updated or their historical context explained.³⁹

Inherent in all these factors - value, form, function, language and style - is the problem posed by ideology itself. Typically ideology is understood as a set of values and ideas that justify and rationalise the programme that a system has put forward. It is the philosophical and intellectual justification for political rule.⁴⁰ Exploring a party's *Weltanschauung* or its philosophy for explaining the world, thus intrinsically demands an investigation into ideology as a dynamic force impacting on a party's value system. The problem lies in the mix of value statements with prescriptive formulations of party objectives and evaluative or emotional elements. It is the ambiguity of the term 'ideology' which constrains and clouds the analysis and therefore begs closer scrutiny.⁴¹

Ideology is as ambiguous in its definition as the objects it aims to describe. One dictionary⁴² definition gives four possible meanings; it is a body of ideas that reflects the beliefs and interests of a nation or political system; it is an idea or set of ideas that is false, misleading or held for the wrong reasons but is believed with such conviction as to be irrefutable; it is speculation that is imaginary or visionary; and it is the study of the nature and origin of ideas. The term 'ideology' was invented by the French aristocrat and philosopher Destutt de Tracy in 1796. De Tracy sought a 'science of ideas', which he called ideology. In searching for truth other than through religion, he believed that by 'purifying' ideas it was possible to achieve 'objective' truth and 'correct' thought.⁴³ He believed innate ideas did not simply exist but that all thought was derived from sensation.⁴⁴ When Marx 'rediscovered' the phrase, he did not accept that reality could be

³⁹ Wulf Schönbohm, op. cit. p.34.

⁴⁰ Karl Dietrich Bracher cited in; Lewis S. Feuer, *Ideology and the Ideologists*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1975, p.2.

⁴¹ "Als Gedanken- und Sinngebilde haben die Programme zwar auch ihren Platz in der Geistes- und Ideengeschichte, vor allem aber wirken sie als Momente der politischen Realität, als Ideologien in der geschichtlichen-gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, als Vehikel oder Verschleierungen von Interessen. O.K. Flechtheim, *Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg 1973, p.132.

⁴² Collins Dictionary of the English Language, Patrick Hanks (Editor), Collins, London/Glasgow 1985.

⁴³ Daniel Bell, *On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties. The End of Ideology*, The Free Press, New York 1962, p.395.

⁴⁴ David Hawkes, *Ideology*, Routledge, London 1996, p.55.

explained by ideas. In *The German Ideology* (1845-6) Marx, the materialist, believed "existence determined consciousness" not vice versa.⁴⁵ The realm of ideas belonged to the *Überbau* which merely reflected and was dependent on the dominant and decisive underlying social consciousness, determined by the fixed relationships between social classes to the means of production. He believed ideas and matter form a totality, implying that the objective circumstances that people inherit and their ability to impose their subjective will on this material environment in order to alter it, are mutually determinable.⁴⁶ From this he concluded that imaginary representations, or ideology can not only be used to conceal the material interests of a particular class or group in society and present those interests as if they were in the general interest of humanity, but these representations can also exert influence on the way people think and behave. Representation can thus actively determine material conditions. The result is that people are no longer able to differentiate representation from reality. For Marx ideology meant 'false consciousness' and referred to the maintenance of social and economic interests by the middle classes who supported the ideology.

Karl Mannheim's⁴⁷ early study *Ideology and Utopia* rejected the attempt to identify where thinking is distorted in the pursuit of society's interests. Instead he wanted to neutralise the "*totaler Ideologiebegriff*" that had been so critically influenced by Marx. Mannheim made a distinction between ideas which defended the existing order, these he called 'ideological' and ideas which sought to change the existing social order, which he called 'utopian'. It is not so much of interest in this study to make the distinction between an ideology and a utopia. Mannheim's theory is of interest for the suggestions he makes to understand how the values, the ideas and the interests of a particular group, in this case, a political party, are expressed in doctrine. His concern is with the social conditions in which intelligence and thought emerge inquiring into the role of ideas in social change. His theory of the *Sociology of Knowledge* asks us to analyse a person's or a group's 'perspective' if we want to understand their interests, by which he means their mode of conceiving their society as determined by their particular social setting and

⁴⁵ Daniel Bell, op. cit., p.395.

⁴⁶ Hawkes refers to this process as the 'aestheticization' of politics. David Hawkes op. cit. p.93.

⁴⁷ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, Harvest Books Harcourt Brace & Co., New York 1936.

historical experience. It is assumed therefore that social relations influence our thought. Thought is not derived from immanent laws or pure logic but are shaped by real, existential factors that we all experience. This approach provides a very useful and direct way of explaining the CDU's postwar discourse, since it not only forces us to consider the socio-economic conditions which prevailed between 1945 and 1949, but also to consider the impact of Germany's collective history, the experience of National Socialism and the Weimar Republic in particular, but also of earlier political and sectarian factors in determining the nation's 'perspective.' Criteria include analysis of the meaning of concepts being used, the counter-concept phenomenon, the absence of certain concepts, or the identification of dominant models of thought and the level of abstraction. Mannheim suggests tracing single expressions that appear to relate back to a central *Weltanschauung* and to question whether these explicit references, which proceed on an intellectual level, actually correspond to the facts. Using aspects of Mannheim's theory, the analysis of programmatic statements of the CDU would determine firstly the particular perspective dominant in the CDU and secondly to test whether their doctrine was a truthful reflection of that perspective or indeed a deviation from it. In each case it is imperative that political ideas, as expressed in programmes and secondly, their outcome, as displayed through the practical implementation of policy, are both analysed in the context of their own time.

In his pioneering study *Ideologie und Wahrheit*, Theodor Geiger⁴⁸ claimed that it is only possible to describe but not to define ideology. He is able to place ideology within the realm of ideas as opposed to the material or perceptible world, but is reluctant to define it as the opposite to truth since 'truth' is also too vague a term about which to generalise. Ideologies are the result of the distortion of opinion with theory. When a person attempts to present his/her subjective opinion as factual, the statement becomes theoretical or 'objectified.'⁴⁹ It cannot be claimed as a legitimate fact but is a value judgement. In the same way, the CDU can be seen to mix opinion with theory to produce a powerful and convincing cocktail of political rhetoric employed in programmatic statements. Adenauer

⁴⁸ Theodor Geiger, *Ideologie und Wahrheit*, Humboldt Verlag, Stuttgart/Wien 1953.

⁴⁹ "Das Werturteil also objektiviert ein subjektives Verhältnis des Sprechenden zu einem Gegenstand und macht dieses Pseudo-Objektive zum Aussagebestandteil eines Satzes von der Form theoretischer Sachaussagen." Theodor Geiger, op. cit., p.600.

for example made 'anti-materialism' central to his discourse style. Based on his own fear and perception of the threat from the east he 'objectified' materialism into a value judgement on the Soviet system, with persistent repetition of the materialist mantra until it was sufficiently entrenched in society that it no longer appeared an ideological value judgement but more as a pseudo-theory. Geiger⁵⁰ in fact prefers to talk of '*ideologischen Aussagen*' than '*Ideologien*' because he believed that the only truthful part of a value judgment is the statement itself. All we know for sure is that such value judgements have been made and their relationship to truth remains obscure.

Spranger⁵¹ resents the negative association that the word ideology has adopted. He believes that ideology is in essence, *Gedankengebilde*, with which every politician has to contend. Spranger blames the studies of Mannheim and Marx for seeking to expose and unmask what ideologies were meant to be concealing. This tainted history says Spranger has not only served to discredit the meaning of the term, but it has unjustly evaluated it. It has falsely believed that a political ideology is a truthful statement about reality. It has been modelled as a theory and postulated as a science. Ideology, says Spranger, was never intended to be a science. An ideology does not endeavour to explain truth, it merely formulates '*gedankliche Zukunftsentwürfe*' or ideas of what the future *should* be like, but not what that reality actually *is*.⁵² It is part myth and part dogma, which defies any scientific criticism or deconstruction. By attempting to remove the myth one removes the very essence of the ideology. There is no relevance in the question whether the hopes, fears, expectations and desires that make up an ideology are 'true.' Spranger would thus like to reinstate the term ideology, fusing it with positive meaning, to describe these future objectives, but realises the opposition he faces due to the experiences of 20th century ideologies and their totalitarian regimes. What is of real interest to this study however is Spranger's view that *Gedankenmächte*, can and have actively influenced the course of political life. Religious ideologies, he says, have shaped the whole culture of the middle ages. The Law of Nature, the rule of law, the economy,

⁵⁰ Theodor Geiger, op. cit., p.66.

⁵¹ Eduard Spranger, "Wesen und Wert politischer Ideologien," in; Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Jg 2, 1954 p.119.

⁵² "Eine echte Ideologie hat nicht die Kühle einer wissenschaftlichen Theorie, sondern die Wärme eines Glaubens, genauer gesagt; eines Zukunftsglaubens." Eduard Spranger, op. cit. p.123.

human rights and sovereignty of the people similarly were *Gedankenmächte* which influenced the political development of the 19th century. It is at this point that the divisions between political history and the history of ideas are blurred.⁵³

Despite the obvious problematic nature of the term ideology then and the tendency amongst sociologists to criticise its value as an interpretative category, the term has not disappeared from our vocabulary. The need to explain and evaluate a person's enunciations, to discover their value system and possibly concealed interests, persists as a sociological and political issue. The interest still exists in trying to understand the relation between the ideal and the material, and is backed up by the consuming concern in postmodern politics with 'image' and 'perception'. Although methodologically it is difficult to accurately test the equivalence of an ideology's theory with its practice, between a statement and a party's subsequent actions, ideology as a 'media of representation'⁵⁴ was necessary in post-war Germany in order to effect social change.

This study then is not concerned with the idea that ideology is concealing 'truth,' but with the influence of that party's world view on political outcomes. Since programmes rely on ideology and an ideology relies on a programme, this interdependency of programme and ideology suggests the two factors are inseparable. Stammen⁵⁵ also observes that party ideologies and party programmes are interchangeable; "Sehr oft spricht man im Hinblick auf Parteiprogrammen auch von Parteideologien." Narr⁵⁶ adds, "Alle und jede Aussage wird eben, da sie subjekt und situationsgebunden ist, ideologisch." The link between abstract and visionary ideas and political reality cannot be ignored and the potential that a party's ideology possesses to make or change history is of paramount interest in this study. Klaus von Beyme⁵⁷ stated that over the longer term

⁵³ "die angebliche Grenze zwischen rein politischer und Geistesgeschichte wird flüssig. Sogenannte Realitäten werden Gedankenmächte, Gedankenmächte werden realisiert." Eduard Spranger, *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ David Hawkes has referred to an ideology as 'a media of representation,' David Hawkes, *op. cit.*, 1996, p.55.

⁵⁵ Theo Stammen, *op.cit.*, p.31.

⁵⁶ W. D Narr, *op. cit.* p.297.

⁵⁷ Klaus von Beyme, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*, Gower, Aldershot 1985.

only parties based on an ideology have succeeded in establishing themselves.⁵⁸ As this study will now show, the role of ideologically inspired ideas and principles was paramount to the birth of the CDU. Then, once perceptions had been shaped by the CDU's ideology, more direct power political aims could be achieved.

“Never before did political systems and forms of government or politics itself, democratic and dictatorial alike - display such an overwhelming need to justify themselves intellectually ... they require an ‘ideological infrastructure.’ ”⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Even Ralf Dahrendorf and Raymond Aron who spoke of the end of ideology in the post second world war mood of scepticism and antipathy towards politics, later revised their forecasts to talk of the continuation and immortality of ideologies.

⁵⁹ Karl Dietrich Bracher talking of the political climate in 1945. Cited in; L.S Feuer, op. cit., p.2.

Traditions and *Weltanschauung*

1. Political Catholicism before 1918

A study of the origins of German Christian democracy is a study in parallel of Catholicism, Protestantism, socialism, conservatism and liberalism, since all have been important factors in its development. The Christian denominations of Catholicism and Protestantism learnt to assimilate the attributes and aspirations of political ideologies to fulfil partisan, class interests and thus acquire a political identity in the decades following the end of the Napoleonic Wars. By consciously choosing to adopt a political agenda, Catholics in particular sought to gain an equal share of power and influence in society.

The motives for the tactical politicisation of Catholicism in Germany can only be understood by first acknowledging the antipathetic relationship between Protestants and Catholics and the nature of their relationships to the state. The Reformation marks the beginning of Germany's religious divide and the birth of antagonism between the State and its people. The Catholic Church faced a struggle to arrest the absolutist tendencies of the state to intervene in Church affairs and undermine Church freedom and independence, whilst the Protestant Church profited by fortifying its links to state authority and gained legitimation directly from the state. Alienated from political involvement, the Catholic Church increasingly saw the need to express and defend its own political and social interests and protect its independence from state secularism. The Reformation however paradoxically also engendered spiritual and ethnic solidarity amongst Germans of both confessions, and a sense of shared belonging to European Christian culture.⁶⁰ This longing to establish national unity, combined with a parallel insistence on diversity and separate cultural identities is characteristic of the 'German Question' which dominated the development of 19th century Europe and is essential for understanding an interdenominational political movement such as Christian Democracy. The minority status of Catholics was compounded in subsequent centuries by the process

⁶⁰ Ernst Deuerlein, CDU/CSU 1945-1947 Beiträge zur Zeitgeschichte, J.P Bachem, Köln 1957, p.8.

of secularisation that accompanied the Enlightenment, and reached its peak during the 19th century *Kulturkampf* in Bismarck's authoritarian Prussian state. Here the Catholics seriously questioned the democratic integrity of Protestants for voluntarily supporting authoritarian centralism, with the result that Catholics became profoundly sceptical of forging an interdenominational party in the period of political Catholicism between 1870 and 1933. This, together with a genuine moral responsibility felt by the Catholic Church to solve the social inequalities of the capitalist industrial age, was sufficient legitimation for forming an interest group of otherwise politically diverse Catholics. Becker notes;

“Die Legitimation des politischen Gebildes Katholizismus könnte bezweifelt werden, vereinigte es doch in sich auf religiöser, deswegen politisch fragwürdiger Basis, auf eine unorganische Weise heterogene politische und soziale Vorstellungen. Das politische am Katholizismus konnte dann lediglich in der Organisation von Katholiken ganz verschiedener politischer Meinung gesehen werden.”⁶¹

The aim of this chapter is to explore the content of this heterogeneous, but politically and socially inspired Catholic movement in Germany from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It will identify the political, economic and social conditions which initiated and sustained the need for a political form of Catholicism and examine the political intransigence of its Catholic members. It will show where political Catholicism maintained continuity in its doctrine, where it broke with tradition and where it absorbed alternative political influences, most notably liberalism, in an effort to adapt to changing circumstances. This is best illustrated by focusing on the Catholic Centre Party which increasingly abandoned its anti-liberal stance to manoeuvre its policies more closely to those of Bismarck's national, liberal-capitalist order. In the quest to establish equality and social justice for Catholics, a gradual diminishing in the application of Catholic ethics took place in favour of a pragmatic and politicised approach by Catholics, also employing legislative means for introducing social and political reform. By learning to work with, and not in hostile opposition to the state, Catholics hoped to realise their vision of a democratic society. This discussion of the early development of political Catholicism as an historical backdrop and a prelude to Christian democracy, will assist later chapters in demonstrating that the vibrant diversity in political *Weltanschauung*

⁶¹ Winfried Becker in; Geschichte der christlich-demokratischen und christlich-sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland, Günter Rüther (Hrsg.), Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von Nottbeck Köln 1986, p.98.

between liberal, conservative and socialist Catholics remained as marked after 1945 as it had been in the previous century. In fact it was the eclectic spectrum of political interests within the Catholic community that offered the potential for political union with Protestants who held corresponding political convictions. This begs the question, what was it that was different about political Catholicism after 1945 that made the CDU a success, but by its absence had caused the Centre Party between 1870 and 1933 to fail?

Germany's debate between Conservatism and Liberalism in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, is central to the political divide within the Catholic community. Political Catholicism formed along the same liberal - conservative divide that had characterised Germany's conservative and liberal movements in the post 1789 period. Conservatism developed in opposition to the French Revolution⁶² whilst liberalism developed in support of the ideals enshrined in the Revolution. Liberal ideas of the Enlightenment interpreted by Lessing, Kant and Humboldt challenged the Romantic-conservative ideologies of Adam Müller, Carl Ludwig von Haller and Friedrich Julius Stahl.⁶³ Conservatives held on to the 18th century romanticist view of society in which monarchy and Church held the authority. They felt threatened by the views of the Enlightenment - symbolised by the French Revolution and Germany's revolution in 1848 - claiming that the new spirit of rational individualism was the cause of social disruption. They criticised political liberalism for interpreting a free, secular society as a state polity, where individual freedom was inscribed in a "contrat social" binding both citizen and state to rights and obligations. Romantics repudiated these principles of freedom of the French Revolution, claiming people were not mechanistically equal, but each member of society had a different function to fulfil. Individual freedom was thus gained by each individual's own role and responsibility within the community whatever their vocation might be, based on the belief that by contributing to the principle of mutual exchange and accepting our reliance on interdependency in society, we achieve personal and individual satisfaction. The Romantic-Conservatives argued that we are by nature free,

⁶² Adalbertin Wahl, "Beiträge zur deutschen Parteiengeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert" in; *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 104, Oldenbourg Verlag, München/Berlin 1910, p.547 (537-594).

⁶³ Friedrich Julius Stahl was one of the most important of conservative theoreticians. He believed the state derived its origin from God and the state must therefore protect Christianity and the Christian Church. See Helga Grebing, *Geschichte der deutschen Parteien*, Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden 1962, p.47. Also see comments in chapter 2 of this study.

and this innate freedom is not enhanced or extended by the compulsion to enter into a political contract with the State. Conservatives hoped to counteract the secular forces of the Enlightenment by reinforcing the core values of Christianity, that had once brought solidarity and cohesion during the Middle Ages. The political thought of Novalis, one of the most important thinkers among the early Romantics, best exemplifies the conservative mood. Novalis was stimulated by the discussions about the French Revolution and romanticised about nobility, who, he believed, was an important "moral faculty" in the state and who embodied the conservative principle of tradition. In his 1799 essay *Die Christenheit oder Europa*, Novalis called for Christianity to be revived and enforced in the face of growing secularism and dreamed of a united Europe under the spiritual leadership of the Catholic Church. He broadly acquainted Catholicism with allegiance to the monarchy and Protestantism with democracy.⁶⁴ But in pursuit of political ambition the Protestants, Novalis argued, had;

"...trennten das Untrennbare, theilten die untheilbare Kirche und rissen sich frevelnd aus dem allgemeinen christlichen Verein, durch welchen und in welchen allein die ächte, dauernde Geburt möglich war."⁶⁵

The Catholic Church, defiant in its support of authoritarian and conservative structures would however learn to apply the liberal principles of freedom and tolerance as weapons in its own struggle against the power of the state. Political Catholicism therefore derived its concept of freedom directly from the ideals of the French Revolution, but altered the liberal meaning of 'freedom of the individual' to a Christian, biblical interpretation of social solidarity.⁶⁶

In contrast to the early religiosity that characterised the Catholic movement, it was not until the revolution in 1848 that Catholics began to differentiate between a cultural and a

⁶⁴ Reinhold Aris, *History of Political Thought in Germany from 1789 to 1815*, Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London 1965, p.279. Aris notes that the Romantics had originally been brought up as Protestants but rebelled against their faith as they saw the impact it was having on the political situation in Europe and many converted to Catholicism.

⁶⁵ Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), "Die Christenheit oder Europa." Ein Fragment in; Paul Michael Lützeler (Hrsg), *Hoffnung Europa. Deutsche Essays von Novalis bis Enzensberger*, S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1994.

⁶⁶ Winfried Becker, *Geschichte .. op. cit.*, p.108.

political agenda and to perceive social issues in a political context.⁶⁷ In 1848 it seemed as if the entire party system would also develop into a bipolar⁶⁸ structure consistent with the conservative-liberal fronts in the French Revolution. Conservatism and Liberalism were the basic orientations for the political spectrum, based on whether support was shown for the monarchy or for a republican form of government, or according to the more simple definition, that the liberal seeks to change the existing order, whilst the conservative seeks to maintain it.⁶⁹ Yet it transpired that a multiple party system was in fact a more realistic response to the many different opinions which emerged *within* the Catholics' conservative and liberal camps. A range of political interests across the party political spectrum satisfactorily addressed the diversity of political Catholicism. The socialist Catholics for example could offer an alternative to Social Democracy, which after the 1848 publication of the Communist Manifesto, began to imbue socialist ideas with political clout. By 1848 political Catholic activity began in the form of *Vereine* (a form of legion, society or association often industry linked) and soon Germany's political spectrum became subdivided into moderate liberalism, conservatism, political Catholicism, the democratic movement and the labour or workers' movement. Catholics showed support for all political persuasions, emphasising their religious confession only when the Church was directly implicated in political decisions or when the status of Catholics appeared to be in jeopardy.⁷⁰ This development shows that conservatism and liberalism originated as cultural-religious definitions in Germany, before maturing into specific political expressions.⁷¹ The study will reveal that this primary allegiance to quasi-religious *Weltanschauung* cuts across the entire political divide of Catholics and Protestants.

⁶⁷ Hans Maier, *Politischer Katholizismus, sozialer Katholizismus, christliche Demokratie*, Pesch-Haus Verlag, München, 1962, p.11.

⁶⁸ Neumann suggests that initially it seemed as though Germany would also develop into a two party political system of Liberals and Conservatives, as in England and the USA. Sigmund Neumann, *Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1973, p.20.

⁶⁹ This classification is provided by Ludwig Bergsträsser, *op. cit.* p.16.

⁷⁰ As arose during the territorial issue of a *grossdeutsche* and *kleindeutsche* solution to the German Question. Karl Rohe, "Entwicklungen der politischen Parteien und Parteiensysteme in Deutschland bis zum Jahre 1933," in; O.W Gabriel/O.Niedermayer/R. Stöss (Hrsg.). *Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland*, Bonn 1997. p.44.

⁷¹ "Liberalismus und Konservatismus, die nun nicht nur in einem formalen Sinne um Wandel oder Wahrung gegebener Verhältnisse kämpften, sondern als eine Frontenbildung, die auf menschliche Grundgegensätze zurückging, geradezu Idealtypen eines Parteienschemas zu repräsentieren schienen." Sigmund Neumann, *Die Deutschen Parteien*, *op.cit.*, p.15.

The expression of a political form of Catholicism can only be properly examined in connection with the role of Catholic Social Teaching, which places society as its primary object and aim. The 'teaching' aspect refers to the responsibility of the Catholic Church as a whole, in matters relating to social welfare, whilst the word 'Social' is the dominant and most pervasive definition of the entire concept. Catholic Social Teaching was the most important underlying theory by which political Catholicism took its reference, and many political Catholics often attempted to sanction their political actions with statements from the papal encyclicals.⁷² A Catholic party may indeed find itself torn between the eternal and universal demands of the Catholic doctrine, and the temporal interests of the state. It effectively has two programmes.

"Catholic Social Teaching is a form of social moral authority. It does not provide a direct political or social programme but it does insist that the economic and social order cannot be totally separate from the moral order."⁷³

It thus places moral demands on society, but does not purport to be a programme, which can be used for political action.⁷⁴ Catholic Social Teaching, moreover, openly stated that Catholics can operate within any given political system, whether it is a monarchy or a republic, provided the independence of the Church was guaranteed.

Although a general form of Catholic social doctrine can be traced to the 15th century,⁷⁵ by the 19th century the principles of Catholic Social Teaching became a force for

⁷² Winfried Becker, "Die Zentrumpartei und die Enzyklika Rerum Novarum," in; W. Besch/H.L. Cox W, M. Janssen, N. Panter, Rheinische Vierteljahresblätter (Sonderdruck), Bouvier Verlag, Bonn 1992, p.263.

The 1891 papal encyclical Rerum Novarum begins with an attack on the devastating political changes brought about by the French Revolution which now threatened social stability. "Der Geist der Neuerung, welcher seit langem durch die Völker geht, mußte, nachdem er auf dem politischen Gebiet seine verderblichen Wirkungen entfaltet hatte, folgerichtig auch das volkswirtschaftliche Gebiet ergreifen."

⁷³ Nicolas Coote, Catholic Social Teaching, Social Policy and Administration, Vol.23, No. 2, 1989, p.150.

⁷⁴ The Centre Party later exercised caution in quoting the papal encyclicals in connection with its political programme for fear that it would be accused of comparing the Pope's authority with that of the Kaiser.

⁷⁵ Godehard Lindgens, "Die politischen Implikationen der katholischen Soziallehre" in; Iring Fetscher und Herfried Münkler (Hrsg.), Pipers Handbuch der politischen Ideen, Neuzeit: Vom Zeitalter des Imperialismus bis zu den neuen sozialen Bewegungen, Band 5, Piper, München/Zürich 1993, p.84.

binding politically diverse Catholics. Catholic Social Teaching was concerned with the conflicts surrounding state and society, the question of Catholicism's political organisation and the question of social justice. Catholic Social Teaching tackled the "Social Question" in an effort to improve the living and working conditions of the proletariat during Germany's industrial revolution. It unequivocally opposed capitalism and individualism, which it claimed was inherent in liberalism and so sought to mitigate the excesses of capitalist-individualism in the economic and social spheres through social legislation. Yet the mixed political heritage and socio-economic status of Catholics held significant implications for the political representation of conservative and liberal philosophies. Differing interpretations of 'individualism' or 'liberalism' meant that in the practical application of Catholic teaching, opposition to capitalism was often modified.⁷⁶ Conservative Catholic views differed from liberal, Catholic views with regard to the role of the Church in the State and to the State's responsibility for social welfare and the freedom of its individuals. There were those who embraced socialist reform measures, those who favoured a monarchy, others a republic, those who welcomed state intervention measures and those who resisted any involvement with the state. Although the most progressive of solutions were often found where attempts at a synthesis of divergent political thinking were made, the political climate created by Bismarck's regime was not conducive to their implementation.

E. R Huber's⁷⁷ history of the constitution, divides the political Catholic movement into three groups; the conservative Catholics represented by the Munich circle and who supported an organised monarchy; the liberal Catholics of the Rhineland who favoured a constitutional monarchy and constitutional rights for Catholics, as defended by the brothers August and Peter Reichensperger; and thirdly - with some overlap - the Catholic social movement, characterised by figures such as Wilhelm Emmanuel von Ketteler. These early Catholic conservatives, Catholic liberals and Catholic social reformers became the inspiration for a vibrant Catholic movement. Despite post First

⁷⁶ "Catholic social ethics are always antithetical to those of capitalism. It may none the less come about that here and there a less rigorous interpretation of this or that point may have favoured a mental trend towards capitalism." Amintore Fanfani, *Catholicism, Protestantism and Capitalism*, Sheed & Ward, London 1935, p.152.

⁷⁷ E.R Huber, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789*, Band 2, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1960, (p.345-370).

World War reforms, political Catholicism after 1918 displayed a remarkable pattern of continuity through the Romantic-Conservatives, the more liberal Solidarists and the reformist group of Christian Socialists. With these three main strands in mind, the development can be divided into six periods,⁷⁸ that begin in the 1840s and culminate in 1933. The first phase which unfolded from the 1840s through to the 1860s was a conservative response from the Catholic Church to the working classes who sought protection from the adverse effects of capitalism and industrialisation. Phase two from the late 1860s to the early 1880s covers the birth of interdenominational Christian social associations and their social reform plans, but also of the first real political party, the Centre Party, which initiated attacks on social democracy and bourgeois liberalism. The third phase from the mid 1880s to the end of the century was characterised by Catholic Workers' Associations⁷⁹ and a growing indictment of socialism. From 1900-1918 - the fourth phase, the Christian trade unions and the '*Volksverein für ein katholisches Deutschland*' were the dominant forces of Catholic political activity, which triggered the fifth phase between 1918 and 1928 - a commitment towards democratic reforms. Finally, phase six, from 1928 to 1933, sees the depoliticisation of social and political Catholicism, as the Centre Party tried unsuccessfully to tame Hitler's politics but also revealed attempts by a number of Catholic groups to bring National Socialist views in line with their own. Whilst it may not necessarily be correct to refer to all earlier initiatives as 'political Catholicism' they may be seen as representative of the Catholic reaction to the challenges of Modernity and "must be seen as the beginning of the development of a Catholic political party."⁸⁰ These groups succeeded in provoking the debate on the conflict of modernism and prompted German Catholicism to decide how it should best respond to the social inequalities thrown up by the industrial revolution. In the remainder of this section the study will examine the six periods of political Catholicism.

⁷⁸ This division is based on the phases suggested by J. Stegmann (1969) and Franz Focker (1978).

⁷⁹ Ketteler's Workers' Association, founded in Mainz in 1872, became the first mass political organisation of political Catholics and attracted the largest membership of any political organisation. Jonathan Sperber, *Popular Catholicism in 19th Century Germany*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1984, p.211.

⁸⁰ Wilhelm Mommsen (Hrsg.), *Deutsche Parteiprogramme* (Deutsches Handbuch der Politik Band 1), München 1960, p.191.

1840s-1860s

True to conservative tradition, the early conservative Catholics sought to defend the authority of throne and altar and hold on to established traditions of a corporative society or '*ständische Gebundenheit*', which had characterised the middle ages. A society arranged according to *Stände* or estates, is best described as a pre-capitalist social order or social arrangement in which the rights of an upper class and a lower, largely agricultural class are divided according to their status as aristocratic, free or unfree. Based on a system of manorial rights and lineage, each individual belonged to a particular *Stand*, or estate, which was accepted as both permanent and pervasive of all aspects of life. Each and every individual gained their status in society by virtue of their membership of a *Stand* and their valued contribution to its wealth and cohesion. The estate idea further relies on a class or group of classes that is selected as eligible for leadership, and so conflicts with the liberal idea of self-governing of the people, where all classes and members of society are invited to participate.⁸¹ The Bavarian Catholics, characteristically anti-liberal, were particularly in favour of a monarchy. Figures such as Josef von Görres, spokesman for the Catholic Church and supporter of confessional unity⁸², Franz von Baader and other Catholic conservatives in the Munich Circle, argued that the relationship between state and society encompassed more than the principle of reason, as political liberalism maintained. A liberal view of society, they argued, failed to understand the individual as a metaphysical being. This romanticist strand of social critique mirrored the views of French traditionalism, voiced by figures such as Gustav de Failly and the French parliamentarian Abbé Félicité Robert de Lamennais, whose ideas had a significant influence on the development of modern German Catholicism.

The Rhenish Catholics, represented by August and Peter Reichensperger, favoured a constitutional monarchy, but were also more liberal in their political-economic outlook and in favour of limiting monarchical powers, to allow more democratic, constitutional

⁸¹ Ludwig Bergsträsser, op. cit., p.48.

⁸² The Rhineland Romanticist Josef Görres believed strongly in the organic concept of the state and, like Novalis, ascribed the monarch a symbolic role. His 1816 essay 'Germany and the Revolution' philosophically summarises his vision of liberal conservatism and the need for German unity. Conflict with the Prussian government over the issue of German unity and frustration with an apolitical middle class caused him to abandon his campaign and by the 1820s retreated to studying the history of mysticism.

rights to be passed to the people. This liberal strand of Catholics firmly believed that a reconciliation could be reached between Christianity and democracy, since state and society, they argued, cannot coexist without religion, and a democracy could only be established on the basis of the moral authority provided by the Church. The answer to social inequality, they claimed, could be found in the moral code of Christian religion. The responsibility for social issues should therefore come from the Church and Christianity rather than from the state. The Reichenspergers' initiative was a subtle attempt at reconciling the Catholic Church with the principles of the French Revolution. De Lamennais also sought to forge links between conservative Catholicism and liberalism. He envisaged that the Catholic Church was the natural leader for managing the new social and political order and for guiding the masses towards democracy. The book by the Bishop of Mainz, Emmanuel von Ketteler, '*Die Katholiken im Deutschen Reiche*'⁸³ and subtitled 'A draft for a political programme, also investigated the possibility of closer understanding between the Catholic Church and the Prussian state and between Catholics and Protestants in general. Ketteler took a broad, holistic view of an individual's place in society incorporating all aspects of their political, economic, religious and social interaction. Regrettably Ketteler's social reform initiatives were ignored by the middle classes, who became too preoccupied with issues of national unification in the second half of the 19th century and paid scant regard to social issues. Both Lamennais and Ketteler and other Catholic liberals were condemned by Pope Gregor XVI and his successor Pius IX for their apparent promotion of liberal and democratic ideas. Papal authority expressed vehement opposition to industrial progress, to liberalism and enlightened political education. Capitalism was labelled as a direct

⁸³ W. E v. Ketteler, *Die Katholiken im Deutschen Reiche, Entwurf zu einem politischen Programm, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe. Schriftliche Aufsätze und Reden 1871-1877. Abteilung 1, Band 4.* Hrsg. Erwin Iserloh, V. Hase & Koehler Verlag, Mainz 1977. p.186-258. The introduction to Ketteler's 13 point programme has prophetic resonance; "Ich hoffe daher, daß ein solches katholisches Programm das Programm aller gläubigen Christen und aller rechtlich denkenden Menschen in Deutschland werden kann.... Wenn ich mich zunächst an die Katholiken wende, so geschieht es hauptsächlich aus dem Grunde, weil die Mißverständnisse zwischen uns und den bekennnistreuen Protestanten augenblicklich noch viel zu groß sind, um an eine politische Vereinigung zu denken. Vielleicht wird die gemeinschaftliche Not dieses Resultat herbeiführen. Eine katholische Partei ist deshalb auch nur vorübergehend notwendig." See also Adolf M. Birke, "Bischof Kettelers Kritik am deutschen Liberalismus," in: Martin Schmidt/Georg Schwaiger (Hrsg.), *Kirchen und Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1976.

extension of the liberalist order and therefore fundamentally incompatible with Catholic ethics.⁸⁴

Ketteler's programme for social reform was even categorised by the term "Christian liberalism."⁸⁵ In his 1862 pamphlet '*Freiheit, Autorität und Kirche*,' Ketteler openly states that the words *Aufklärung, Fortschritt, Freiheit, Brüderlichkeit* and *Gleichheit*, contained a superior, godly and heavenly meaning. Like de Lamennais and other liberal Catholics, Ketteler understood the need for the Church to establish a dialogue with liberalism and socialism, if it was to respond to modern society and encouraged conservative Catholics to reassess their understanding of the term liberalism;

"Wer möchte nicht liberal sein in der eigentlichen Bedeutung des Wortes? Es bedeutet ja: freigiebig sein; billig sein; vorurteilslos sein; freisinnig sein; nach wahrer Freiheit streben."⁸⁶

Ketteler could not hope to challenge entrenched Catholic beliefs that associated socialism with atheism and, later, liberalism with Bismarck's *Kulturkampf*, yet Catholics did appear to be increasingly willing to accept a liberal economic order, once they found themselves benefiting directly from it. Earlier Catholic demands for the overthrow of the entire capitalist system waned, to be replaced by a milder more pragmatic criticism of existing social policy, and support for labour and social welfare legislation. In a speech in 1869, Ketteler encouraged the new wave of liberal thinking in Catholic circles, when for the first time he advocated; "die unbedingte Freiheit auf allen Gebieten der

⁸⁴ "The capitalist does not doubt the lawfulness of any act that fully corresponds to what he considers the exigencies of human reason. The Catholic order is a supernatural order, the capitalist order is a rational order in the sense of the Enlightenment." Amintore Fanfani, op. cit. p.143.

⁸⁵ Josef Stegmann in Wilfried Gottschalch/Friedrich Karrenberg/Franz Josef Stegmann. Helga Grebing (Hrsg.), *Geschichte der sozialen Ideen in Deutschland*. Deutsches Handbuch der Politik. Günter Olzog Verlag. München-Wien 1969, p.376.

⁸⁶ Ketteler cited in Godehard Lindgens, op.cit. p. . Whilst the Pius Verein in Mainz did not succeed in becoming a part of the National Assembly in 1848, it produced a political manifesto which was predominantly liberal in its outlook and contained references to social injustice. See Hans Harnop, Albert Baumhauer, Mitarbeit Joseph Hammer, *Dokumente zur christlichen Demokratie, Deutschland, Österreich, Schweiz*. Eichholz 1969. p.10f. Karl Rohe also adds that few links existed between the political associations and the parties in the Frankfurt Assembly. "Zwischen dem politischen Vereinswesen im Lande und den Fraktionen in der Paulskirche bestand keine direkte Entsprechung, zumeist sogar nur ein sehr lockerer Zusammenhang." Karl Rohe, "Entwicklungen .." in O.W Gabriel/O.Niedermayer/R.Stöss (Hrsg.), *Parteiendemokratie ...* op. cit. p.45.

Volkswirtschaft.”⁸⁷ This marked an historical watershed in the social and economic aims of political Catholicism. Instead of campaigning for the end of capitalism, liberal Catholics agreed to carry out modifications to the system where necessary, to ensure that the workers also benefited from capitalism’s opportunities.

Late 1860s- Early 1880s

After Prussia’s victory over Austria in 1866, Emmanuel von Ketteler and other prominent Catholics, who continued to campaign for equal social rights for Catholics, feared that Catholics were now even more at risk of becoming a minority in Protestant dominated Prussia. Bismarck, with backing from a conservative, Protestant majority had succeeded in pushing through a *kleindeutsche* solution to the German question, angering and alienating many German Catholics who had preferred a *grossdeutsche* solution to include Catholic Austria. Prussia’s subsequent annexation of many south German states, also meant that the Catholic communities there embarked on a long struggle to retain the independence of their Church and schools. Catholic minority status in Prussia became a significant motive for the rise of the Christian Social Unions in the 1860s, but there was also a general incentive among Christians, in particular those Catholics in regions where they did not suffer minority status, such as Bavaria, to emphasise shared Christian unity, as a bulwark against the secular forces of liberalism.⁸⁸ They maintained that the State should be run according to the principles of Christian Natural Law, which prescribed a democratic state form.

Speaking as a Christian lay preacher at a Christian Social Association in Berne, Prof. Dr. Carl Hilty⁸⁹ disagreed with the motives driving the Christian Social movement.

⁸⁷ Speech in Offenbach at the Liebfrauenheide, cited in Josef Stegmann, op. cit. p.383.

⁸⁸ The explanation given in 1945 that it had been Germany’s fall from Christianity that caused national socialism is reminiscent of the views of Kettler who in his advent sermon in 1848 says “die sozialen Zustände [sind] zum grossen Teile als eine notwendige Folge des Abfalls von Christus.. der Abfall vom Christentum habe das Verderben über uns gebracht, die Rückkehr zum Christentum könne nur helfen”. W.E von Ketteler cited in Wilfried Gottschalch/Friedrich Karrenberg/Franz Josef Stegmann, op. cit., p.344.

⁸⁹ Prof. Carl Hilty was born in Switzerland in 1833 and was a professor of law in Berne from 1874. He played an active role in public life, becoming a member of the National Council in 1890, chief auditor of the army and Switzerland’s first representative at the new International Court of Arbitration in The Hague. His two major works ‘Glück’ and ‘Was ist Glaube?’ which appeared around the turn of the century had a significant impact on Konrad Adenauer, who after his studies had suffered a crisis of religion, in which he began to question his own faith. Hilty’s pragmatic, undogmatic Christian faith, his principles and practices are reflected in Adenauer’s later life and in particular in his treatment of the

Christianity, he said, was not suitable as a political programme and questioned why the name Christian Social was being used as a party name. The only way to solve the Social Question, he argued, was through the individual and their religion but not by virtue of their political association to a Christian socialist party whose aims were covertly more revolutionary than Christian;

“Die Schwierigkeit der socialen Frage liegt auch nicht darin, daß man nicht weiß, wo es unmittelbar und zunächst fehlt, sondern die Einen verstehen unter Sozialpolitik und socialer Demokratie eine so große Umänderung aller bestehenden Verhältnisse, daß sie auch ganz entschlossen ihn herbeiführen, wenn es auf gütlichem Wege, mit dem Stimmzettel, nicht geht.”⁹⁰

The Church-led Christian social associations finally disbanded under pressure from within the Catholic communities to unify more closely in the face of the *Kulturkampf*.⁹¹

By 1870 the Centre Party was founded to represent the political interests and concerns of Catholics of both conservative and liberal persuasion. Like its name, the Centre Party saw its role as an honest broker between left and right wing politics, a party to engender harmony and moderation. Rainer Barzel⁹² described the Centre Party's motives as the rejection of an extreme and doctrinaire position;

“Das politische Wollen der Partei ist weder totalitär, noch radikal, einseitig oder ideokratisch.”

One year after its foundation, the Centre Party was elected to join the first Reichstag in the Kaiser's new German Reich. It did not postulate itself as an exclusively Catholic party, but as the guardian of Christian influence in the national state and a protector of freedom for all confessions.⁹³ Its first programme, the Soest programme of 1870 outlined

Christian socialists in his own political party. See Hans-Peter Schwarz. Adenauer. Der Aufstieg 1876-1952. DVA, Stuttgart 1986, p.110ff.

⁹⁰ Prof Carl Hilty, Einige Gedanken über die Gründung christlich-socialer Vereine, Verlag von U. Siebert, Bern 1896, p.32.

⁹¹ Wolfgang Schroeder, Katholizismus und Einheitsgewerkschaften. Der Streit um den DGB und der Niedergang des Sozialkatholizismus in der Bundesrepublik bis 1960, J.H.W Dietz, Bonn 1992, p.40.

⁹² Rainer Barzel, Die Geistigen Grundlagen der Politischen Parteien, Goetz Schwippert, Bonn 1947, p.145.

⁹³ Karl Buchheim, Geschichte der christlichen Parteien in Deutschland, Kösel, München 1953, p.205.

only nine directives and sufficed as a party programme for almost fifty years!⁹⁴ The Soest programme was committed to natural law, declared inviolable respect for human rights and equality in class and religion. It was national in its outlook and supportive of the State, (its central party organ carried the patriotic title "Germania") yet emphasised the constitutional nature of its programme as a committed *Verfassungspartei*. The Reichstag deputy, Carl Bachem confirms that the development of its profile as a political party was essential, since it would not have survived on exclusively Church principles for very long.⁹⁵ Its politics however were soon criticised for opposing the state, and for only representing Catholics and not the whole nation, as parallel liberal and conservative parties could claim. The Centre was thus charged for contributing to more pluralism and division in society and not to furthering national unity. It was true that the Centre's declared principal objective of its 1870 election campaign, was to protect the freedom of the Catholic Church;

"Manche Zeichen der Zeit ...deuten auf Angriffsversuche gegen die kirchliche Freiheit. Es gilt daher, die verfassungsmäßig anerkannte Selbstständigkeit der Kirche unversehrt zu erhalten."⁹⁶

Catholics in the Centre also strove to provide a counterweight to liberal Protestant hegemony, and strongly opposed the close relation between the Protestant Church and the State. Yet the Centre Party's opposition to Bismarck's Protestant state was fuelled not only by its confessional allegiance to Catholicism or to maintain Church independence, but was the consequence of the party's sociological structure.⁹⁷ Its representatives were working class factory workers, clerical employees and agricultural labourers, hostile to capitalism and the nationalist, bourgeois middle classes. The party was thus held by the nature of its constituency to be libertarian, constitutionally

⁹⁴ The next programme to be produced after the Soest 1870 programme was in 1922. This contained vague and non-committal formulations but maintained its middle ground. See Sigmund Neumann, *Modern Political Parties. Approachs to Comparative Politics*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1956, p.358.

⁹⁵ Carl Bachem cited in Rainer Barzel, *Die Geistigen Grundlagen...* op. cit., p.146.

⁹⁶ Soest Wahlprogramm, June 1870, cited in Wilhelm Mommsen, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme...* op. cit., p.212ff.

⁹⁷ Sigmund Neumann, *Die Deutschen Parteien*, op. cit., p.39.

conservative, socially meliorative and pragmatic.⁹⁸ This social heterogeneity would also become the source of the party's identity crisis during Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* which brought anti-Catholic legislation and the widespread persecution of Catholics. Guaranteed support from the Church and other clerical organisations also meant that the Centre was not compelled to act as a fully fledged political organisation responsible to party members, with party leaders, conferences and manifestos until as late as 1911 when it finally developed as a unified organisation.⁹⁹

In 1872 the Centre Party leader, Ludwig Windthorst, emphasised that the party welcomed all Christian confessions on the condition that they agree to the principles laid out in its programme. Bismarck and the Liberals were not convinced and continued to disapprove of a confessional party in their political assembly. Even Windthorst's attempts to encourage Evangelical representatives into the party, were undermined by Bismarck's contempt for the Centre.¹⁰⁰ Many other disgruntled groups, including Social Democrats, who opposed the foundation of Bismarck's Reich or who feared a spread of his *Kulturkampf* to all confessions,¹⁰¹ began to see the Centre Party as an ideal forum for expressing their resistance and protest. This further inflamed Bismarck's hatred towards the Centre Party (in his '*Gedanken und Erinnerungen*' Bismarck calls the Centre Party 'an enemy of the state') causing him to predict that a coalition of the Centre and the Social Democrats would ensue, should the Kaiserreich collapse. The statement demonstrates that not only were the SPD and the Centre Party seen as compatible, but that the Kaisereich's existence was not compatible with either.¹⁰² The fact that both the Centre Party and the Social Democrats emerged as parties in clear opposition to Bismarck's state gave both parties a point of communality in joint coalition and goes

⁹⁸ Noel D Cary, *The Path to Christian Democracy. German Catholics and the Party System from Windthorst to Adenauer*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, (Massachusetts) London (England) 1996, p.4.

⁹⁹ Hans Harnop, Albert Baumhauer, Mitarbeit Joseph Hammer. op. cit. p.12.

¹⁰⁰ Helga Grebing, *Geschichte der deutschen Parteien* op. cit., p.83.

¹⁰¹ The Altkonservativen's fear that the *Kulturkampf* could spread to Protestant Church was reflected in their 1872 programme. Wolfgang Treue, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1954*, Musterschmidt Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Göttingen 1954, p.16.

¹⁰² This observation was noted by Dr Anthony Glees, Department of Government, Brunel University.

some way to correcting the widespread belief that they were hostile and incompatible partners.¹⁰³

Mounting hostility towards the Centre Party finally resulted in Bismarck drafting the 1873 *Kulturkampf* legislation which undermined the freedom of the Catholic Church. The accusation that the Centre had been attempting to mobilise Catholic forces against the state in a 'national provocation' unwittingly altered how the Centre party began to see themselves. They identified themselves more forcibly as a Catholic *Volkspartei*, and Catholic members began to show a deeper identification with the Catholic *Weltanschauung* than expressing their usual national patriotism and loyalty to state authority.¹⁰⁴ Catholic emancipation increasingly sought to create its own Catholic *Sonderwelt* in place of campaigning to improve the social and political integration of Catholics.¹⁰⁵ Despite its ongoing internal identity crisis, the Centre became the second largest party in the 1874 Reichstag elections, leaving Bismarck no choice but to scale down his attacks on the party, to declare an end to the *Kulturkampf* and to promise to revise Church and cultural policy legislation. With time, growing economic success and national political consolidation, also made the Reich appear more attractive to the Centre Party, and members gradually urged Windthorst to abandon the party's hostility and seek compromise and closer understanding with state authority. Observing the potential for Germany to develop from an agrarian to an industrial state, Windthorst gradually sought to remove Catholics from their isolated and economically retarded position and introduce them to the wider forum of the Reich's politics, whilst also aiming to overcome the division between Protestants and Catholics. As Windthorst became more favourable to co-operation with Bismarck's government and to supporting his reforms, this in turn brought Bismarck's recognition for many of the Centre's policy recommendations. Attitudes towards liberalism among the Catholic community were more positive but still ambiguous, which reflected different economic interests between the landed, property and agricultural groups on the one hand and the small business and manufacturing communities on the other. This diversity continued to pose a difficult dilemma for the

¹⁰³ Sigmund Neumann, *Die Deutschen Parteien*, op. cit. p.38.

¹⁰⁴ Helga Grebing op.cit., p.84.

¹⁰⁵ Wolfgang Schröder, op. cit., 1992. p.37.

party over the nature of its political representation. The large property owners and farmers in particular urged the Centre Party to endorse Bismarck's customs legislation for example, as a way of protecting their economic interests, whilst an increasing number of successful Catholic businesses in Germany's burgeoning industrial revolution found the policies of the Reich in tune with their own interests. Discrepancies also existed in Catholics' attitudes towards the role of the state. Aristocratic Catholics favoured the authoritarian-monarchical structure of the Prussian state whilst the Catholic *Bürgertum* or middle classes were more democratic in their thinking.

This right-wing shift of many Catholic groups, meant that the Centre had left a vacuum for a truly representative workers' body which represented the social concerns of the Catholic proletariat and could fight the SPD's socialism on equal terms. The rise of the Catholic Workers' Associations from around 1884, and later of the Christian trade unions, was a direct response to the growing neglect by the Centre Party of social issues. Although the Centre first deployed the Workers' Associations as a useful aid in mobilising proletarian support during the elections, the Associations soon withdrew their support from the Centre Party once they felt that their specific interests were not being represented.¹⁰⁶

On the sensitive issue of social legislation, Catholicism, both within the Centre Party and within the Catholic community as a whole, found itself divided over the extent to which it felt the state should intervene to solve social inequalities and to what degree these should be resolved by individual economic initiatives. Sufficient Centre Party members voted for a number of state controlled social measures to rival the conservative members of the party who were courting favour with the nationalist state. The Christian Social Associations in the Rhineland-Westphalia industrial regions for example were for state intervention, as were the representatives of the Association for Social Policy who believed in the primacy of political and ethical goals above pure economic advantage and in the need for an effective social policy programme. They hoped to introduce their own social initiatives via state legislation and, most importantly, they believed that it was compatible to establish trade unions *within* the existing liberal economic order.¹⁰⁷ They

¹⁰⁶ Wolfgang Schröder, op. cit., p.41.

¹⁰⁷ Josef Stegmann, op. cit., p.402.

saw trade unions and cartel associations as an effective way of binding market forces into an organisational framework and can therefore be seen as early social marketeers.

By the end of the 1870s Bismarck's protectionist economy nevertheless continued to enjoy support from the industrialist community in the Centre Party, whose contribution was welcomed during the economic boom at the turn of the 19th century. A core number of ardent Catholic traditionalists such as the Centre Party MP, Graf von Galen, who later became the Centre's social policy spokesman in the Reichstag, invoked memories of the solidarity that had existed among members of the former guild associations which he maintained could provide the answer to the current individual isolation suffered by the egalitarian nature of the industrial age, and offer a fairer alternative to the capitalist model.¹⁰⁸ The social conservative Karl Freiherr von Vogelsang also kept up protests into the 1870s and 1880s at the growing Catholic acceptance of the existing liberal order;

“Das kapitalistische Wirtschafts- und Sozialsystem, welches jetzt die ganze zivilisierte Welt absolut beherrscht, heute jedoch den Kulminationspunkt seiner Herrschaft bereits überschritten hat und dem Untergange zueilt, steht in einem unversöhnlichen Widerspruch zu der gesamten ethischen Veranlagung des Christentums. Ein dauerndes Nebeneinander beider entgegengesetzter Systeme ist unmöglich.”¹⁰⁹

Vogelsang became unique in his blatant condemnation of liberalism, individualism and capitalism, but by 1890 such anti-capitalist sentiments among Catholics were increasingly suppressed. Extremist views of the kind held by Vogelsang were almost entirely discounted in favour of a more pragmatic social programme.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ It followed that the individual attention characteristic of a guild system could also be applied to the individual's position in society and their relation to the state. This line of thinking would also explain preferences in the Centre for self-administration and autonomy in regional political affairs, namely towards a federal organisation of the state and which was in contrast to the centralised Prussian state that developed in 19th century Germany. In its very first programme after its 1871 election into the German parliament the party had called for a maintenance of Germany as a Bundesstaat and opposes all attempts to change the federal structure of the constitution. The Centre's initial defence of the federal state also gradually receded as the party gained more power and influence in moulding Bismarck's constitution.

¹⁰⁹ K. F von Vogelsang cited in Josef Stegmann, op. cit., p.388.

¹¹⁰ Winfried Becker, Die Zentrumsparthei.. op. cit., p.273.

1880s - 1900

By the mid to late 1880s the Centre Party had manoeuvred itself into the position of the most influential conservative party in parliament, with its focus on maintaining the status quo in Germany's social and political order. It had not completely removed the danger of discrimination by Bismarck's liberal, conservative supporters however, as the experience of the *Kulturkampf* had made many Catholics inherently suspicious of potential maltreatment by the state and cautious about state intervention in social issues. The central issue still to be decided by Catholics, of all socio-economic classes, was whether to continue to campaign for root and branch social reform and the establishment of a new social and economic order, or whether they would attempt to bring about change from *within* the existing economic system, by introducing social legislation and by limiting only the worst excesses of the liberal-capitalist society. It was not easy for those Catholics who had traditionally rejected economic liberalism and any moves to resolve the Social Question by reconciliation with the capitalist system. The Catholic Church had viewed liberalism as endemic of the process of state secularisation and throughout the century had become its most vociferous critic. The tone of early papal encyclicals, *Mirari vos* in 1832 and *Singulari nos* in 1834 as well as Pius' IX's *Quanta cura* in 1864 was unforgiving, rejecting freedom of thought, culture, expression and the liberal embrace of modern civilisation and progress.

Not all forms of liberalism had to follow classical, liberal lines however. The more liberal Rhenish Catholics for example sought to justify their own interpretations of liberalism. They endorsed a liberalism that was socially responsible, yet also helped to promote and advance industrialisation in the Rhineland. The change in mood by the Catholic Church towards the end of the century towards capitalism is best exemplified by the 1891 papal encyclical by Pope Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum*. The encyclical was written as a response to the need to reconcile the conservative philosophical traditions of the Catholic Church with the modern social and political developments brought about by socialism and liberalism. It was no coincidence that *Rerum Novarum* appeared at a time when the Centre Party also faced modification of its political direction to adapt to its new influential role on government.¹¹¹ Although the text blames class divisions as the root of

¹¹¹ Ibid., p.262.

social inequality, importantly it does not advocate the abolition of the right to private ownership or call for nationalisation of all means of production, two key characteristics of a liberal economy. It maintained that the state, together with the Church, and the proletariat were jointly responsible for tackling social misery. The Pope also settled the internal Catholic controversy over the question of a public or a private sector approach to social reforms by coming out wholeheartedly in favour of state intervention. *Rerum Novarum* significantly did not argue for a radical overhaul of the existing social structure and wide-reaching social reform, but for implementation of social policy *within* the existing capitalist order. The Berlin CDU member Otto Heinrich von der Gablentz, later suggested that *Rerum Novarum* was a search for a third way; “Hier sollte ein dritter Weg gefunden werden”¹¹² deliberately ruling out a radical form of socialism to tackle the social question. He feared that socialism could unleash full-scale revolution, which would be far worse than tolerating social injustice; “die Angst vor der Revolution ist stärker als die Empörung über das Unrecht.”¹¹³

Catholicism’s early preoccupation with maintaining the cultural and confessional integrity of the Catholic Church and its abhorrence of liberalism meant that before now the Centre Party had not given the formulation of social policy serious attention.¹¹⁴ After Bismarck’s departure in 1890 and with him many of his anti-clerical, national liberal supporters, the *Kulturkampf* had been scaled down. With its confessional dilemmas resolved, the Centre soon found itself at odds over social and economic policy. In direct competition with the Social Democrats who profiled themselves exclusively as the party of the working classes, the Centre faced the practical political question of how society’s ills should best be solved. The trade unionist and Centre Party member Adam Stegerwald, defended the working classes, arguing that the changes in class relations brought about by the industrial revolution, still demanded radical change to the political structure and gave his backing to the idea of a democratic and social *Volksstaat*. The working classes, he noted, made up the majority of Centre Party voters and insisted that

¹¹² Otto Heinrich von der Gablentz, “Zur Problematik Christlich-Sozialer Parteien,” in: Jürgen Fijalkowski, *Politologie und Soziologie. Otto Stammer zum 65. Geburtstag*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Cologne/Opladen 1965, p.205.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Helga Grebing, *Geschichte ... op. cit.*, p.87f.

their rights and concerns should not be ignored. The direction of his programme suggestions was significant, because it challenged existing state structures, which had, in the meantime, come to rely on the support of the middle classes.¹¹⁵ Stegerwald condoned that the state should have powers to intervene to correct economic imbalances and introduce fundamental change to social and political relations. His aim was not to create a centralised state, but simply to grant more constitutional powers to the government. He believed that since the state gained its legitimacy from the people it served in society, communities, families, Churches and trade unions, the state was compelled to fulfil its moral responsibility.

This naive assumption of the state's benevolence did not stand up to reality. Windthorst's successor from 1891, the lawyer Ernst Lieber, steered the Centre party programme in even greater support of national and military aims and convinced a majority in his party to back Wilhelm II's colonial ambitions. The Centre's new nationalistic programmatic course was confirmed when the party gained a record number of votes in the 1898 Reichstag elections. Staunch anti-Prussian Catholics witnessed the trend of combining capitalism and Wilhelmian militarism and imperialism with grave scepticism, but could do little to stop it in its course.

1900 - 1918

The Centre broadly agreed to introduce social legislation within the existing liberal economic system, ceding specific policy areas to state responsibility, and confirmed that Catholics had finally accepted social legislation in preference to sweeping social reform and abolition of the capitalist system. This shift was advocated by the Centre Party member and Reich Chancellor Georg Frhr. von Hertling (1843-1919).¹¹⁶ Now that the mainstream party had found a working relationship with the liberal economic system, the concern with social issues was taken up by the *Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland* which had been founded on papal recommendation at the *Katholikentag* in

¹¹⁵ W. Becker *Die Zentrumsparlei* op. cit., p.130.

¹¹⁶ Hertling developed a theory of the rule of law in the late 19th and early 20th century based on social and cultural obligations to the individual. It is the responsibility of the state to provide each and every individual with the rights and freedom to develop his or her full potential. His position and influence made it possible to forge closer ties between the Centre party and the former political representatives of the Kaiser regime.

1890. Its aim was to mobilise the masses, publicise the party's socialist programme to compete with the Social Democrats, and appeal for unity amongst the Catholic community;

“Es gelang ihm (dem Volksverein), die sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Spannungen in der Zentrumswählerschaft besonders nach der Jahrhundertwende wirksam zu neutralisieren und auszugleichen und die Diskrepanz zwischen der ständisch-hierarchischen Struktur der Partei und der Klassenschichtung der modernen Industriegesellschaft zu überdecken.”¹¹⁷

The political authority of Windthorst, who had been proclaimed the father of the *Volksverein* at the time of its foundation, was important for the *Volksverein's* survival and influence. Windthorst himself found the *Volksverein* idea of a specific Catholic association anachronistic, and harnessed some of the *Verein's* more radical intentions by steering its energies towards fighting the challenge from social democracy. The *Verein's* activities nevertheless proved crucial in widening the Centre Party's representation in regions of the Reich where previously no party organisation had existed and its activity became indispensable to the Centre Party during election campaigns, helping the Centre Party to develop a social programme for parliamentary representation.

Speaking at the *Katholikentag* in 1907, a forum that since its inauguration in 1848 was designed to represent the views of all Catholic associations and unions, the leader of the Centre Party in parliament Adolf Groeber, explicitly called for *Streben nach Reichtum!* revealing the extent to which Catholicism had adapted itself to the capitalist order;

“Das System des Wirtschaftsliberalismus galt somit nicht mehr als eine grundsätzlich abzulehnende ökonomische Ordnung. Man sah im Kapitalismus lediglich eine Wirtschaftstechnik, in der der Produktionsfaktor Kapital eine hervorragende Rolle spielte.....Sozialpolitik bedeutete nicht mehr Kapitalismusfeindlichkeit.”¹¹⁸

Catholicism therefore no longer chose to condemn capitalism, but increasingly believed that it should maximise the benefits of capitalism such as greater wealth and prosperity, by extending these privileges to all groups in society. Catholicism would continue to

¹¹⁷ Horstwalter Heitzer, *Der Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland im Kaiserreich 1890-1918*, Matthias Grünewald Verlag, Mainz 1979, p.146f.

¹¹⁸ Josef Stegmann, *op. cit.*, p.420.

monitor and ensure that the excesses of the capitalist system were minimised. This apparent softening of Catholic opposition to capitalist-liberalism was the result of the long line of efforts by Catholic spokesmen such as Ketteler, Groeber, de Lamennais and Pope Leo XIII in his *Rerum Novarum*. Goetz Briefs, a sociologist and prolific speaker at Christian trade union congresses, later explains that liberalism was condemned purely on moral grounds, for claiming to be economically autonomous and operating according to its own laws. Capitalism, whilst criticised for its excesses, was however perceived as reformable. Capitalist-liberalism relied on a minimum of state and on a maximum of individual responsibility. The dynamic nature of the free market, driven by self-interest and competition, meant it offered an opportunity for social adjustments and thus made it acceptable to Catholics.¹¹⁹

With Lieber's nationalist shift in the Centre Party's programme, and the *Katholischer Verein* defending Catholic interests, the perennial need for an interdenominational body to represent the working classes, to achieve equality and solidarity among all workers, and fight socialism on equal terms with the Social Democrats, was even more acutely exposed. This vacuum was filled by the emergence of the Christian trade unions to be set up. At the first Mainz congress of the Christian trade unions on May 21-22, 1899, programme guidelines called for Christian, interdenominational trade unions. Unlike the social democratic workers' organisations, who operated as political agitators for the SPD, the Christian trade unions should not affiliate themselves to any particular party. Their aim was simply to develop a common representative organ to defend (Christian) workers' interests, without interfering in specific political or cultural predilections. Class differences were not recognised since employers and employees were seen to share common goals. Although the majority of members were Catholic, there was also an Evangelical wing which leaned more heavily on Christian social traditions. Tension often arose between the Christian trade unions and the Catholic Church, since the unions' views were focused on tackling the conflict between work and capital for all Christians, and liberating the working classes from the strict tutelage of the clergy, but not on representing the Catholic Church's concerns. Adam Stegerwald, Centre party member and trade union chairman noted;

¹¹⁹ Goetz Briefs, "Liberalismus und katholische Soziallehre. Bilanz der Gemeinsamkeiten," in; Die politische Meinung, Heft 52, Jg. 5, 1960, p.36.

“Sprachen die Führer der christlichen Gewerkschaften nur als Katholiken, so wurden sie von ihren evangelischen Kollegen nicht verstanden, redeten sie aber als Vertreter einer interkonfessionellen Organisation, konnte man ihnen Unehrebarkeit gegen das Oberhaupt ihrer Kirche vorwerfen.”¹²⁰

The unions' claim to independence in steering social policy however is relativised by the close personal contacts that the unions had to the Centre Party and to the *Verein für das katholische Deutschland*. The unions furthermore took their policy impetus from Catholic Social Teaching.¹²¹ This does not diminish the fact that the formation of independent, Christian trade unions represented the first real attempt to create a forum for interdenominational co-operation on social and economic issues affecting the working classes.¹²²

In the new liberal climate, the powerful binding force of the Catholic *Weltanschauung* was weakening. It appeared as if the solidarity shown throughout the *Kulturkampf*, when Catholics of all classes pulled together to defend their existence began to disintegrate once the threat had been overcome. Catholic doctrine had provided the necessary ideological consensus and was an important factor for maintaining cohesion between Catholics of conservative and liberal persuasion. In an atmosphere of normal cultural relations between the Catholic Church and the state however, the Catholic *Weltanschauung* was not quite so necessary. The question remained, whether, faced with a future national moral crisis, the Catholic *Weltanschauung* would be strong enough to hold Catholic groups together. Sadly, this was not the case.

¹²⁰ Adam Stegerwald cited in; Helga Grebing, *Geschichte...*, op. cit., p.91.

¹²¹ Rolf Thieringer cited in; Wolfgang Schroeder, op. cit., Bonn 1992. p.44.

¹²² Ernst Deuerlein, op. cit. p.28.

1.1. The Centre Party before and during the Weimar Republic

By the end of the 19th century the Centre Party had already begun to suffer from dwindling support, as a result of the broadening of Germany's party spectrum. Many Catholic voters drifted from the Centre Party to the social democrats, or from 1925, to the communists, but also to the *Deutsch Nationale Volkspartei* (DNVP) that set up its own *Nationale Arbeitsgemeinschaft deutscher Katholiken* in 1920. By 1917, when it seemed as if the parliamentary system would not survive the growing radicalism of German parties, the Christian trade unions emphasised that it saw interdenomination as the only force that could harmonise left and right wing factions. Unlike the Berlin Workers' Associations, which were led by Catholic clerics, the interdenominational trade union organisation in Cologne was led by ordinary members of the Christian Churches,¹²³ and the movement was shown special recognition by Pope Pius X in his 1912 encyclical *Singulari quadum*. The unions supported private ownership rights but demanded reforms in the capitalist economy, to introduce joint ownership and worker participation rights in industry, public shares initiatives, and a trade and industry body with parity in its membership to monitor all economic activity. The fundamental difficulty for the Christian trade unions however was how, if at all, they distinguished themselves ideologically from the socialism of the SPD. and their success ultimately depended on developing and defending a unique Christian trade union ideology.¹²⁴ By 1920, the Christian trade unions nevertheless boasted 1.25 million members. Ideas were expressed to reform the party system to allow the divided and disparate *bürgerlichen* groups and Christian workers to form a united and powerful opposition to social democracy. In the same year Adam Stegerwald held his famous speech, *Die christliche Arbeiterbewegung und die Lebensfragen des deutschen Volkes* also calling for an interdenominational Christian democratic party, that was "*deutsch, christlich, demokratisch, sozial*"¹²⁵ echoing earlier suggestions for a Christian-national, conservative and social party by figures such as Emmanuel Ketteler or Friedrich Naumann.

¹²³ Godehard Lindgens, op. cit., p.87.

¹²⁴ Helga Grebing, op. cit., p.91.

¹²⁵ Centre Party leader Heinrich Brüning later claimed that he had in fact been the author of Stegerwald's famous speech. Letter from Brüning to Johannes Mainer, 14 Nov 1945, cited in; Friedrich Brickwedde, *Die frühgeschichte der westfälischen CDU*. Hausarbeit zur Erlangung des Magistergrades der Philosophischen Fakultät der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster. 1978, p.10.

The Centre Party meanwhile had not fully resolved the question of its identity and political representation. The question now focused on whether the Centre should remain an exclusively Catholic party or whether it should broaden its appeal to Protestants, thereby putting aside confessional differences and emphasising their shared belief in Christianity. The party became embroiled in what was termed its *Zentrumsstreit* or the Centre's conflict, over the denominational and political character of the party. This prompted the famous article by the Cologne newspaper publisher, Julius Bachem, in 1906 calling for the Centre to come out of its 'tower' - a symbol of the shelter it offered Catholics. It could end its own segregation by welcoming Protestants to take Centre Party seats in parliament. The article attacked those in the party who saw their main programmatic item as that of satisfying Church demands and as protector of Catholic interests. Bachem would not accept that the confessional division in politics was due to ideological principle, but was a result of historical tradition¹²⁶ and so strove for Catholics and Protestants to overcome their mutual prejudices. Sceptics believed the Catholic *Weltanschauung* was singularly unique and resisted any kind of merger with other *Weltanschauungen* such as Protestantism. Other Centre Party members were concerned that closer interdenominational co-operation could dilute Catholics' interests with those of the Protestants, many of whom were supportive of nationalist, right-wing or bourgeois policies.

Bachem's motivation for forging interdenominational unity was based on the fear that the Centre might otherwise lose the support of the Catholic working classes who would drift to the SPD if the Centre failed to secure them political recognition. The need for a new programme and a new profile thus became a matter of winning the political competition with the SPD. Programmatic reform would then provide the catalyst for further structural reforms in the party. Cary¹²⁷ believes Bachem's designs would achieve three things; reconciliation between Protestants and Catholics, a solution to the social inequalities caused by industrialisation and support for the trend towards parliamentary democracy. Bachem was thus tentatively preparing the Centre Party to become a catch-

¹²⁶ Noel D. Cary, op. cit., p.31.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p.9.

all party in a pluralistic, democratic system. Carl Bachem, Julius' cousin and deputy in the Reichstag noted that the phrase *Christliche Weltanschauung* was intended only as a political formula and not a theological amalgamation. The aim was not to 'represent' Catholic teaching but simply to ensure that Catholic moral beliefs were adhered to in politics.¹²⁸

By the end of the first world war the Centre Party had shifted its traditional support for the Church towards support for the state with a distinct change in attitude towards the idea of a Republican order. After the defeat in war and revolution, social Catholicism was no longer a uniform social group but had developed into a pluralistic Catholic social movement.¹²⁹ In its Duisburg and Cologne conferences in November 1918, the Centre Party confirmed the ongoing validity of its Soest Programme but in view of the forthcoming election to the National Assembly and the uncertainty of the new political order in Germany, the Centre agreed to wait for a decision from the National Assembly before deciding its own position on the state form. The trade union wing boldly pronounced its ongoing support for a monarchy and whilst the Cologne Centre Party spoke of modifying structures within the party, Berlin members talked of renewal and adapting itself to the modern political climate, implying that it was now even less committed to the party's traditional left-wing, socially progressive policies. In its final proclamation on December 30, 1918, the Centre acknowledged that a new political order was inevitable after the fall of the monarchy but insisted that the new system must be a democracy and not a socialist republic. It reaffirmed its original commitment to a Christian based society and its original motto '*Für Wahrheit, Recht und Freiheit*', but discussed changing its name to *Christlich-demokratische Volkspartei (Zentrum)*¹³⁰ and reforming its programme to attract a wider Christian appeal and to signal recognition of the new democratic republic. In reality it failed to attract Protestant voters who leaned more naturally towards the recently formed Evangelical *Christlich Sozialer Volksdienst*¹³¹ whilst some members still felt that the Centre's original policy of protecting religious

¹²⁸ Carl Bachem cited in; Ibid., p.36.

¹²⁹ Josef Stegmann, op. cit., p.435.

¹³⁰ Wolfgang Treue, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1954*, op. cit., p.32.

¹³¹ Sigmund Neumann, *Die Deutschen Parteien*, op. cit., p.40.

freedom and equality should be upheld in view of radical cultural policies of the new Prussian government. Talk of real party reform therefore was diluted.¹³²

In his famous Essen Speech on November 21, 1920, the Christian trade unionist Adam Stegerwald spoke of the crisis of capitalism in German society. The pace of development of science and technology, he said, had advanced beyond humankind's moral development. The resulting social dislocation could only be cured by infusing public life with Christian spirit. Stegerwald's desire was to unite the trade unions to create a mass base for building a new party, an interdenominational 'Labour' party. The move would result in a marked shift to the left for many conservative minded Catholics but was based on Stegerwald's belief that it had been the lack of solidarity between the trade unions of the two main parties - the Centre and the SPD, that had prevented the trade unions extending their influence before. The political values of the Centre Party and the SPD were not truly compatible but they shared the view that there was a need for constitutional reform. Both socialists in the SPD, and Catholics in the Centre, believed there was a need for a parliamentary majority in government to act as an effective opposition to Prussian-German Protestantism. Their fundamentally opposing viewpoints however created unbridgeable tension. For Catholics, a constitutional pact with avowed revolutionary atheists and advocates of class struggle did not qualify as the kind of philosophical starting point implied by the word *Weltanschauung*.¹³³

¹³² Rudolf Morsey, *Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei 1917/1923*, Düsseldorf 1966, p.100.

¹³³ Noel D. Cary op. cit., p.61.

1928-1933

In the polarised parliamentary state system of Weimar, the Centre struggled to maintain its middle position. It could not yet lend its full commitment to the Republican idea and hesitated in embracing democracy. The 1922 manifesto guidelines did not feature the words democracy or democratic anywhere in the text.¹³⁴ Between 1925 and 1933 the Centre was torn over its political representation and provoked rumours that the Centre should split into two factions to accommodate the right and the left-wing tendencies in the party.¹³⁵ On the right, wavering Centre voters were attracted to the *Deutsch Nationale Volkspartei* and on the left, Centre members migrated to the SPD. Adam Stegerwald was one of the few right-wing, conservative nationals who stayed in the Centre, but who also remained chairman of the Christian trade unions. Opposing the radical, right-wing shift in the party, were the left-wing Catholic Workers' Associations and the Catholics of the south-west. Stegmann divides the post-war pluralism in political Catholicism into three categories, Romantic Conservatism, Christian Socialism and Solidarism. An examination of their content reveals continuity with the categories of pre-war political Catholicism and a reoccurrence of political issues that had survived the widely proclaimed need for post-war party reform.

Romantic Conservatism

Romantic Conservatism, or Universalism, as it is often referred to, has its roots in the ideas of Karl Freiherr von Vogelsang. In accordance with its conservative tradition, Romantic Conservatism supported a system of estates, rejected liberalism and capitalism and advocated an economy based on the independent *Mittelstand*. The Viennese economist and social philosopher Othmar Spann (1878-1950), is exemplary of the Universalist philosophy, of a *Ganzheitslehre* for society. Spann's theory distinguished between the *universalistisch-organisch* and the more liberal *individualistisch-atomistische* approach to social organisation. He favoured the *universalistisch-organisch* approach since it defined religion, science, economy, the state and its individuals as composite parts (*Glieder*) of society's whole. An individual, he argued, could only realise their full

¹³⁴ Wolfgang Treue, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1954*, op. cit., p.140ff.

¹³⁵ The Bavarians split from the Centre Party, over the issue of federalism to form their own conservative Bayerische Volkspartei.

potential through participating within a universalist society. Spann believed the state should be arranged on the guild idea of estates but where the state's power and authority should not be derived from individuals or estates or even from a parliament that represented the views of the people;

“Staatswille leitet sich nicht von dem Willen einzelner ab, er ist daher nicht atomistisch-mechanistisch, sondern lebendig gebildet, nämlich von Führern.”¹³⁶

This leading group of *Führern* is not only motivated by their responsibility to governing the state but by *Kriegergeist* and *Kriegertum* based on their specific training as *Führer*. Universalism thus unequivocally leads to an authoritarian state and renders democratic mass elections superfluous. In the same way that political individualism was considered to be against the natural order of society, economic freedom of competition and trade are arranged according to a system of industrial guilds. In a speech held before a fascist organisation in 1933 in Rome, Spann did not conceal the fact that this characteristic group of individuals were represented by the fascists in Italy and by the national socialists in Germany.

In 1930s Vienna, a group of Catholic sociologists attempted to co-ordinate Spann's ideas with those of other Austrian groups. One of these sociologists was Eugen Kogon a former pupil of Spann's and editor of the Christian pamphlet *Schönere Zukunft* and later a co-founding member of the CDU in Hesse in 1945. The 1932 Catholic-Social Manifesto was demonstrably in favour of a universal social tradition branding liberalism as an *Abfall von der gottgewollten Ordnung* and vilifying heavy industry, mass production, freedom of trade and competition, and economic activity carried out in pursuit of profit. The Catholic Social Manifesto argued that although a dictatorship meant the removal of self-administration, it could be;

“je nach den Umständen vielleicht ein brauchbares, ja sogar unumgängliches, wenngleich paradoxes Mittel zur Errichtung des Ständestaates.”¹³⁷

¹³⁶ Othmar Spann, cited in; Josef Stegmann, op. cit., p.440.

¹³⁷ The Catholic Social Manifesto cited in; Ibid., p.442.

Kogon himself favoured a comprehensive corporate system of estates, encompassing industrial democracy, industry regulation, training, the control and reform of finance institutions and national economic planning. Kogon explicitly adds however that this corporate system could function in almost any type of state, with the exception of a dictatorship or a formal party democracy.¹³⁸

Solidarism

The Solidarists believed in a regulatory and integrative system which drew on the constitutive elements of the market, guilds and a welfare state to balance and correct social inequality in industrial society. In 1926, Cardinal Schulte emphasised that capitalism was merely a technical economic system and not therefore to be seen as unchristian. His position was endorsed three years later by the Bishop of Innsbruck, who said private ownership, capital, credit and the stock market were not immoral instruments, if used and interpreted correctly. This was the view of the 1931 papal encyclical, *Quadragesimo anno*, which reflected many of the Solidarists' own views. *Quadragesimo anno* recognised the need for a new social order based on subsidiarity and ranking of professional groups or *Berufstände*.¹³⁹ Solidarists did not support the guild system in order to return to a feudal order of the middle ages. Solidarism aimed at setting up a number of parallel groups in society, equal in status but representative of different professions. Membership of a particular estate was no longer based on background, but was voluntary, and movement between ranks was possible. The main objective was to overcome class structures by co-operation between workers and employers. The Solidarists' understanding was that the state should leave the professions to administer their own interests, but did not go so far as to believe that competition¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Eugen Kogon cited in Josef Stegmann; *Ibid.*, p.443.

¹³⁹ "Kaum bedarf es eigener Erwähnung, daß das, was Leo XIII über die Staatsform lehrte, auch auf die Berufstände oder berufsständischen Körperschaften sinngemäße Anwendung findet, nämlich: die Menschen haben die volle Freiheit, eine Form nach ihrem Gefallen zu wählen, wenn nur der Gerechtigkeit und den Erfordernissen des Gemeinwohls Genüge geschieht." Die Enzyklika Pius' XI, *Quadragesimo anno*, Amtlicher deutscher Text, Hrsg. vom Erzbischöflichen Seelsorgeamt Köln, Düsseldorf 1946, p.48f.

¹⁴⁰ "Die Wettbewerbsfreiheit - obwohl innerhalb der gehörigen Grenzen berechtigt und von zweifellosem Nutzen - kann aber unmöglich regulatives Prinzip der Wirtschaft sein Daher besteht die dringende Notwendigkeit, die Wirtschaft wieder einem echten und durchgreifenden regulativen Prinzip zu unterstellen." Die Enzyklika Pius' XI, *Quadragesimo anno*, op. cit., p.49.

could act as the sole mechanism on which to run an economy. Gustav Gundlach,¹⁴¹ an exponent of Solidarism, criticised the Universalists for rejecting parliamentary democracy in favour of *Führertum* and perceived that there were political motives behind the theological rhetoric. Paul Jostock¹⁴² criticised universalism because he saw that the Catholics' task was to protect the individual from the *heidnisch-herrischen Staatsgeist Hegels* from which Universalism descended. The solidarist, Nell-Breuning, who was also one of the most outspoken of thinkers, condemned Universalism as an offspring of Hegelian philosophy and German idealism. Nell-Breuning did not inherently see any conflict between the Catholic Church and a capitalist system, but the pursuit of profit, he claimed had to be restrained by adequate state regulations.

Christian Socialists

The third group of Catholics in the period 1928-1933 were the Christian Socialists, who descended from the pre-war Christian trade unions. The trade unions were the strongest force behind democratic reform and saw the practical necessity for introducing interdenominational politics and overcoming sectarian conflict. Rather than revelling in class conflict like the Social Democrats, they applied themselves to making the working class a respected part of civil society.¹⁴³ In essence, the unions remained non-partisan, but some labour activists still looked to the Centre Party as their natural party representative. They hoped to initiate realignment of the Centre Party yet the party continued to pay only lip service to interdenomination, whilst remaining a Catholic party with only a nominal number of Protestant members.

Christian Socialists such as Josef Kral, Theodor Brauer, Adam Stegerwald and Theodor Steinbüchel¹⁴⁴ all shared a similar abhorrence of capitalism as the Romantic-Conservatives. They believed in a planned economy but one which did not suppress

¹⁴¹ In 1947 Gundlach would later plead with the Christian Socialists to drop the politically ambiguous term Christian Socialism and replace it with the acceptable term Christian Solidarism.

¹⁴² Paul Jostock, cited in Josef Stegmann, p.445.

¹⁴³ Noel D. Cary, op. cit., p.31.

¹⁴⁴ Steinbüchel in his book, *Der Sozialismus als sittliche Idee*, contributed to softening the attitude amongst Catholics towards Marxist-Socialism, emphasising ethical values as the organising factor for a political and economic order which he claimed existed in Christianity as well as in Socialism and Marxism and saw no reason why dialogue could not be established between them. See Bernd Uhl, *Die Idee des Christlichen Sozialismus in Deutschland*. Hrsg. KAS, V. Hase & Koehler, Mainz 1975, p.37f.

individual freedom. It was not enough to simply remove the excesses of capitalism, but argued that the economy must be made the responsibility of society, of *Gemeinschaft*.¹⁴⁵ Theodor Brauer, the leader of the Christian trade unions during the closing stages of the Weimar Republic, supported the guild system of ranking people in categories according to their professional status. This not only reaffirmed the Centre's 1922 programme, but featured as article no. 165 of the Weimar Constitution, guaranteeing mutual recognition to workers and employers in an equal partnership. Yet ambiguity within the group over the meaning of its philosophy of Christian Socialism meant that it was often tactically employed for propagandistic effect, to create the impression of a revolutionary spirit among Catholics.¹⁴⁶ Christian Socialism has also been accused of disguising the relationship social Catholicism already had with socialism and its secret desire to form a coalition with the socialist democrats.¹⁴⁷ The Christian trade union's slogan *Nation, Autorität, Volkstum, Volksgemeinschaft, Stand und Führung* also made it difficult to distinguish the Christian Socialists' programme from that of the National Socialists.¹⁴⁸ Opposition to this surreptitious right wing drift among Catholics, was staged by the Hesse group of Christian socialists, including Friedrich Dessauer, Walter Dirks, Heinrich Scharp and Ernst Michel of the Frankfurt newspaper, the *Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung*. Some of these went on to become influential co-founders of the Hesse CDU in 1945.

The differing views of the Solidarists, the Universalists and the Christian Socialists reflected the diversity of *Weltanschauungen* that the Centre Party and political Catholicism in general had historically always contained. Party leader Joseph Joos (1919-1927) described the Centre's position not as "entweder-oder" but as "sowohl als auch". The Centre stood for;

¹⁴⁵ Quite what is meant by *Gemeinwohl* is uncertain, since different interpretations can be given depending on whether the Catholic is Jesuit or Dominican. Oswald von Nell Breuning. *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Heute*. Band III, *Zeitfragen 1955-1959*, Freiburg 1960, p.15.

¹⁴⁶ Josef Stegmann, op. cit., p.446.

¹⁴⁷ Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.22. See section II in this study which deals with Christian Socialism after 1945.

¹⁴⁸ Wolfgang Schröder, op. cit., p.50.

“Religion *und* Vaterlandsliebe, Vaterland *und* Menschheit, Deutschland *und* Europa, Zentralismus *und* Föderalismus, Macht *und* Recht.”¹⁴⁹

It was precisely this lack of a clear political identity for the Centre that also made it susceptible to National Socialism, a movement promising unity across all party divisions in Weimar’s party system. Centre Party chairman and Reich president Brüning believed he could reinforce parliamentary democracy by turning it into ‘authoritarian democracy’ and made gestures to Hitler for a sharing of power. In 1932 he envisaged serving as Foreign Minister in a right-wing government with the National Socialists. Brüning believed that once the flood of radicalism receded (after the election of the NSDAP), a Protestant conservative party, that could work with the Centre, would finally emerge.¹⁵⁰

The Reich’s Chancellor Franz von Papen was also sympathetic to Hitler’s programme, and believed he could tame the more radical elements once Hitler was in power. In the September Reichstag elections of 1930, the NSDAP won over 18% of the vote and the Centre only just over 11%, demonstrating that the NSDAP had accommodated the disaffected and alienated voter. When Hitler requested the Reichstag to pass the Enabling Act that would clear his way to govern without legislature for four years, a two-thirds majority was required in parliament. Fearing reprisals, such as expulsion from government or even physical attacks¹⁵¹ the Centre voted *unanimously* for passing the Enabling Act. Before conceding to the Act, the Centre handed Hitler a list of conditions that he must comply with, but did not include civil rights among them. It was here that the Centre committed its most fundamental error. By failing to mention the civil rights of others, the Centre silently abandoned its venerable claim to be defending not just Catholic rights but the general principle of minority rights.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ Joseph Joos, “Die politische Ideenwelt des Zentrums”, in; Ungerer Emil (Hrsg), Wissen und Werken, Braun, Karlsruhe 1928, p.23.

¹⁵⁰ Noel D. Cary, op. cit., p.137.

¹⁵¹ Stegerwald had previously already been beaten up by Nazi insiders whilst holding a speech.

¹⁵² Noel D. Cary, op. cit., p.138.

Once the Concordat had been signed in Rome, which secured the Catholic Church state guarantees such as denominational schools and government subsidies, the Centre Party was dissolved.¹⁵³

¹⁵³ To explain the apathy that Catholics demonstrated towards Hitler in 1933 and the late development of any unified resistance to the regime, critics point to a political quietism that existed amongst Catholics, the belief that the freedom of the Catholic Church was not at stake in the dissolution of the Weimar state and its constitution. This tendency amongst Catholics to focus narrowly on social reform issues meant that they tragically neglected to monitor parallel political developments. See the views of N. Monzel and E.W Böckenförde and Hans Maier cited in; Hans Maier, "Politischer Katholizismus, sozialer Katholizismus, christliche Demokratie", in; CIVITAS, Jahrbuch für christliche Gesellschaftsordnung, Band I, Pesch-Haus Verlag, München 1962.

2. Political Protestantism before 1918

In the previous section, political Catholicism was investigated for its significance in laying the foundations for a Christian based political party and a socio-economic programme, acceptable to all political views across the diverse political spectrum of Catholicism. It focused on the role of Catholic Social Teaching, the Catholic social workers' associations, Christian trade unions and the Centre Party. The factor that defined the CDU as an entirely new phenomenon in the German party system in 1945 however, was its unique character as an interdenominational Christian party, that embraced the Catholic and the Protestant faiths. The CDU modelled itself as a genuine *Volkspartei*, that drew its support not only from both Christian confessions but from all socio-economic classes, professions and political backgrounds. A significant number of the founding members of the CDU in 1945 were indeed Protestants from the ranks of Weimar's former liberal parties and many features of the CDU's programme after 1945 reflected political tendencies of the liberal and conservative Protestant traditions. This clearly shows that the investigation must be extended beyond the confines of political Catholicism, to include an appreciation of the Protestant history of the Christian democratic movement. The section will examine which Protestant traditions would later help to determine the direction of the CDU's socio-economic programme and, in so doing, aims to redress the imbalance in the literature on the CDU, which has so far concentrated on social and political Catholicism as the chief inspiration for the CDU's political programme.

Immediately this raises the question why the history of the Protestant wing of the CDU should have received less attention in the literature on the CDU to date. Political Catholicism is an established term in Germany which has not only generated discussion and interest in scholarly and clerical spheres but also in sociological and political circles, both in terms of its historical and its current political relevance. Political Protestantism on the other hand is more obscure and cannot be treated as a single unified phenomenon. The German Reformation was in this respect a contributory factor, by creating divisions within the Protestant faith. The division of the Church into a separate Lutheran and Calvinist branch, meant differences evolved in their respective interpretations of Protestantism. Later attempts to reunify the two confessions failed on account of

fundamentally opposing confessional differences between the monarchical and Episcopal Lutheran tradition and the synodal democratic tradition of the Calvinist reform Church.

National, liberal Protestantism originally derived its philosophy from the Enlightenment ideas of the French Revolution, including the right to national sovereignty and self determination.¹⁵⁴ As a political idea therefore, German liberalism is inextricably linked to western European civilisation and notions of culture and human liberty. Yet German liberalism also refers to the degenerate 19th century version, where liberalism came to represent the particular political and social movement and state of mind amongst the German middle classes. In the course of the 19th century, liberalism underwent political mutation to the right, parading a nationalist, imperialist programme before finally reaching its pinnacle in fascism in 1933. As a political concept liberal Protestantism reflected the political cultures of certain liberal political parties such as the Deutsche Demokratische Partei (DDP) and Deutsche Volkspartei (DVP) and the interests of the secular middle classes. 19th century middle class Protestants leaned more naturally, but not exclusively, towards *laissez-faire* economic liberalism. Lutheran traditions encouraged the *Bürgertum* in German society to become apolitical and submissive to political authority, hostile to democracy and susceptible to the notion of *Führertum*. Unrestrained capitalist liberals were blamed for worshipping the authoritarian German state, for blind obedience to authority which led to Germany's loss of Christianity and ultimately to the rise of National Socialism.¹⁵⁵

Protestantism has been further criticised for its failure to mount a concerted and united response to the social challenges of 19th century German society or to engender a feeling of Protestant social responsibility.¹⁵⁶ Rooted in Christian trade union and Christian social

¹⁵⁴ Kurt Nowak, "Protestantismus und Weimarer Republik. Politische Wegmarken in der evangelischen Kirche 1918-1932" in; Bracher/Funke/Jacobsen (Hrsg.), Die Weimarer Republik. 1918-1933. Schriftenreihe Band 251, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn 1987, p.219 (218-238).

¹⁵⁵ Although Protestantism, was a relatively homogeneous block during Weimar, in the Third Reich the block split between a obrigkeitsstaatliche group and a democratic group. Joachim Perels, Die Entstehung demokratischen Denkens im deutschen Protestantismus in; Gegenwartskunde 2/81, Jg 30, 1981 p 153-163.

¹⁵⁶ The Catholic commentator O'Shanahan remarked that between the initial pleas to a Protestant social conscience by Johann Hinrich Wichern at the Wittenberg assembly of the German Protestant Churches in September 1848 and the first Evangelical Church day at Bethel-Bielefeld in November 1924, no initiative was made to create a feeling of Protestant social responsibility. "Die Verhandlungen der Wittenberger Versammlung für Gründung eines deutschen evangelischen Kirchenbundes im September

parties, the Social Protestant agenda transcended the institutional confines of the Evangelical Church, and Protestant political parties were historically more passive than their Catholic counterparts in tackling political issues such as inequality, injustice and poverty. The history of a specific social ethical movement in German Protestantism has therefore been less documented than the history of the social movement in German Catholicism. In social policy terms therefore the Protestants could be seen to have very little to bequeath to a new, socially responsible Christian democratic party in 1945.

Protestant-Evangelical social ethical teaching, unlike the documented encyclicals in Catholic Social Teaching, appears obscure and intangible, and makes theorising on the subject often difficult and imprecise. Evangelicals have also adopted a complex and ambiguous attitude towards the idea of a Christian political party. The Evangelist theologian Helmut Thielicke¹⁵⁷ for example, thought that from a practical point of view Protestants and Catholics could co-operate in an interdenominational Christian party, but whilst Catholics had Catholic Social Teaching to provide them with Christian criteria in accordance with Natural Law, the Evangelical Christian had nothing comparable. Evangelists rejected the idea that politics rests on fixed Christian axioms, and instead claimed to respond to a moral or political situation as it arises, but nevertheless applying a Christian frame of mind. This can be problematic in the political sphere however, given that a party cannot operate without a programme. Evangelists may thus find themselves in an interdenominational Christian party which is bound by Christianity but whose programme content is Catholic and not Evangelical.¹⁵⁸ It can be argued¹⁵⁹ however

1848 (Berlin 1848) and Verhandlungen des ersten Deutschen Evangelischen Kirchentages 1924. Bethel-Bielefeld 14-17. November 1924", cited in; William O'Shanahan. German Protestants face the Social Question. Vol 1, The Conservative Phase. 1815-187, University of Notre-Dame Press, Notre-Dame Indiana 1954, p.209.

¹⁵⁷ Thielicke was an important participant in the Freiburg group discussions during the war. See Helmut Thielicke, Theologische Ethik II/2, p.689-698. Also see section 3 of this study.

¹⁵⁸ Wilhelm Hahn, "Die CDU als Problem der evangelischen Theologie", in: Demokratische Bewährung, Staatsbürger Verlag, Bad Godesberg 1965 (p.79-96).

¹⁵⁹ Whilst Catholicism traditionally wrangled with the form the State should take, be that a monarchy, aristocracy or republic, the non-Orthodox Calvinist form of Protestantism placed less emphasis on the state form per se and has been more concerned with finding a way of securing principles of Christian natural law, human rights, individual liberties and the constitutional rule of law within political ethics. According to this theory Protestantism's interest in democracy as a form of government stemmed largely from the fact that this represents the best possible system for protecting human rights. See Joachim Staedtke, "Demokratische Traditionen im westlichen Protestantismus," in; Hans Pflaumer (Hrsg.) Demokratische Traditionen im Protestantismus, Hans Seidel Stiftung e.V., Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, Heft 2, Olzog Verlag, München 1969, p.9ff. (7-30).

that the lack of a comparable Evangelical teaching or programme must not necessarily be seen as a sign of weakness. The need to rethink and reformulate each new problem as it occurs could mean that Evangelism is less doctrinaire and more flexible and dynamic in its response. Compared to the unity and consistency of Catholicism, Evangelical teaching may thus appear tactically inferior but in fact forces Protestants to develop a clearer understanding about the specific nature of their character. This taught them that the most important task was applying the most important principle of Evangelical ethics, that of freedom, in the political context.

Since the Evangelical Church distanced itself from socio-political issues, it could not hope to fulfil the didactic role within Protestantism as the Catholic Church played within Catholicism. Like political Catholicism, Protestants were divided between conservatives, liberals and social-reformists, but this lack of Church involvement meant the Evangelical Church could not reconcile political differences between Protestant groups, as the Catholic Church had tried to do.¹⁶⁰ It is also not possible to talk of *The Protestant Church* in the same way as *The Catholic Church*, since the Protestant Church was divided into a number of independent Evangelical *Landeskirchen* and into many separate communities and Protestant sects across Germany, all with their own individual rules, traditions and denomination. The *Landeskirchen* were often closely integrated into the political affairs of local government and lost true independence of activity. This was a situation that not only existed in the 19th century but was criticised for persisting beyond the immediate second world war period.¹⁶¹ Despite its fragmented nature, Protestantism is still seen as a credible force, "eine politische Größe ersten Ranges."¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ Günter Opitz, *Der Christlich-soziale Volksdienst. Versuch einer protestantischen Partei in der Weimarer Republik*. Hrsg. Von der Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1969, p.13.

¹⁶¹ The former member of the Freiburg Circle, Erik Wolf noted; "Eine verhängnisvolle Verquickung der religiösen und sittlichen Begriffe mit den herrschenden politischen Anschauungen und Verhältnissen .. hemmt noch immer die freiheitliche und einheitliche Entwicklung des kirchlichen Verhältnisses." On a positive note Wolf interestingly also suggests that the relatively autonomous arrangement of independent Churches also meant that they were more resistant to the totalitarian endeavours of the unitarist Reichskirche created in 1933 as the Nazis Christian umbrella organisation. Erik Wolf, "Die Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland" in; *Frankfurter Hefte*, Heft 2, 1. Jg, 1946, p.83.

¹⁶² Dorothee Buchhaas-Birkholz, *Zum politischen Weg unseres Volkes. Politische Leitbilder und Vorstellungen im deutschen Protestantismus 1945-1952. Eine Dokumentation. Restauration oder Neuanfang in der evangelischen Kirche?* Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1989, p.10.

The neglect of Protestantism in studies of the origins of the CDU's Christian democracy can also largely be explained by the perception of Liberalism after 1945. Protestant traditions were not welcomed in the CDU's programme. *Anti-liberalism* became a cornerstone of the CDU's early programmes condemning it alongside Marxism, for instilling a secular and materialist *Weltanschauung* in German society. Yet the history of political Protestantism is as important to the history of German Christian Democracy and the CDU's policy of the Social Market Economy, as political Catholicism, and must jointly be examined for its contribution and influence on the CDU's policies and identity. The study does not refute the negative assertions made about the nature of liberal-Protestantism, indeed it will demonstrate how they hold up under historical scrutiny, but seeks to correct the bias that has been shown towards Catholicism. The study will now highlight the social ethical thinking that emerged in the 19th century and Protestant efforts to develop an interdenominational party. Section 3 examines the significant *neo-liberal* movement, that began a third way alternative during the Third Reich. This Freiburg circle of neo-liberals rejected the classical 19th century liberalism, driven by exploitative, economic and monopolistic practices, in favour of a neo-, social-ethical liberalism, that still believed in a market economy but with social responsibility. This demonstrates that the Evangelical *Weltanschauung*, whilst different to Catholic Social Teaching, also contained a code of political ethics which relied on Christian social teaching for reference. It also suggests that from the late 1930s, liberalism was starting to undergo redefinition and revival, to restore those aspects of its original humanitarian interpretation and its association with European western culture, and give new emphasis on a moral economy. It was this strand of liberalism that would have a significant impact on politics after 1945.

To examine the liberal and conservative traditions in German Protestantism, this section will begin with a short inquiry into the religious forms of Protestantism, namely Lutheranism and Calvinism in order to understand the religious motives driving political Protestantism. Here the study draws on the thoughts of Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch, two of the most eminent sociological and economic thinkers of in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They offer a good insight into the parallels between Protestantism and Catholicism, and their theories of the relationship between religion and the economy aid deeper understanding of the CDU's programme after 1945. The study continues by

tracing political initiatives within 19th and early 20th century German Protestantism towards a social, ethical, political programme, examining political parties and individual social reformists who contributed towards that aim. It took no less than three hundred years from when the first Protestant reformers Luther, Calvin and Zwingli formulated initial ideas on how society should be organised,¹⁶³ to the rise of a specific Evangelical-social movement in the 19th century, marked by figures such as Johann Hinrich Wichern (1808- 1881), Adolf Stöcker (1835-1909), Viktor Aimé Huber and Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919). Specific attention will be paid to those political parties whose programmes represented the interests of German Protestants from the mid 19th century until the dissolution of political parties by Hitler in 1933. Besides the focus on liberal parties in this period, some attention will be given to the conservative parties in the mid to late 19th century period, in order to demonstrate where liberal and conservative¹⁶⁴ programmes meet and diverge and secondly to highlight how many of the Conservative parties' ideas were generic to conservative Catholics and to conservative Protestants alike. Finally the study will examine the neo-Liberalist programme developed during the Third Reich by Evangelicals and Catholics of the Freiburg Circle. The third way solutions put forward by the Freiburg groups of economists and socialists must be considered as forerunners to the Social Market Economy in the immediate post second world war period.

Towards an understanding of Lutheranism and Calvinism through Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch

Troeltsch was interested in the importance of religious thought for the development of the modern state and Weber was concerned with investigating the origin and the nature of capitalism, by identifying causal links between Protestantism and the pursuit of capitalism. Weber himself summarised that Troeltsch's two volumes of *Die Sociallehren*

¹⁶³ Karrenberg however maintains that even the leaders of the Reformation, Calvin and Luther, were not concerned with economic and social issues and had never claimed to have devised a concept of a society based on a Christian order. Friedrich Karrenberg, "Geschichte der sozialen Ideen im deutschen Protestantismus" in; Wilfried Gottschalch/Friedrich Karrenberg/Franz Josef Stegmann, op.cit. p.563ff (563-694).

¹⁶⁴ Whilst it is possible to show that there were elements of programmatic continuity from the conservative party traditions beyond 1945, there were equally as many items, which due to their implicit links to national socialism, were consciously expunged from the CDU's new programme.

der christlichen Kirchen in 1911, were primarily concerned with the *Lehre*, the doctrine of religion, unlike Weber who was concerned with what he calls the 'practical' consequences of religion.¹⁶⁵ Troeltsch himself stated that;

"Without a definite mental and spiritual background, a system of this kind (capitalism) cannot become dominant."¹⁶⁶

This supports one of the central themes of this study, namely that the CDU concentrated on establishing a religious ethical substratum to its politics in order that a market economy could subsequently flourish in a stable political and moral society.

Ernst Troeltsch

Troeltsch outlined that the early forms of Protestantism, Lutheranism and Calvinism, were representative of a Church civilisation that existed during the middle ages, a universal Christian civilisation, regulating State and society, based on the belief that Natural Law is identical with the Law of God.¹⁶⁷ Obedience to authority was the essence of Luther's political thought. Luther believed that by serving the State one was also serving God, indeed it was the State that made a religious life possible. Since authority is divine authority, obedience to the state was both a political and a religious duty. Luther was not an exponent of early political liberalism however. His orthodox philosophy demanded subjection to an absolutist ruler and did not encourage the individual to develop as a liberal and critical citizen. As a conservative, Luther supported the ruling classes and prophesised that there would be those in the Catholic Church who would also choose to embrace Protestantism, not for theological reasons, but as a means of stabilising and maintaining their political power.¹⁶⁸ Conversely Troeltsch conceded that Lutheranism closely followed Catholic social philosophy. It adopted the same Catholic doctrine that since the Middle Ages had relied upon the unpolitical character of a society's individuals and on the traditional economic arrangement of society into guilds.

¹⁶⁵ Max Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik I, Eine Aufsatzsammlung*. Hrsg. von Johannes Winckelmann, Siebenstern Taschenbuch Verlag, Hamburg 1975, p.28.

¹⁶⁶ Ernst Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress. A historical study of the relation of Protestantism to the Modern World*. Williams & Northgate, London 1912, p.133.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p.51.

¹⁶⁸ Reinhold Aris, *op. cit.* p.297.

Luther encouraged the attitude that the order of things in society, including the ruling authorities, were beyond reproach. Nurtured obedience to state institutions and a passive acceptance of one's place in society instilled the correct conservative attitude amongst Protestants. Luther's *Zwei-Reich Lehre* was intended to separate the roles and responsibilities of Church and State, yet the Reformation actually introduced a closer, more dependent relationship between the Evangelical Church and the State, where the Church became subordinate to the dictates of the State. As the links between the State and the Evangelical Church continued into the 19th century, religion came to be seen as a way of actively strengthening people's identification with king and country.¹⁶⁹ The *Zwei Reiche Lehre* distinction between an earthly world and a spiritual sphere was not intended to absolve individuals of their responsibility in society.¹⁷⁰ Like Catholicism, Lutheranism felt threatened by the challenges of modern society, the formation of the nation state with its political and economic struggle for power, the unlimited aspirations of capitalism and the rise of the masses. In the modern liberal society, social cohesion would be sought through equality before law and not by the traditional doctrine of social harmony and of a system of guilds or estates. Further Catholic and Lutheran parallels are found in the idea of the organic state, the inspiration of the philosopher and 'founder'¹⁷¹ of political Protestantism, Friedrich Schleiermacher. The organic state was anti-Enlightenment and above all anti-revolutionary, since it is the nature of an organism that it does not alter violently or suddenly, but evolves over a period of time. This thinking formed the backbone of Catholic and Protestant Conservatism, as a safeguard against the alienation of the individual in society. The urgent need for social reform as a response to the challenges of the modern age, was, according to Troeltsch however, only successfully understood and developed by Catholicism. Indeed Luther's reform of the Church saw Protestantism simply as a modification of Catholicism. Like Catholicism it was also concerned with assuring man's salvation, but Protestantism held different views

¹⁶⁹ Hans Georg Aschoff, "Protestantismus und Staat im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert" in: Geschichte der christlich-demokratischen und christlich-sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland. Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Band 216, im Auftrag der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Hrsg. von Günther Rüther, Bonn 1989, p.61 (57-93).

¹⁷⁰ "Die viel zitierte lutherische Zwei-Reiche-Lehre... wäre völlig mißverstanden, wollte man sie so interpretieren, als sei die Ordnung der weltlichen Bezüge damit aus der christlichen Verantwortung, aus christlichem Mitdenken entlassen." Friedrich Karrenberg, op.cit. p.563.

¹⁷¹ Reinold Aris, op.cit. p.291.

about how this could best be achieved. (These answers were partially linked to the concept of predestination which most concerned Weber). Catholicism believed the Church would be the guide of social reform, whilst involving a return to Christian Natural Law in which group-solidarity and a respect for a system of class distinctions prevailed. In contrast to early Catholic thinking however, 19th century political Catholicism believed capitalist activity could be incorporated into the system, provided that it did not threaten social cohesion in society. Troeltsch concluded that: "the modern Catholic social policy is a capitalistic regenerated programme of mediaeval class ideas."¹⁷²

Although German Protestantism is generally understood to belong to the Lutheran variety, the Calvinist strand must not be forgotten. Calvinism took a more active role in the changing modern social, political and economic conditions of the industrial revolution, transforming the entire Christian social philosophy and ethics in countries such as England and the United States where it took root.¹⁷³ As Calvinism developed, Troeltsch maintains, Lutheranism was left behind and soon became stationary. Calvinism showed all signs of becoming a major political influence in the world, in all matters of ethics, organisation, politics and social questions and makes its practical influence all the greater.¹⁷⁴ Calvinism stood as the democratic, revolutionary strand in Evangelical thinking, inciting resistance to despotic rule in the Anglo-Saxon revolutions. The Calvinist version of Protestantism defended itself against suppression by the State and placed the right to resist (*Widerstandsrecht*) as the central tenet of its philosophy. This contrasts sharply with the non-revolutionary Lutheran Protestantism with its belief in the patriarchal state that demanded state power was respected as a manifestation of God's will.

¹⁷² Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, Vol 1. 1911, First published in English, Allen & Unwin, London 1931, p.310.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Ernst Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress*. op.cit., p.54.

After the defeat of the First World War and the upheaval of the 1918 Revolution in Germany, Troeltsch delivered an essay on the opportunities for German Democracy¹⁷⁵ insisting that democracy was no longer only a doctrine but had become a practical necessity;

“Democracy can unite broad social strata to facilitate enormous productivity, can supply a foundation of love and affection for the common state, can bring into greater play the dignity and personality of each citizen, can root responsibility and initiative in individual will and can effect a selection of fresh talents and will: all things of the highest ethical value and most fruitful political significance.”¹⁷⁶

He insisted that while the Germans have; “no talent for democracy and none at all for politics or what amounts to the same thing,” they must learn it. Social conservatives, he argued, who believed that the German spirit and culture descended from the traditions of the romantics and humanists, the German empire of the middle ages and from Luther and the Reformation, must learn that democracy is not incompatible with this line of tradition. Importantly the essay foresees areas of linkage;

‘our classical spiritual heritage also offers sufficient lines of connection to a spiritual-ethical conception of democracy.’¹⁷⁷

This highlights the potential compatibility that existed between conservative traditions and liberal democracy, that would later lead to third way political solutions in Christian Democracy.

Max Weber

The views of Max Weber¹⁷⁸ both complement and complete Troeltsch’s analysis on the relationship between politics and religion. As a member of the *Deutsche Demokratische*

¹⁷⁵ Ernst Troeltsch, “Die deutsche Demokratie,” December 29, 1918, first published in; Hans Baron, *Spektatorbriefe. Aufsätze über die deutsche Revolution und die Weltpolitik 1918-1922*, J.C.B Mohr, Tübingen 1924, p.301-313.

¹⁷⁶ Ernst Troeltsch, “Die deutsche Demokratie,” translated into the English and printed in; Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, Edward Dimendberg (ed.), *The Weimar Republic Sourcebook*, University of California Press, Berkeley, California, Los Angeles California, London 1994, p.90.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ It is not possible here to enter into a full detailed discussion of Weber’s political ideas and their possible impact on the development of German history. The study will restrict its focus to the relationship between religion and politics and consider Weber’s contribution in the DDP. Indeed Weber’s views on

Partei (DDP) and as a prominent sociologist in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Weber actively contributed to the shaping of German politics in this period. Weber's ideas would most certainly have influenced the political thinking of senior post Second World War politicians who had served alongside Weber in parties in the Weimar Republic. Max Weber belonged to the class of German Liberals who admired the parliamentary¹⁷⁹ system in England and glorified England Protestantism for the promotion of German modernisation, hoping that imperial Germany would emulate Great Britain in political liberty and world power.¹⁸⁰ At the same time Weber also believed in the notion of Germany's anti-western, non-democratic *Sonderentwicklung*¹⁸¹ and was committed to the pursuit of German nationalism.¹⁸²

Weber showed no more sympathy to Protestantism than he did towards Catholicism. In fact he did not follow the ethics of Jesus Christ but adhered to his own absolutist ethics of responsibility. Midgley¹⁸³ has noted;

“If Christianity were content to be an ideology - a subjective meaning imposed upon a meaningless universe - it would be awarded a place. Given that Christianity is not an ideology, there is no room for it in Weber's realm of values.”

the influences of religion for economic society have undergone considerable scrutiny and the validity of his theories have been fundamentally questioned. The study's further neglect of other subjects in Weber's thinking in particular the very relevant questions of *Volkssouveränität* and *Führerdemokratie* have for reasons of space been compromised here.

¹⁷⁹ A parliamentary monarchy was in fact the best form of state that Weber could envisage, based on the belief that if the highest position in the country was 'occupied' by the monarch, politicians would not be consumed the ambition to become head of state. A politician's power was thus adequately restrained. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890-1920*, Mohr, Tübingen 1959, p.311.

¹⁸⁰ Günther Roth, "Weber, the Would-Be Englishman" in; Harmut Lehmann/Günther Roth (Editors), *Weber's Protestant Ethic. Origins, Evidence, Contexts*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993, p.121.

¹⁸¹ Alexander Schwan, "Deutscher Liberalismus und nationale Frage im 19. Jahrhundert" in; M.Funke/H.A Jacobsen, H.H Knütter, H.P Schwarz (Hrsg.), *Demokratie und Diktatur. Geist und Gestalt politischer Herrschaft in Deutschland und Europa*, Festschrift für Karl Dietrich Bracher, Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1987, p.46 (46-59).

¹⁸² His nationalism was not of a kind that inspired the Nazis' National Socialism. Despite supporting Realpolitik and German Kultur, he was not a Social Darwinist or anti-Semitic. See W.G Runciman, *Max Weber. Selections in Translation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1978. p.209. National identity for Weber was not based on specific categories of language or ethnicity, but was was a dependent concept, shaped by its relationship to political events and the state. See also Harry Liebersohn, "Weber's Historical Concept of National Identity" in; Harmut Lehmann/Günther Roth op. cit., p.131.

¹⁸³ E.B.F Midgley, *The Ideology of Max Weber. A Thomist Critique*, Gower, Aldershot 1983. p.95.

So Weber treated Protestantism and Catholicism as if they *were* ideologies, where the Christian confessions had imposed a subjective meaning upon the institution of the Church, which is merely a human organisation, and not a divine society.

During the nineteenth century, economists and sociologists, including Weber, found themselves embroiled in the so-called '*Methodenstreit*' debating the merits of different economic models for social organisation. The debate was broadly divided into two schools of thought: the English tradition of the 'Classical Economic School' and the German 'Historical School.' The classic economics of the English tradition or 'Manchesterism' was based on a set of ahistorical, economic rules which were fuelled by self-interest and laissez-faire. In Germany however it was thought that the lateness of the industrial revolution and a largely agrarian population made the English approach unsuitable. Society, it seemed, was changing too rapidly in Germany and demanded that the economy was obliged to also take the negative social consequences of the industrial revolution into consideration. The organisation of the economy is thus crucially held to be historically variable. The German Historical School further argued that society's economic activity can not be divorced from legal, political and religious factors. Individuals are influenced by ethical considerations such as duty, the desire for glory or their wish to conform. Since these factors are changeable, it follows that economic phenomena must also remain variable.¹⁸⁴ Weber importantly followed the teaching of the German Historical School, postulating that Germany's unique form of capitalism was an historical phenomenon.

In his classic treatise *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber hoped to contribute to the debate on how ideas affect historical reality;

"Zur Veranschaulichung der Art, in der überhaupt die 'Ideen' in der Geschichte wirksam werden."¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ Gordon Marshall, *In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism An essay on Max Weber's Protestant Ethic Thesis*, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., London 1982, p.29.

¹⁸⁵ Max Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik I* in; Johannes Winckelmann (Hrsg.), op. cit., p.76.

It is worth noting that the *Protestant Ethic* was written in a period in history when Weber sought to reinvigorate the middle classes to engage in a class conscious, political struggle against conservatism. He hoped that the implementation of a liberal, social policy would attract the support of the German *Bürgertum* and the proletariat to join in the fight against conservatism.¹⁸⁶ Even if historians and sociologists have since re-evaluated the tenability of Weber's 'Protestant Ethic' thesis and the efficacy of religious ideas in reality, the work nevertheless enforces the ideological interest that Weber pursued. It is also important to recognise the great impact of the work, not only after its release in 1905 but also in the Weimar period and beyond. Weimar politicians and specifically those that went on to shape the CDU's programme after 1945 were, as contemporaries of Max Weber, direct recipients and therefore also practitioners of his political thinking.

It is not the occasion here to assess the validity of Weber's Protestant Ethic thesis, but to understand Weber's distinction between Catholic and Protestant attitudes to capitalism. Weber focuses his attention in *Die protestantische Ethik*, on the affinity between religious beliefs and a rational economic ethic, which he said embodied the 'spirit' of capitalism. This affinity would suggest that there is a causal link between Protestant beliefs and the rational capitalist mentality, with the assertion that it was Calvinistic asceticism which produced the capitalist spirit on which the capitalist system relies.¹⁸⁷ The capitalist spirit was seen to create the correct psychological conditions 'eine anerzogene geistige Eigenart' for capitalism to emerge and be sustained. The fact that Protestants predominately occupied the upper echelons of modern industry could, Weber concedes, be as much historically determined as causal, admitting for example that more Protestants had access to a university education than Catholics, and hence their enhanced wealth creating opportunities. Yet he insists in his final conclusion that there are differing attitudinal and psychological dispositions between Protestants and Catholics.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890-1920*, op. cit., p.417.

¹⁸⁷ The exact nature of the causal link between Calvinism and Capitalism is ambiguous, since the capitalist spirit is both the distinguishing characteristic of and the important precondition for the capitalist system.

¹⁸⁸ "Der Grund des verschiedenen Verhaltens muß also der Hauptsache nach in der dauernden inneren Eigenart und nicht nur in der jeweiligen äußeren historisch-politischen Lage der Konfessionen gesucht werden" in; Max Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik I*, op. cit., p.33.

The ethical teachings of Calvinism are believed to be conducive to fostering a capitalist economic order and outlook, allowing spiritual energy to be channelled towards capitalist ends.¹⁸⁹ Its premise is based on the Calvinist concept of 'predestination'. Before discussing the term, it should be remembered that Weber's interest was not in the official doctrines of Protestantism but rather on the *unintended* consequences of accepting them. These consequences included what Weber described in *The Protestant Ethic* as a "direction to practical conduct".¹⁹⁰ It is interesting to briefly consider how the belief in predestination impacts on practical conduct. The doctrine of predestination is based on an individual's ignorance of their ultimate destiny and an obsession with salvation from God's damnation. This predicament is characterised by the question "am I among the chosen?" The individual is powerless to intervene to change God's decree, but by conducting a life according to the doctrine of Protestant ethics, the individual could win God's favour and be assured of the certainty of salvation. The Calvinist is freed from the fear of damnation by becoming successful in one's profession or chosen career. This encourages work to be performed as if it were an absolute end in itself - a calling. By virtue of continuous capitalist enterprise, profit is renewable and so becomes an end in itself. The 'ethic' or 'ethos' of modern capitalism develops from the individual's belief that it is his or her 'duty' (*Berufspflicht*)¹⁹¹ to increase and accumulate wealth and capital where the motivation is driven by transcendent values and not through selfishness or greed. The need for this new spirit of modern capitalism stands in contrast to the classical economic morality that preceded it, when capitalist endeavour sought the ruthless acquisition of wealth, connoting vulgar materialism, 'adventurist' speculating and risk. Weber's new vision of the modern capitalist therefore is of a frugal individual, tamed by 'bourgeois rationality'¹⁹² who restricts personal consumption, maximises profits rationally, runs low risks and calculates returns on investment. For Weber ethics formed the basis of an individual's activities.

¹⁸⁹ The assumption that Calvin and Calvinism led the way to capitalism has been strongly disputed by Karl Holl who claims Calvinism did more to fight the capitalist economy than foster it. Karl Holl, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte*. Band 1, p.385ff; cited in Friedrich Karrenberg, op. cit., p.564.

¹⁹⁰ J. Alan Winter, "Elective Affinities between Religious Beliefs and Ideologies of Management" in; *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 79 1973/74, p.1138 (795-1598).

¹⁹¹ "Der Mensch ist auf das Erwerben als Zweck seines Lebens, nicht mehr das Erwerben auf den Menschen als Mittel zum Zweck der Befriedigung seiner materiellen Lebensbedürfnisse bezogen." Max Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik I*, op. cit., p.44.

¹⁹² Gordon Marshall, op. cit., p.44.

In the Lutheran tradition, work or *Beruf* is carried out as a God ordained duty to authority, whilst in Calvinism the motivation is ascetic. It is due to this distinction that Catholics regarded Calvinism and not Lutheranism as its religious opponent.¹⁹³ Although Weber never fully pursued the subject of Protestantism and modernity in Germany, leaving this task to Troeltsch,¹⁹⁴ Troeltsch's influence on Weber should not be underestimated.¹⁹⁵ Troeltsch believed the Protestant concept of the calling as 'the Christian justification of industrial life' is derived from the conservative doctrine of each and every individual or worker contributing to society in accordance with their appointed function or class, the guild system which is Catholic in origin.¹⁹⁶ The chief architect of the Social Market Economy, Alfred Müller-Armack¹⁹⁷ defined what he saw as the fundamental differences between Catholicism, Lutheranism and Calvinism;

“Während der Katholizismus die ständisch-handwerkliche Wirtschaftsweise des Mittelalters konserviert, lenkt der calvinistische Westen in eine kapitalistisch-industrielle Entwicklung ein. Das Luthertum hingegen paßt sich den Aufgaben der Neuzeit im wesentlichen mit öffentlich-staatswirtschaftlichen Einrichtungen an.”

This not only demonstrates the more obvious correlation between socio-economic development and religion but implies that the nature of that development is defined by the particular denominational characteristics of that religion. Whereas Catholicism focused its economic activity on agriculture and handicrafts, attacking finance, credit and wholesale trade and adhered to the Canon-Law ban on investment and interest, Calvinism encouraged the expansion of industrialisation and capitalism and rejected Canon-law restrictions on investment. The natural if not simplified conjecture to this,

¹⁹³ In Calvinism “eine ganz andersartige Beziehung zwischen religiösem Leben und irdischem Handeln hergestellt ist als sowohl im Katholizismus wie im Luthertum.” Max Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik* I, op. cit., p.73.

¹⁹⁴ Thomas Nipperdey, “Max Weber, Protestantism and the Debate around 1900” in; Harmut Lehmann/Günther Roth (Editors), op.cit., p.80.

¹⁹⁵ Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, “The German Theological Sources and Protestant Church Politics” in; Harmut Lehmann/Günther Roth, op.cit., p.32.

¹⁹⁶ Ernst Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress*, op. cit., p.129f.

¹⁹⁷ Alfred Müller-Armack, *Religion und Wirtschaft*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1959, p.545.

which is inferred by Troeltsch, is that modern capitalist development can be ascribed not to Protestantism as a whole but to Calvinism in particular.¹⁹⁸

The religious sociology practised by Ernst Troeltsch and Max Weber was an investigation into how far religious ethos influenced political, economic and social aspects of life. It needs little elucidation to see why this inquiry should also preoccupy Christian Democrats after 1945, when the challenge lay in instigating the correct 'spirit' for capitalist activity in Germany, whilst at the same time preventing the development of an unrestrained form of capitalism, that is driven by profit and power and lacking in any ethical foundation. Weber's pertinent essay '*Politik als Beruf*'¹⁹⁹, written in the post-war, revolutionary mood of 1919, but not published until the later years of the Weimar Republic, must be examined not only for its influence on Weber's intended audience of post first world war politicians, but re-examined for its lessons for politicians after the second world war, among them, those individuals who took up responsibility in the new CDU.

The essay investigates the nature of a politician's calling to a political vocation. There are two ways of making politics one's vocation; either one lives 'for' politics or one lives 'off' politics, although he adds that the contrast is not exclusive and in reality the politician does both.²⁰⁰ The politician who lives *for* politics makes politics his life. He is not dependent on his vocation for his livelihood but gains meaning in his life by serving this cause. He who lives 'off' politics as a vocation makes politics his permanent source of income. Although the power instinct belongs to the normal attributes of every type of politician, the danger exists when that urge for power detaches itself from reality and drives only self-interest. This type of politician is a contemptible species of politician who acts out of vanity and lacks realism and responsibility.²⁰¹ Weber inquires whether it

¹⁹⁸ Despite important areas of incompatibility between Calvinism and Lutheranism in the Protestant tradition, in the context of 19th century Germany they represented one united front against Catholicism. Albert Ritschl had sought to emphasise the unity amongst Lutheran and Calvinist Protestants, even if he had a higher regard for Lutheranism. Weber strongly opposed Ritschl, arguing that Lutheranism was a deficient form of Protestant religiosity and relied on Matthias Schneckenburger for his analysis of the differences between the Lutheran and Calvinist religions. See Friedrich Wilhelm Graf, *op.cit.*, p.46.

¹⁹⁹ Max Weber, *Politik als Beruf*. Nachwort von Ralf Dahrendorf, Philipp Reclam jun., Stuttgart 1992.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p.16.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p.63.

is even possible to talk of compatibility between ethics and politics, when the instrument of politics is power which by definition relies on the threat or the use of violence.²⁰² The answer is found in the nature of *justified* intention. The ethical standards that govern political activity are based on 'intentions,' *Gesinnungsethik*, or responsibility *Verantwortungsethik*. If the *intentions* of a particular action are noble then the code of ethics behind that action are justified as meaningful, even if in reality they are not. An action governed by the ethics of intention is based on the Christian belief that if the Christian acts correctly, whatever the outcome may be, it will be decided by God. The ethics of 'intention' falls short when the end, or intention, is considered to sanctify often violent or evil means. The individual is not compelled to feel personal blame or moral responsibility for improper behaviour, arguing that it was God's will to create humans this way, however imperfect they might be. The ethics of 'responsibility' on the other hand, presupposes that the individual is answerable to the consequences of their own actions. An individual behaving according to the ethics of responsibility also acknowledges that humans have faults, but instead of shifting the blame and responsibility, they accept the full consequence of their behaviour. It was precisely Weber's appeal to those called to political life to employ an 'ethics of responsibility,' to accept the consequences of their actions, rather than an 'ethics of intentions' which implied that any means could be justified in the name of an ultimate end.

What then is the relevance of *Gesinnungsethik* and *Verantwortungsethik* in the context of this study? Protestantism, according to Weber had legitimised the power of the state and thereby also legitimated violence as a means. Lutheranism in particular had taken the responsibility for war away from the individual and transferred it to government, which for the individual, it could never be a sin to obey. Luther is thus blamed for fostering an attitude that legitimated an authoritarian state as a divine institution. Weimar's *Interessenparteien* as this section will now show, did not pursue worthy political ideals since they were harnessed by the need to fulfil particular class interests and short term goals. They did not project their vision of a *bonum commune* through their programmes but sought only to retain political power, failing to take the full responsibility of a political party. These are examples of Weber's *Gesinnungsethik* and point to failure of

²⁰² Ibid., p.68.

the Bismarckian, Wilhelmian periods and the Weimar Republic to correct elements of German political society. An ethics of responsibility therefore clearly represented the best ethics for Germany to adopt after 1945. Weber finally concludes the essay by stating that both the ethics of intention and the ethics of responsibility are not diametrically opposed but indeed complementary and that only together do they make a man truly qualified for a political vocation.

“Insofern sind Gesinnungsethik und Verantwortungsethik nicht absolute Gegensätze, sondern Ergänzungen, die zusammen erst den echten Menschen ausmachen, den, der den ‘Beruf zur Politik’ haben kann.”²⁰³

Germany’s historical experience nevertheless demanded a re-assessment of the individual’s role towards political responsibility, both as voter and as politician, one which sought to replace the passive, submissive character for an active, democratic and responsible participant in political affairs. Later sections will show that among others, Konrad Adenauer embodied the post Second World War figure of the *Verantwortungsethiker*, whilst even retaining some Machiavellian characteristics that could be seen to fulfil the complementary measure of *Gesinnungsethik*. There are further, more minor incidentals in applying Weber’s theory of the vocation of politics to the figure of Adenauer. According to Weber, the lawyer was the kind of educated professional suitable for political service. Adenauer also studied law. The wider significance of the lawyer as politician in the rise of a political party is an interesting one to draw parallels with the rise of the CDU. According to Weber, a political party relies on the same techniques as a lawyer, since parties who manage politics are simply managing interests. The skill of the trained lawyer is to plead effectively the cause of his or her client. The lawyer wins by making a ‘strong case’ for his or her clients’ arguments and knows how to use language most effectively for success. These are obvious parallels to the task of a political party in legitimating its political programme to win elections, and to Adenauer’s rhetorical skill in particular.

²⁰³ Max Weber, op. cit. p.81.

Social ethical thinking in German Protestantism

Protestantism has been criticised for its failure to recognise or adequately respond to the 'social question' in late 19th century society and those attempts to instigate a social movement from within the Protestant camp have been accused of not going beyond the experimental stage.²⁰⁴ The movement was marked by the figures of Johann Hinrich Wichern, Victor Aimé Huber, Friedrich Karl von Bodelschwingh and Adolf Stoecker. Bodelschwingh differed from other social thinkers of his time, emphasising that the responsibility of the Protestant Church did not lie with solving the social question, but with its involvement in state institutions and its development towards a parliamentary system. This stood in contrast to the approach by the Catholic Church which campaigned for the freedom of the Church and for the rights of the working class individual in society.²⁰⁵

Described by one post war commentator with some exaggeration as "die stärkste und eindrucksvollste Persönlichkeit, die der Protestantismus im 19. Jahrhundert hervorgebracht hat"²⁰⁶ Johann Hinrich Wichern may be seen to be a pioneering representative of the early Christian social movement. His *Innere Mission* was aimed at supporting individuals' social and religious needs and reuniting the divided Protestant Church. He believed that through a renewal of the Christian faith and Christian socialism, he could establish the basis for social and economic renewal.²⁰⁷ His historical sermon at the Wittenberg *Kirchentag* in 1848 succeeded above all in raising awareness of the struggle Christianity would face in future with communist-socialism over the social plight of the proletariat, and established the Central Committee for the Inner Mission in 1849 to act as a Christian bulwark against communism. A series of follow-up Church

²⁰⁴ Gerhard Schulz, "Die 'Christliche Union' und die kirchliche Tradition" in; M.G Lange/G. Schulz, K. Schütz. Mit einer Einleitung von Sigmund Neumann, Parteien in der Bundesrepublik. Studien zur Entwicklung der deutschen Parteien bis zur Bundestagswahl 1953, Ring Verlag, Stuttgart/Düsseldorf 1955, p.36 (p.26-40).

²⁰⁵ "Der deutsche Protestantismus, in einem anders gearteten Verhältnis zur staatlichen Autorität, stieß bei seiner Sorge um den Arbeiter zunächst auf wirtschaftliche Probleme, deren Wechselwirkung mit politischen Problemen er jedoch bald erkannte." Ernst Deuerlein, CDU/CSU 1945-1947 Beiträge zur Zeitgeschichte, J. P Bachem, Köln 1957, p.25.

²⁰⁶ Franz Schnabel, Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert. Bd 4, Herder, Freiburg in Br.1951, p.440.

²⁰⁷ William O'Shanahan, op. cit., p.212.

congresses gave an important impulse to social policy initiatives within the Evangelical Church, even if his ideas remained largely theoretical judgements which never went so far as practical social policy recommendations or resulted in industrial legislation to improve workers' conditions.²⁰⁸ Wichern sought to implement the kind of traditional, patriarchal spirit to regulate employer-employee relations that harked back to a pre-industrial, romantic age and advocated gradual social reform through state institutions. This is cited as an explanation why Wichern is not remembered as a true initiator of an Evangelical social movement.²⁰⁹ In the same year he outlined his views in the *Denkschrift* entitled *Die innere Mission der deutschen evangelischen Kirche* which interestingly was reprinted in a new edition in 1948.²¹⁰ Under the influence of Friedrich Julius Stahl, Wichern adapted his programmatic concerns to more conservative viewpoints, and the reform element in his social thinking was diluted to idealise a more traditional Christian ordered community. Further examples of theological inconsistencies in his thinking and his inability to create a true dialogue between the Church and the modern, secular world have caused him to be criticised for encouraging a *geistige Ideologisierung* in Christianity's relationship to socialism.²¹¹

Closely related to the views of Wichern was Victor Aimé Huber, a less well-known Evangelical social political thinker, who first saw the social question as a working class issue.²¹² He recognised the importance of the new industrial age and the significant role that the working classes would play in future.²¹³ In strong opposition to the revolutionary politicisation of the labour movement by Ferdinand Lassalle, Huber single-handedly sought to bring about social change from within existing society, attracting the attention of Catholic social thinkers including Bishop von Ketteler. Huber's programme

²⁰⁸ Hans-Georg Aschoff, op. cit., p.70.

²⁰⁹ Günter Brakelmann, *Die Soziale Frage des 19. Jahrhunderts. Teil II: Die evangelisch-soziale und die katholisch-soziale Bewegung*, Luther Verlag, Witten/Ruhr 1962, p.35.

²¹⁰ J. H. Wichern, *Die inner Mission der deutschen evangelischen Kirche. Eine Denkschrift an die deutsche Nation, im Auftrage des Centrausschusses für die innere Mission*. Martin Gerhardt (Hrsg), Agentur des Rauhen Hauses, Hamburg 1948.

²¹¹ "Seine ganze Konzeption des christlichen Staates und der christlichen Gesellschaft, auch wenn sie einzelne großartige Elemente enthalten hat, wurde somit zur spätbürgerlichen christlichen Ideologie" im: Günter Brakelmann, op. cit., p.37.

²¹² Fritz Fischer, "Der deutsche Protestantismus und die Politik im 19. Jahrhundert" in: *Historische Zeitschrift* Nr.171, 1951, p.505 (p.473-518).

²¹³ Günter Brakelmann, op. cit., p.46.

suggestions for workers' participation in industrial production, industrial action, plus profit share schemes, reflect trade unionist ideas even before workers and parties had begun to mobilise the trade union movement.²¹⁴ In contrast to Wichern, Huber did not advocate state intervention to solve the social question. His vision of co-operative associations would allow individuals the freedom to perform 'self-help' programmes and offered the best guarantee for solving social injustices between the rich and the poor. Huber saw the possibilities for a non-political social reform by calling upon private responsibility in the name of religion²¹⁵ and insisted that *Gewerbefreiheit, Freizügigkeit und freies Niederlassungsrecht* represented the three pillars of social freedom.

The earlier section on political Catholicism showed that appeals by the Christian trade unions in the 1920s to recognise their common Christian values could not combat the years of ingrained prejudice between Protestants and Catholics. Yet those moves towards creating an interdenominational party by Christian trade unionists including Adam Stegerwald were supported by prominent Evangelical figures such as Heinrich Braun, Rudolf Bornemann and Karl Anton Schulte. They emphasised the communality shared in Christianity, the freedom of the individual and sovereignty of the people, and sought where possible to minimise confessional differences. The views of the Evangelical teacher of national law and Protestant conservative, Friedrich Julius Stahl coincided with the romantic views of the Catholic and liberal conservative Josef Görres, who believed in forming a 'Christian state' where political parties were bound, not by organisational factors, but by confession.²¹⁶ Although there is evidence between 1815 and 1933 of real links between the Centre Party and humanitarian, socially conscious Protestants such as Adolf Stoecker, Friedrich Julius Stahl and Johann Hinrich Wichern, Becker²¹⁷ maintains however that it would be illusory to talk of any real political break-through.

“Eine gemeinsame Parteibildung auf der Grundlage eines Einverständnisses über das christliche Menschenbild wurde nicht erreicht. Das Trennende zwischen den Konfessionen wurde zumal in Deutschland stärker empfunden als die Infragestellung

²¹⁴ Friedrich Karrenberg, op. cit., p.577.

²¹⁵ William O'Shanahan, op. cit., p.283.

²¹⁶ Ernst Deuerlein, CDU/CSU 1945-1947, op. cit., p.16.

²¹⁷ Winfried Becker, Die Zentrumspartei., op. cit., p.276f.

des Christentums durch die tendenziell oder offen säkularistischen Weltanschauungen.”

2.1. Liberal and Conservative Parties before and during the Weimar Republic

Chapter one of this section on political Catholicism discussed the ideological conflict between conservatism and liberalism, that defined the *Weltanschauung* and the region-specific, socio-economic *Milieu* of Catholics and the basis for Germany's political parties.²¹⁸ It was discussed, that as a political idea, conservatism - whilst in existence before the French Revolution²¹⁹ - gained new force as a specific political movement to respond to the liberalism of the Enlightenment. The early Romantic definition of conservatism aimed at protecting the status quo, was anti-establishment and anti-liberal in tone and took a defensive reaction to state power and interference.²²⁰ In the period 1850-60, the Conservative-Liberal dichotomy sub-divided into six further categories which distinguished between social democrats, left liberals, right national liberals, Catholics, plus at least two factions of Conservatives, and was a clear indication that Germany would develop into a multi-party, pluralistic state. German parties were characterised by loyalty to philosophical and ideological principles, and political campaigns were run on "politische Glaubensbekenntnisse"²²¹ earning German parties the title of '*Weltanschauungsparteien*.' By the time of the Reich's foundation in 1870, the shared antagonism towards Socialist and Catholic ideologies and mutual nationalist interests led to a fusion of liberal and conservative groups into one united national camp, shrinking the previous six ideological categories to just three, Catholics, Socialists and

²¹⁸ It has been argued that the regional dimension of a particular socio-cultural milieu, including its religious and social characteristics were the most significant influences on voting behaviour. See M. Rainer Lepsius, "Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur. Zum Problem der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft" in; Gerhard A. Ritter (Hrsg.), *Die Deutschen Parteien vor 1918*, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Köln 1973, p.67. Karl Rohe goes so far as to suggest that the party system of the early Kaiserreich should be understood as a loosely connected system of regional party systems, which were only transformed once national politics took a more dominating role. Karl Rohe, *Elections, Parties and Political Traditions. Social Foundations of German Parties and Party Systems, 1867-1987*, Berg, Providence 1990, p.9.

²¹⁹ Panajotis Kondylis defines the beginning of conservatism as the reaction to the emergence of the absolutist state. Panajotis Kondylis, *Konservatismus - Geschichtlicher Gehalt und Untergang*, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1986.

²²⁰ Karl Rohe, "Entwicklungen" op.cit., p.43.

²²¹ Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte. 1866-1918. Band II. Machtstaat vor der Demokratie*, Verlag C.H Beck. 3. Aufl., München 1995, p.312.

Nationals.²²² Conservatism had thus developed into a movement which sought its identity not *anti*, but indeed *with* the State.

Liberalism and Conservatism therefore prove wholly inadequate terms to accurately describe the political aspirations of the parties of the newly found Reich. Between the 1848 revolution and the foundation of the Reich and beyond, the terms defy any attempt to maintain ideological continuity. It is a task of this study to show that re-definition and re-evaluation of the concepts 'conservative' and 'liberal' in the mid to late 19th century and early 20th century, can account for seemingly dramatic re-inventions of parties' political identities over time. In the same way that the Centre Party deserved specific mention for its influence on the CDU, certain conservative and liberal parties from the late 19th century and early 20th century Weimar Republic also provided political impulses for the content of the CDU's programmes after 1945, as well as a body of able conservative and liberal politicians. This will therefore provide the focus for the remaining part of this chapter.

Conservative parties

The conservative wing of Protestantism included those who saw the root of all evil in the liberal ideas of 1789, such as the brothers Gerlach,²²³ Friedrich Julius Stahl,²²⁴ and the federalists who were sceptical of the State and its central bureaucratic authority. Both strands held common core conservative values, rejection of the parliamentary system, suspicion of modernity, support for the monarchy, emphasis on the 'whole' society and not on the individual, and loyalty to tradition and religion. The Protestant orthodox-conservatives, the *Altkonservativen* were among those who opposed the Prussian annexation of German *Länder* in 1866 for fear that the Evangelical Church would become part of the Prussian Union, causing the party to split in 1867. A break-away group calling themselves the *Freikonservative Vereinigung* thereby demonstrated their support for Bismarck's policies. The *Altkonservativen* who also found themselves unable

²²² Karl Rohe, *Entwicklungen ..* op.cit., p.47ff.

²²³ Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach who opposed the ambition of the *Kulturkampf* to achieve state omnipotence left the Prussian Conservative Partei to join the Centre Party.

²²⁴ Referred to as a champion of autocratic hierarchy, Stahl differed in philosophy to the Gerlach brothers in granting people some constitutional rights. He could therefore be seen more as a reformist conservative who suggested a way towards a constitutional monarchy.

to withstand the nationalism which followed the Reich's foundation, gradually drew their cause closer to Bismarck too. The *Deutscher Nationalverein* and the national, liberal *Protestantenverein* were conservative parties that sought to redefine Protestantism by bringing it in line with modern society. But they too were rapidly subsumed by Bismarck's nationalist striving for German unity. A further group of federalist conservatives, the *Deutschkonservative Partei* founded in Frankfurt/Main in 1876, declared themselves representatives of non-Prussian conservatives, yet continued to endorse Prussian hegemony and uphold the status of the aristocracy within the German Reich.²²⁵

The traditional show of Conservative opposition to a liberal, anti-feudal and democratic nationalism was further distorted once German nationalism adopted imperialist and expansionist ambitions from the turn of the century, inciting the Conservatives to declare in the Reichstag in 1910;

“Wir sind fürs Königtum, wir sind für Herr und Marine, wir sind für alles Nationale.”²²⁶

Bismarck could confidently rely on conservative support for almost all government policies, in particular military expansion where it promised to increase the Reich's power and influence in international affairs. Former political divisions between the conservatives and the liberals increasingly blurred and the conservative cause soon became synonymous with the national cause. They shared a vehement opposition to socialist and ultramontane political majorities, and found common ground with the liberals' anti-federal and nationalistic outlook.²²⁷ Among the ideological shifting and shuffling of the mainstream parties, unexpected but significant parallels were redrawn across the party spectrum, causing Friedrich Naumann for example to note in 1911 that

²²⁵ The federal ambitions of the *Deutschkonservative Partei* were questionable as they continued to see the Reich as an enlarged Prussia and explains why they failed to draw support from conservatives in other regions of the Reich. From 1890 they turned their support to representing the interests of agricultural industry. Helga Grebing, *Geschichte der deutschen Parteien*, Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden 1962. p.59.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.69.

²²⁷ Karl Rohe, “Entwicklungen...” *op.cit.*, p.44.

the Centre Party, as a Catholic conservative party and the *Konservativen* as a Protestant conservative party, had very little difference between them.²²⁸

After 1918, conservatives turned their attention to evaluating the First World War and its significance. They longed to see the war as a natural and self-justifying event and to attach a higher meaning to the war experience. This new conservative tendency, termed *neo-conservatism*, was not a reactionary movement that sought to restore the authoritarian nationalism of the pre-war era. Once it had been freed from the constraints of the monarchy, nationalism found a new freedom of expression. Also abandoning their former contempt for socialism, these conservatives believed in reconciling their conservative-nationalist traditions with Socialism and the organised labour movement, to develop a new German version of National Socialism. This movement has been termed the 'Conservative Revolution.'²²⁹ Neo-conservatives had a vision of a *Volksgemeinschaft*, a community based on principles beyond the established political categories of left and right. By transcending the political framework of left and right, they hoped to create a sense of German national identity.²³⁰ The conservative adviser to Franz von Papen, Edgar Jung, expressed views which would later be echoed by Christian democrats. Jung believed in a community based on shared interests between workers and employers, and whilst the economy should remain in private hands, the state was responsible for keeping the 'greed' of capitalism in check. In '*Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen*' from 1927, Jung criticised Socialists for wanting to 'socialise the basically healthy system of private enterprise' and together with thinkers such as Moeller van den Bruck and Karl Radek envisaged a 'third idea' between capitalism and socialism.²³¹ Neo-conservatism hoped to combat the Marxist idea that socialism should be class-based and looked to embrace both workers and middle classes. It did not seek to eliminate capitalism as a suitable economic system but rather to give it the 'correct' moral spirit of a national socialism.

²²⁸ Friedrich Naumann cited in; Wolfgang Treue, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1954*, op. cit., p.16.

²²⁹ Roger Woods, *The Conservative Revolution in the Weimar Republic*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London 1996. See also Kurt Sontheimer, *Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik*, Nymphenburger, München 1968. And Klaus Epstein, "Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik" in *Historische Zeitschrift*, 197, 1963.

²³⁰ Roger Woods, op. cit., p.62.

²³¹ Edgar Jung, cited in Roger Woods, op. cit., p.63ff.

A Christian Conservative: Adolf Stoecker and the Christliche Arbeiterpartei

The division of the Evangelical Church into 39 separate territorial Churches and their dependence on local property owners, and those in local governing authority, frequently meant that the Church was tied to the vested interests of the ruling authority. Evangelical Bishops were often *Landesfürsten*, whilst aristocrats and high level civil servants were Evangelical Church leaders. This symbiotic relationship between the Evangelical Church and State authorities, and the aristocratic, property owning members of the Church alienated the working classes. The Church showed little understanding or sympathy for the fate of the Protestant working classes when they looked in vain to their Church for support in matters of social injustice.²³² As a result the Church became distant and detached from the people, losing popularity and influence and ultimately any moral hold on its members.

Adolf Stoecker recognised this deficiency in the Evangelical Church by comparing it to the efforts of the Catholic Church, with its modern form of Catholic Social Teaching and unrelenting struggle against liberalism. Originally a member of the Protestant orthodox movement and a descendant of the *Deutsch Konservativen*, Stoecker criticised Wichern's *Innere Mission* as inadequate for solving the social question. He claimed that a party political response was needed, in the hope that this would intensify the activities of political Protestantism."²³³ His first attempt to mobilise Protestant support for social policy was via the 1877 *Zentralverein für Sozialreform* with co-founder Friedrich Naumann. Stoecker left only one year later to form his own party, the Christian *Arbeiterpartei*. He had recognised a gap in the party spectrum for a party of the masses to reinvigorate the influence of the Church in society. Stoecker aimed his Christian labour party at tackling the plight of Christian workers, alienated by liberalism and abandoned by the Evangelical Church. By incorporating social reforms into its programme Stoecker hoped to gain the working class vote, reform their anti-Christian attitudes as well as make the monarchical state more palatable to them. Besides the proletariat, he targeted the religious and patriotic *Kleinbürgertum* who found little

²³² Werner Jochmann, "Stoecker als nationalkonservativer Politiker und antisemitischer Agitator" in; Werner Jochmann/Günter Brakelmann/Martin Greschat, *Protestantismus und Politik. Werk und Wirkung Adolf Stoeckers*. Hans Christians Verlag. Hamburg 1982, p.129.

²³³ Hans-Georg Aschoff, op. cit., p.71.

affinity with social democracy. But as far as the workers could see, Stoecker was a figure of the ruling classes and working class suspicions arose about Stoecker's real intentions.²³⁴ Further criticisms were levelled at Stoecker's Christian, conservative programme and its attacks on liberalism, Marxism and social democracy, accusing it of lacking clarity. Stoecker's former influential position in the Evangelical Church had also not helped in motivating the Church to develop its own social policy.²³⁵ In October 1878, the *Evangelische Oberkirchenrat* voiced their concern that Stoecker's actions were eroding people's trust in the Church,²³⁶ compounding the general Evangelical anxiety that Stoecker was employing Christianity for political purposes.

Although his party failed to win a place in the Reichstag, Stoecker's charismatic image was noted by conservatives who believed Stoecker could become a useful figure for the conservatives to gain the support of the politically disinterested right-wing class. Stoecker eventually changed the name of the party, removing *Arbeiter* from the title and announced that the party was directed towards "*eine christliche-konservative Volkspartei*," a programme change that was warmly received by conservative Protestants. Further transgressions in his programme followed as Stoecker adopted an anti-Semitic tone, attacking Jewish liberalism.²³⁷

Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP) and conservative splinter groups

By 1918 the conservatives faced an identity crisis. Traditionally they had been in favour of the Kaiser, the state and the military, but after the 1918 revolution these institutions faced radical reform. The conservative ideology had no viable alternative to offer to the new parliamentary democratic order of society. The chauvinism and antidemocratic irrationalism on which conservatism had survived until the outbreak of the first world war was no longer tenable. In November 1918 the *Deutsch Konservativen*, the

²³⁴ Franz Fischer, op. cit., p.508.

²³⁵ Wolfgang Treue, *Die Deutschen Parteien. Vom 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, Walther Hubatsch (Hrsg), Ullstein, Frankfurt, 1975, p.72.

²³⁶ Dietrich von Oertzen, *Adolf Stoecker: Lebensbild und Zeitgeschichte*, Verl.d. Vaterländischen Verlags- und Kunstanstalt, Berlin 1910.

²³⁷ Hans Georg Aschoff, op. cit., p.71. Comments here suggest the motive of Stoecker's anti-semitism was not racist, only anti-liberal, yet this claim would require more substantive argument to prove its validity.

Freikonservativen, the *Christlich-Sozialen* and some members of the *Deutsch-Völkischen* merged to form the *Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei*, (DNVP). The DNVP's hurriedly produced election programme opposed the new constitution and the Versailles treaty and launched an assault on democracy and the republican idea. The DNVP underwent increasing radicalisation and internal party tensions, until finally the *Völkisch* members left to form their own party, which later became the north German representative wing of the Nazi Party. A more moderate wing of the DNVP resigned to accept the republican order and became a credible force between 1924 and 1926, when its candidate Hindenburg was elected Reich president. It also drew closer to Centre Party members including Adam Stegerwald, who began to look for a way to embrace right-wing forces into Centre party ranks.

The structure of the Church was also affected by the 1918/19 revolution, freeing the confessions from the rigid confines of the State and removing the position of the highest bishop, the 'Summus Episcopus' from the Evangelical *Landeskirchen*. This forced the Churches to focus more independently on developing "eine neue, aus der Verantwortung des Gewissens kommende Ordnung."²³⁸ The earlier claim by the Church to support all political parties, was also revised in the aftermath of the First World War when the Church sought to reinstate its political influence and now began to support only those parties that promised to secure Church interests.²³⁹ The prospect of a Church related interest party being founded along the lines of an Evangelical wing of the Centre Party seemed unlikely and the Church finally threw its support behind the DNVP which committed its *Gründungsaufruf* to combining Christianity with nationalism. The leader of the Evangelical *Vertrauensrat* Otto Dibelius, became a member of the DNVP's *Berufständischer Ausschuss* committee in 1919 and the priests Gottfried Traub, who represented the liberal-conservative middle classes in the DNVP, and Reinhard Mumm, who supported Christian social traditions, further strengthened links between the Protestant Church and the DNVP.

²³⁸ Ernst Deuerlein, CDU/CSU 1945-1947, op. cit., p.30.

²³⁹ Kurt Nowak, op.cit., p.222f.

Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst

The appeal of the DNVP declined after the 1924 elections, as voters drifted to the Nazi Party and to a number of splinter parties²⁴⁰ that had broken away from the DNVP. One of these splinter groups, the *Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst* founded in 1930 is interesting for its interdenominational programme and its choice of 'Christian' in its title. The aims in setting up the *Christlich Sozialer Volksdienst* was to become the Evangelical counterpart to the Centre Party and encourage a more positive acceptance of democracy. Together with leading Centre members the CSVD launched a newspaper called *Der Zusammenschluß* to campaign for interdenominational co-operation in political affairs. The publication was short-lived but its idea confirms the relevance of discussions about an interdenominational party. The CSVD programme targeted those German Protestants who felt that the DNVP was unchristian. They did not refer to the CSVD as a party but as a *lebendige Bewegung* committed to "*innere Erneuerung, für die nationale Befreiung und für die soziale Neugestaltung*"²⁴¹ and to forming a unified *Einheitsfront* across the party spectrum in defence of German Christian culture. They refused to be labelled as specifically right or left wing, conservative or national, claiming these terms had undergone inimical redefinition, emphasising only that they represented a synthesis of religious, national and social elements.

Liberal Parties

Whilst the roots of western liberalism can be found in the Enlightenment and principles of the French Revolution, in the American wars of independence, in Locke, Hume, Montesquieu, in Rousseau or Voltaire, German Liberalism represents more of a literary and philosophical inquiry than political²⁴² and a product of the social peculiarities of 19th century German society. Yet the fate of Germany and German democracy is inextricably linked to the fate of German liberalism²⁴³ and represents one of the most important

²⁴⁰ The splinter parties included the interest based *Wirtschaftspartei* founded in 1920, the *Konservative Volkspartei* established in 1930 and the *Christlich-Sozialer Volksdienst* from 1930. See Wilhelm Mommsen, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme*. *Deutsches Handbuch der Politik*, op.cit., p.533ff.

²⁴¹ Statement by the *Christlich-Sozialen Volksdienst* in the Reichstag on October 18, 1930 printed in *Ibid.*, p.545f.

²⁴² In his book, *Das Kulturideal des Liberalismus*, Schulte-Bulmke, Frankfurt am Main 1947, Wilhelm Röpke who primarily saw society as an organic whole and not a sum of its individual parts, did not subscribe to the view that Rousseau was a liberal. "Der Liberale hält es mit Montesquieu und nicht mit Rousseau, mit dem "Esprit des Lois" und nicht mit dem "Contrat Social."

²⁴³ Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte* op.cit., p.314.

subjects of party political discussion in Germany. German liberals were predominantly law theorists and not economists as in the English liberal tradition, and were primarily concerned with the role of the state and its responsibility for social issues.²⁴⁴ The 1848 liberal movement for instance had not envisaged a democratic republic where sovereignty lay with the people, but a constitutional monarchy with restricted democracy.²⁴⁵ Liberals and democrats were anti-federal and inspired by the dream of national unification. They compromised the liberal principle of extending individual freedom to all members of society, the proletariat in particular, in order to facilitate a monarchist-aristocratic form of government favourable to advancing the liberals' own economic interests.²⁴⁶ This failure to bring about a true social and political revolution based on constitutional freedoms and rights of the individual was compensated by nationalist power politics. National unification would be brought about via an authoritarian, monarchist nation state, subordinating the goal of '*Freiheit*' to that of '*Einheit*.' After achieving the goal of German unity in 1871, the liberals retreated from political activity and placed blind trust in Bismarck's policies of expanding the German Reich.²⁴⁷ It was a flight into idealism, which Weber interestingly termed an 'ethicizing' of Bismarck's power.²⁴⁸

The Liberals were broadly represented by the *Deutsche Fortschrittspartei*,²⁴⁹ that had been formed in 1861 by democrats and liberals, and by the National Liberal Party

²⁴⁴ Günter Maluschke, "Wie sozial ist der klassische Liberalismus" in: Jörg Dieter Gauger/Klaus Weigelt (Hrsg.), *Soziales Denken in Deutschland. Zwischen Tradition und Innovation*. Bouvier, Bonn 1990, p.9 (9-29).

²⁴⁵ Helga Grebing, *Geschichte der deutschen Parteien*, op.cit. p.1.

²⁴⁶ Wolfgang Treue, *Die Deutschen Parteien vom 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, Walter Hubatsch (Hrsg.), Verlag Ullstein, Frankfurt/Main 1975, p.19.

²⁴⁷ Nipperdey does not believe that the liberals capitulated before Bismarck so easy as other historians have maintained. He claims the National Liberals held on to their aims to strengthen parliament and continually improve the constitution and since in the early years after the Reich's foundation after Bismarck had fallen out of favour with the Conservatives, the National Liberals were relied upon almost as a joint-ruling party. Thomas Nipperdey, *Deutsche Geschichte. 1866-1918*, op. cit., p.318.

²⁴⁸ The Protestant Treitschke provided Bismarck's Realpolitik with spiritual justification "Treitschke born into an austere Protestant family gradually embraced the religion of Idealism and invested Bismarck's new state with the same passion and absolute moral righteousness that had previously belonged to religion." Fritz Stern, *The Failure of Illiberalism. Essays on the Culture of Modern Germany*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1972, p.9.

²⁴⁹ The Prussian based Fortschrittspartei was incidentally the first party to develop a central party organisation. Other parties continued to rely on regional groups and established associations or Vereinswesen.

(*Nationalliberalen*) formed in 1867 to specifically represent Prussian liberalism. A succession of left and right wing liberal party factions ensued,²⁵⁰ as liberals disagreed internally over Bismarck's foreign and domestic policies. In the first German parliament after the foundation of the Reich, liberal parties were most dominant and included the National Liberals and the Progressives (*Fortschrittspartei*). The *Demokratische Partei* (DP) established in 1885, was a loose organisation of urban middle class, democratic and left-liberal groups,²⁵¹ whose first programme in December 1884 appealed to democrats to halt the right wing drift, and to establish democratic associations as a way of disseminating and enforcing democratic principles across society. Its democratic, anti-militaristic programme still lacked a comprehensive social programme²⁵²

By the turn of the century, German liberalism found new expression in the views of Max Weber and Friedrich Naumann.²⁵³ Naumann was conscious of the "*Emanzipationskampf der Arbeiterschaft*"²⁵⁴ and believed liberalism should learn to embrace socialism. A generous and sensible social policy, he argued, would help to secure the support of the masses for the state to exercise power politics in foreign affairs. Weber condoned socialism and a dirigiste economy as temporary measures to free Germany of its economic difficulties, to eventually return to a free capitalist economy and to satisfy Germany's economic dependence on foreign trade.²⁵⁵ By 1910, a union of the *Freisinnige Vereinigung*, to whom Friedrich Naumann now belonged, the *Freisinnige Volkspartei* and the *Deutsche Volkspartei* formed the *Fortschrittliche Volkspartei* to develop social

²⁵⁰ The *Nationalliberalen Partei* emerged from a break-away faction of the *Fortschrittspartei* but then redivided into left and right wing groups with the left wing rejoining the *Fortschrittspartei* to form the *Freisinnige Partei*. This then also redivided into the *Freisinnige Vereinigung* and the *Freisinnige Volkspartei*.

²⁵¹ The DP emerged when the *Fortschrittspartei* joined with the *Liberale Vereinigung* in 1884 to form the *Deutsche Freisinnige Partei*. Democratic members of the *Fortschrittspartei* protested against the merge because it risked compromising the democratic principles of the party and so left to form their own party, the DP *Demokratische Partei*.

²⁵² Dieter Fricke, *Die bürgerlichen Parteien in Deutschland. Band 1. Handbuch der Geschichte der bürgerlichen Parteien und anderen bürgerlichen Interessenorganisationen vom Vormärz bis zum Jahre 1945*, VEB Bibliographisches Institut, Leipzig 1968, p.269.

²⁵³ In 1896 Naumann had founded the *National Sozialen Verein*.

²⁵⁴ Helga Grebing, *Geschichte der deutschen Parteien*, op.cit., p.36.

²⁵⁵ Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik* op.cit., p.320ff.

oriented policies within a liberalist programme.²⁵⁶ Naumann's transition from an Evangelical-social philosophy to a national-social philosophy, which had begun in the closing years of the 19th century, also clouded his social reform initiatives. Encouraged by the views of Weber, Naumann now maintained that socialism was only attainable by first fulfilling national political ambitions. Martin Wenck, priest and contemporary of Naumann, commented on this significant development in Naumann's thinking;

“Und von dieser Stunde an begann der Aufbau des nationalen Sozialismus aus dem christlichen Sozialismus heraus.”²⁵⁷

A total of four new liberal parties emerged after the war, the DVP, the *Christliche Volkspartei*, the *Deutsche Demokratische Partei* or DDP and the *Demokratische Partei*, DP. Other liberal parties that had existed during the foundation of the Reich in 1871 survived the changes that took place during the Wilhelmian period and those that unfolded as the state passed from Kaiserreich to republic.²⁵⁸ The newly constituted parties had done nothing more than change their names with considerable programmatic continuity between Kaiserreich and Weimar, which is startling given that the state had been transformed from a constitutional monarchy to a parliamentary republic. Support for the monarchy was generally upheld or either alternative, diluted forms of parliamentary democracy were suggested such as that by Windthorst, the Centre leader's advocacy of an authoritarian democracy or Max Weber's constitutional monarchy. Their re-emergence after the end of the war thus showed the liberals intact but still disunited. Leading members of the *Fortschrittliche Volkspartei*, including Max Weber and Friedrich Naumann, joined with members of the left wing of the *Nationalliberalen Partei* to form the *Deutsche Demokratische Partei*, DDP in the hope that this would provide the organisational basis for active democratic involvement of the middle

²⁵⁶ “Die Partei fordert die gleichberechtigte Mitwirkung aller Staatsbürger in Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung und Rechtsprechung zur Förderung des politischen und sozialen Fortschritts, zur Hebung der Wohlfahrt und Volksbildung. Sie bekämpft alle Sonderbestrebungen, die dem Gemeinwohl zuwiderlaufen, und erstrebt den friedlichen Ausgleich der sozialen Gegensätze in einer die Freiheit des einzelnen verbürgenden Gesellschaftsordnung.” Wilhelm Mommsen. Parteiprogramme. Deutsches Handbuch der Politik, op. cit., p.173.

²⁵⁷ Martin Wenck cited in Günter Brakelmann, Die Soziale Frage des 19. Jahrhunderts, op. cit., p.80.

²⁵⁸ Sigmund Neumann, Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1977, p.27.

classes.²⁵⁹ The DDP's 1919 programme declared its allegiance to the Weimar constitution, to the Republic as a *Volkstaat* and *Rechtstaat* and affirms its *Volkspartei* character in the preamble;

“Das ganze Volk! - ohne Unterschied von Klasse, Beruf und Religion; innere Einheit tut uns vor allem not und der einzige Weg zu ihr ist die Demokratie.”²⁶⁰

The programme openly favoured a private economy, individual ambition, personal responsibility and initiative. But the economy must ensure that democratic principles of individual freedom, social justice and human dignity were respected and economic exploitation avoided. In the National Assembly elections, the DDP became the second largest party of the middle classes after the Centre. Yet the DDP voters, representatives of the middle class *Mittelstand*, and formerly protected and secure in the monarchical order, found themselves alienated in the new republic between industry representatives and trade unions. Once the DDP signalled that it would also consider socialisation plans and co-operation with the SPD many members switched their allegiance to the *Deutsche Volkspartei* DVP. Having being denied entry to the DDP, the former National Liberal Party leader Gustav Stresemann formed the DVP. Had Stresemann been given access to the DDP, Treue²⁶¹ believes that he would have attempted to transform it into a force to fuse the centre ground with the far right wing conservatives. Since the DVP's 1919 programme rejected the Weimar Constitution and the Versailles Treaty and a return to a monarchy²⁶² any possibility of political co-operation with the DDP was quashed. Faced with growing economic crisis during the Weimar Republic, the gap widened between the left reaching DDP and the now right reaching DVP under Stresemann. After Stresemann's death, the DVP, moved even further to the right until it finally agreed to the 1933 Enabling Act and to the dissolution of its own party. By 1930 the *Deutsche Demokratische Partei* then reassembled to become the *Deutsche Staatspartei* (Theodor

²⁵⁹ Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik*, op.cit., p.326. With this aim in mind Weber produced a series of articles for the *Frankfurter Zeitung* entitled “Deutschlands künftige Staatsform.” It is interesting to note here that a central tenet of his democratic vision was the incorporation of federalism. In his 1918/19 plans for the constitution he tackled the issue of the rights of the *Länder* to influence government decisions.

²⁶⁰ Wilhelm Mommsen. *Parteiprogramme*. *Deutsches Handbuch der Politik*, op.cit., p.509.

²⁶¹ Wolfgang Treue, *Die Deutschen Parteien*. *Vom 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*. op.cit., p.133.

²⁶² W. Mommsen, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme*. *Deutsches Handbuch der Politik*, op.cit., p.519.

Heuss was one of its MPs) that campaigned in its 1930 manifesto for a '*staatspolitische Erneuerung*', to develop the Republic into a social and national *Volksstaat*. It was in favour of capitalism so long as private ownership was extended to the majority and those property owners who held power were also committed to their social responsibilities. They called their vision "Social Capitalism" which appears programmatically close to the idea of a social market economy. It believed that the capitalist economic system would only be capable of competing with the socialist economy if it proved that its social commitment and responsibilities to the state and people surpassed those promised by socialism.

Considerable blame for the collapse of the Weimar system must clearly be laid at the door of the conservative and liberal parties for failing to carry out their party political functions responsibly, and for not fully grasping the meaning of government and opposition in a democracy.²⁶³ The fate of the Republic was in the hands of the parties in the middle ground, in particular the Centre, the DDP and the DVP whose task it was to consolidate middle class voters and integrate them with those working class voters who could not find sympathy for the socialists, to prevent the polarisation of the party system, which ultimately facilitated the rise of the National Socialists.²⁶⁴ As Weimar's conservative and the liberal parties progressively weakened, voters abandoned their party loyalties to support the new inclusive programme of the National Socialists. Catholics and Communists remained the most resistant to Nazism, but the Nazis otherwise drew support from a cross-section of the former middle class parties, carving the image of the NSDAP as the first successful *Volkspartei*.²⁶⁵ During the course of the Third Reich a number of protest and resistance activities emerged from the camp of the Evangelical Christians, signalling a fundamental re-evaluation of Evangelical social-political thinking.²⁶⁶ Other signs of protest and recommendations for a renewal of Christian

²⁶³ Peter Lösche, *Kleine Geschichte der deutschen Parteien*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1993, p.66.

²⁶⁴ Larry Eugen Jones, "Adam Stegerwald und die Krise des deutschen Parteiensystems" in; *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg. 27, 1979, p.1.

²⁶⁵ See Jürgen W. Falter, "The First German *Volkspartei*. The Social Foundations of the NSDAP" in; Karl Rohe (Hrsg) *Elections, Parties and Political Tradition*, op. cit., p.53-81.

²⁶⁶ The most important results of these reviews are the Barmer Theological Declaration in 1934, the controversial Stuttgart Schuldbekenntnis in October 1945 and the 1947 Darmstädter Wort by the Reichsbruderrat of the EKiD (the German Evangelical Church).

Evangelical thinking beyond the Evangelical Church came from the Freiburg group of neo-liberals.

3. Ordo-liberalism in the Third Reich

The neo- or ordoliberal movement began in the 1920s and 1930s and later gave its name to the ORDO year book founded in 1948 by W. Eucken, A. Rüstow, W. Röpke, F. Böhm, L.v. Mises, F.A Hayek and A. Müller-Armack. Like the Catholic social reform movement, ordo-liberalism took Germany's turbulent historical development as the basis for their investigations,²⁶⁷ analysing the liberal, monopolistic style economy of the late 19th and early 20th centuries and the extreme centralised, economically restrictive economy experienced in Hitler's Third Reich. The ordo-liberals sought an alternative which would avoid the worst excesses of both systems, a third way between the system of laissez-faire capitalism and centralised collectivism. Neo-liberalism sought to reconcile the best elements of established economic liberalism such as economic freedom, individuality, freedom and material wealth for the nation, the right to private property ownership, the rule of law and moral foundations for society with moral and social concerns. Yet as its name suggests, neo-liberalism takes liberalism rather than socialism as its point of departure. Economic liberalism it seemed, remained the only economic form that closely corresponded to the essential and original form of political, democratic and cultural liberalism.²⁶⁸

For the lessons of the post Second World War period, Röpke remarked that the decision to abolish laissez-faire style economics would not automatically require abolition of the market economy. The market economic principle, he said, must be upheld and protected at all costs since it represented "geradezu eine Schicksalsfrage unserer Zivilisation."²⁶⁹ Salvation from a catastrophic form of liberalism of the past and from the threat of

²⁶⁷ In exile in Turkey Wilhelm Röpke turned his attention to the origins of totalitarianism and a critique of society and civilisation. In *Civitas Humana* and *Die Gesellschaftskrise der Gegenwart*, Röpke explains that the erosion of values of western liberal civilisation and Christianity had been underway since the industrial revolution in England and the French Revolution. The Enlightenment, he argued, had given the false impression that freedom was to be found in the dissolution of order and democracy had come to mean nothing more than the proletarianisation of the masses with conflicting values of individualism and collectivism.

²⁶⁸ Hans Schmid, *Neoliberalismus und katholische Soziallehre. Eine Konfrontierung*, Mit einer Einführung von Prof Dr. Oswald v. Nell-Breuning, Bund-Verlag, Köln 1954, p.25.

²⁶⁹ Wilhelm Röpke, *Civitas Humana, Grundfragen der Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsreform*, Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Erlenbach-Zürich 1944, p.46.

Socialist collectivism in the future is, he argues, to be gained by a reinvigoration and a return to those original principles of humanity, where individualism is brought into harmony with social justice. In neo-liberalism the individual is not answerable to the state but to God alone and relies on personal rationality and reason for orientation. Wilhelm Röpke's '*Civitas humana*' claims that his version of liberalism is entirely compatible with Christianity and even dares the phrase "un bon chretien est un liberal qui s'ignore"²⁷⁰ (a good Christian is a liberal without knowing it). Importantly the market economy would not be the sole preserve of individuals to operate but should be steered and monitored by state regulation and economic policy, guided by the interests of social justice. Franz Böhm believed in setting up constitutional guarantees that would protect the freedom of competition and control monopolies. After the framework and the conditions in which the economy should operate had been established, the state should not influence the economic process itself. The natural regulatory principle of supply and demand and the system of competition should remain the cornerstone of the economic order which in turn operates in accordance with defined, fair, market economic rules. The ordo-liberals rejected the old-liberal theory, that an appropriate and workable economic system could evolve spontaneously and naturally as a product of the free market alone. Trust in the freedom of markets, unfettered competition and state non-intervention had failed to regulate a fair economy and provide for a just society. The economy, they argued, must be imbued with rules, in an 'orderly' framework that takes account of social values. Rules and economic principles were seen as important for analysing the economy and, where necessary, for removing obstacles to economic freedom, such as price fixing or supply regulation. If these rules are disregarded the economic system will decline.

Classification of Ordo-liberals

Distinctions can clearly be drawn between the socio-liberalism of the Freiburg School of ordo-liberals and the more extreme representatives of a laissez-faire liberalism - F.A Hayek and C. Mötteli. Whilst Hayek and Mötteli are particularly closely affiliated to the classic, English liberal tradition, the more moderate Freiburg School believed in the

²⁷⁰ Ibid., p.18.

interdependence of economic policies and state responsibilities. Walter Eucken's '*Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik*' stipulated that:

“eine rationale Wirtschaftspolitik die Interdependenz aller gesellschaftlichen und staatlichen Ordnungen sowie wirtschaftspolitischen Maßnahmen beachten muß.”

A further distinction²⁷¹ is made *within* the Freiburg School between those who gave the state the task only of creating and maintaining competition in the economy and in protecting and promoting the freedom of the individual, and those more religiously oriented neoliberal thinkers, who believed the state should also be responsible for directly implementing social policies. Böhm, Eucken, Lutz and Meyer formed the first sub-group in the Freiburg School of ordo-liberals who focused their attention on the interaction and comparison between different economic systems, whilst Müller-Armack, Rüstow and Röpke all emphasised the spiritual, ethical values of the social market.

"The Social Market Economy must be the servant of humanity and of trans-economic values. All social, ethical, cultural and human values are more important than the economy yet the economy must prepare the ground for their fullest development. For this reason the economy must not take on forms which are incompatible with these trans-economic values."²⁷²

The aim at a synthesis between economic, political and cultural elements is thus more pronounced among the second group of neo-liberals. Alexander Rüstow²⁷³ emphasised the need for a comprehensive '*Gegenprogramm*' to Bolshevism. He observed that the Soviet system had a clearly defined concept, enforced by notions of social '*Geschlossenheit*' and '*Einheitlichkeit*'. The economic element - the '*Planwirtschaft*' - formed the centre point of the programme with interdependence to corresponding social forms. In contrast, he argued, western capitalism, had no such programme or order. It was based more on practice and tied loosely around the notion of 'maintaining peace.' The west therefore was suffering from a '*Mangel an Eingliederung*' or

²⁷¹ Manfred Wulff, Die Geistigen Grundlagen und Quellen des Ordoliberalismus in den 30er und 40er Jahren in; Jörg Dieter Gauger/Klaus Weigelt (Hrsg), Soziales Denken in Deutschland, op. cit. p.156-170.

²⁷² Alex Rüstow cited in; Alan Peacock and Hans Willgerodt (Editors), German Neo-liberals and the Social Market Economy, Macmillan, London 1989, p.108.

²⁷³ Albert Hunold, Wirtschaft ohne Wunder, Eugenrentsch Verlag, Erlenbach-Zürich 1953, p.106.

'*Unterintegration*' and Röpke attacked this deficiency by searching for an integrated economic and constitutional 'order' that would finally be embodied in the Social Market Economy. The religiously motivated ordo-liberals intended that this should be "*eine bewußt gestaltete marktwirtschaftliche Gesamtordnung*"²⁷⁴ and a counter-ideology to Marxist socialism. The concept of the 'Social Market Economy' thus descended from the strand of Christian neo-liberals. The slogan was the brain-child of Alfred Müller-Armack, the Social Market Economy's intellectual and spiritual leader. Müller-Armack descends from the intellectual traditions of Weber, Scheler, Plessner, Sombart and Marx²⁷⁵ and was therefore preoccupied with the impact of cultural and religious factors on political dogma.

"Immer aber blieb mir der Erkenntnis aus meinen geistes- und religionsgeschichtlichen Forschungen bewußt, in welch hohem Maße geistige, religiöse und philosophische Faktoren die politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Realität des letzten Jahrtausends europäischer Geschichte bestimmt haben."²⁷⁶

This revelation is important for an understanding of the CDU's motive for basing its programme on a synthesis of Christianity and politics. As fellow liberals returned from exile in 1945, meetings were held between Protestant and Catholic academics, church men, politicians, economists and trade union representatives. Müller-Armack describes the objective of one such meeting, organised by Gustav Heinemann, adviser to the Comite Monnet in Holland;

"Die Tagung galt dem Versuch protestantische Richtlinien einer künftigen Gesellschaftspolitik zu entwickeln. Daneben kam die Frage eines ersten ökonomischen Wiederaufbaus zur Sprache."²⁷⁷

²⁷⁴ Alfred Müller-Armack, *Wirtschaftsordnung und Wirtschaftspolitik. Studien und Konzepte zur Sozialen Marktwirtschaft und zur Europäischen Integration*, Rombach & Co, Freiburg im Breisgau 1966, p.244.

²⁷⁵ Müller-Armack rejected Weber's dualism of religion and capitalism, preferring instead Marx's interpretation that capitalism was produced by the dynamic interaction of economic and social activity. Dieter Haselbach, *Autoritärer Liberalismus und Soziale Marktwirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Politik im Ordoliberalismus*, Nomao Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1991, p.122f.

²⁷⁶ Alfred Müller Armack, *Auf dem Weg nach Europa. Erinnerungen und Ausblicke*, Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, Tübingen 1971, p.58.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.40.

This would suggest that for many ordo-liberals, Protestantism's traditional emphasis on economic freedom as the precursor, to and the guarantor of political freedom, was the starting point of the search for principles of a modern social order.

Alfred Müller Armack's²⁷⁸ 1948 work, *'Das Jahrhundert ohne Gott'*, is characteristic of the intellectual debates that dominated the CDU's early manifestos, in their appeal for a re-christianisation of society and politics. The evils of the early 20th century were explained by secularisation and the loss of belief in transcendent values, as society devoted itself to materialistic, earthly idols. A Godless society, we are given to understand, is a life without any fixed order. The task in 1945 would therefore consist of 'rechristianising' German society. The Christian denominations, explains Müller-Armack must learn to put their religious differences aside, since the Christian faith had been under threat for over one hundred years, and Catholics and Protestants jointly shared the same fate and religious communality. In future, religious values should determine the organisation of social, political and economic affairs. Although the economic system was bound by its ethical responsibilities, the economy still remained of central importance to Armack's social critique. The economy he describes;

"Es ist und bleibt ein wichtiges, wenn auch nicht das zentrale Lebensgebiet, und von seiner guten Ordnung hängt für die Kultur sehr viel ab."

The question of the best economic system, maintained Armack, must be discussed impassionately so that economic principles do not become religious maxims as the intransigent liberalism of the past was, or - as the post second world war trend was indicating - a centralised, administrative economy that was being heralded as the new economic solution to a better society. This all pointed to the need for the economy to be assigned a set of ethical principles, drawn from Christianity.

Ordo-liberal theories were expounded by a third group of ordo-liberals, the Freiburg Group, whose programme further differed to those of the Freiburg School. Whilst the Freiburg School broadly sought a more independently functioning market economy, the

²⁷⁸ Alfred Müller Armack, *Das Jahrhundert ohne Gott*, Regensberg'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Münster 1948. An shortened edited text is reprinted in; G. Brakelmann and T. Jähnichen (Hrsg), *Die Protestantischen Wurzeln der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Ein Quellenband*. Gütersloh 1994, p.375-380.

Freiburg Group adhered to market economic measures defined within the state's overall economic policy.²⁷⁹ The Freiburg Group was further sub-divided into the Freiburg University Group (or Freiburger Konzil), the working committee of Erwin v. Beckerath and the Bonhoeffer Circle. The studies by Christine Blumenberg-Lampe,²⁸⁰ and Hauenstein²⁸¹ succeed in distinguishing between the different groups in Freiburg, suggesting that other literature has tended to subsume all three groups under one 'Freiburg Group' heading, on the grounds that the economists Eucken, Lampe and Dietze were participants in all three groups. The Beckerath group, Blumenberg notes, has often been neglected altogether.²⁸² The Working Committee of Erwin v. Beckerath produced an economic programme in 1943/44 closely related to the ideas of the Bonhoeffer Circle for a post-war system of economic management. Both programmes respond to the 19th century dilemmas of Catholic and Protestant political and economic traditions and offer solutions through a programme of third way politics that combine the best aspects of both socialist and liberalist systems. Their programmes are axiomatic in understanding how the programme of the Social Market Economy came about.

Freiburger Konzil

The Department of Law and Political Affairs at Freiburg University provided the seeds of resistance to the Nazi regime with more than half of the department's members belonging to the *Bekennende Kirche*.²⁸³ In 1938 a group of Protestants and Catholics including Walter Eucken, Constantin v. Dietze, Gerhard Ritter and Adolf Lampe, calling

²⁷⁹ Blumenberg argues that the two programmes should be viewed as one joint endeavour, where the Bonhoeffer programme forms the preamble to the subsequent Beckerath audits. The groups' economic objectives were after all the same. Christine Blumenberg-Lampe, *Das wirtschaftspolitische Programm der 'Freiburger Kreise'. Entwurf einer freiheitlichen-sozialen Nachkriegswirtschaft. Nationalökonomien gegen den Nationalsozialismus*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1973, p.130.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Fritz Hauenstein, "Die Arbeitsgemeinschaft Erwin v. Beckerath" in; Norbert Kloten, Wilhelm Krelle, Heinz Müller, Fritz Neumark (Hrsg), *Systeme und Methoden in den Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Erwin v. Beckerath zum 75. Geburtstag*, Mohr, Tübingen 1964, p.56-60 and Fritz Hauenstein, "Der Freiburger Kreis" in; 20. Juli 1944, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Hrsg), Bonn 1969, (p.42-46).

²⁸² Blumenberg believes this was because its members were not pursued by the Gestapo. The Beckerath group's investigations into the post-war economy had greatly interested many SS officials who also envisaged a free market economy as a viable post war solution, arrogantly assuming at this stage that even after Hitler had gone, they would remain in power. There was thus little incentive to persecute the committee's members.

²⁸³ Blumenberg-Lampe, op.cit. p.15.

themselves the 'Freiburger Konzil' met to discuss the merits of Catholic and Evangelical Christian ethical teaching and the prospects for forming a Christian based national economy. Inspired by Eucken's views on economic theory, the group questioned the most suitable economic system, a centrally planned and administered economy or a free, market led economy. The arrest of Constantin v. Dietze however soon forced the Konzil to suspend their meetings. In 1946 when members were released from Berlin concentration camp, the Freiburg group of Professors, Adolf Lampe, Otto Hof and Gerhard Ritter, renewed the Konzil discussions for establishing a Christian based economic order. Their discussions resulted in the 'Freiburger Denkschrift.'

Erwin von Beckerath

Erwin von Beckerath was commissioned on behalf of the Nazi Academy²⁸⁴ for German Law at Freiburg University, to conduct a working committee of economists to investigate theoretical ways of solving problems in the economy. Basing its views on Eucken's recently published '*Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie*' the *Zentralausschuss*, discussed the merits of a regulated (*gelenkte*) economy in its first meetings at the end of 1940. Their discussions resulted in a series of audits between 1942/43, intended as draft programmes or guidelines for a "*klar umrissenes wirtschaftspolitisches Programm*" for post-war Germany. Stackelberg in Berlin, outlined that the first task of post war reconstruction was to decide between a market economy or a centrally administered economy. Although a centrally controlled economy was practical and necessary in the short term, he believed a centrally administered economy was too primitive to manage the complexities of modern society. The centralised economy, he argued, had been sustained by the state as its only and largest consumer during the war, but in peace time a central economy would not be sophisticated enough to meet consumer needs, and so

²⁸⁴ Beckerath's group occupied a leading role, as the *Zentralausschuss*, among eight further research groups. The director of the Political Economic Research Academy, Jens Jessen, recruited many former members of the defunct 'Verein für Sozialpolitik' which had been founded in Eisenach in 1872 to counteract the growing influence of free market economic liberalism. It shared its protest with the social Catholics and middle class social reformists in the Evangelical camp. Its programme direction was based on the belief that unequal and individually pursued interests are not conducive to providing for the good of the whole society. "Wir sind der Überzeugung, daß das unbeschränkte Walten teilweise entgegengesetzter und ungleich starker Einzelinteressen das Wohl der Gesamtheit nicht verbürgt, daß vielmehr die Forderungen des Gemeinns und der Humanität auch im wirtschaftlichen Leben ihre Geltung behaupten müssen." Einladungsschreiben zur Gründungsversammlung des Vereins für Sozialpolitik 1872 in Eisenach in; Franz Boese, *Die Geschichte des Vereins für Sozialpolitik 1872-1932*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1939, p.4.

risked harnessing individual freedom in consumption and in business. Whilst advocating a market economy in principle however, the group agreed that the correct market economic conditions would not be immediately be in place and could lead to social and economic chaos if introduced in post-war Germany too soon. Their suggestion was a third way, 'a market economy, based on market economic planning and control (*Lenkung*).'²⁸⁵ In 1943 the working group for 'Political Economy' was suspended following closure of the Academy for German Law.²⁸⁶ Beckerath, Böhm, v, Dietze, and Eucken continued their work clandestinely in cooperation with trusted personalities from industry and commerce who acted as temporary advisers to the group, now known as 'The Working Committee of Erwin v. Beckerath.' When Dietze and Lampe were arrested in September 1944 for their involvement in the Bonhoeffer Circle, Beckerath's Working Committee was disbanded and through fear of discovery by the Nazis, members destroyed the Committee's material.²⁸⁷

Dietrich Bonhoeffer

In 1942, Dietrich Bonhoeffer was assigned the highly confidential task of producing a *Denkschrift* as a platform for discussion at the forthcoming World Church Conference and which could become a programme for Germany's future new order;

'eine Art Programmschrift ..., in der womöglich alle Hauptzweige des öffentlichen Lebens unter den Gesichtspunkten christlicher Sozialethik behandelt werden sollten.'

The *Denkschrift* focused on the social and economic *Gesamtordnung*, and less on ethical principles of Christian Social teaching applicable to an individual's own economic activity. Bonhoeffer envisaged a co-ordinated and detailed planning of a '*staatliche*

²⁸⁵ The audits were only a segment of the work produced by the group before its members were arrested, dealing with all aspects of the envisaged economy including the transition from a war economy, economic reconstruction, currency reform, the tax system and regulation for industrial relations and the trade union organisations. The work by Lampe in Freiburg was supplemented with contributions by other Freiburger individuals, Eucken and Dietze who together focused their attention on specifying the tasks facing the future post-war German economy. Additional draft programmes were submitted to Beckerath by Lampe and Stackelberg.

²⁸⁶ It was suspected that the oppositional nature of some of the working groups had been identified, contributing to the decision to close the Academy. Blumenberg-Lampe, op.cit., p.37.

²⁸⁷ Significant numbers of documents and material were successfully hidden by Lampe's wife Gertrud in her home and cellar and survived not only searches by the Gestapo, but also those by the French military when they occupied the house in 1945.

Wirtschaftsordnung’ rooted in Christian ethics. Whilst the socialist Catholics maintained materialism was synonymous with capitalism which justified the removal of the entire capitalist system, more liberal minded Catholics and Protestants equated materialism with secularism and a Godless society, one that was capable of morally condoning a national socialist programme. They did not condemn capitalism however, arguing that it was not people’s striving for wealth per se that puts a nation in moral jeopardy but an underlying materialist attitude that threatened the moral, ethical fibre of a society’s individuals.²⁸⁸

Divided into two main sections,²⁸⁹ section one of the *Denkschrift* provides an historical analysis of National Socialism, entitled “*Das politische Chaos unserer Zeit und seine Ursachen*” and section two presents a catalogue of conditions that a future German state would have to fulfil, entitled “*Grundzüge einer politischen Gemeinschaftsordnung nach christlichem Verständnis.*” It was particularly aimed at;

“einer theologisch-historischen Besinnung auf die Grundzüge evangelischer Sozialethik und das Wesen gesunder politischer Gemeinschaftsordnung nach evangelischem Verständnis.”

Bonhoeffer identified the need to lay Christian foundations of an ethical social and economic doctrine in Evangelical thinking. They were concerned with creating a philosophical underpinning for a political programme, to extend Christian ethics to social and political ethics. The central question whether there were basic differences between Catholic and Evangelical ethics or where there was communality between them to

²⁸⁸ Christine Blumenberg Lampe, op.cit., p.55.

²⁸⁹ The ordo-liberal Franz Böhm and Erik Wolf also produced an appendix on the law, whilst the three Freiburg economists, Lamper, Hof and Ritter drafted appendix 4, Economic and Social Order. After discussion of the text by a group of eminent individuals including Carl Goerdeler, Erik Wolf, Franz Böhm, Helmut Thielicke, Theophil Wurm, Otto Dibelius and Walter Bauer, three further appendices were added to the *Denkschrift*, covering church and education policy and the Jewish Question. Helmut Thielicke laments that this question should have preoccupied the Bonhoeffer group in the way it did. “Daß der nazistische Rassengedanke hier so naiv und unkritisch übernommen wird, zeigt einen Grad von Zeitgehörigkeit.” The appendix includes such statements as Jews possessing “gefährvollen Anlagen und Charaktereigenschaften” and warns of possible damage that could result from “einer engen Berührung oder gar Vermischung mit anderen Rassen.” Their concern with racist issues is incompatible with their moral, ethical position. Helmut Thielicke, In der Stunde Null. Die *Denkschrift* des Freiburger ‘Bonhoeffer-Kreises,’ J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1979, p.22.

facilitate co-operation, puts the work of the Bonhoeffer group at the heart of the CDU agenda.

“Die politische Krisis unserer Epoche ist zutiefst eine seelisch-geistige Krise und ihre Ursachen gilt es aufzudecken, ehe an ein Programm des Wiederaufbaus auch nur gedacht werden kann.”²⁹⁰

Their views were guided by three considerations, first by God’s word as expressed in the Ten Commandments, second by factual economic necessities which have a permanent impact on the economic order and third by rational assessment of the current economic situation. According to the first consideration, they held no pretence that religious doctrine provided permanently valid guidelines for economic activity. More useful solutions they thought were provided by individuals’ evaluation of each issue as it arises, based on the powers of human reason, revealing Calvinist thinking. The second consideration influencing the economic order was determined by the desire for an individual’s self-development and material benefit, by the need to exercise frugality in one’s economic affairs, as well as by the State’s obligation to provide a stable currency and sound financial policies. Whether the State chose to operate a planned or a competitive economic policy, they argue, it must always ensure that it operated a viable economic policy in accordance with the ‘*Gesamtordnung*.’ Here the rules for the State’s social policy were as important as its rule for economic policy. Thirdly, the catastrophic situation that Germany found itself in towards the end of the second world war demanded specific economic measures to enable its reconstruction.

The Bonhoeffer Evangelicals were as condemnatory of the late 19th century liberal order as Catholics, which they said had failed to create a moral framework for social justice and had led to exploitation of the proletarian workers during the industrial revolution. They complained that it destroyed the relevance of Christian values in society and respect for economic freedom, as cartels and industrial monopolies took control over any existing economic policy. Under no circumstances must the future state permit laissez-faire style economic management but would be required to set rules to which private business must adhere, and then monitor that these rules are not contravened. The principles of a competition based economy would be used to regulate future economic

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p.37.

policy including employment and wage policy. No direct action on the part of the state, can force people to adopt a community spirit and a moral social awareness per se, but it can aim to create the right conditions for people to foster their own social harmony. A fair social policy will result if the individual develops and exercises his/her own set of ethical principles in social and economic life. Other moral institutions besides the state, such as Church associations, voluntary organisations or even individual firms were also equally seen to be as capable of engendering social ethical solidarity. The *Denkschrift* argues that 19th century social policy wrongly attempted to impose a community ethos from above, dividing people into specific social groups and defining how the relations should function between them. More concrete measures for a social policy included trade union organisations, a labour chamber comprising employees and employer and other recognised chambers of industry and workers' committees as well as legislation for the protection of employees and regulation of industrial relations between employer and employee. The tone of the programme is sober, avoiding any specific religious dogma and encouraging only moral values in the new social order. Whilst this was Christian in origin it did not imply that only Christians should participate in its activities and benefit from the social policy.

One interesting difference is the decision not to equate a liberal economic order with a capitalist order, as the socialist Catholics had done. Instead they chose to make explicit mention of their standpoint on capitalism;

“Gerade die Kritik an den auftretenden Schäden hat den Ausdruck “Kapitalismus” für die im 19. Jahrhundert verwirklichte Wirtschaftsordnung eingebürgert. So entschieden wir selbst gegen allen Mammondienst auftreten und die damaligen Zustände kritisieren, so sehen wir doch bewußt von der Verwendung des Schlagwortes “Kapitalismus” ab: denn es ist mit zu verschiedenen und vielfach unklaren Inhalten belastet.”²⁹¹

This indicates that certain groups with a socialist agenda may have been employing the term ‘capitalist’ in a derisory manner in order to further their own programme’s popularity but clearly the Bonhoeffer Evangelicals also had their own motives for detaching capitalism from its Liberalist counterpart, to rid capitalism of its tainted image

²⁹¹ G. Brakelmann/T. Jähnichen, *Die Protestantischen Wurzeln ... op. cit.*, p.341.

and so allow for its future regeneration in post-war Germany. In 1943 and 1944 the majority of those who had worked on the Freiburger Denkschrift were arrested by the Gestapo and Bonhoeffer and Goerdeler were subsequently killed. After a few minor adjustments to the original text by Protestants and Catholics in 1945, the *Denkschrift* was published.

Continuity and Change 1945-1947

4. British Zone

4.1. Rhineland and Westphalia

The first political programmes to appear in 1945 gave a reflective, philosophical account of Germany's history, the failures of the Weimar Republic and the lessons of the National Socialist dictatorship. Social Catholicism still maintained liberalism and capitalism had been the root cause of materialist thinking and the cause of National Socialism, encouraging Catholics to rekindle their affinity with undertaking socialist reform.¹ Dr Zimmermann, General Secretary of the Christian Democratic Party in the Rhineland best captured the mood in the winter of 1945;

“Die politische Tendenz geht in aller Welt nach links. Die soziale Not, die in Verfolgung dieses Krieges überall entstanden ist, macht dies verständlich ...Links nicht im Sinne einer radikalen politischen Umwälzung, sondern im Sinne einer sozialen Reform und einer sozialen Politik.”²

Besides the physical devastation and destruction, the post war mood of a new beginning presented an opportunity to implement Catholic Socialism that had been developed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries³ and for left-wing Catholics to stage a radical overhaul of Germany's economic and social system. Christians of all denominations were in agreement that a fundamental *Gesinnungsreform* was needed to correct the secular trend they claimed had weakened religious values and moral standards

¹ “Diese verschieden gefärbten sozialen und sozialistischen Ideen, Programme und Vorschläge waren schlechthin atmosphärisch in ihren weitgehenden und konkreten Äußerungen, wenn auch in der Grundlage von Elementen der geistigen Tradition katholischer Soziallehren bestimmt.” Gerhard Schulz, op. cit., p.89.

² Karl Zimmermann, Rede bei der ersten Reichstagung der Christlich Demokratischen Union, in Godesberg am 14., 15. und 16. Dezember 1945, Schriftenreihe der Christlich Demokratischen Union des Rheinlandes, Heft 5, Köln.

³ “Dieser konfliktlose Übergang zu einer sozialistischen Gesellschaft kam nicht nur den sozialökonomischen Harmonievorstellungen der katholischen Gesellschaftslehre entgegen, er gab zugleich die Einschätzung der wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und politischen Verhältnisse der unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit wieder.” Gerold Ambrosius. Die Durchsetzung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945-1949. Beiträge zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik in Deutschland nach 1945. Hrsg. Vom Institut für Zeitgeschichte, DVA, Stuttgart 1977, p.15.

in society and had increased Germany's susceptibility to National Socialism.⁴ Catholics pledged to resolve their earlier scepticism towards liberal democracy⁵ and the century-old conflict between individual freedom and social equality by following a higher form of *Christian* democracy. Socially, spiritually, politically and economically, Germany was set to undergo complete renewal.

In the period from 1945 to 1947, almost all programmatic discussions among Christian democrats - including those that took place in Rhineland and Westphalia - were defined by this post war revival of Christian Socialism. Like its pre-war variety, Christian Socialism was predominantly supported by the Catholic members of the Cologne Circle. But it was opposed by the Solidarists, who favoured Solidarism as an alternative interpretation of Christian social teaching, and by Protestant liberal, conservative groups who instead backed a programme of Christian Realism. Christian Socialism nevertheless made a lasting and significant impact on the new CDU, even though it was just one of a series of programme suggestions put forward by Christian Democrats at the time. Previous studies have often overestimated Christian Socialism's influence on the CDU's programme discussions and given comparatively little attention to Evangelical or Solidarist reform initiatives, despite the fact that Konrad Adenauer's personal philosophy, as this chapter will reveal, more closely resembled Evangelical social ethics than Catholic Social Theory. At the heart of conflicting discussions in 1945 was the question that had dominated politics throughout the last century; should Germany adopt an individualist or a collectivist approach to socio-economic policy in order to ensure individual and collective prosperity and social justice?

⁴ Ute Schmidt, "Die Christliche Demokratische Union Deutschlands" in; Richard Stöss (Hrsg), *Parteien Handbuch. Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1980*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1983, p.515ff.

⁵ Friedrich Zimmermann of the CDU's young Christian Democrats, the Junge Union describes the difficulty that the term 'democracy' traditionally represented, emphasising that it was the CDU's conscious aim to overcome it;

"Wir Leute von der Union glauben indessen, bei allen Vorbehalten der Parteilichkeit, denen wir uns unterwerfen sollen, dennoch einer Antwort nahezukommen, wenn wir sagen: die Gründung der Union stellt den kühnsten Versuch dar, das grundgelegte Spannungsverhältnis der Formaldemokratie, das zwischen der Freiheit und der Gleichheit, aufzulösen, um zu einer höherentwickelten Demokratie zu gelangen. Denn nur christlicher Geist, der keinen Wertunterschied zwischen der Freiheit (des Christenmenschen) und der Gleichheit (des Menschen vor Gott) kennt, kann nach unserer Überzeugung auch im politischen Raum beiden Grundformen gerecht werden. Wir glauben uns frei von Anmaßung, wenn wir uns deshalb die christliche Weltanschauung für den eigentlichen Oberbegriff, für den Beziehungspunkt einer wahren Demokratie halten." Friedrich Zimmermann cited in; O.K Flechtheim, *Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Bildung in Deutschland seit 1945*, Band I, op. cit. p.20.

Uertz's⁶ classification of these competing programme perspectives is useful. Christian Solidarists descended from the liberal, market-oriented Jesuit School, who believed in a less regulatory framework for society. Christian Socialists came from the Dominican tradition, and were strictly dedicated to socialism and a '*Ganzheitlich*' approach to the Catholic notion of *Gemeingut*. The *Gemeinwohl* or common good, was both the starting point and end objective of the Christian-socialist society and took precedence over the status of the individual. Despite the attempt to relativise the importance of Christian Socialism in the CDU's programme history, it remains of considerable interest in this investigation, since it emerges that it was the phrase itself and its perception in society that was most problematic and controversial for the party, more than the actual content of the Christian Socialist programme. This indicates that shaping the CDU's programme profile was determined as much by tactical, ideological and image considerations as by the genuine search for a new order. The double weaponry of Christian Socialism was skilfully exploited by Adenauer, through his tactical use of political programmes and programmatic discussions for gaining political advantage.

One of the founding members of the CDU in Cologne, Leo Schwering, claimed that the Rhineland-Westphalia region, the former home of the Centre Party and the Catholic social reform movement, was decisive for the success of the CDU;

"So lag damals in ihren Händen die Zukunft der ganzen CDU. Infolgedessen übertrifft die Bedeutung der Rheinischen und westfälischen Gründung diejenige aller anderen Landesparteien im gesamten Bundesgebiet."⁷

Schwering's failure to acknowledge the importance of the Berlin group of Christian Democrats who met to discuss the foundation of a Christian party one day ahead of the Cologne group, is an indication of the early dominance displayed by the CDU in the British zone and the fierce competition that rapidly emerged between the main centres of Christian Democracy.

⁶ Rudolf Uertz, *Christentum und Sozialismus in der frühen CDU. Grundlagen und Wirkungen der christlichen Sozialen Ideen in der Union 1945-1949*, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte Nr. 43, DVA, Stuttgart 1981, p.18.

⁷ Leo Schwering, *Vorgeschichte und Entstehung der CDU*, 2. Aufl., Verlag Deutsche Glocke GmbH, Cologne 1952, p.3.

Both in programme and personnel terms there was a degree of continuity with the Centre Party, even if old disputes blocked close unity in the Rhineland and Westphalian CDU. In October 1945 the Centre Party was formally relaunched in Soest⁸ and its former general secretary, Hamacher rapidly criticised the new CDU for occupying the middle ground in German politics with a diverse amalgam of political groups (*Sammelpartei*) inevitably harbouring Nazi reactionaries.⁹ The new Centre party leader, Spiecker, also criticised the CDU for describing itself as a '*Weltanschauungspartei*' claiming religion and *Weltanschauung* were "values unto themselves" and should not front political life. Yet the belief that politics should descend from a spiritual, Christian basis was inherited from the Centre Party¹⁰ with the exception that the CDU focused more broadly on 'western European values of humanistic and Christian traditions' in contrast to the Centre Party's old reliance on Catholic Social Teaching and exclusive representation of Catholic interests.¹¹ For a while the Centre Party existed alongside the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) in Cologne, as the region's Catholic majority meant Centre Party members outweighed all other former party affiliations in the region. The Centre Party's attempt to push the CDU to the right of centre¹² however, provoked the CDU to denounce all affiliation with its political predecessor and to focus on building a party of all Christian denominations and socio-economic classes and put an end to Germany's centuries' old confessional schism.

⁸ There was fierce opposition to refounding the Centre Party by former members including former Chancellor Brüning who warned of the party's past failure to modernise itself from a confessional to a political party. In a letter dated October 1945 to Dr. Hamacher, the new party chairman after 1945 Bernhard Kaes warned "Die große katholische Kirchenpartei in Deutschland ist mehr statisch als dynamisch und trägt manche Züge des altern Liberalismus. Sie hat sich keine großen politischen Ziele setzt [sic] und keine Parolen ausgegeben zur Neuformierung des Reiches und der Gesellschaftsordnung." ACDP, Landesverband Westfalen-Lippe, III-002-025/1.

⁹ Noel D. Cary, op. cit., p.171.

¹⁰ "Das wichtigste Erbe, das die Union von der Deutschen Zentrumspartei übernommen hat, lag in dem Bekenntnis zu einer geistigen 'weltanschaulichen' Priorität des politischen und sozialen Lebens." Winfried Becker, Geschichte... op. cit., p.353.

¹¹ Not all members agreed with Spiecker. Centre Party member Helene Wessel believed that *Weltanschauung* had a very valid role to play in a political party and she was convinced that the only parties to prosper after the war would be those that gave politics a spiritual dimension.

¹² Kurt Witt, "Wie die Union entstanden ist," in; Bruno Dörpinghaus, Kurt Witt, Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU. 1. Jg., K.G Löhse, Frankfurt/Main 1950.

This section will consider the course of the political discussions on the alternative strategies of Christian Socialism, Solidarism and Christian Realism in the Rhineland and Westphalian states¹³ of the British zone, and examine the written manifestos that they developed. These are the Cologne Principles from June 1945, the Principles of the Rhineland and Westphalia CDP¹⁴ in September of the same year, the Neheim-Hüsten manifesto in March 1946 and the Ahlen programme in February 1947.

Christian Socialism

The Cologne Circle or 'Walberberger Movement' of Christian Socialism was initiated during the Nazi period by the Walberberg monastery priests Laurentius Siemer and Eberhard Welty. In 1941 Siemer and Welty were approached by the Catholic workers' movement representatives in Cologne, Nikolaus Groß and Heinrich Körner to discuss a society based on the natural rights inherent in Christianity, as a model to replace the now defunct Nazi system. Groß and Körner were specifically concerned by "which ethical principles should become the foundation for their work."¹⁵ Meetings followed in the Kettelerhaus, the centre of resistance discussions in Cologne, with other Cologne trade unionists and Catholic labour representatives including Johannes Albers, Karl Arnold, Andreas Hermes as well as Jakob Kaiser and the resistance member, Carl Goerdeler from Berlin.¹⁶ Contacts were established with other members of the German resistance¹⁷

¹³ The State of North Rhine-Westphalia was formed in July 1946.

¹⁴ The party was called Christian Democratic Party until the joint meeting of all regional Christian Democratic groups in Bad Godesberg in December 1945 when it was agreed to adopt the Berlin party name Christian Democratic Union.

¹⁵ "welche ethischen Grundsätze sie ihren Arbeiten zu unterlegen hätten." Laurentius Siemer, *Aufzeichnungen und Briefe*, Knecht, Frankfurt 1957, p.125.

¹⁶ The Kettelerhaus group also had contacts during the Nazi period to Social Democrats where the idea of a Labour Party was first discussed. For details of the members and activities of the Cologne group during the Nazi period. See Vera Bücker, "Der Kölner Kreis und seine Konzeption für ein Deutschland nach Hitler" in; *Historische Politische Mitteilungen*, 2/1995.

¹⁷ The German resistance was broadly represented by three core groups. The Kreisauer Circle with approximately 20 members including Helmuth James von Moltke and York, Eugen Gerstenmaier, Theodor Steltzer. Their programmatic ideas for a post Hitler era were developed from around 1940-1943 and focused on foreign policy and economic policy and the notion of a 'Personal Socialism' to counteract the decline in religious faith. The second and most significant of resistance groups was that led by Carl Friedrich Goerdeler's and Ludwig Beck's known for their two memorandum documents *Das Ziel* from 1941 and *Der Weg* from 1943/44. Their programmatic ideas looked particularly at aspects of constitution, domestic and foreign policy based on an 'organic' order and the principle of subsidiarity. This included the estate system in which interest groups, workers and employers collectively managed their own affairs thus doing away with the need for one 'Führer'. The third group was the Freiburg Bonhoeffer Circle focused on economic, social and domestic policy and produced their programme

such as the Kreisau Group, K.D Bonhoeffer and Eugen Gerstenmaier and Bernhard Letterhaus, secretary of the Catholic Workers' Movement (KAB).¹⁸ Following a number of arrests however the Cologne group was disbanded and those who managed to escape, including Kaiser and Hermes, went into hiding in Berlin. Welty had documented the group's discussions in the manuscript '*Was nun?*' subtitled '*Grundsätze und Hinweise zur Neuordnung im deutschen Lebensraum*.'¹⁹ The manuscript was published immediately after the war, and became one of the first platforms for political discussion.

The basic philosophy of the Dominicans' Christian Socialism was derived from Christian social ethics, which offered a *Gesamtentwurf* for all aspects of social, ethical, political and economic life. Dominicans extracted the social aspects of Catholic Social Teaching, in particular its focus on '*Gemeingut*' as guidelines for developing a socialist order. They believed that by overcoming the confessional conflict between Catholics and Protestants and initiating a return to God and to Christian values, they would lead the way to a new reformed society. Morals and an ethical code of behaviour should determine the public as well as the private sphere and the interests of individuals and society should be put before those of the state. The statements were clearly a reaction to the immorality of National Socialism but also revealed the conservative backlash against modernity, capitalism and the liberal progressive thinking of a secular society. They were a reminder of those same views that in the 19th century had blamed liberalism and individualism for undermining Christianity's influence in society and man's sense of spiritualism ever since the French Revolution. Liberalism, capitalism, collectivism and fascism, they argued, were the consequences of a secular society, and only by the overthrow of capitalism, and the establishment of a Christian socialist order would Germany avoid a repeat of its historical mistakes. In his work *Christlicher Sozialismus* Welty²⁰ writes;

'Politische Gemeinschaftsordnung' in 1942/43. Stauffenberg, Hitler's attempted assassin did not participate in any programmatic discussions. See Günther Schulz, "Die Gesellschaftsordnung in den Staatsentwürfen des deutschen Widerstandes" in; Jörg Dieter Gauger and Klaus Weigelt (Hrsg), op. cit., p.129-155.

¹⁸ Rudolf Uertz, "Verpflichtendes Erbe? Ursprung und Programmentwicklung der CDU" in; Die Neue Ordnung, Nr.39, 1985, p. 86 (84-93).

¹⁹ Eberhard Welty, *Was nun? Grundsätze und Hinweise zur Neuordnung im deutschen Lebensraum*, Albertus-Magnus-Akad. d. Dominiker, Walberberg circa 1950.

²⁰ It is the metaphysical nature of the human spirit not the material that forms the basis of his Christian ethics. Eberhard Welty, "Christlicher Sozialismus" in; Die neue Ordnung, Heft 1 Jg. 1, Kehle Verlag,

“Man muß die geschichtlichen Tatsachen glattweg leugnen oder vergewaltigen, wenn man bestreiten will, daß die abendländische Menschheit sich im nämlichen Maße fehlentwickelte, als sie die Grundsätze der christlichen Ethik vergaß.”

Emphasis on the individual was not to be misinterpreted as liberal individualism, but meant individual freedom within the context of the community. The state was equally bound by its duty to serve the community, the '*Gemeingut*' ensuring its spiritual, cultural and ethical well-being, as well as the more obvious material benefits. Welty envisaged a centrally administered economy, to satisfy society's 'needs' or '*Bedarfsdeckung*.' The market is not given any regulatory function in Welty's economic order but the state may assign economic planning to self-administering bodies, that operate under the auspices of the state. Large industry should be nationalised to allow for better state planning and production, but small and medium sized businesses should remain in private hands, provided that no threat of monopoly existed. Where monopoly occurs the state is granted the right to confiscate property and transfer it to public ownership. The measure was targeted primarily at those industries accused of carrying out exploitative economic practices in collusion with Hitler, including heavy raw materials and manufacturing industries, banks and finance institutions. Property ownership on the other hand should be distributed fairly, allowing individuals to improve their own personal welfare.²¹

Welty's Christian Socialism unmistakably reveals similarity to the central tenets of ordo-liberalism. Even though the overtly theological aspect of Welty's programme is less marked in ordoliberalism, both philosophies advocated the idea of a third way programme, as a holistic solution to society's needs. Catholic Social Teaching was the basis for Welty's Christian democratic programme and relied, like ordoliberalism, on the same Thomist tradition.²² Christian Socialism may have oriented its economy around the

Heidelberg 1946/7. "Christlicher Sozialismus" was intended for internal party discussion in which Welty attempted to define what the term Christian Socialism meant in view of the misunderstanding of its relationship to Marxist socialism and the clash with the teaching of the papal encyclical *Quadragesimo anno* 1931 which states that socialism and christianity are mutually exclusive and incompatible concepts.

²¹ Eberhard Welty, *Die Entscheidung in die Zukunft, Grundsätze und Hinweise zur Neuordnung im deutschen Lebensraum*, Kerle, Heidelberg 1946, p.288.

²² Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.33. Ambrosius shares the view that there is significant communality between ordo-liberalism and Christian socialism but qualifies ordo liberalism as a theoretical concept and not a specific programmatic response to dealing with post war society like Christian Socialism. To

principle of *Gemeinwohl* in contrast to the competition driven economy of ordoliberalism, but Christian Socialism upheld state protection for full and fair competition. Like ordoliberalism, Christian Socialism granted the state the right to intervene in the case of monopolies and seize state ownership of industry. In 1947, Joachim Tiburtius²³ from the Berlin CDU drafted a Christian socialist economic programme, to specifically prove the contentious issue, that it was possible to produce a Christian economic programme. The post-war efforts by Protestants and Catholics to bring about social reform was in simplified terms aimed at introducing Christian elements into policy decision making, such as working hours, wage or employment conditions and to promote a sense of Christian responsibility in those politicians implementing reforms. Unlike Socialism, which attempted to overthrow the existing economic order to replace it with state ownership of all means of production, socialist reform, sought to minimise the negative consequences of a liberal economy that is run according on the principle of private ownership of the means of production. Christian Socialism looked to encompass and integrate all aspects of the economy in a *Gesamtordnung*.²⁴ Like ordo-liberalism private ownership of monopoly industries, such as gas and coal was endorsed on the condition that consumer interests were not curtailed. In Tiburtius's vision of a *Gemeinwirtschaft* there is no barrier to a state owned industry being managed by an independent board, where the state's interests are represented alongside those of employers and consumers. Given the mixed structure of this economic model, Tiburtius himself questions if his ideas can truthfully be termed 'socialist,' since all indications point to a more liberal economy;

be precise he attributes Christian socialism to the Beckerath group rather than to the more liberal Freiburg school of ordo-liberals. See chapter 3 of this study.

²³ Prof. Dr. Phil. Habil. Joachim Tiburtius, *Christliche Wirtschaftsordnung: ihre Wurzeln und ihr Inhalt*, Union Verlag, Berlin 1947, p.29ff. See section II, chapter 5.1 of this study for a discussion of developments in Berlin.

²⁴ Tiburtius outlines a strong moralising and monitoring role for the state, identical to ordo-liberalism "Der Staat ist in unserem Plan Herr über die Grundstoffe der gewerblichen Wirtschaft. Er entscheidet über Betriebsgrößen und Besitzverteilung in der Landwirtschaft. Er gibt dem Wettbewerb sittliche Normen, ordnet das Rechnungswesen als Grundlage der Selbsterkenntnis der Unternehmer und seiner eigenen Unterrichtung für notwendige Ergänzung und Eingriffe. Er soll den Wettbewerb durch Aufhebung der Kartelle und durch Zugang der Verarbeiter zu den Grundstoffen wirklich frei machen..... Das Arbeitsverhältnis wird auf Gesamtverträgen unter staatlichem Schutz aufgebaut." Ibid., p.82.

“Ist diese Gesamtregelung als Sozialismus und als christlich zu bezeichnen? Ist die dem Wettbewerb belassene weite Zone, ist die Anerkennung des Zinses nicht als liberal zu bewerten?”²⁵

The intention of Christian Socialism was therefore more ‘social’ than ‘socialist’ but reveals that the ensuing fate of Christian Socialism lay in its controversial name and its scope for misunderstanding and possible deliberate misrepresentation, rather than in its content per se. Welty’s socialism was derived from its original Natural Law definition, denoting ‘social’ in the context of *Soziallehre* and rejecting any ideological or historical affiliation with Socialism, in particular with its Marxist version. In view of the striking similarities between Christian Socialism and Ordoliberalism, Kraiker²⁶ goes so far as to suggest that Christian Socialism was an ideology of reformed capitalism. Although Christian Socialism found its strongest and most dedicated advocates in the Cologne Group in the Rhineland, discussions reveal that some members were anxious about adopting a Christian Socialist programme due to mounting ideological confusion between the Socialism in Christian Socialism and the Socialism of Marxism and Social Democracy. Inevitably Welty’s version of Socialism - genuine or not - was open to misinterpretation. Many in the CDU were unable to overcome their suspicion that the substance of Christian Socialism ultimately harboured the same ideals as Marxist collectivism.²⁷ Programmatic discussions were clearly not only concerned with the substance but also with how the political concept was perceived and its potential for manipulation in political campaigning. It was perhaps naive in the context of 1945, to expect socialism to be taken as a neutral concept devoid of all ideological links and traditions. The Christian Socialists’ demand for *Gemeingut vor Eigengut* for example

²⁵ Ibid., p.82.

²⁶ G. Kraiker & M. Welteke, “Die politische Reorganisation des Bürgertums” in; Huster/Kraiker/Scherer/Schlotmann/ Welteke, *Determinanten der Westdeutschen Restauration 1945-1949*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt/Main 1975, p.217 (214-260).

²⁷ “Am ehesten, viel früher als die entsprechenden politischen Entscheidungen fallen, zeigt sich das in der Ebene der Sozialphilosophie, der Interpretation der kirchlichen Soziallehre, der allgemeinen, gleichsam ‘ideologischen’ Haltungen zu den Grundproblemen der Zeit. Wer im Jahre 1946 eine sozialistische Entscheidung für akzeptabel, wenn nicht vom theologischen oder sozialmetaphysischen Standpunkt aus gar für besonders begrüßenswert hielt, wird 1947 und erst recht danach seine Zweifel haben, ob denn das mit christlichen Sozialismus Gemeinte Gemeinsamkeiten mit dem aufweise, was der Sprachgebrauch sonst unter Sozialismus versteht, ob nicht verschiedene Dinge gemeint seien, ob nicht in der Sache viel eher eine Gegnerschaft als eine Bundesgenossenschaft begründet sei.” Arcadius R. Gurland, *Die CDU/CSU. Ursprünge und Entwicklung bis 1953*, Dieter Emig (Hrsg), Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Köln/Frankfurt am Main 1980, p.208.

would naturally evoke connotations of universalistic, fascist and collectivist theories of *Gemeingut*.²⁸

In May 1945 Leo Schwering, Wilhelm Warsch and Theodor Scharmitzel of the Cologne Circle re-assembled. Schwering says, drafting a programme was the most important task for the first meeting;

“Diese erfahrenen Politiker kannten ihr Publikum. Sie wußten um die Programmseligkeit des Deutschen.... War schon das Programm bei den historischen Parteien der Vergangenheit stets eine Frage höchsten Ranges, wieviel mehr jetzt, da man es unternahm, etwas völlig Neues zu schaffen.”²⁹

Schwering describes that the only programme outline available to them at the time was from a man called Hans Schäfer, drafted March 19, 1945 who had thought of the name *Christlich Demokratische Volkspartei* for a party that integrated Catholic and Protestant middle classes and the non-socialist working classes. It was agreed that democracy and parliamentarianism should be among the primary aims of the new programme, and should also include the words ‘Christian’ and ‘Socialism,’ as a way of reclaiming the term from the Marxists. Following several initial discussions, the group produced a 29-point programme. Although emphasis was on the ‘social’ aspect of the new programme, it rejected nationalisation plans for industry and supported a market economy, further evidence that Socialism was not a key feature. Schwering finally presented their programme at the first official meeting of the Cologne CDP on June 17, 1945, at the Kolpinghaus in Cologne. A total of eighteen individuals, all Catholic, and several former members of the Centre Party, the clergy and the Windthorstbund met to define the ethical and spiritual foundations for the new party. Eberhard Welty who presented his work ‘*Was nun?*’ was warmly received, since it clearly built on Adam Stegerwald’s 1920 Essen Programme.³⁰

²⁸ Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.70

²⁹ Leo Schwering, *Vorgeschichte ...* op. cit., p.21.

³⁰ The Walberberger-Cologne Circle took nationalisation plans further than those envisaged by Stegerwald back in 1920. Rudolf Uertz, *Christentum und Sozialismus...* op. cit., p.33.

In an effort to create an interdenominational party structure, Protestants including Hans Ecke and Fritz Fuchs were invited to join chairman Leo Schwering and other Catholics at the first meeting of the newly constituted programme commission in the Walberberger monastery³¹ from June 23 to June 30 to discuss drafting the party's new programme - the Cologne Principles. Siemer and Welty were not direct members of the Programme Commission but forwarded their ideas for socialist reform, including the suggestion that the party should be called a "*Christlich-sozialistische Gemeinschaft*."³² The group agreed to emphasise the social aspect of the programme but they did not follow the Dominicans' other more radical suggestions. Schwering insisted on the continued value of private property and individual initiative, *bourgeois* society and culture.

"Der Name sozialistisch in der Verbindung mit christlich sei, richtig verstanden, zwar nicht anstößig, doch müsse es bei der alten Bezeichnung christlich-demokratisch bleiben."³³

The term Christian Socialism was clearly problematic, and caused critics to lament that the focus has always been directed on the name and not the content of Christian Socialism. Uertz³⁴ has argued that the group was under great time pressure to publish their programme, and explains why the Cologne Principles did not sufficiently communicate the true meaning of Christian Socialism, as explicated in the more profound and comprehensive '*Was Nun?*' Time pressure or not, the reaction that the phrase provoked, indicates that the powerful impact of political concepts on public perception, must first be acknowledged by political parties before drafting programme statements and manifestos.

³¹ Other members of the Cologne Circle's Programme Commission were Johannes Albers, Hans Ecke, Fritz Fuchs, Sybille Hartmann, Joseph Hofmann, Peter Schaeve, Thedor Scharmitzel. Peter Schlack, Wilhelm Warsch and Karl Zimmermann.

³² Franz Focke, *Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung. Die Idee eines Christlichen Sozialismus in der Katholisch-Sozialen Bewegung und in der CDU*, Peter Hammer Verlag, Wuppertal 1981, p. 211.

³³ Leo Schwering, *Vorgeschichte ... op. cit.*, p.35.

³⁴ Uertz argues the true basis of a new social and political order suggested by the trade unions was combined with the social ethical ideas of the Walberberger tradition. Rudolf Uertz, *op. cit.*, p.28ff.

The Cologne Principles

Although the phrase Christian Socialism appeared in the preamble to the Cologne Principles³⁵ it is otherwise apparent from the manifesto, published on July 1, 1945 and subtitled *Der Ruf zur Sammlung des deutschen Volkes!* that many of the radical and theological aspects of the Walberberger philosophy had already been dropped.³⁶ The manifesto³⁷ contained a preamble followed by twenty individual points. The emphasis in the preamble on '*Gemeinwohl, soziale Gerechtigkeit and soziale Liebe*' are values taken directly from Catholic Social Teaching and Christian ethics,³⁸ whilst the call for a;

"soziale Ordnung, die der demokratischen Überlieferung der deutschen Vergangenheit ebenso entspricht wie der Weite und dem Geiste des christlichen Naturrechts"

is reminiscent of demands by the Centre member and trade unionist Adam Stegerwald in his 1920 Essen Programme, for a Germany that was '*deutsch-christlich-sozial*.' The main body of the Cologne Principles³⁹ determined that private property ownership must be; '*nach den Erfordernissen des Gemeinwohls geordnet sein*' whilst the '*Vorherrschaft des Großkapitals, der privaten Monopole und Konzerne wird gebrochen*' and the economy must be aimed exclusively at the '*Bedarfsdeckung des Volkes*.' These few examples reveal that the Christian Socialist views of the Dominican priests Eberhard

³⁵ Some of the dissenting views within the group were aired at the first conference after the foundation of the CDU in Düsseldorf on 24th November 1945. In his speech Karl Arnold upheld traditions but pointed to the need in future to embrace the working classes and confessions, "... bleiben wir unserer politischen Tradition treu und werden auch damit auch der Arbeiterschaft gerecht, der es auch heute wie früher ablehnt, den Reichsgedanken zur Diskussion zur stellen." Karl Arnold, *Der Soziale und der sittliche Geist in der Demokratie, Gründungsversammlung der CDU in Düsseldorf 24. November 1945, Schriftenreihe der CDU des Rheinlandes Heft 3, Köln, p.14.*

³⁶ The terms *Verstaatlichung* and *Sozialisierung* for example were removed after the very first draft discussions. Wolfgang Jäger, "Adenauers Einwirkung auf die programmatische Entwicklung der CDU 1945 bis 1949 in der Frage der Wirtschaftsordnung" in; Dieter Blumenwitz et al, *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit*, DVA, Stuttgart 1976, p.431.

³⁷ In the Cologne Circle's 10 year Festschrift from August 1955, Dr Warsch recalls the work of the programme commission. Despite the fact that its members were different - both "kirchlich und dogmatisch" he reveals that Christianity provided them with a political platform "Dieses Werk wurde das geistige Rüstzeug und die erste Grundlage des beginnenden Kampfes um die Seele und das Vertrauen unseres Volkes." ACDP Landesverband Rheinland III-002-025/1.

³⁸ Peter Hintze (Hrsg), *Die CDU Parteiprogramme. Eine Dokumentation der Ziele und Aufgaben*, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn 1995, p.IX.

³⁹ Copies of all CDU programmes and draft principles are printed in O.K Flechtheim, *Dokumente ...*, op. cit.

Welty and Laurentius Siemer had succeeded in making a significant influence on the July version of the Cologne Principles, even if from this point, the priests' impact steadily declined.⁴⁰ From 1946, Welty and Siemer no longer participated in the development of the CDU's programme⁴¹ but Welty nevertheless kept his Christian Socialism alive through the Walberberg monastery's publication '*Die neue Ordnung*'.⁴²

Christian Realism

Prior to any knowledge of the Cologne Principles, Protestants in Wuppertal drafted their own Barmer Guidelines in July 1945.⁴³ Author of the *Barmer Erklärung*, the priest Lutze, believed a Christian party must be founded on the principles of democracy and a secular state. He was also aware that some Protestants put political interests before religious ones, as well as including people in the party who held no particular religious commitment. They were driven politically by the desire to form a; 'Christian motivierten bürgerlichen Sammlungsbewegung als Gegengewicht zu den 'linken' Parteien.'

By the beginning of 1946, Wuppertal Protestants brought out their programme of Christian Realism, to prevent the trade union strand of Christian Socialists assuming they had exclusive representation of the CDU's working classes.⁴⁴ Christian Realism supported a liberal, market oriented economy corresponding closer to the traditional

⁴⁰ The terms Christian Socialism or Socialism with Christian Responsibility did not feature in the first programme of the Berlin CDU.

⁴¹ Franz Focke, op. cit., p.211.

⁴² The first issue of *Die neue Ordnung* in January 1946 perpetuated the apocalyptic fear of the demise of Christian culture in the western world, of the Abendland under existential threat. "Welt und Menschen sind über ihre eigene Grenzen hinausgewachsen." Germany's new order must therefore entail a "Rückkehr zu dem, was wir verlassen und sogar geschmäht haben" a return to a natural order as devised by God. "Wenn das christliche Abendland den Mut besitzt, heimzukehren zu Gott und zu Christus, dann bekennt und entscheidet es sich gleichzeitig zu seiner eigenen Geschichte und Vergangenheit, zu seiner eigenen Lebens- und Geisteshaltung, zu seiner eigenen Sitte und Kultur Die Kultur des Abendlandes wird christlich bleiben oder – sie wird untergehen." The pamphlet declares its approach to be unashamedly dogmatic "Was immer der Betrachtung unterstellt wird, das wird vom Grundsätzlichen her gesehen und behandelt." Their ideology "die Weise der Schau" is the main determinant. Christianity represented an ideological framework which the Walberberger group sought to impose on the chaos and ruin they found in Germany. *Die Neue Ordnung*, Heft 1 Jg 1, Kerle Verlag, Heidelberg 1946.

⁴³ The Wuppertal Evangelicals in the early CDU circles descended from the former middle classes and had supported liberal parties during Weimar including the right-wing DNVP. Arcadius R. Gurland, op. cit., p.27-31.

⁴⁴ Franz Focke, op. cit., p.211.

Protestant proclivity for an ethics of liberal-individualism, but accepting that the immediate post war period required a degree of socialist measures such as economic planning and control to solve immediate shortages. Yet the liberal-conservative Christian Realists clearly envisaged replacing the planned economy with a liberal, competition based economic system as the best mechanism, where private business becomes the vehicle for economic regeneration. The Wuppertal group saw social policy as an extension of the existing liberal economic system which distinguished them from Christian Socialists who viewed the social and economic system as a '*Ganzheit*.'⁴⁵ As discussed earlier in the study, Evangelical theology holds that a system of Christian ethics can only be imposed on the personal, individual sphere, but maintains that each individual possesses or develops a socially conscious '*Gesinnung*.' Politics and economics (and here the issue of property ownership is paramount) are part of this individualistic, non-metaphysical domain.⁴⁶ Although confessional and sociological differences threatened to impede co-operation on social and political reform between Catholics and Protestants, by September 2 1945, the Cologne group of Christian Democrats successfully merged with Düsseldorf and Wuppertal to form the Rhineland CDP in Cologne.

The Principles of the Rhineland and Westphalia CDP (second draft of the Cologne Principles)

On the same day that the Rhineland CDP was formed, a Westphalian CDU was founded in Bochum. The Rhineland and Westphalian groups had previously met on August 13, in Wattenscheid, to agree on the Cologne Principles as the basis for a joint programme commission and to establish a united Christian Democratic party for the states of Rhineland and Westphalia.⁴⁷ The Rhineland based Düsseldorf group wanted to rework the entire document of the Cologne principles to give more emphasis to the '*Einheit des Reichs*' whereas the Westphalians were content with the federalist elements offered by

⁴⁵ Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.31.

⁴⁶ "Für die christlichen Sozialisten waren ihre sozialen Ordnungsideen nahezu identisch mit Christentum, für die Protestanten dagegen war die politisch-soziale Ordnung ein metaphysikfreier, eigengesetzlicher Raum, für den Ethik und Theologie keine unmittelbar gültigen politischen Normen abgeben können, da diese einzig für die Gesinnung relevant sind." Rudolf Uertz, op. cit., p.40.

⁴⁷ "So wiederholte sich das Bild von Kloster Walberberg, aber es war doch anders. Nicht nur das Milieu war verändert, auch der Akzent hatte sich verlagert." Leo Schwering, Vorgeschichte .. op. cit., p.53.

the Cologne programme.⁴⁸ Before negotiations began, both parties aimed to clarify their position on the relationship between Christianity and politics in order to reconcile their confessional differences. They did not aim however to produce a detailed religious response to all aspects of the social and political system. By the third meeting of the programme commission in October, the group agreed that the programme should not be dominated by religious and theological statements, but that these should be limited to the preamble and employed only for enhancing the programme's political credibility; "*um die Wirkung des Religiösen im Raume der Politik handele.*"⁴⁹

The Principles of the Rhineland and Westphalia CDP, or the second draft of the Cologne Principles as it was known, demonstrated a compromise between the views of the two state parties. The first part of the preamble was formulated by the Christian realist Otto Schmidt and the second part by the Christian Socialist Karl Arnold. Differences between the first and the second draft of the Cologne principles show the scale of the Christian Realist influence. They made several revisions to the Cologne Programme to express their objection to the terms Christian Socialism and Christian natural law and to the lack of reference made to German national unity. They altered the text to include; "*Die deutsche Einheit ist für uns ein unabänderlicher Grundsatz, sie zu wahren unsere höchste Pflicht.*" Gradually Socialist Catholics and Liberal Protestants appeared willing to compromise, and by the second draft of the Cologne Principles in September 1945, the term Christian Socialism was avoided. The phrase "*wahrer christlicher Sozialismus*" that featured in the June draft of the Cologne Principles was replaced with "*christlich, deutsch, sozial*" the term favoured by Adam Stegerwald. They altered the programme's standpoint on private business and individual responsibility, claiming private business initiative should not merely be '*erhalten*' as the first draft condoned, but positively '*erweckt.*' The implementation of '*freie körperlichen Selbstverwaltung*' should also be altered to '*öffentlich-rechtlichen Wirtschaftsvertretungen*' which implied a change from state run to joint associations of worker and employer bodies to oversee and control policy.⁵⁰ The interesting point here is that Christian Realism only demanded modification

⁴⁸ Horstwalter Heizer, *Die CDU in der Britischen Zone. Gründung, Organisation, Programm und Politik*, Droste, Düsseldorf 1988, p.167.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.170.

⁵⁰ Ute Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p.526.

of two relatively minor points of the Christian Socialist programme to suit their more liberal, realist objectives,⁵¹ suggesting that the differences between the two philosophies of Christian Socialism and Christian Realism were surmountable and permanent political interdenomination could become a reality.

Christian Solidarism

Welty's and Siemer's Christian Socialist views came under fire from those social and moral philosophers who believed in Christian Solidarism over Christian Socialism, including Heinrich Pesch, Oswald von Nell-Breuning and Gustav Gundlach SJ. Their criticism was a revival of pre-war antagonisms, once again attacking the Dominicans' attempt to recreate a social order in 1945 similar to that which existed in the Middle Ages, subordinating the individual to the community. Section one of this study showed how the Christian Solidarist Jesuits were credited with influencing the 1931 papal encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*, calling for the existing liberal economy to be adapted to meet its social responsibility. Jesuit thinking also underpinned the early Christian trade union movement, including Stegerwald's Essen programme in 1920 and the Centre Party's programme. Their notion of Christian Solidarity was crucially defined by their acceptance of a liberal-individualistic society. They believed that society was characterised by liberal-individualism, maintaining the separation between politics and ethics, yet their thinking departed from liberal-capitalist support for a true competitive economy on account of their preference for the guild system.⁵² Whilst the Solidarists did not oppose the capitalist economic system *per se*⁵³, they did not accept the classic economic view that the market is self-regulating or individuals' pursuit of wealth

⁵¹ "Dem Christlichen Realismus genügten also zwei geringfügige Veränderungen der an sich christlich-sozialistisch inspirierten Walberberger Leitsätze, um diese in seinem realistischen (liberalen) Sinne interpretierten zu können." Rudolf Uertz, *op. cit.*, p.57.

⁵² According to the solidarists, each member in the guild system voluntarily contributes to the whole, based on the belief that this works to the benefit of all. These parts could be professional bodies, administrative bodies or associations.

⁵³ Oswald von Nell-Breuning's assessment of the papal encyclical *Quadragesimo anno* and its standpoint on capitalism cites that "die kapitalistische Wirtschaftsweise sei nicht als solche in sich selbst verwerflich" but is condemned only when either the capitalist partner or the proletarian partner involved in the capitalist relationship tries to exploit the capitalist system exclusively to their own advantage. The mistake of the capitalist system in the past was namely that it was allowed to develop into this individualist, liberal type of capitalism. A capitalist system that contains inbuilt social obligations and a legal framework of rules and regulations by which it must abide however is acceptable. Oswald von Nell-Breuning S.J., "Kapitalismus und Sozialismus in katholischer Sicht" in; *Frankfurter Hefte* Heft 7 Jg. 2, 1947. p.665-681.

creation will naturally bring about a healthy balanced economy. They claimed that the economy must be 'managed' to ensure that society benefits as a whole. The Solidarists defended state intervention as a natural and necessary function, whilst the risk of too much state power and control was tempered by the Solidarists' rule of subsidiarity.

By April 1946, the party's *Interzonenausschuss* confirmed that agreement on the basic direction of the party had been achieved, but there were still a number of conflicting concepts in the area of economic and social policy among Socialists and Solidarists.⁵⁴ Jesuits argued that Christian Socialism was too preoccupied with providing theoretical, philosophical explanations that did not translate to a practical programme, and furthermore was a contradiction of the teachings of the Church on the issue of property ownership. Although the final draft of the Rhineland-Westphalia Principles retained the original Christian Socialist thrust of the first Cologne Principles, it does not disguise the obvious opposition from Evangelical Christian Realists and Catholic Solidarists. Although in the immediate post-war climate no group openly expressed its views on the liberal economy for fear of being labelled liberal-capitalist or reactionary,⁵⁵ once the Wuppertal group and Konrad Adenauer had both joined the Rhineland CDU, their principal motive became to defend the party from the left-wing ambitions of the Christian Socialist authors of the Cologne Principles.⁵⁶ Uhl⁵⁷ has suggested that despite its genuine proposals for social reform, the Christian Socialist programme of Welty failed because it was too authoritarian, illusory and even dangerous. Ambrosius⁵⁸

⁵⁴ The Interzonenausschuss had been set up during the meeting at Bad Godesberg in December 1945 under the leadership Dörpinghaus. Controversy over Christian Socialism and Solidarism came to a head in their first meeting in Mingoldsheim. See Akte Zwischenzonenverbindungsausschuss, ACDP, NL-Dörpinghaus: I-009-007/1.

⁵⁵ Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.25.

⁵⁶ Franz Focke. Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung. Die Idee eines Christlichen Sozialismus in der Katholisch-Sozialen Bewegung und in der CDU. Peter Hammer Verlag, Wuppertal 1981, p.299.

⁵⁷ See Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.82ff. Uhl is sceptical of Welty's aim of 'rechristianisation'. Since a Christian order must by definition be imposed from above and not as in a democracy from below. Christian Socialism thus leads to an authoritarian state form. "Der Wunsch Weltys, aus christlicher Liebe heraus eine vollkommene Ordnung für die Menschen herzustellen, wird zur Gefahr für ihre Freiheit und zur Gefahr für den Glauben, der ein Akt der freien Entscheidung sein sollte. Die Planung der Menschen auf Christus hin, um sie dadurch zu "vollguten" Menschen zu machen, führt konsequent zur Gefährdung, ja Aufhebung der Freiheit der Menschen." W.D Narr also remarks that the weakness of the Christian Socialist programme was that the focus on rechristianisation caused them to neglect plans for reform of institutional structures. Wolf-Dieter Narr, CDU/SPD op. cit., p.86.

⁵⁸ Ambrosius p.16.

believes Welty's social reform measures were contradictory; advocating private ownership over public ownership but supporting nationalisation plans, calling for worker co-determination rights but then doing nothing to restrict the power of the employer; favouring state control of the economy but rejecting a centralised, administered economy. Kraiker⁵⁹ claims that there was not one socialist, progressive feature put forward in the first two years of programmatic discussions that did not undergo revision or rejection at some later date. Even Welty, as the original theoretician of Christian Socialism, expressed anxiety that Christian Socialism could be misunderstood and warned that unless they succeeded in explaining the meaning of the term and how it differed from all other forms of Socialism, then it might be wiser to forego use of the term;

“Wir betonen nochmals, daß wir die Fragen und Befürchtungen, die das Wort hervorruft, genau kennen. Es muß unbedingt gelingen, die weiten Schichten unseres Volkes, die für diesen Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung gewonnen werden sollen, genügend darüber aufzuklären, worin der christliche Sozialismus besteht, und wie er sich von allem sonstigen Sozialismus unterscheidet. Sonst wäre es ratsamer, auf den Ausdruck zu verzichten.”⁶⁰

In the Jesuit journal *Stimmen der Zeit* in October 1947, Christian Socialism received its harshest criticism yet. It demanded that Christian Socialism asked what it really wanted to achieve. Did it want to socialise the whole economy or at least all of its decisive parts? Or would it be satisfied with the nationalisation of certain areas of the economy, in particular the key industries? The former, they said, would be in clear contradiction to the teaching of the Church and economic common sense, and if Christian Socialism wanted only the latter, then, they argued, it is just no longer Socialism.⁶¹ Christian Solidarists felt that their political concept more truthfully reflected the socialist aims and spirit of Catholic Social Theory.

The programmes by Evangelicals and Solidarists have also been accused of attempting to bring about the correct theological condition or *Gesinnung* in society at the expense of

⁵⁹ G. Kraiker & M. Welteke, op. cit., p.218.

⁶⁰ Eberhard Welty, *Christlicher Sozialismus*, op cit., p.69.

⁶¹ P. Paul Berkennkopf, *Stimmen der Zeit*, Monatschrift für das Geistesleben der Gegenwart. Herder, Freiburg October 1947.

formulating a concrete programme.⁶² They took the naive assumption that instilling the correct Christian behaviour and attitude in individuals was sufficient to bring about a stable social and political order. Since the social and political system should remain secular in structure, Evangelicals and Solidarists did not foresee a closed and rigid set of rules on which to run society such as in classic Liberalism, collectivism or Christian Socialism, but one which acted flexibly, pragmatically to current circumstances. This lack of a tangible programme, says Schmidt,⁶³ did not make Solidarism any less successful, since;

“der Solidarismus als die liberale Form der katholischen Sozialethik, der auch die flexiblen Liberal-Konservativen um Adenauer zuneigten, die ideologische Grundlage für die praktisch-politische Zusammenarbeit und das spätere Regierungsbündnis von Christlichen Demokraten und Liberalen in der Frühphase der Bundesrepublik schuf.”

Schmidt claims that Catholicism learnt to assimilate the liberal economic views of thinkers such as Pesch⁶⁴, and combined these with its own 19th century achievements in social reform and Solidarist thinking and so learnt to accept that the modern industrial economy thrived on the principle of market economics and the granting of individual economic freedoms. Schmidt believes it was the Jesuit ‘individualist’ interpretation of Catholic Social Teaching that enabled dialogue to take place with conservative Protestants in the first place. These liberal thinking Catholics shared the view with Evangelicals, that the political and social order was a secular sphere and not synonymous with a closed, Christian society run according to natural law.⁶⁵

The Rhineland-Westphalia CDU and the ‘Reichstreffen’ in Bad Godesberg

Between 14-16 December, 1945, Andreas Hermes, Chairman of the CDU in the Soviet zone, invited all Christian ‘Volksparteien’ to a ‘Reichstreffen,’ under the supervision of

⁶² Rudolf Uertz, op. cit., p.54.

⁶³ Ute Schmidt, op. cit., p.520.

⁶⁴ Heinrich Pesch, the Volkswirtschaftler (1854-1963) did not think the individual was a means to an end for society but was free and independent. Pesch was concerned with the economy and the individual’s place in it as the source of national prosperity. Competition was desired and necessary as was the right to private ownership. Solidarism for Pesch was not a theological concept but a social, philosophical one and he believed no national economic programme could be gained from Christianity directly. Christianity only offered guidelines for a moral code. See section by Wilfried Gottschalch in Wilfried Gottschalch/Friedrich Karrenberg/Franz Josef Stegmann, op. cit.

⁶⁵ Schmidt’s view is also shared by Rudolf Uertz, op. cit., p.53 and Wolf D. Narr, op. cit., p.88.

the British and US military authorities, to declare their joint aim of co-ordinating all regional Christian democratic *Landesverbände* into one central *Reich* organisation, to establish a “*wirtschaftliche und soziale Neuordnung*” and a “*neue Politik aus dem Geist des Christentums und der Demokratie*.”⁶⁶ The meeting demonstrated the beginning of a strong ideological and organisational influence by the Berlin Christian Democrats over the western zones.⁶⁷ Yet calling the meeting a *Reichstreffen* was an exaggeration, since many states were not represented. Representatives from states in the French zone and Bavaria in the US zone, were among those absent⁶⁸ dashing hopes of achieving a national consensus on key issues. The conference secured formal agreement on the party name, accepting the Berlin party title the *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* (CDUD)⁶⁹ and, most importantly, consensus was reached on adopting Berlin’s programme of *Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung* as the official party programme. It was here that Christian Socialism appeared to regain some of its lost profile in the western CDU. Yet the resolutions reached at the conference have more adequately been termed a pyrrhic victory for the Christian Socialists.⁷⁰ The claim to have given recognition to the party’s trade union wing by establishing ‘social committees’ or *Sozialausschüsse* was a mild concession by the right-wing members of the party who

⁶⁶ Brigitte Kaff, *Die Unionsparteien, 1946-1950. Protokolle der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU Deutschlands und der Konferenzen der Landesvorsitzenden, Forschungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte*, Droste, Düsseldorf 1991, p.IX.

⁶⁷ Hans Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer. A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction Vol 1: From the German Empire to the Federal Republic, 1876-1952, Berghahn Books, Providence, Oxford 1995. Berlin’s claim to national leadership of the *Reichspartei* was undermined by the fact that Kaiser and Hermes were prevented from attending by the Soviet military authorities. In his absence Hermes’ speech was read out. See section II, chapter 5.1 of this study for the programme discussions in Berlin.

⁶⁸ Adenauer was also prevented from speaking because of the ban on political activity which had been imposed by the British High Authority.

⁶⁹ All regional groups agreed to adopt the name except for the Christian democrats in Bavaria who preferred to call themselves the CSU. The first CDU Chairman Josef Müller in Bavaria, said “Christian Social Union corresponded more to our conception of social evolution deriving from a Christian sense of responsibility in cultural, economic and above all social policy than the idea Christian Democratic” cited in Geoffrey Pridham, *Christian Democracy in West Germany*, Croom Helm, London 1977, p.24. The CDU was the only party at the time not to use the word ‘Party’ in its title because of its negative connotations of ‘Weimar parties’ and the ‘Nazi Party.’ A. J Heidenheimer, Adenauer and the CDU, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1960, p.22. In conversation with the mayor of Hamburg Adenauer stated; “There were many arguments for and against the name Christian Democratic. But we definitely think that the name ‘Union’ should not be adopted for the following reason: it is impossible to know what path the Christian Democratic Union will take under pressure from the Russians. This might eventually provide valuable material for hostile agitation.” Hans Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer. A German Politician ... op. cit., p.339.

⁷⁰ Franz Focke, op. cit., p.219ff.

sensed labour representatives' dissatisfaction with their lack of power and influence in the party. Erich Köhler from the CDU Hesse launched the party's projected socio-economic and political platform, which was virtually identical to the Berlin CDU's founding manifesto, the *Gründungsaufwurf*⁷¹ from June 26, revealing a clear trade union influence.⁷² The meeting confirmed a commitment to state ownership of key industries and private monopolies and to a system of central economic planning or '*planvoller Wirtschaftslenkung*.'

Adenauer's influence on the CDU's Programme

The question when Adenauer's influence on programmatic development in the region really began has not been conclusively resolved. During 1945 Adenauer is believed to have had little involvement with developing the party's first programme. Leo Schwering is reported to have contacted the lord mayor Adenauer in Cologne in April 1945, to discuss the foundation of a new party, but Adenauer expressed that he preferred to wait to consult northern Protestants first. Later that year however Schwering is also reported as criticising Adenauer for his "continued meddling."⁷³ Other reports insist that Adenauer's background influence should not be underestimated,⁷⁴ claiming he was kept informed of all developments by Schwering and Warsch who frequently sought his advice and also sent him a copy of the Cologne Principles. One thing is clear however. Once he was elected Chairman of the Rhineland CDU and of the British zone as a whole in January 1946, his subsequent influence on the direction of the programme and the party was unchallengeable.⁷⁵ There is an inherent contradiction when analysing Adenauer's programmatic involvement in the party,⁷⁶ between the theoretical and

⁷¹ Uertz believes that the Berlin manifesto was chosen as the party's official programme, because it was more pragmatic than the social, ethical and theological basis of western Christian Socialism. Rudolf Uertz, op. cit., p.62.

⁷² Horstwalter Heitzer, Die CDU in der Britischen Zone ..., op. cit., p.178.

⁷³ Noel D. Cary, op. cit., p.165.

⁷⁴ Horstwalter Heitzer, Die CDU in der Britischen Zone ... op. cit., p.483.

⁷⁵ So erklärt es sich von selbst, daß Adenauer am 8. Januar 1946 in Düsseldorf in den Landesvorstand der Rheinischen CDU wiedergewählt wurde. Das war der Anfang. Danach hat er systematisch alle wichtigen Ämter, die im Bereich des Rheinlands und der britischen Zone erreichbar waren und von ihm wahrgenommen werden konnten, in seiner Hand vereinigt." Bruno Heck, "Adenauer und die Christliche Demokratische Union Deutschlands" in; Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit. Beiträge von Weg und Zeitgenosse, DVA, Stuttgart 1976, p. 189 (187-203).

⁷⁶ Wolfgang Jäger, Adenauers Einwirkungin; Dieter Blumenwitz et al. op. cit., p.427-451.

theological basis of his personal political *Weltanschauung* on the one hand and Adenauer's tactical and pragmatic utilisation of programmes on the other. As a result one can never be sure when Adenauer was acting out of genuine conviction and when he was using philosophical, ideological arguments as an instrument for gaining political advantage.

Adenauer's world view⁷⁷ was best communicated in his memoirs⁷⁸ and in his many speeches as party chairman. Probably the most well known and exemplary of these was his famous speech at Cologne University on August 24, 1946.⁷⁹ This speech provides a useful source of entry into an investigation of Adenauer's *Weltanschauung* as it encompasses almost all his key political values and demonstrates Adenauer's rhetorical skill in relating diverse themes into one coherent whole. He most frequently refers to '*christlich-abendländischen Kultur*' and to the '*Würde*' of the individual, but also to his abhorrence of an all-powerful, omnipotent state whether this was the fascist regime of National Socialism or the communist version in the Soviet Union. He makes cross links between the values of western culture and European economic interdependence and the potential threat from communism. By repeating the same pattern in later speeches, Adenauer succeeds in consolidating and reinforcing his message, until the values appear indissoluble and one could not be achieved without implicating another. On economic policy Adenauer believed in private enterprise and the right to private property ownership, insisting on the inextricable link between political freedom and economic freedom. This principle became polarised so that a centralised, administered economy became associated with dictatorship and a liberal, market economy with political,

⁷⁷ For a comprehensive account of Adenauer's personal philosophy, see Werner Weidenfeld, Konrad Adenauer und Europa. Die Geistigen Grundlagen der westeuropäischen Integrationspolitik des ersten Bonner Bundeskanzlers, Europa Union Verlag, Bonn 1976 and Anneliese Poppinga, Konrad Adenauer. Geschichtsverständnis, Weltanschauung und politische Praxis, DVA, Stuttgart 1975 and Hans Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer, A German Politician ...op. cit.

⁷⁸ Adenauer's memoirs *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, Band I, DVA, Stuttgart 1965, is a comprehensive collation of original documentation from the period overlaid with Adenauer's subjective interpretation of events. Retrospectively the impression is created that developments in Germany between 1945- 1949 were the result of a coherently executed concept. Hans Peter Schwarz commented on Adenauer's memoirs "Zwischen der argumentativen Selbstdarstellung und den tatsächlichen Motivationen klafft erfahrungsgemäß oft ein Abgrund." Hans Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer. Seine Deutschland- und Außenpolitik 1944-63. DTV, München 1975, p. 102.

⁷⁹ "Grundsatzrede des 1. Vorsitzenden der Christlich-Demokratischen Union für die Britische Zone in der Aula der Kölner Universität. March 24, 1946" in; Hans-Peter Schwarz (Hrsg) Konrad Adenauer. Reden 1917-1967. Eine Auswahl, DVA, Stuttgart 1975, p.82-106.

freedom and democracy. Adenauer tactfully did not blame capitalism for the rise of fascism, as the Christian Socialists did, but on materialism in general.⁸⁰ Although at first Adenauer seems to lean more naturally towards the liberal-conservative strand in the Rhineland and Westphalia, in practice;

“Adenauer’s Konzept stimmte mit den beiden Gründungsimpulsen der CDU nicht überein, sondern es deutete voraus auf eine Entwicklung, die 1946 noch nicht eingesetzt hatte.”⁸¹

The Neheim-Hüsten Programme

Any gains made at the Godesberg meeting in December, such as parity of decision-making for employees in industry, were negated once Adenauer became chairman of the newly constituted committee of the British zone and chairman of the Rhineland CDU on 5th February 1946. Leo Schwering had opposed Adenauer’s appointment, predicting that it would entail a right-wing shift for the party and years later referred to the day as the day of Adenauer’s *‘Machtergreifung’*.⁸² In the spring of 1946 Adenauer single-handedly drafted a programme for the British zone CDU in Neheim-Hüsten⁸³ disregarding all party resolutions made at the December meeting in Godesberg. Adenauer formulated his programme as a unification document to merge the *Landesverbände* in the British zone with those of the US zone⁸⁴ and represents one of the key texts for understanding the ideological shift that the CDU undertook in 1946.

The most important element of Adenauer’s Neheim-Hüsten programme was respect for the individual’s economic and political freedom;

⁸⁰ Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.26.

⁸¹ Anselm Doering Manteuffel, “Die ‘Frommen’ und die ‘Linken’ vor der Wiederherstellung des bürgerlichen Staats. Integrationsprobleme und Interkonfessionalismus in der frühen CDU” in; Jochen Christoph Kaiser & Anselm Doering-Manteuffel (Hrsg.), *Christentum und Politische Verantwortung. Kirchen im Nachkriegsdeutschland*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart/Berlin/Köln 1990, p.93 (88-108).

⁸² Leo Schwering cited in H.P Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer. A German Politician ... op. cit., p.352.

⁸³ Horstwalter Heitzer, *Die CDU in der Britischen Zone*....op. cit., p.182.

⁸⁴ Heizer notes that Adenauer was the only one from a total of 30 delegates at the Neheim-Hüsten conference who had succeeded in producing a complete and comprehensive manifesto. “Durch das Fehlen eines Alternativentwurfs war der Programmausschuss nicht nur psychologisch sondern auch faktisch auf die Beratung des Adenauerschen Programms festgelegt und damit weitgehend auf redaktionelle Aufgaben beschränkt.” Ibid., p.486.

“Ausgangspunkt aller Wirtschaft ist die Anerkennung der Persönlichkeit.... (...) Freiheit der Person auf wirtschaftlichem und Freiheit auf politischem Gebiet hängen eng zusammen. (...) Die Sicherung der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Freiheit der Einzelnen, wie der Gesamtheit, verlangt Anerkennung des Privateigentums.”⁸⁵

Adenauer's emphasis on 'personalism' and 'freedom of the individual' marks the new focus of a Christian political programme.⁸⁶ Earlier demands for a *Bedarfsdeckungswirtschaft* was subtly modified by his adding the sentence; “*und vor allem der Befreiung und Entfaltung der schaffenden Kräfte des Menschen.*”⁸⁷ The programme condoned nationalisation of the coal industry as a concession to the Christian Socialists but Adenauer circumvented more wide reaching nationalisation plans for German industry by stating;

“Die sich aufdrängende Frage der Vergesellschaftung von Teilen der Wirtschaft ist zur Zeit nicht praktisch, da die deutsche Wirtschaft nicht frei ist.”

The coherence and structure of the programme also distinguishes Neheim-Hüsten from previous programmes and is indicative of the move from the earlier, heavy philosophical style of *Grundsatzprogramme* towards a more pragmatic style of *Aktionsprogramm*.⁸⁸ The programme comprised three separate sections - A. Fundamental Principles and Requirements B. Urgent measures for the period of reconstruction and C. Relations to other countries.

Always conscious of the political and tactical impact of programme statements, Adenauer removed the term Christian Socialism, but had also become uneasy with the status given to the term 'Christian.' Adenauer feared that the reference to Christian could risk alienating the liberals in the Free Democratic Party (FDP) with whom he later

⁸⁵ Neheim-Hüsten programme, printed in O.K Flechtheim, Band 2, op. cit., p51 (48-53).

⁸⁶ Rudolf Uertz, op. cit., p.76.

⁸⁷ Horstwalter Heizer, Die CDU in der Britischen Zone op. cit., p.487.

⁸⁸ G. Kraiker & M. Welteke, op. cit., p.432. Klaus Gotto also notes a distinct change in the programme style during the latter half of 1946. “..Die Verlagerung der ethisch-normativen Begründung des Programms von einer religiös-theologischen auf eine christlich-kulturelle Ebene.” Gotto, Christliche Demokratie in Deutschland, Analysen und Dokumente zur Geschichte und Programmatik der Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands and der Jungen Union Deutschlands. Konzeption Dr Holher Asmussen. Mit Beiträgen. Ernst Knoth, Melle 1978, p.24.

aimed to encourage coalition.⁸⁹ Comments in his memoirs also indicate that Adenauer did not consider early programme statements to hold any real, lasting relevance;

“Eine Partei wie die unsrige konnte erst im Verlauf einer gewissen Zeit die ihr zugrunde liegenden Ideen zu festen und klar umrissenen gemeinsamen Programmsätzen entwickeln.”⁹⁰

Christian Socialism in the CDU, he claimed, was a preliminary phase only, until the trade union wing grew to accept Adenauer's belief in Christian individual ethics in combination with liberal, market economics. Neheim Hüsten intended to provide a compromise between liberal-conservative and Christian Socialist forces, in order to avoid a split in the party, as well as to moderate the party's left-wing influence.⁹¹ Interestingly the Neheim-Hüsten programme generated more criticism from Otto Schmidt⁹² in the Wuppertal Protestant camp than from Christian Socialists. Schmidt protested that the programme did not have democratic credibility, since its contents had not been approved with leading *Länder* members of the British zone, and it further lacked theological underpinning and sensitivity for the party's range of confessional interests. Christian Socialists in the British zone on the other hand chose to ignore the personalistic, liberal tone in Adenauer's Neheim-Hüsten programme and continued to regard the Cologne Principles as their official programme.⁹³

Two main programmatic alternatives were thus fighting for party dominance; Christian Socialism supported by Jakob Kaiser in the Soviet zone and Karl Arnold and Johannes Albers in the British zone and Christian liberal-individualism backed by the Solidarists, the Wuppertal Protestants and Adenauer.⁹⁴ Adenauer was aware of the need to reach a

⁸⁹ “Adenauer did not intend to make the party programme into an avowal of Christian faith.” H.P. Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer. A German Politician ... op. cit., p.353.

⁹⁰ Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*, Band I, DVA, Stuttgart 1965, p.52.

⁹¹ Ibid., p.61.

⁹² From the beginning of 1946 Otto Schmidt was elected the representative for Protestant workers' rights in the Rhineland CDU with equal powers as Adenauer and Johannes Albers.

⁹³ Anselm Doering Manteuffel op. cit., p.94.

⁹⁴ Further to the socialist demands from within the party there were also those from the British Labour Government in the British Occupied Zone. British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin spoke in the House of Commons on October 22, 1946 declaring British support for the socialization of German industry and called on Germany to initiate the necessary steps. Arnold J. Heidenheimer; op. cit., p.123.

compromise with the Christian Socialists, in order to avoid internal party conflict. He tactfully cited Christian Socialist rhetoric in subsequent speeches, a tactic that involved giving Christian Socialist views sufficient exposure but at the same time keeping them under tight control.⁹⁵ Just five and a half weeks after releasing the Neheim-Hüsten programme, Adenauer's party in the Rhineland set up a programme commission to reconcile the party's divergent socio-economic views. Adenauer himself took an active role in drafting its contents. When it was finally presented on August 24, 1946 at the Essen Burgplatz as the 'Social Programme of the CDU,' there was evidence that a compromise had been reached, through the decision to opt for a mixed economic model or '*Gemischtwirtschaft*.' The Social Programme was followed up by the 'Essen Programme', effectively a bridging programme for North Rhine-Westphalia before the release of the Ahlen programme for the entire British zone.⁹⁶

The Ahlen Programme

The British zone programme drafted in Ahlen, Westphalia in February 1947, was a consolidation of the economic principles of Neheim Hüsten, the work carried out by the economic and social committees, and the Essen programme. Ahlen outlined the economic and social policies of the CDU in the British zone as preparation for the state parliamentary elections in spring 1947, providing an alternative to the nationalisation plans of both the British government and the German socialist parties, the SPD and KPD. It signalled a move towards a mixed economy that included nationalised, private and co-operative structures for industry. Adenauer's definition of a mixed economy almost certainly differed to that by the Christian Socialists, who would interpret a mixed economy for example as parity in decision making for employers and employees.⁹⁷ Yet it mattered little, so long as consensus was perceived to have been achieved on all sides, and co-operation could be futhered. The Ahlen programme sought to bring about a new order, a third way between the extremes of collectivism and capitalism. From the autumn of 1946 to January 1947, two separate drafts were put forward, the first by Albers, the second by Adenauer. After joint consolidation, Adenauer agreed to accept

⁹⁵ Horstwalter Heizer, *Die CDU in der Britischen Zone* op. cit., p.489.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.495ff.

⁹⁷ Rudolf Uertz, p.90.

the nationalisation plans put forward by Albers, most notably for the coal industry,⁹⁸ whilst Albers agreed to drop the phrase Socialism;

“Wir wollen das Wort Sozialismus bei uns nicht, auch nicht Sozialisierung soll Ausgangspunkt unserer Orientierung sein.”⁹⁹

The term ‘*Gemeinwirtschaftlich*’ was suggested in place of socialism. Ahlen’s nationalisation plans were more extensive than those outlined in Neheim-Hüsten but upheld Adenauer’s belief in the ‘*Machtverteilendes Prinzip*,’ first introduced at Neheim-Hüsten, to avoid a concentration of power among private individuals or the state and to distribute the power of large and monopoly style industries to smaller representative bodies, including employees, trade unions and regional councils, communities and private individuals. Liberal influences are further expressed in the statement;

“Freiheit der Person auf wirtschaftlichem und Freiheit auf politischem Gebiet hängen eng zusammen.”

Industrial democracy is encouraged with co-decision making powers for employees, trade unions and profit share schemes in industry, but there is no mention of the role of the market in Ahlen, neglecting entirely to state which mechanism should be used to regulate the economy. This gap in the programme would enable the CDU in 1949 to introduce market economics via the Düsseldorf Principles, without seen to be contradicting the principles of Ahlen. Economic planning was no longer conceived as an aim in itself, but;

“Planung und Lenkung müssen deshalb auf das unbedingt notwendige Maß beschränkt werden.”¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ In a meeting of the North Rhine-Westphalian Landtag, on 23-24 January 1947 Adenauer nevertheless qualified his acceptance of nationalisation plans by stating that the decision for or against a socialist organised society would ultimately depend on wider external factors.

⁹⁹ Meeting of the CDU Sozialausschuß of the British Zone, 23/24 January 1947 in Cologne. ACDP, NL Dörpinghaus StA. The exact date of the meeting is not certain and may have been a few days earlier or later.

¹⁰⁰ Ahlen Programme, printed in O.K Flechtheim, op. cit., p.53-58.

The traditional Catholic condemnation of capitalism featured significantly in the programme¹⁰¹ but equally rejected the state socialism that characterised the Soviet Union or the type of state capitalism of Hitler's regime. The provision was made for profit sharing schemes and to channel co-decision making powers to employees. Employee representatives would be invited to sit on industry's executive boards to jointly decide on key economic planning and social issues together with management. It was envisaged that economic planning and administration would be undertaken by independent economic bodies in designated chambers of commerce, both in the more regulated post-war economy and once normal economic conditions had been restored. In short the Ahlen Programme;

"could rouse the enthusiasm of Catholic adherents of social reform on the principle of Solidarism without imposing too rigid a system on the Protestants in north Germany."¹⁰²

The Ahlener Programme most accurately summarises the ambiguities of the CDU's programme in the immediate post-war period and it would be false to assume that the outcome was the preserve of the Christian Socialists or a product of Adenauer's tactics.¹⁰³ Heizer disagrees with Uertz that the Ahlen Programme was a synthesis of Christian Socialism and private economics, arguing instead that Ahlen was nothing more than; "ein zeitlich begrenztes Nebeneinander grundsätzlich verschiedener Ordnungsvorstellungen"¹⁰⁴ This theory also contradicts the views of Narr and Heidenheimer who see Ahlen 'clearly as a programme of the left' and the 'high point of Christian Socialism.' The indecision that prevails among post-war historians over Ahlen's true meaning is an exact indication of the vagueness of third way politics. It is precisely the level of ambiguity and imprecision over the origin, significance and direction of its ideology that made Ahlen acceptable to all groups. Each group could

¹⁰¹ "Das kapitalistische Wirtschaftssystem ist den staatlichen und sozialen Lebensinteressen des deutschen Volkes nicht gerecht geworden." The Ahlen Economic Programme; Ibid., p.53.

¹⁰² Arnold J. Heidenheimer, op. cit., p.128.

¹⁰³ Whilst some historians have argued that the Ahlen programme was primarily the brain child of Adenauer, Uertz insists that Adenauer's draft programme was simply a modified version of that put forward by the Christian Socialists, Albers, Arnold and Welty. Rudolf Uertz, *Verpflichtendes Erbe?*....op. cit., p.89.

¹⁰⁴ Horstwalter Heizer, *Die CDU in der Britischen Zone* p.504.

find, if not all, then some of its views represented, and was free to draw its own interpretations from the text. Emphasising Christian Socialism in the preamble and economic freedom in the main body of the text, it succeeded in placating both poles of opinion.

Schmidt¹⁰⁵ believes the Ahlen programme;

“erfüllte für die Union eine wichtige Funktion in der Außendarstellung und diente kurzfristig als Wahlplattform, die trotz innerparteilicher Kontroversen den Eindruck erweckte, als sei die CDU in der Frage des wirtschafts- und sozialistischen Neuaufbaus einhelliger Meinung.”

Apart from its propagandistic effect, the non-committal nature of the Ahlen programme had benefits for reconciling the party's differences on economic policy. As the study will show, just two years after Ahlen, the trade union wing would show support for social market economics by accepting the Düsseldorf Principles, without experiencing a compromise of their principles. Adenauer himself certainly only conceived Ahlen as a temporary campaign programme for the *Landtag* elections in order to highlight in the public realm the main programmatic differences between the CDU and the SPD.¹⁰⁶ Right-wing voices in the CDU would later denounce the early programmes as obsolete and relevant only to those unique post-war circumstances. Christian Socialists on the other hand, residing in the party's affiliated *Verbände* and *Vereinigungen*, in particular the *Sozialausschüsse* or the *Junge Union* placed more value on the early programmes of Neheim-Hüsten and Ahlen since they relied on them as legitimation for their existence.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Ute Schmidt, op. cit., p.535.

¹⁰⁶ Bruno Heck, Adenauer und die Christliche Demokratische Union Deutschlands, op.cit., p.197.

¹⁰⁷ Ute Schmidt, op. cit. p.531.

4.2. The North - Lower Saxony, Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen

Lower Saxony

The north German towns of Hanover, Braunschweig, Oldenburg and Schaumburg-Lippe, which later formed the state of Lower Saxony in the British zone, differed considerably in confessional and political structure from the Rhineland and Westphalia regions. Not surprisingly this was reflected in its Christian party development. Despite a predominantly Evangelical population, it was former Centre Party members Christian Blank and Bernhard Pfad, together with Christian trade unions Anton Storch and Wilhelm Naegel who set about establishing a new Christian party in Hanover in 1945. Centre Party members were suspicious about joining forces with the formerly national socialist inclined middle class Protestants¹⁰⁸ but were encouraged by the Westphalia CDP member, Kannengießer to overcome their prejudices. Kannengießer visited north Germany to report on the foundation of the CDP in the Rhineland and Westphalia, prompting Pfad to extend the party's appeal to former conservative, agrarian based 'Welfen' party voters in the region. Yet Pfad held onto his fear that the party would be overwhelmed by the Protestant majority. The subsequent intervention by Adenauer to elicit a positive response from the Hanover group proved decisive. He sent his delegates Leo Schwering and Theodor Scharnitzel to hold discussions with the Hanover group to convert them to the Christian democratic idea. It took until September 1945 for the Hanover group to concede to the foundation of a joint Christian democratic party and from this point on, Pfad sought contact with Evangelicals.¹⁰⁹

At the Evangelicals' conference on 28-31 August, 1945 in Treysa, Hesse, Evangelicals jointly declared their readiness to join a '*politisches Zusammengehen beider Konfessionen auf dem Boden christlicher Union.*' It was an ideal forum for contacts to be forged, between figures such as *Oberkirchenrat* in Hanover, Adolf Cillien and the former CSVD member Arnold Fratzscher. Although most of the early documents on the CDU in Lower Saxony have been lost or were destroyed, with little remaining to

¹⁰⁸ Horstwalter Heitzer, *Die CDU in der Britischen Zone*, op. cit., p.93.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.96.

indicate the course programme discussions took in 1945, Fratzscher¹¹⁰ himself reported that a number of similar initiatives ran in parallel to the establishment of the CDU in the region, which for a while threatened to steal the thunder of the Cologne based CDP. One such initiative came from Wilhelm Naegel¹¹¹ who called for a socially committed market economy. Naegel did not want simply to mimic the development of the Christian Democratic groups in Cologne and Berlin, but to develop the region's own specific Christian, democratic and social manifesto. The former mayor, Arthur Menge, also campaigned for a separate union of non-socialist groups, but alienated liberal voters by including 'Christian' in his party's title, *Christlich Demokratische Union*.

At the founding party conference of the CDU in Hanover on 18 November 1945, both the Catholic figure Pfad and the Protestant Cillien signalled the historically unprecedented commitment shown by Protestants and Catholics to interdenominational cooperation. Their shared experiences in the resistance against Hitler had forged what was termed a *Leidensgemeinschaft*. Mutual recognition by Christians of both denominations that the loss of Christian faith and an obsession with materialistic ambitions had led to the National Socialist catastrophe, provided sufficient justification for the two communities to come together. Evangelicals acknowledged their mistake in adopting a passive role in politics and pledged to take a more active role in shaping political events in future. In an unprecedented move by Protestants, the fusion of Christianity with politics in the form of a Christian party was deemed legitimate. The Christian faith, claims Fratzscher, was no closer to offering direct guidelines for economic and political policies, but could nevertheless become the basis for all political action and decisions.¹¹² Economic policies drafted by Wilhelm Naegel, rejected nationalisation and showed support for private business as an invaluable aid to the process of economic reconstruction. Some of the group's early ideas are also reported to have found expression in Adenauer's Neheim-Hüsten manifesto in February 1946.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Arnold Fratzscher, *CDU in Niedersachsen. Demokraten der ersten Stunde*, Niedersächsische Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, Niedersachsen 1971, p.33.

¹¹¹ Naegel later became the leader of the Economic Committee in the Bizone Wirtschaftsrat.

¹¹² Arnold Fratzscher, *op. cit.*, p.35.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p.33.

In the Catholic dominated areas of Lower Saxony, such as south Oldenburg, the launch of the Rhine-Westphalia CDP was met with greater enthusiasm and it was adopted as the CDP programme in the region. In Protestant north Oldenburg on the other hand, the CDP could not compete with the liberal democratic DP party, which contained both Protestants and Catholics.¹¹⁴ Virulent conflict between the confessions in the DP however, soon sent Christians of both denominations flocking to join the CDP. In Braunschweig, where three thirds of the population were Protestants, Christians, liberals and conservatives, who traditionally voted SPD, left liberal or *Deutschnationale*, first met in May 1945, but it took until December to launch a Christian party.

Schleswig-Holstein

In the period before 1933, northern Germany had had no experience of a Christian party that had attempted to engender political reconciliation between right and left wing parties.¹¹⁵ The Centre Party never gained more than about 1% in elections whilst Protestants voted DDP, DVP, *Deutschnationale* or SPD until around 1930, when the National Socialists were swept in to dominate Schleswig-Holstein's party spectrum. On 18 September, 1945 in Plön, Schleswig-Holstein, the former DNVP *Reichsminister* Schlange-Schöningen¹¹⁶ set out to form a Christian conservative party to combine all forces to the 'right of the SPD' and which he first named *Christlich Soziale Aufbau Partei*. By November, after recruiting other Christian democratic groups across Schleswig Holstein he changed the party's name to CDAP *Christlich Demokratische Aufbaupartei*. Among those invited to join Schleswig-Holstein's CDAP was former

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p.17.

¹¹⁵ Horstwalter Heitzer, *Die CDU in der Britischen Zone*, op. cit., p.105.

¹¹⁶ Schlange-Schöningen has been described as a "reactionär-aggressiver Konservativer mit starker völkisch-alldeutscher Orientierung" In May 1924 he wrote a Denkschrift to Hugenberg stating "Wir müssen den parlamentarischen Weg mißbrauchen, um in die Machtstellungen des Staates zu kommen mit der festen Absicht, eines Tages von diesen Machtstellungen aus das Parlament zu vernichten." The aim was dictatorship "die Diktatur, von der man möglichst nur wenig sprechen soll, die man aber wollen muß" in order to "den inneren Aufbau der Staatsmacht und der Wehrhaftigkeit zu ermöglichen." He later distanced himself from the DNVP, and until 1932 lent his support to forming a new 'bürgerliche' movement to support Brüning's increasingly authoritarian style of government but gravitating towards acceptance of the republic. During the Nazi period he sought contact with members of the resistance including Moltke and Goerdeler. Schlange-Schöningen later became director of the Economic Administration in the British Zone and agricultural minister in the Wirtschaftsrat for the Bizone. Günter J. Tittel, "Hans-Schlange Schöningen. Ein vergessener Politiker der 'ersten Stunde,'" in; *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg.35. Heft 1, 1987, p.28 (25-63).

member of the Kreisau resistance group, Theodor Steltzer¹¹⁷ who, returning to Schleswig-Holstein from Berlin, related details of the Berlin CDU development.¹¹⁸ Like the Berlin group, Schlange-Schöningen also wanted to overcome the confessional and political antagonisms that had paralysed the Weimar Republic. Yet it was difficult to dispel scepticism amongst liberal and conservative Protestants who feared that joining forces with Catholics concealed a hidden Catholic agenda to resurrect the Centre Party. When former Centre Party MP for Lübeck, Adolf Ehrtmann met with opposition from Liberals to the idea of co-operating with Christians in a joint broad based party, he turned to Adenauer in the Cologne CDP for support, but Adenauer offered no reply. Finally, Kannengießer at the Westphalia CDP, supplied him with names of members of the *Bekennende Kirche* whom he could approach,¹¹⁹ enabling Ehrtmann to strike an alliance with the popular *Bund freier Demokraten*. On 23rd November they jointly formed the CDU for Lübeck, basing their programme on the Hamburg manifesto, the Hamburger Principles. Schlange-Schöningen meanwhile focused his efforts on promoting his own unique version of Christian-conservatism in Hamburg, Westphalia and Lower Saxony, inciting political conflict with the CDU groups in these regions. The task of forming a party in Schleswig Holstein was thus passed to Carl Schröter, who proceeded to form the '*Demokratische Union*' (DU) in January 1946, before finally agreeing to merge the DU with the CDU.

¹¹⁷ Theodor Steltzer was jointly responsible for producing the 15th July 1944 Denkschrift a post-war programme for a new German order which he says was aimed at giving pragmatic not metaphysical recommendations and at communicating to the allies a truthful picture of the post war domestic situation in Germany. His regrets however that his suggestions were not implemented by the allies. "Es gehört zu den Enttäuschungen der jüngsten deutschen Geschichte, daß diese wohl stärksten Ansätze zu einer organischen deutschen Neuordnung und zu einer aus echten Antrieben stammenden deutschen Selbstreinigung achtlos liegenblieben und stattdessen durch die Alliierten die mechanische Restauration eines überlebten formalistischen Parlamentarismus und eine oberflächliche und von Ressentiments nicht freie Reeducationspolitik betrieben wurde." Nachwort to Theodor Steltzer, 'Von deutscher Politik. Dokumente, Aufsätze und Vorträge, Josef Knecht, Frankfurt/Main 1949, p.151. The British authorities elected Steltzer minister president of Schleswig Holstein.

¹¹⁸ Gerhard Schulze, op. cit., p.60.

¹¹⁹ Horstwalter Heitzer, Die CDU in der Britischen Zone, op. cit., p.113.

Hamburg

In Hamburg Christian Democrats broadly fell into two groups.¹²⁰ The Christian Socialist Catholics who relied on the organisational structure of the Catholic social associations and on the former Centre Party, and the liberal-conservative, Hanseatic *grossbürgerlichen* Protestants who made up the DVP, DNVP and the 'Wirtschaftspartei' during the Weimar period. Liberals could only overcome their scepticism of the CDU idea when the opportunity arose to participate as '*Honaratioren*' in the upper echelons of the party. Protestant circles still believed that the Catholic Centre Party was behind the new Christian democratic movement, and only in the summer of 1946, when the Protestant mayor Rudolf Petersen and other non-party affiliated individuals joined the CDU, did Protestants succeed in swinging the party majority in their favour.

During the first meeting on 19 September 1945¹²¹ discussions focused on the need to convert Hamburg's existing Christian democratic working group, or *Arbeitsgemeinschaft christlich-demokratischer Gruppen* and the *Bund Freies Hamburg* BFH into one 'Christian Union.' The Christian Union should become a cross-party Christian organisation aimed at anchoring Christianity in political life, that encouraged understanding between different Churches and faiths, persuaded all political parties to adopt Christian principles and promoted Christian individuals as MPs for the newly emerging parties. Catholics and Protestants in the Christian Union called for mutual respect for their respective Church traditions and a policy of non-interference into their faith. Since they did not consider themselves a political party, members contemplated excluding people from joining if they did not belong to a Christian church.¹²² The Treysa conference of Evangelical Church leaders gave Hamburg's interconfessional 'Christian Union' its full support. Church leaders were keen for the Union to base its programme on Christian principles but were hesitant about political parties employing the word Christian in the context of political programmes.

¹²⁰ Helmut Stubbe-da Luz, *Von der Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Grossstadtpartei – 40 Jahre Christlich Demokratische Union in Hamburg*. (1945-1985), Staatspolitische Gesellschaft Hamburg e.v, Hamburg 1985, p.9.

¹²¹ In the home of Herr Schmidt in Oesfeldt, Hamburg. ACDP, Hamburg III-010-039.

¹²² Helmut Stubbe-da Luz, *op. cit.*, p.31.

During the September meeting, former Centre Party figure Franz Beyrich and the author Rudolf Beissel urged that an interdenominational Christian, democratic party should be set up in addition to the 'Christian Union' umbrella organisation. They recognised the potential of Christianity for political legitimacy;

“der christliche Gedanke allein allen Stürmen standgehalten habe und daß deshalb eine christliche Partei notwendig sei, aber auch eine ungeheure Anziehungskraft haben werde.”¹²³

The party could further rely on support and ideas generated by the Christian Union. Suggestions were put forward for the new party, including the idea of a Labour Party¹²⁴ and a draft programme, *Aufruf für Solidarität* was formulated by Dr von Poll. It was criticised by Hopmann of the Political Committee for not possessing the “*ideenmässig ...geeignete Grundlage*” referring to insufficient concern for social issues. Hopmann instead recommended adopting the 'Cologne Principles' even if most members present were not familiar with the Cologne programme. Hopmann and Heyn thus set about formulating new guidelines more closely related to the Cologne programme than to Poll's *Aufruf*, suggesting the party should be called *Deutsche Freiheitspartei*. Their recommendations however did not stress the party's link to Christianity, prompting Dr Günther¹²⁵ to argue that a Christian democratic party could contribute to overcoming political divisions within the middle classes;

“Gerade da das bürgerliche Lager, um einmal diesen überholten Begriff zu verwenden, in sich uneins sei, sei eine christliche –demokratische Partei unentbehrlich.”

Christianity further provided the most solid foundation in 1945 to rebuild a new society; “Da sei das Christentum eine volle tragfähige Grundlage.” Dr Heyn thus subsequently recommended discussions with the military authorities to establish a Christian democratic party but expressed some reservation over including the word Christian in

¹²³ Dr Beissel, ACDP, III-010-039.

¹²⁴ The Labour Party would rely on the support from the left liberals, the Bund Freies Hamburg and the Vaterstädtischen Bund. Hans-Otto Kleinmann, *Geschichte der CDU. 1945-1982*, Günter Buchstab (Hrsg), DVA, Stuttgart 1993, p.35.

¹²⁵ Minutes from founding meeting on 19th September 1945 in house of Herrn Schmidt Oesfeldt, Hamburg; Hamburg III-010-039.

the title; “wobei allerdings die Frage, ob das Wort “christlich “ aufzunehmen sei, einer sorgfältigen Prüfung bedürfe.”

The initiative to found the Christian Democratic Party was finally seized on October 1, 1945 by Theodor Steltzer¹²⁶ who successfully campaigned opposite the newly founded free democrats, the FDP, to attract the liberal vote. Since the British military did not tolerate political splinter groups in its zone, recognition was given to the Christian Democratic Party only. The Christian Union and the *Bund Freies Hamburg* BFH thus lost their significance once licences had been granted in November 1945. Basing their programme on the Cologne Principles, the Hamburg CDP could demonstrate continuity across the British zone,¹²⁷ but the Hamburg programme was also more pragmatic than the Cologne Programme and the guidelines emphasised the liberal-democratic aspects over those of Christian Socialism. The programme refrained from using the ambiguous term ‘*Allgemeinwohl*’ and point eleven in the programme described nationalisation as a question of *Zweckmässigkeit* to be advocated only if it could prove to bring advantages to the individual and the community. The decision by the Hamburg CDU to adopt only fifteen of the twenty points of the Cologne programme reflected Hamburg’s own specific confessional and political situation.¹²⁸ The Christian Democratic Party’s (CDP) first party conference finally took place in Hamburg on 27 November 1945, with twenty-nine founding members, eight of whom were former Centre Party members, two from the DVP, and eighteen were non-party affiliated before 1933. Of the eleven members of the executive committee, it was stipulated that a maximum of three should be of Catholic origin. The group advertised its cause appealing principally to Protestants as potential members.

¹²⁶ Gerhard Schulze, op. cit., p.61.

¹²⁷ “daß man den überregionalen, wenigstens zonenweiten Zusammenhang mit gleichgerichteten Bestrebungen als ein wesentliches Merkmal der CDP herausstreichen wollte.” Helmut Stubbe-da Luz, op. cit., p.38.

¹²⁸ The Hamburg CDU left out statements about the “Kräftigen Bauernstand” which did not apply so much to a city, and ‘Handwerk’, as well as cleansing the civil service and economy of Nazis. The foreign policy should be ‘Christianised’ whatever that should mean and they showed their preference for a decentralised independent status for Hamburg with self-administrative powers and not the Länder structure favoured by the Cologne CDP. No reference is made to Christian Socialism or of condemning private business monopolies. Horstwalter Heitzer, *Die CDU in der Britischen Zone*, op.cit., p.126.

The *Hamburger Allgemeine* of 11 October 1946, a newspaper claiming to support *christlich demokratische Erneuerung* devoted its leading page to the discussion of economic policy which it saw as the solution to the current misery;

“Die Wirtschaft soll den Menschen freisetzen von der Bedrückung der Not. Sie soll ihm helfen, die Freiheit zu gewinnen, damit er die in ihm ruhenden geistigen und seelischen Kräfte entwickeln kann.”

Germany should channel its *seelische Kräfte* into economic reconstruction. This contrasts to the Cologne programme and other Christian democrats in the west for whom economic policy was secondary to social policy and the nation's moral and social well-being. The article continues;

“Wir fordern Freiheit der wirtschaftlichen Betätigung..... Nach wie vor messen wir der privaten Initiative des einzelnen grosse geistige und materielle Werte zu.”

Significantly the article does not envisage the deconstruction of capitalism and is unique in questioning whether National Socialism should indeed be seen as the culmination of fervent capitalist activity. On the contrary, business entrepreneurs are applauded for their achievements;

“Der freie Unternehmer hat im 19. und um die Wende des 20. Jahrhunderts den Fortschritt der Technik und damit die Grundlage unseres späteren Wohlstandes geschaffen. Sein Lebensbereich muß wieder hergestellt werden.”

Such language would have caused outrage in the Christian Socialist Rhineland. It is interesting to note that a Social Committee, formed in the Hamburg CDU and made up of representatives from trade and industry, later participated in producing the CDU's Ahlen Programme. Like the Christian Socialists, the committee also promised to introduce social legislation in the area of social insurance, trade unions, and employer-employees relations, but with the important difference that it aimed to combine Conservatism with Socialism.

Bremen

Bremen was the only independent state to form a CDU party. Established in spring 1946 the party was described by Holzapfel as the most difficult case in the whole of the British zone.¹²⁹ Protestants had opted to join the newly established liberal *bürgerlich* party, the *Bremer Demokratische Volkspartei* and at first it seemed Catholics had no choice but to join them too. Separate initiatives by former Centre Party member Philipp Jahn and by *Christlich Soziale Volksdienst* (CSVD) members Johannes Kaum were however brought together through the voluntary intervention by Hanover's CDU candidate Arnold Fratzscher, but were interrupted, when, on 10 May 1946, Protestants including Kaum, suddenly applied to the American authorities for a license to found the CDU in Bremen. The Christian wing of the *Bremer Demokratische Volkspartei* (BDV) made up of majority Catholic Centre Party members subsequently left to join the new CDU, causing irreparable rifts within the liberal camp. By June 1946 the CDU in Bremen was formed under chairman Kaum and deputy chairman Jahn.

¹²⁹ Report on 25th November 1946, ACDP, NL-Lingens I-178-001.

5. Russian Zone

5.1. Berlin (Brandenburg)

Historical accounts of the CDU in the Soviet occupied zone¹³⁰ published during the Cold War not surprisingly reflect a Marxist bias. Although no comprehensive history of the CDU in the Soviet zone was produced during this time, regional developments were chronicled in the party's series *Beiträge zur Geschichte der christlichen Demokratischen Union Deutschlands* and *Hefte aus Burscheidungen* or *Dokumente der CDUD* and reveal the extent to which the party underwent rapid ideological *Gleichschaltung* in accordance with the Russian occupation policies for the Soviet zone;

“Die Geschichte der CDU in der SBZ bzw. DDR ... ist in erster Linie die einer erzwungenen Anpassung an die ideologischen und gesellschaftspolitischen Vorstellungen der SED bis hin zur Umwandlung zu einem bloßen Instrument kommunistischer Kader - und Machtpolitik.”¹³¹

Research into the east CDU must therefore take into account the problems of reliability and objectivity of east German sources, the distorted facts of oral history and biased or censored party newspapers. There is little reference for example to the degree of ideological pressure the CDU was under to define its programme according to Soviet policy.¹³² The censorship and repressive tactics of the Soviet military and the SED party would inevitably have imposed ideological constraints and affected the freedom of action, the motives and the manner of expressing the Berlin CDU's programmatic principles. Attention therefore is paid to the immediate post-war period, when the Soviet military was only beginning to make their intentions known and when the CDU still held

¹³⁰ For example Rolf Badstübner, Günter Wirth, Werner Wünschmann, Erwin Krübke, Friedrich Kind (Brandenburg), Hans Koch (Mecklenburg) Hans Joachim Koppe (Berlin), Alwin Schaper (Sachsen-Anhalt), Victor Thiel (Thüringen) and Hans Zillig (Sachsen).

¹³¹ Manfred Agethen, “Die CDU in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1953”, in: Jürgen Fröhlich (Hrsg), ‘Bürgerliche’ Parteien in der SBZ/DDR. Zur Geschichte von CDU(D), DBD und NDPD. 1945-1953, Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln 1994, p.47.

¹³² Norbert Mattedi, Gründung und Entwicklung der Parteien in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1945-1949, Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen (Hrsg), Deutsche Bundes-Verlag, Bonn & Berlin 1966, p.9. Other west German historians who have written on the CDU in the Soviet zone include Werner Conze, Peter Hermes, Anna Hermes, Johann Baptist Gradl, Peter Bloch, Siegfried Suckut, Christian Hacke.

onto a degree of political autonomy. Agethen believes *Gleichschaltung* began as early as 1945;

“Eine wirklich *freie* programmatische und organisatorische Entwicklung der Parteien war von Anfang an nicht möglich.”¹³³

Agethen notes that the events in the Soviet zone were of course also weighted differently by east and west German observers for obvious propaganda reasons. This serves as a necessary reminder to adopt a critical appraisal of all documents and statements from the period, in the west as well as in the east zone, but also supports the thesis of this study, namely that ideology played a fundamental role in the development of the CDU. The party needed a *Weltanschauung* as a pre-requisite to seeking political power, formed by the philosophical principles expressed in the first party manifestos. Ideology then became an instrument employed by the CDU's political leaders to aid practical implementation and legitimisation of their political aims and ambitions.

Although many of the studies on the CDU in the east may be ideologically loaded, it would be incorrect to label them as flawed, since they demonstrate what was political reality for the east at the time. The charge that the Marxist-Leninist slant makes it 'false' vis a vis the 'correct' western view is outdated and naive. History of the western occupation zones was also influenced through ideological tampering as a result of specific allied interests. From a post cold-war perspective then it is reasonable to assume that ideology and tactical politicking were at work on both sides of the German border. Like Konrad Adenauer in the west, Jakob Kaiser, the second CDU leader in the Soviet zone was blessed with the political acumen necessary to exploit party programmes and political terminology for political advantage. In the period from 1945 -1947, Kaiser's operative political performance was bolstered by a convincing programme concept. Christian Hacke¹³⁴ remarks;

¹³³ Manfred Agethen op. cit., p.48.

¹³⁴ Christian Hacke (Hrsg), Jakob Kaiser. Wir haben Brücke zu sein. Reden, Äußerungen und Aufsätze zur Deutschlandpolitik, Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von Nottbeck, Köln 1988, p.44.

“Bei einer Würdigung des Wirkens von Jakob Kaiser gilt es zu unterscheiden zwischen seinen konzeptionellen Überlegungen einerseits und der praktischen, operativen Politik andererseits.”

This section will trace the development of the CDU's platform in Berlin from 1945 to the end of 1947 when the Soviets finally removed Jakob Kaiser from his position as party leader. The study will focus on examining the transmutations in the CDU's programme from its original declaration in the July 1945 *Aufruf an das deutsche Volk!* through two successive leaderships against the backdrop of escalating east-west tension and intra-party competition.

The beginning under Soviet Military Administration

On May 8th, 1945, the day of German capitulation, control over central and eastern Germany and Berlin was placed in the hands of the Red Army. By June 9, the Soviet military authorities, had been set up to direct the entire administrative and governmental powers of the Soviet zone with the aim of transferring Stalinist socialism to its occupied zone in Germany.¹³⁵ Driven by political motives to establish a model party system before the remaining three allies arrived in July to occupy their own sectors in Berlin, the Soviets immediately licensed German political party activity. The Soviets thus pre-empted the political arrangements for Germany planned for Potsdam in August, and effectively set a precedent for the British, American and French zones to follow suit.¹³⁶ The Soviets aimed exclusively at a centralised party structure and permitted only those

¹³⁵ The Soviet military was following a programme conceptualised during the 1930s by the German Communist party that did not envisage the immediate introduction of socialism in Germany but to install a 'Demokratie neuen Typs' which took its inspiration from western style democracy but removed all capitalist hegemonic tendencies. See Arnold Sywottek, *Deutsche Volksdemokratie. Studien zur politischen Konzeption der KPD 1935-1946*, Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, Düsseldorf 1971, p.74. Hermann Weber believes until 1945 the Soviet zone had not finalised any fixed strategy for post-war Germany. "Die Entmachtung Deutschlands, seine militärische Entwaffnung und Besetzung sowie die wirtschaftliche Wiedergutmachung in Form von Reparationen schienen ihm vordringlicher als ein 'sozialistisches' Deutschland." Immediate 'Stalinisation' plans would have raised protest from the western allies and in the beginning Stalin needed the support of those democratic anti-fascists in Germany as erstwhile allies in order to install his vision of an 'antifascist democracy' before proceeding with a more ambitious long term plan to extend Soviet structures across Germany. Hermann Weber, *Von der SBZ zu DDR. Band 1. 1945-1955*, Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, Hannover 1966, p.10ff.

¹³⁶ The Potsdam ruling on political parties finally stated "in ganz Deutschland alle demokratischen politischen Parteien zu erlauben und zu fördern mit der Einräumung des Rechtes, Versammlungen einzuberufen und öffentliche Diskussionen durchzuführen." Potsdamer Abkommen und andere Dokumente, Hrsg. vom Kongress Verlag, Berlin 1950.

parties in the states of the Soviet zone that had been licensed in Berlin. These were the Communist Party (KPD) the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the CDU and the Liberal Party (LPD). As time progressed and parties in the west gradually gained more, but not complete independence, parties in the Soviet zone increasingly became the puppets of the Soviet military authorities.¹³⁷

Andreas Hermes as first party leader

Andreas Hermes¹³⁸ former Centre Party member and activist in the resistance group against Hitler, was one of the key founding fathers in Berlin. Following his arrest with other members of the '20th July Group' in Cologne, Hermes was imprisoned in the Lehrter Straße in Berlin until the end of April 1945 and only narrowly escaped execution. On his release by the Red Army he was given the post of director of the ministry for food and nutrition for Berlin city.¹³⁹ Jakob Kaiser¹⁴⁰ became Hermes's deputy. Kaiser had also escaped to Berlin following the attempted assassination of Hitler, where he hid from the Gestapo for nine months at a house in Babelsberg. On May 25, Hermes and Kaiser met at 11, Platenallee¹⁴¹ where they began to exchange ideas with former political activists from the old *Volkskonservativen* and *Christlich-Sozialen Volksdienst*, the Centre Party and the liberal Staatspartei (formerly DP) as well as with non-socialist trade unions, businessmen and intellectuals¹⁴² with a view to producing a draft political programme. There is little coincidence that the visions of a new order devised by Hermes and Kaiser in Berlin should correspond to those formulated by the

¹³⁷ Hermann Weber, "Die sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland und das Parteiensystem der SBZ/DDR", in: Deutschland Archiv, 15, 2, Heft 10.1982, p.1067.

¹³⁸ Andreas Hermes was former President of the Reichsverband of the Raiffesisen Cooperative, and as a member of the Centre party Reichsminister for food, agriculture and forestry (1920-22) and for finance (1922-1923) during the Weimar Republic, member of the Prussian Parliament (1924-1928) and of the Reichstag (1928-1933).

¹³⁹ Johann Baptist Gradl, *Anfang unter dem Sowjetstern, Wissenschaft und Politik*, Berend von Nottbeck Köln 1981, p.14. Johann Baptist Gradl was a co-founder of the CDU in the Soviet Zone and from 1947 worked closely with Kaiser. After Kaiser's removal from office Gradl became the Federal Minister for Issues pertaining to Germany as a whole and Chairman of the Exil CDU.

¹⁴⁰ From 1919 Kaiser was director of the Christian trade unions in Berlin and from 1924 for the christian trade unions in Rhineland and Westphalia. From 1928 he became member of the Centre party executive and MP in the Reichstag in 1933. He dedicated his life to resolving the religious and political differences among trade union groups with the aim of one day forming one united trade union.

¹⁴¹ Werner Conze, *Jakob Kaiser, Politiker zwischen Ost und West 1945-1949*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1969, p.15.

¹⁴² Johann Baptist Gradl, *op. cit.*, p.15.

Walberberger Circle in Cologne.¹⁴³ As members of the resistance movement, Hermes and Kaiser had been involved in the discussions at Walberberg and the Kettelerhaus in the early 1940s.

Some of the more friendly party literature on the history of the CDU has sought to deflect attention from historical continuity of political traditions that originate with the beginning of the German party system. Instead the party's inception has been mysticised, giving an almost romantic image of the solidarity and *Katakombengeist* shared in the resistance. This gives a misleading belief that the communality of ideas which emerged in 1945 was derived from a shared spiritual awakening experienced during National Socialism. More credible is the reality which reveals that many of the founders of the CDU in 1945, such as Hermes and Kaiser, were participants from the Walberberg and resistance group who had held programmatic discussions during the Nazi era and found themselves scattered around the regions of Germany at the end of the war.

Lemmer and Kaiser believed the CDU founders were martyrs of democracy and pillars of resistance, who not having bowed to the Nazi dictatorship, had a moral right to represent Germans.¹⁴⁴ The first round of meetings was followed on June 15, by a series of programmatic discussions with 23 participants, equally represented by Catholics and Protestants,¹⁴⁵ and including Ernst Lemmer, Walther Schreiber, Emil Dovifat, Otto Heinrich von der Gablentz, Theodor Steltzer, Heinrich Krone, Josef Ersing, Ferdinand Friedensburg and Elfriede Nebgen.¹⁴⁶ The political diversity of the Berlin group is partly

¹⁴³ Kurt Witt paradoxically termed the way in which groups of Christian democrats found each other as; "spontan, aber auf reifem Feld." Kurt Witt, "Wie die Union entstanden ist", in Bruno Dörpinghaus/Kurt Witt (Hrsg), *Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU*, Jg 1, K.G Lohse, Frankfurt am Main 1950. Conze adds, "Es muß freilich betont werden, daß nicht nur die Parteigründer in Berlin, sondern auch in Köln ihre Grundlagen nicht primär von Walberberg übernahmen, sondern die Walberberger Anregungen mit älteren Programmforderungen verbanden." Werner Conze, op. cit., p.38. This should help to dispel the myth of the so-called 'Hour Zero' in Germany in 1945.

¹⁴⁴ Ernst Lemmer, Jakob Kaiser, ACDP, I-090-015/1.

¹⁴⁵ 17 former Centre members and 6 from the DDP. Siegfried Suckut, "Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU(D)", in: Martin Broszat und Hermann Weber (Hrsg), *SBZ Handbuch, Staatliche Verwaltungen, Parteien, gesellschaftliche Organisationen und ihre Führungskräfte in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1945-1949*, Oldenbourg/München 1990, p.515.

¹⁴⁶ Elfriede Nebgen, Kaiser's wife, had completed her PhD on the topic of the synthesis between Socialism and Catholicism and gives some clue as to her background and influence on the party's programme and on Kaiser. Numbers and attendance fluctuated at the early meetings. For full details of participants and dates of attendance between 15-22 June, ACDP, I-090-016/2.

explained by the fact that many resistance members were sent to Nazi prison camps in Berlin, whilst the high-calibre of party activists is derived from the fact that many senior politicians had been residing in Berlin since the Weimar Republic.

The early meetings were dominated by the search for a party name. Suggestions included *Deutsche Demokratische Aufbaupartei*, *Christliche Volkspartei*, *Soziale Volkspartei*, *Deutsche Erneuerung* and *Neues Deutschland*. Hermes put forward *Demokratische Union* to adequately describe the mix of social classes, religions, and political tradition, “als ein Programm zur Überwindung der konfessionellen Gegensätze in der Politik.”¹⁴⁷ All members were in agreement that ‘democratic’ should be included in the title but for many, including Hermes, the word ‘Christianity’ remained controversial. Christianity, Hermes stressed must not represent a ‘*Scheidegrenze*’ for access to the party and, echoing similar demands to the Protestant Otto Schmidt in the Rhineland, insisted that the party should be open to all those “die ohne Bindung an eine kirchliche Gemeinschaft das Gesetz der natürlichen Ethik in sich tragen.”¹⁴⁸ The term Christian was particularly problematic for those Lutherans who drew a distinction between the worldly and the spiritual sphere. ‘Christian’ was finally adopted in the title to symbolise the desire to overcome confessional divisions between Catholics and Protestants, and in particular to establish a moral code for political life following twelve years of facism. There were other more tactical reasons for calling the party Christian. Failure to do so risked losing the traditional Catholic voter and could as a result lead to a revival of the Centre Party.¹⁴⁹ Both before and after the party’s foundation, there was close, intense contact between the Protestants in the founding group of the CDU and Church leaders, most notably the Evangelical Bishop in Berlin, Otto Dibelius, who joined the CDUD to demonstrate his support for their programme and to lend the party a degree of moral credibility.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Alexander Fischer, “Andreas Hermes und die gesamtdeutschen Anfänge der Union”, in: Alexander Fischer/Manfred Agethen, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Hrsg), *Die CDU in der sowjetisch besetzten Zone/DDR 1945-1952, Aktuelle Fragen der Politik* Heft 4, Ernst Knoth GmbH, Sankt Augustin 1994, p.10.

¹⁴⁸ Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.37.

¹⁴⁹ Werner Conze, op. cit., p.20.

¹⁵⁰ In contrast to the Catholic dominated Rhineland, Evangelical church figures largely initiated the regional CDU political groups across the Soviet zone, which in turn stirred up criticism from Protestants. This prompted Dibelius to warn all Evangelical priests to exercise caution and restraint in

Yet including the word Christian also carried the risk of alienating liberal groups in society and soon led to a separate Liberal Party (LPD) in the zone.¹⁵¹ Despite this, the CDUD succeeded in attracting many former Democratic Party (DP) members to its ranks, proof that the CDUD could also profile itself as a liberal, middle class party. There was widespread agreement that the party should not be a revival of the Centre¹⁵² even if the Centre's legacy had still very much survived. Trade unionists in the group sought to integrate all salaried workers and labourers into the new party and drew inspiration from the Centre Party figure Adam Stegerwald and his 1920 Essen programme of a *Christlich-Nationalen Volkspartei* that included all social classes from workers to property owners. Although basically conservative in outlook, Stegerwald had believed social reform was possible by combining elements of Evangelical social ethics and Catholic Social Teaching.¹⁵³ Stegerwald's mantra of Christian – German – democratic- social was echoed in the first Berlin programme;

“aus heißer Liebe zum deutschen Volk die christlichen, demokratischen und sozialen Kräfte zur Sammlung; zur Mitarbeit und zum Aufbau einer neuen Heimat.”¹⁵⁴

their political involvement. Peter Hermes, “Sozialismus oder Volkspartei. Andreas Hermes und die Gründung der CDU in Berlin 1945”, in: *Die Politische Meinung*, Nr.193, Jg 25, 1980, p.78.

¹⁵¹ The Soviets also granted the Liberal Democratic Party a license so it was not possible for the CDU to tap all of the votes right of the SPD and KPD. Alexander Fischer, “Der Einfluß der SMAD auf das Parteiensystem in der SBZ am Beispiel der CDUD”, in: *Parteienanfänge in der Sowjetischen Besetzten Zone. Zwei Vorträge*, Archiv für Christlich Demokratische Politik der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Hrsg), Deutscher Bundestag, Sankt Augustin 13/11/92, p.26.

A possible union with the LDP remained ideologically difficult for the two parties even though considerations had pointed in that direction. For example a letter from the CDU Landesvorstand in Thuringia to the LDP regional group in Schallenburg on 4.10.46 outlines that although cooperation between their parties would have been possible on the basis of democracy, the obstacles remained the CDU's emphasis on Christianity the LDP's emphasis on liberalism, which neither party was prepared to accept. In Landesverband Thuringia, ACDP, III –031 90. This is confirmed also by Krippendorff: “Das Zusammengehen mit der profilierten Gruppe der Liberalen jedoch hätte einen echten Kompromiß erforderlich gemacht, und zwar in jedem Falle auf Kosten des Wortes ‘christlich’ im Parteinamen - dazu aber war man nicht bereit.” Ekkehart Krippendorff, “Die Gründung der Liberal-Demokratischen Partei in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone 1945”, in: *Vierteljahressheft für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 8, 1960, p.293 (290-299).

¹⁵² The Soviet military authorities would have preferred a revival of the Centre party as they anticipated a Catholic party to have little chance of survival in a zone that was predominantly Protestant. Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.18.

¹⁵³ Siegfried Suckut, op. cit., p.515.

¹⁵⁴ Aufruf an das Deutsche Volk, programme printed in O.K Flechtheim, Band II, op. cit., p.27-30.

Jakob Kaiser had not exactly envisaged setting up a new party.¹⁵⁵ He was more in favour of an integrated trade union or a British style Labour¹⁵⁶ party and instead proposed a Christian *Volksblock* in co-operation with the Social Democrats. This idea was rejected by the CDU group¹⁵⁷ and finally abandoned by Kaiser once the SPD was relaunched at the end of May.¹⁵⁸ By June 22, a total of 35¹⁵⁹ members had given their agreement to the CDU's founding programme in Berlin, and with Soviet approval was published on 26, June 1945, entitled '*Aufruf an das deutsche Volk!*'

The CDUD's founding programme: *Aufruf an das deutsche Volk!*

The programme opened with the call for a '*Sammlungspartei*' to end conflict between religions, parties and politics and support for a new democracy;

"Deutsche Männer und Frauen! Wir rufen Euch auf, alles Trennende zurücktreten zu lassen. Folgt unserem Ruf zu einer großen Partei, die mit den anderen Parteien der neuen Demokratie gemeinsam am Aufbau Deutschlands arbeiten will."¹⁶⁰

The programme promulgated religious tolerance and independence of the Church from the State, the rule of law and the guarantee of political freedoms. There was some disagreement among members over the question of Germany's collective guilt and how this should be formulated in the founding document, but finally agreeing on the short and vague formulation;

"Groß ist die Schuld weiter Kreise unseres Volkes, die sich nur allzu bereitwillig zu Handlangern und Steigbügelhaltern für Hitler erniedrigten."¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁵ Werner Conze, op. cit., p.15.

¹⁵⁶ In negotiations with Karl Germer and other SPD figures about forming a new Labour Party, Kaiser even suggested it should be called 'SPD' in order to adopt the party's antifascist credentials for the new party. Franz Focke, op. cit., p.199.

¹⁵⁷ Siegfried Suckut, op. cit., p.516.

¹⁵⁸ The SPD produced a more left wing programme than they had had before 1933 in an attempt to bridge their differences with the communists.

¹⁵⁹ Of the 35 who initially signed the founding Gründungsaufruf 19 were Catholics and 14 Protestants, 6 were formally non party affiliated, 17 were former Centre members and 6 were from the DDP.

¹⁶⁰ Aufruf an das Deutsche Volk! op. cit., p.27-30.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

Internal party dissension on matters concerning the economy is disclosed in two brief paragraphs calling for urgent measures to alleviate acute food and housing conditions, under 'straffer Planung'; "ohne jede Rücksicht auf persönliche Interessen und wirtschaftliche Theorien."¹⁶² Private property ownership was endorsed for individuals but was bound by its social obligations to society as a whole, and long term nationalisation were prescribed for the basic utility industries, coal, iron and energy production, as well as for large chemical manufacturers and other monopoly industries. Many of the original members genuinely believed that the free liberal economy had outlived itself, but the more market oriented thinkers in the party, Walther Schreiber, the former Prussian minister for trade and industry, Plewes, Haas and Schmettow, who had not been present at the very early discussions, conflicted with Kaiser and the trade union wing once they had entered discussions. Their disagreements caused a delay in the programme's launch.¹⁶³ Hermes' conservatism was also partly responsible for the scant reference to economic policy in the founding July document, as he sought to avert Kaiser's more pronounced socialist ambitions from getting through.¹⁶⁴

The lack of clarity and detail over social and economic questions in the first *Aufruf* was also due to ignorance of the political future. It was easier to fall back on philosophical statements to build moral and respond to the economy's most immediate needs for providing food and housing.¹⁶⁵ Party founders furthermore expected all four allied zones soon to be merged, and a unified economic system to be established for the whole of Germany. As was the case in drafting the Cologne programme, statements in the Berlin *Aufruf* were often deliberately ambiguous to cloud differences in opinion between the

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ ACDP, I-090-015/1. Also see diary entry on 20 June 1945, Anna Hermes, Andreas Hermes - Leben und Wirken. Nach Briefen, Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen, Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart 1971, p.200.

¹⁶⁴ "..... so ist es doch unzweifelhaft, daß ihre (die CDU Partei) von ihm (Hermes) maßgebend mitformulierte Programmatik möglicherweise ein anderes, von Sozialisierungstendenzen (Jakob Kaiser) geprägtes Gesicht erhalten hätte." Günter Buchstab, "Andreas Hermes. Die Tradition christliche Grundwerte und Parteien", in Günter Buchstab /Klaus Gotto (Hrsg), Die Gründung der Union. Traditionen, Entstehung und Repräsentation, Olzog, München 1990, p.114.

¹⁶⁵ "Wie dieses Deutschland verwirklicht und verfaßt sein sollte, wurde noch nicht einmal angedeutet. ...Der erste Anruf enthielt noch kein Programm, sondern nur ein 'Notprogramm' für die grundlegende Gesinnung und das zunächst Vordringliche." Werner Conze, op. cit., p.22.

members. Ferdinand Friedensburg,¹⁶⁶ former member of the *Demokratische Partei* (DP) and cofounder of the CDUD, notes that the disagreement on economic policy helped to produce the programme's conciseness as well as awareness of the need to distinguish themselves to socialist party programmes. Yet conscious political ambiguity¹⁶⁷ entailed consequences for the party, as Suckut¹⁶⁸ remarks:

“Nachteilig konnte es sich unter diesem Gesichtspunkt auswirken, daß die im Gründungsaufwurf niedergelegte Programmatik breiten Raum für unterschiedliche Interpretations- und Konkretisierungsversuche ließ.”

It is important for understanding the underlying liberal influence in the party, to note that that the document made no mention of Christian Socialism or ‘Socialism with Christian responsibility’.

From the outset, the Berlin Christian Democrats pursued a national agenda, in the belief that their party would soon take up the role of representing the whole of Germany. They called themselves a ‘*Reich*’ party and insisted on the title CDU *Deutschlands* (CDUD). Policies were aimed at national implementation and not restricted to zone level as in the west. This premature assumption that it would become the party's headquarters was largely based on Berlin's status as the capital city and as the seat of the allied control office, making the Berlin CDUD best placed for direct liaison with the allied authorities. The self-nominated party headquarters, the *Reichsgeschäftsstelle*¹⁶⁹ prepared to establish

¹⁶⁶ “Ernstere Probleme gab es zum Problem der künftigen Wirtschaftsstruktur. Hierbei setzte sich der namentlich von den ehemaligen Mitgliedern der Demokratischen Partei aber auch von Hermes selbst vertretene Grundsatz der möglichst großen Freiheit gegenüber den gerade von Jakob Kaiser befürworteten Sozialisierungstendenzen durch.. auch kam es uns darauf an, uns grundsätzlich und praktisch möglichst deutlich von den sozialistischen Parteien abzuheben.” Ferdinand Friedensburg, *Es ging um Deutschlands Einheit, Rückschau eines Berliners auf die Jahre 1945*, Haude & Spener, Berlin 1971, p.51.

¹⁶⁷ The CDU was not alone in its ambivalent programme formulation. Even the German Communist Party had declared its support in its first programme from 11th June 1945 for a “völlig ungehinderte Entfaltung des freien Handels und der privaten Unternehmerinitiative auf der Grundlage des Privateigentums.” Wolfgang Treue, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1954*, op. cit., p.162.

¹⁶⁸ Siegfried Suckut, “Zum Wandel von Rolle und Funktion der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands (CDUD) im Parteiensystem der SBZ/DDR (1945-1952)” in *Parteiensystem zwischen Demokratie und Volksdemokratie. Dokumente und Materialien zum Funktionswandel der Parteien und Massenorganisationen in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1950*, Hermann Weber (Hrsg), Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln 1982, p.518.

¹⁶⁹ The name *Reichsgeschäftsstelle* was later changed to *Hauptgeschäftsstelle* due to protest from Adenauer who refused to accept Berlin as the party's central headquarters.

links with the *Landesverbände* in other states in the zone, whilst Kaiser set up a liaison office for establishing contact with CDU groups in the British, American and French zones. The party was divided into five areas of responsibility -women, culture, law, welfare, economy and finance and assigned the task of transforming the founding manifesto into specific policies to then advise the party leadership, Chairmen Andreas Hermes and Walter Schreiber.¹⁷⁰

The CDUD's first party conference

On the same day that the CDUD held their first party conference in the theatre *am Schiffbauerdamm* in Berlin-Mitte on July 22, 1945, the first issue of the CDUD's party organ *Neue Zeit* went into circulation. The military authorities unfairly delayed granting the CDUD a license to publish a party newspaper or to hold its initial party conference, which meant that in the first month of the party's existence, the CDUD had little opportunity to publicise their programme. At their founding conference Hermes thus took the opportunity in a long and detailed speech to expand on the party's founding programme. The speech interestingly reveals the growing influence exerted by the market economic advocates in the party.¹⁷¹ Hermes believed the decision over state intervention and which industries should be nationalised, was a pragmatic one, to be made on the merits of each individual case. Although the free, laissez-faire economy was declared well and truly defunct, Hermes openly supported the role of private business initiative;

“Die freie Unternehmerinitiative wird in diesem Gesamtrahmen eine der stärksten Garantien für unseren Wiederaufstieg sein.”

¹⁷⁰ Heinrich von der Gablentz, Gedanken zur Parteiarbeit, 8 August 1945, ACDP, I-155-001/1. The original founding committee members remained the leading representatives for the CDU until January 1946 when, after Kaiser took up the leadership, a more permanent executive board was constituted.

¹⁷¹ “Planwirtschaft heißt nicht Zwangswirtschaft....Wir halten an dem Privateigentum fest, das die Entfaltung der Persönlichkeit gewährleistet, aber wir sind davon überzeugt, daß jedes Privateigentum unter unseren heutigen Verhältnissen mit einer Hypothek gegenüber der Gesamtheit des Volkes belastet ist und daß nur sein von höchster sozialer Verantwortung getragener Gebrauch seinen Bestand sichern kann.” Andreas Hermes. Speech at the founding conference of the CDUD on 22 July 1945 in Berlin. ACDP, III-012-923. Also printed in Anna Hermes, Und setzt Ihr nicht das Leben ein. Andreas Hermes - Leben und Wirken. Nach Briefen, Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen, . Seewald, Stuttgart 1971, p.292.

The block of anti-fascist democratic parties

On June 23, 1945, Hermes was informed by the KPD and SPD that the CDUD's license was also conditional on the CDUD's agreement to join the so-called Anti-fascist-Democratic-Parties or *Einheitsfront*, a 'block' that comprised the SPD, KPD, LPD and the CDUD. Hermes gave his agreement by July 29, because he believed that the experiences of party conflict and competition during Weimar and the memories of the Nazi party's grip on totalitarian power, meant political parties in future should co-operate despite differing ideological traditions.¹⁷² The four party block was established on July 14, with CDUD representatives Hermes, Schreiber, Kaiser, Steltzer and Lemmer, with the explicit aim of forming joint policy proposals in specialist committees containing representatives from all four parties. A ruling stating that all resolutions must be unanimous and that veto rights would only be granted to the Communist Party however, meant that the CDUD could not oppose any Communist motions. At first Hermes paid little regard to the constraints, anticipating that the Potsdam Conference from July 17- August 2, 1945 would in any case grant Germany the right to its own administrations and eventually its own government.¹⁷³

The antifascist block undertook to develop policies for the quick reconstruction of the economy, the restoration of legal protection on the basis of the democratic rule of law, a campaign for freedom of conscience and religion and to restore peaceful relations to other countries, de-nazification, land reform, the dismantling of German industry and acknowledging the right to war reparations. Interestingly no statement was made about the block's political direction, but ironically; 'Von Sozialisierung war nicht die Rede.'¹⁷⁴ The block parties reached basic agreement on an antifascist democracy but other

¹⁷² "In der Überzeugung, daß diese Einheitsfront allein das Gelingen unserer schweren Aufgabe zu verbürgen vermag, stehen wir zur Zusammenarbeit der antifaschistisch-demokratischen Parteien und sind entschlossen, unsere ganze Kraft an ihre Festigung und Vertiefung zu setzen. Nicht Trennung, sondern Sammlung kann und muß unsere Losung sein." Andreas Hermes' speech at the first conference of the four block parties on August 12th, 1945 in Berlin. Printed in Anna Hermes; *Ibid.*, p.299.

¹⁷³ Johann Baptist Gradl, *op. cit.*, p.25. The non-communist parties were also convinced that they would outnumber the communists in the *Einheitsfront* and thus be able to diminish the special relationship enjoyed by the KPD with the Soviet authorities and so gradually exert more influence on the party system themselves. Norbert Mattedi, *op. cit.*, p.55.

¹⁷⁴ Werner Conze, *op.cit.*, p.24.

programme statements lacked clarity and direction, with the result that the block's *Aktionsprogramm* was never formally ratified.¹⁷⁵

Land Reform

The CDUD was able to test the block's commitment to the rule of law in the summer of 1945, over the issue of land reform in Saxony. With the support of the KPD and SPD, the Soviet denazification programme sought to confiscate property from all identified war criminals. Land over 100 hectares would be redistributed to small farms, resettlers and refugees without paying compensation to private landowners for the loss of their land. The CDUD's founding programme¹⁷⁶ showed that the party was in favour of land reform (on condition that compensation be paid) but these statements now proved too vague for the CDUD to enforce in the block. This led Hermes to fear that after the Soviets had confiscated land, the integrity of industry and small business would also be threatened.¹⁷⁷ When the block refused to amend land reform policy, the CDU rejected the resolution. This marked the first time that the CDUD had chosen to oppose a motion by the other three parties and the issue soon developed into a real test of the CDUD's status in the block.¹⁷⁸ The Soviet military authorities responded to Hermes' obstinacy by

¹⁷⁵ For an explanation of the functioning of the antifascist block, see Manfred Koch, "Blockpolitik und Parteiensystem in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1950", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B37/84, September 15th, 1984, p.7. Also Siegfried Suckut, "Zur Krise und Funktionswandel der Blockpolitik in der sowjetisch besetzten Zone Deutschlands um die Mitte des Jahres 1948", in: *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 31, 1983, p. 674ff.

¹⁷⁶ The CDUD founding document contained only two sentences on agricultural policy. "Eine umfassende ländliche und gärtnerische Siedlung muß unter weitgehender Heranziehung des Grossgrundbesitzes einer möglichst grossen Zahl von Deutschen den Zugang zu eigener Scholle und zu selbständiger Arbeit eröffnen. Die wirtschaftliche Sicherung eines freischaffenden Bauertums und die Ansiedlung der Landarbeiter sind ein unerlässlicher Bestandteil jeder dauerhaften Aufbaupolitik und verlangen den stärksten Ausbau des ländlichen Genossenschaftswesens." Wolfgang Treue, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1954*, op. cit., p.180. The newspaper *Neue Zeit* from 31. August 1945 enunciated the CDUD's views on land reform as outlined in the founding document, but, according to Gradl, this amounted more to a Siedlungspolitik than to a radical overhaul of land ownership and redistribution between the classes. Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.40.

¹⁷⁷ "Als christlich-demokratische Partei, die das Privateigentum bejaht, lehnen wir es ab, einer entschädigungslosen Enteignung zuzustimmen Wenn heute an das Privateigentum des landwirtschaftlichen Besitzes gerührt wird, so wissen wir nicht, ob nicht morgen an dasjenige der Industrie und übermorgen an das des Handwerkes usw. gerührt wird." Andreas Hermes' speech on September 16th in Berlin. Printed in *Anna Hermes, Und setzt Ihr....* p.306-315.

¹⁷⁸ In a letter from Hermes to Eisenhower on September 20th, 1945 the CDUD executive wrote to the Control Council to voice its protest on agrarian reform; "eine der Bodenreform vorausgehende gesamtdeutsche Landesplanung: die sofortige Aufteilung derjenigen Grossbetriebe bei denen das ohne Leistungsminderung geschehen könne: die vorläufige Weiterführung aller anderen Betriebe in der bisherigen Form: die Überlassung von Restgütern an die bisherigen Besitzer, die entschädigungslose Enteignung von NS Verbrechern : in allen anderen Fällen eine Entschädigung unter Berücksichtigung

blackmailing regional CDUD groups and forcing them to vote for land reform and to declare a vote of no confidence in their party leader Hermes.¹⁷⁹ Any refusal to do so resulted in threats and interrogation by the Soviet military. On December 19, the Soviet military demanded Hermes' and Schreiber's resignation on account of their attitude to the land reform proposals and the increasingly 'reactionary' course in which they were accused of steering the party.

The meeting of the CDU in Bad Godesberg

The land reform debacle had other serious repercussions for Hermes at the occasion of the national meeting of the CDU on December 14-16, 1945 in the Rhineland town of Bad Godesberg. Hermes had planned the meeting to unite all regions and all zones and to present his draft programme to CDU delegates before launching a national debate with all delegates to discuss the aims and tasks of the Christian democratic movement.¹⁸⁰ Hermes' intransigence over the land reform issue however, prompted the Soviets to reject his travel visa request to the west, where Hermes was expected to chair the meeting. In his absence, Hermes' lengthy speech was read out.

The speech¹⁸¹ emphasised the aims of an interdenominational *Volkspartei*;

“Ebensowenig wie wir in unserer Bewegung einer Konfession eine Monopol zubilligen, ebenso sehr rufen wir alle Stände unseres Volkes. Wir sind keine Partei

der allgemeinen Schrumpfung des Volksvermögens: und unter gleichen Gesichtspunkten eine sachgemässe Neuregelung der landwirtschaftlichen Verschuldung.” ACDP I-090-018/4, p.194.

¹⁷⁹ The lack of a credible party newspaper (Neue Zeit was banned from reporting on the land reform) to distribute information, an incomplete party structure and deficient lines of communication meant that the land reform issue was not fully discussed internally. The Soviet military was in a position to wrench submission from other levels of the party without the central committee having any knowledge of their actions and themselves powerless to exert any influence over their own party members. Programmatically it was not clear to the regional CDU groups that there was indeed any area of conflict between their party's vague programme and the recommendations put forward by the Soviet military authorities.

¹⁸⁰ In a letter to the author Gertrud Bäumer on November 27, 1945, Hermes wrote: “Wir wollen den ernstesten Versuch machen, die in den einzelnen deutschen Landesteilen zum Teil unabhängig voneinander entstandenen Parteibildungen auf der Grundlage eines umfassenden Programms zu einigen.” Alexander Fischer, Andreas Hermes und die gesamtdeutschen Anfänge der Union, op. cit. p.17.

¹⁸¹ Hermes speech produced for the meeting of the CDU in Bad Godesberg December 14th-16th, 1945. ACDP, III-012-923.

eines Standes oder einer Klasse. Wenn je der Begriff "Volkspartei"¹⁸² für eine politische Gruppierung zutreffend war, so für die christliche-Demokratische Union. Schon heute können wir sagen, daß der deutsche Arbeiter unseren Ruf gehört hat und in den vordersten Reihen unserer Bewegung steht."

Endorsing the Potsdam agreement, Hermes believed Germany should be treated as one unified economy and was staunchly opposed to change of the east German border, arguing that the area east of the rivers Oder and Neisse was profoundly German in history and culture;

"Zum deutschen Land gehört besonders der Osten jenseits der Oder und Neisse Dieses Land ist deutsch zunächst seiner Lage nach Dem Blut und der Seele nach sind die deutschen und slawischen Bevölkerungsteile verschmolzen."

The region of Pomerania and Silesia, he said, was a bridge to reach cooperation and understanding with the east. His remarks are compatible with the foreign policy of his successor Jakob Kaiser. Both men shared the view that Germany should resist any development that sought affiliation either exclusively with the east or with the west or encouraged the division of Germany into separate states. On internal affairs, Hermes was committed to political decentralisation in the spirit of bringing more democracy to Germany, but restrained federalism where it could impinge on national interests.¹⁸³ He reiterated his support for nationalising the coal and iron industry, but maintained manufacturing industry could not be nationalised and heavy industry was 'indispensable' and therefore played a 'special role'. Wilde believes that Hermes' clarification of his political message at Bad Godesberg had consciously extracted and accentuated the market economic elements of the party's original June declaration.¹⁸⁴ Hermes defended private ownership as a "unantastbarer Rechtsgrundsatz" and a "Grundlage für den Wiederaufbau" and expressed his concern at Soviet intervention in management and

¹⁸² J.B Gradl notes that the choice of the term Volkspartei in the Soviet zone later earned the CDUD criticism as being a party of the right, since it also welcomed reactionary members. Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.53.

¹⁸³ "Diese Auflockerung des preussischen Blocks schafft die Möglichkeit, dem deutschen Volk eine politische, staatsrechtliche Gliederung zu verleihen, die dem Gewicht seiner Stämme volle Geltung und Entfaltung ermöglicht, ohne die natürliche Einheit des Reiches und die geschlossene Vertretung seiner Interessen nach einheitlichen Gesichtspunkten zu verhindern." Hermes speech produced for the meeting of the CDU in Bad Godesberg December 14th-16th, 1945, ACDP III-012-923.

¹⁸⁴ Manfred Wilde, Die SBZ-CDU 1945-1947. Zwischen Kriegsende und kaltem Krieg (unpublished manuscript) München 1998, p.279.

property relations. Despite this conservative-liberal thrust of his speech, Hermes also devotes attention to increasing the status and influence of the trade unions and extending co-decision making powers for employees. Conforming with the party's founding document, Hermes did not specifically refer to Christian Socialism, but delegates at the conference ratified the party's economic and social programme as a 'Socialism with Christian responsibility';

‘Insgesamt muß das System planvoller Wirtschaftslenkung mit der alten abendländischen Idee der freien und verantwortlichen Persönlichkeit ausgefüllt und belebt werden. So vertreten wir einen Sozialismus christlicher Verantwortung.’¹⁸⁵

The term Christian Socialism had been coined by the left wing members of the CDU in the British zone but by the time the Godesberg meeting took place in December, it had already been modified to suggest a politics of the third way rather than an explicit left wing programme. Hermes conceded that the Berlin *Aufruf* had offered insufficient detail about the party's economic system, but he tried to explain the deficiency as flexibility and by the fact that were not tied to any fixed dogma;

“Die christliche-Demokratische Bewegung hat den großen Vorzug, daß sie mit keinem wirtschaftlichen Dogma belastet ist. Wir behalten uns vor, in jeder Situation unbefangen zu fragen, welche Methoden ihr angemessen sind und uns je nachdem im Einzelfall für Bindung oder Freiheit zu entscheiden. Unser soziales Verantwortungsbewußtsein vor dem Volksganzen ist der alleinige Maßstab unsere Entscheidung.”

The refusal to be tied to one permanent economic model was the CDUD's pragmatic solution to the century-old dilemma over whether Germany should adopt a socialist or a liberal economy. It had begun to recognise that the favoured model was in fact a mixed economy with a move away from state intervention. A third way style alternative had the advantage that the rules, according to which the economy is run, are not rigid rules but negotiated and pragmatic responses, depending on individual and current circumstances. Importantly third way politics allows for change without jeopardising political credibility.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ Dr. Karl Zimmermann, Generalsekretär, Rede bei der ersten Reichstagung der CDU in Godesberg 14., 15. und 16. Dezember 1945, op. cit., p.13.

¹⁸⁶ This was obviously hard for Hermes to advocate in view of the Soviets' plans.

Many of Berlin's founders on the CDUD executive board nevertheless perceived this modern approach to economic management as a programme deficit, in particular those members of the Economic Committee¹⁸⁷ who began questioning what was new about the CDUD's programme vis a vis other parties.¹⁸⁸ Two days after delegates had pledged their commitment to a Socialism with Christian responsibility at Godesberg, v. d. Gablentz, called an urgent committee meeting in Berlin to discuss the party's problematic profile and its understanding of the term Christian Socialism or *Sozialismus christlicher Verantwortung*. The Catholic member, Dovifat, was concerned how the term would be received by the public, while Strauss feared its unclear definition may be exploited for tactical use. Tillmann was more pragmatic. He saw benefits in employing the term, to convince the electorate that the party had socialist credentials and because it enabled them to compete with parties who signalled socialism to be the new *Zeitgeist*;

“daß heute z.B in einer öffentlichen Versammlung jeder, der es ablehnt, sich als Sozialisten zu bekennen; als liberal-kapitalistisch-reaktionär abgestempelt werden würde.”

Uncertainty over the party's programme identity continued into the January of 1946, even once the Soviets had removed Hermes and Schreiber from their positions as leaders of the party and replaced them with Kaiser and Lemmer. Questions such as “worin besteht denn aber unsere neue Gesinnung?” unser Radikalismus?” were still being raised and Plewe wondered whether the party should attempt to formulate a theoretical basis for their programme. This prompted Dovifat to formulate the Committee's views on Christian Socialism to submit to their new leader Kaiser. But there were divisions. Whilst Dovifat maintained their version of 'socialism' should be defined solely by its Christian profile and respect for the inviolable freedom of the individual, Gablentz wanted an economic interpretation of Christian Socialism, emphasising commitment to public ownership or '*Gemeinschaftseigentum*.' Strauss and Tillmann remained fundamentally opposed to a planned economy, arguing that a Christian party should not commit itself to *any* specific order, and reminded the committee that advocating a

¹⁸⁷ The majority of the Economic Committee members were Evangelists and included Dovifat, Tillmanns, von der Gablentz, Gravenhorst, Plewe, Pfarrer Schwartzkopff and Walter Strauss.

¹⁸⁸ Protocols of the CDUD Economic Committee in ACDP, I-090-016/4.

'planned' economy could be misunderstood as a Soviet type administered economy. Tillmann in particular emphasised that economic planning would strictly be a temporary measure until normal conditions returned and a free market could be reintroduced, guided by an overarching macro-economic policy. Nationalisation plans should only be implemented to satisfy the population's needs and - as a direct backlash of the Weimar period experience - to avoid exploitative economic practices or monopolistic tendencies from developing in the economy. The *Mittelstand*, he said, should be given priority at all times.

Kaiser as leader

Jakob Kaiser and deputy Ernst Lemmer, were installed as the party's new leaders just one day after Hermes and Schreiber had been dismissed by the Soviet authorities. The Soviet authorities welcomed Kaiser's arrival, since he had been an active and respected member of the resistance movement who had suffered Nazi persecution. He was also known as a leading member of the Christian trade union movement and the former deputy chairman of the Rhine Centre Party.¹⁸⁹ Kaiser recognised German working class divisions and the need for one integrated trade union, and his new socialist rhetoric, promising to rid Germany of the evils of capitalism, was obviously in step with Soviet thinking.

In December, shortly after learning of his nomination as new leader of the CDUD, Kaiser received a letter from his foreign policy advisor and editor of the *Neue Zeit*, Alfred Gerigk,¹⁹⁰ informing him, that now the SPD was planning to fuse with the KPD (to form the SED) there was a unique chance for a party political programme to be drafted for a British style Labour Party, attracting those workers and the *Kleinbürgertum* voters traditionally hostile to Marxist dogma and now politically alienated by the launch of the SPD/KPD merger. Gerigk believed the Christian element adopted by the CDU would help to make their political campaign even more effective. The move towards a

¹⁸⁹ Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.50.

¹⁹⁰ Letter from Alfred Gerigk, Kaiser's foreign policy adviser to Jakob Kaiser on 24th December 1945, NL Jakob Kaiser, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Akte 71, also reprinted in Siegfried Suckut, *Zum Wandel...* op. cit., p.135-136.

specific Labour party, could now be made without any drastic or obvious change of course in the CDU's existing programme;

“Wenn es bisher als ein Mangel angesehen werden konnte, daß die CDU kein Parteiprogramm bekanntgegeben hat, sondern nur den Gründungsaufruf, so kann diese vorhandene Lücke jetzt die Möglichkeit bieten, die von mir angedeutete Entwicklung vorzunehmen, ohne daß rein äußerlich ein solcher Vorgang als eine Schwenkung oder Wandlung erscheint.”¹⁹¹

The possibility to ‘interpret’ the principles contained in the party’s founding document ‘differently’ notes Gerigk, means the new direction must not appear as if the CDU had abandoned any of its former values. The emphasis could simply be shifted to other aspects. He did not anticipate any friction with the Soviet authorities either;

“weil ja der Grundton dieses Programms äußerlich manchen Forderungen von sowjetischer Seite anscheinend entgegenkommen würde.”

By virtue of its socialist credentials, the CDU appeared sufficiently distinct from the liberal LDP and enabled it to escape charges by the SED and the Soviets, that it was middle class, liberal-reactionary and fascist.¹⁹² Kaiser had registered the considerable interest in a Christian socialist programme among regional Christian democratic groups at the *Reichstreffen* in Godesberg in December 1945, as well as the western CDU’s enthusiasm for Berlin to adopt the party leadership.¹⁹³ It seemed opportune therefore to act on Gerigk’s advice, and adopt a Christian socialist discourse, transform it into a comprehensive programme, and so unite the party under one slogan and one political direction. It was also an opportunity to raise the profile of Kaiser’s own campaign for assuming the national party leadership.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p.325ff.

¹⁹³ In particular the speeches by the western CDU members Leo Schwering and Erich Köhler supported the Berlin CDU. Köhler from the CDU Hessen gave a speech on the economic and social aspects of the party programme. “Die programmatischen Aussagen sind zum Teil wörtlich dem Berliner Gründungsaufruf vom 26. Juni 1945 entnommen und verraten die Handschrift ehemaliger christlicher Gewerkschaftler.” Horstwalter Heizer, *Die CDU in der Britischen Zone* ... op. cit., p.180.

Meeting of the Soviet zone CDU executive, February 13th, 1946

Kaiser had previously employed the term Christian Socialism in speeches and articles, such as in the article entitled *Zum Weg der Union* in the December 30 issue of the *Neue Zeit* in 1945, and at the rally of the *Einheitsfront* on January 30, 1946. But it was not until the first meeting of the zone executive board on February 13, 1946 that Kaiser proclaimed Christian Socialism to be the party's official programme for the Soviet zone. In a speech entitled, "*der soziale und staatspolitische Wille der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands*"¹⁹⁴ Kaiser, as the new party chairman, talked of consolidating the party's programme to aid internal cohesion and to stand firm against the increasingly tense political climate in the Soviet zone. He talked of uniting as one *Volkspartei*, with an economic and social system that was driven by its duty to serve the *Gemeinwohl* and achieve German unification. Like many of his counterparts in the west, he pronounced the liberal, capitalist era dead. The future, he said, belonged to democratic socialism with Christian responsibility, even though middle class traditions remained integral to the concept of the *Volkspartei*;

"Nur eine revolutionäre Partei verlangt stets dem radikalen Bruch mit den Traditionen der Vergangenheit. Für uns dagegen ist es eine Selbstverständlichkeit, daß wir keinen Bruch in der Tradition wollen, sondern daß alles, was die bürgerliche Kultur an Werten geschaffen hat – und sie hat Unvergängliches geschaffen – als Bestandteil ewigen Volksgutes auch in eine neue Ordnung mit hinüber genommen werden soll. Die Ordnung aber, der die bürgerliche Ordnung nunmehr Platz zu machen hat, wird eine sozialistische Ordnung sein müssen."¹⁹⁵

This combination of liberal, middle class traditions and social reforms defined the moderate character of Kaiser's socialism, and was not unlike his 'liberal-socialist' counterparts in the west. Socialism was not socialisation of the means of production or class struggle but one whereby society adopted a social conscience. Private property ownership was not questioned, and should be restrained only if monopolist tendencies emerged in the economy. Kaiser makes an additional concession to large scale industry, arguing that ownership issues were less significant than the introduction of co-decision making powers for industrial employees. Building a synthesis between Christianity and

¹⁹⁴ Jakob Kaiser, *Der soziale und staatspolitische Wille*, February 13, 1946. Speech at the meeting of the CDU executive in Berlin. Landesverband Berlin, ACDP, III-012-1063. Also printed in Christian Hacke (Hrsg.), Jakob Kaiser. *Wir haben Brücke zu sein...*, op. cit., p.86-99.

¹⁹⁵ Kaiser, *Der soziale und staatspolitische Wille*, op. cit.

Socialism and between east and west, he said, was Germany's 'historic responsibility,' combining eastern emphasis on the *Gesamtheit* with western values of the importance of the individual. This also offered a solution to social reform and to German unification,¹⁹⁶

“Mir scheint für Deutschland die große Aufgabe gegeben, im Ring der europäischen Nationen die Synthese zwischen östlichen und westlichen Ideen zu finden. Wir haben Brücke zu sein zwischen Ost und West; zugleich aber suchen wir unseren eigenen Weg zu gehen zu neuer sozialer Gestaltung.”

For Kaiser, Christian Socialism was not only an organising principle for engineering social reform, nor was it simply a tactical device to reunite the splintered labour movement with the chronically undermined middle classes, but a fundamental principle for balancing the forces of capitalism and democracy in the west, with socialism and dictatorship in the east.¹⁹⁷ It was an idea best encapsulated in the Christian Democratic Union.

The change in leadership from Hermes to Kaiser has frequently been termed a left-wing programme shift, due to Kaiser's new adherence to a Christian Socialist agenda. Yet if the personnel and programmatic transition was significant, the question is raised, why did it only cause minimal internal party division and discussion?¹⁹⁸ Wilde¹⁹⁹ claims that since the autumn 1945, other leading Berlin members in the economic and social policy committee, had begun to move towards Christian Socialist thinking anyway. Suckut²⁰⁰ describes the leadership change as a move from an undefined, representative party of the middle classes, to an explicit Christian Socialist opposition, that strengthened the party's overall political importance. In actual fact, the leadership change was less significant than is assumed. Kaiser's politics were not dramatically different to Hermes'. Both were former Catholic trade union activists in the Weimar Republic who believed in worker participation in industrial decision making and the nationalisation of some industry, but

¹⁹⁶ Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.130.

¹⁹⁷ Christian Hacke, "Ein deutscher Patriot im Gegenstrom der Nachkriegsentwicklung. Zum 100. Geburtstag von Jakob Kaiser", in: Deutschland Archiv, 21.1.1988, p.178.

¹⁹⁸ Norbert Mattedi, op. cit., p.78.

¹⁹⁹ Manfred Wilde, op. cit. p.326.

²⁰⁰ Siegfried Suckut, Die CDU in der DDR. Zu Funktion und Funktionswandel einer christlichen Partei im Sozialismus, DDR Report, Jg 15, Heft 11, 1982, p.703.

fundamentally they upheld the importance of middle-class liberal traditions for the future. Their policy aims for Germany were also compatible. They were reluctant to grant Germany's regions too much decentralised power and rejected the Oder-Neisse border as Germany's eastern border and any loss of territory in the west. Kaiser did expand the party's Christian Socialist programme when he took over the leadership, but it is his 'instrumental'²⁰¹ use of Christian Socialism for gaining political advantage that was most significant, rather than any fundamental departure from the economic and social principles documented in the 1945 *Aufruf*. Kaiser did not consider his change in leadership constituted the need for a revision of the party's programme, and kept the original *Aufruf* as the official party programme. If he did make alterations to his programme, they were more subtle and were reflected via his speeches during 1946 and 1947. Gradl²⁰² also denied that Kaiser's more frequent employment of the term '*Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung*,' indicated a real programmatic shift to the left, or indeed a fundamental departure from earlier Catholic social thinking;

"Das was wir in der Sache wollten, war gar nicht etwa von Grund auf neu. In der christlichen Morallehre war Kritik am Laissez-Faire eine Selbstverständlichkeit. In den Zeiten des Widerstandes, vom Kreisauer Kreis bis zu den Dominikanern von Walberberg, dachte man genauso über eine freiheitliche, aber disziplinierte Wirtschafts- und Sozialordnung nach."

Gradl agrees that the motive for the rhetorical emphasis of Christian Socialism was more ideological;

".... eben besonders im sowjetischen Besatzungsbereich war es notwendig, sachlich und politisch der Geschlossenheit des kommunistischen Systems und der Selbstsicherheit der Kommunisten eine andere, ebenfalls weltanschaulich fundierten und auf Gemeinschaft zielende Grundvorstellung entgegenzusetzen. Das hat mit einer 'Schwenkung nach links' nichts zu tun."

Besides placating Soviet proclivities, Kaiser saw *Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung* as a pragmatic slogan, to win respect and support from Christian Socialists in the west and to genuinely assist him in describing and communicating the

²⁰¹ Manfred Wilde adds, "Die SBZ-CDU instrumentalisierte den Christlichen Sozialismus jedoch nicht nur ganz anders als beispielsweise die Union der britischen Besatzungszone, sondern entwickelte ihn auch programmatisch eigenständig weiter." Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p.278.

²⁰² Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.56.

society that he wanted to create, namely Christian and socially responsible.²⁰³ He also saw it as a counterweight ideology to the cohesiveness of Marxist-Socialism.

Although the leadership change did not amount to a radical left-wing shift, Kaiser did however exercise his trade union influence to introduce better working relations between employer and employee 'als Mitgliedschaft in einer wirtschaftlichen Gesamtheit' in a working partnership that negotiated salary, working conditions and labour legislation.²⁰⁴ Kaiser's tendency to articulate his views on a high, abstract level, referring only to a *Wirtschaftsdemokratie* when discussing his policy on industrial democracy, may have been difficult to discern whether Kaiser was advocating a centrally administered or a market economy, but the ambiguity allowed Kaiser to keep his options open.

The search for programme consensus

The details of Kaiser's vision were left to his policy specialists to flesh out. Their task was to expand a two worded slogan into a comprehensive political programme. The specialist committee included the individuals Georg Grosse, Herschel, Dovifat, von der Gablentz, Gradl, Tiburtius, Tillmann and Walter Strauss. Their aim was to develop a new economic and social order, based on Christian social principles to overcome the alienation of mass society. Small and independent autonomous communities were understood to be more resistant to totalitarian tendencies in the state.²⁰⁵ In line with Hermes' plans for nationalisation, the control of mineral resources and public utility firms should be held in public ownership and all other monopolies and cartels dismantled. Plans to implement a currency reform²⁰⁶ were initiated by Friedrich Ernst,

²⁰³ J.B Gradl cites Kaiser's comment in the *Neue Zeit*, on 5th May 1946, when Kaiser noted that whoever does not desire the term socialist should choose another one! Johann Baptist Gradl. op. cit., p.56.

²⁰⁴ Retaining party political neutrality had formed the basis of the agreement on a united trade union organisation, the *Einheitsgewerkschaft*. In a Informationsbrief Nr.12 'Aus der Arbeit der Union' containing extracts from Albert Voss's speech from the executive board meeting on 13th February 1946 on the trade union movement, Voss expressed the Union's firm commitment to a unified trade union, but did however suggest that the CDU should instill the trade union with "unsere Prägung" namely christian democratic thinking and recommended seminars to encourage political activity and involvement among the workers. "Wir müssen dafür sorgen, daß unsere Ideologien, unsere Ideenwelt in die Gewerkschaften hineingetragen werde." Albert Voss in ACDP, III-012-1063.

²⁰⁵ "Die Gliederung der Masse in übersehbare kleine Gemeinschaften der Nachbarschaft und der Arbeit." Albert Grosse in *Deutschland und die Union*, ACDP, I -155-001/1.

²⁰⁶ The CDU's Gründungserklärung in July 1945 had already highlighted the need for a currency reform not as a specific feature of a socialist or a market economy but as a measure to tackle their biggest fear-

former ministerial director in the Prussian ministry of trade after the First World War and Reich commissioner for banking under Chancellor Brüning. Ernst²⁰⁷ suggested devaluation, accompanied by a reinstatement of the *Reichsbank* to control money supply, to reactivate the banking industry as a whole across Germany and to introduce tax reforms, spending and price controls. He anticipated that the allies would supply the capital required to set up the *Reichsbank*, thereby committing the allies to establishing uniform economic planning for Germany.²⁰⁸

In his 1946 pamphlet *Über Marx hinaus* the key spokesman²⁰⁹ on economic policy, v. d. Gablentz²¹⁰, explained that their programme of *Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung* did not aim to emulate Marx but, as the title suggests, to go beyond Marx - *Über Marx hinaus*, to supersede Marxist Socialism. Gablentz refers to the Communist Manifesto as a '*geniale Leistung*,' but the task was to now write the second half that developed a programme for a classless society. The fundamental challenge in economic policy was to overcome the conflict between *Freiheit* and *Bindung*. 'Freedom' and 'restraint' were thought to be elements contained within every economic policy, and implemented according to prevailing 'psychological and technical' circumstances. Current conditions demanded a stronger tendency towards *Bindung* than *Freiheit*;²¹¹

inflation. All credit institutions in the east zone, unlike in the western zones were closed down and assets were confiscated. From August the Soviets replaced them with a centralised banking system.

²⁰⁷ Article on "Fragen des Währungs-Banken – und Reichsschuldenwesens," lecture by Friedrich Ernst, ACDP, I-090-016/4.

²⁰⁸ The CDU executive submitted a request to the allied Control Council pointing out the benefits of re-opening the banks, suggesting a future bank system for Germany and reevaluation of the Reichsmark. When the CDU put its recommendations to the four party Einheitsblock it was welcomed by the LPD but rejected by SED on the grounds that bank capital had been to blame for causing inflation and the war. Since the SPD and KPD were not willing to formulate their own suggestions for the Soviet military authorities and following the removal of Hermes and Schreiber as well as the LPD chairmen at the end of 1945, discussions on currency reform did not resume until January 10, 1946 when the CDU again pushed to reopen banks, release hoarded cash and fund business activity. See Siegfried Suckut, *Blockpolitik in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1949. Die Sitzungsprotokolle des zentralen Einheitsfront-Ausschusses*, Quellenedition, Mannheimer Untersuchungen zu Politik und Geschichte der DDR 3, Köln 1986. Copy of CDU application p.106. In the final statement by KPD and SPD in the 10 January meeting little remained of the CDU's reform plans as these had almost entirely been replaced by KPD and SPD reform measures.

²⁰⁹ For Tiburtius's economic policy programme see the section on the CDU's early development in the Rhineland in this study, where his views are compared for their similarity to ordo-liberalism.

²¹⁰ Von der Gablentz and economic policy Sondermaterial, ACDP, III-012-1063. Party executive board meetings, Berlin 5/6 March 1946.

²¹¹ Gablentz's programme emphasised three aims: a 'planned' or publicly administered economy, public ownership of industry and codecision making rights for employees, but Uhl has criticised Gablentz for

“Deswegen treten wir ein für die unsere Zeit gemässe Ordnung der öffentlichen gelenkten Wirtschaft. Wir sind Sozialisten.”²¹²

By March 1946, Kaiser secured his first travel visa to the west, to outline his vision of a socialist new order to the western CDU. He held two speeches on March 29 and 31, in Düsseldorf and Essen, that upheld the commitment to a socialist order, but he endeavoured to define what he understood by the term;

“Der Begriff Sozialismus ist nicht, wie oft behauptet wird, gleichbedeutend mit ‘Sozialisierung aller Produktionsmittel. Sozialismus bedeutet nichts anderes als der Wille, jede öffentliche Aufgabe, jede Arbeit auf allen Gebieten des Lebens auf die soziale Wirkung, d.h auf die Wirkung für das gesamte Volk hin auszurichten.....Es ist kein Schlagwort, sondern der Ausdruck einer Einsicht.”²¹³

Yet he reinforced the left-wing aspect of his programme that made trade unions the main architects of the new social order. Socialism would be the link or *Bindeglied* to unite diverse political interests in the trade union movement. He touched on the more controversial response to socialism in the west and acknowledges the difficulty of eliciting western commitment to the term, which; “mag hier im Westen des Reiches schwerwiegender klingen, als auf Berliner Boden.” Kaiser hoped to resolve political differences between the east and the west CDU at the forthcoming party conference in Berlin, during which a vote would also be held to replace the provisional party leadership with a democratically elected leader.²¹⁴

The Berlin party conference

The first Berlin party conference on 16th and 17th June, 1946 was an occasion for Kaiser to consolidate his leadership across all zones and to more widely publicise his

lacking programmatic clarity. Whilst both Tiburtius and Gablentz independently produced draft recommendations for a new socialist economic order, which Kaiser of course did not, Uhl argues that the planning aspect of Gablentz’s concept failed to conclusively state whether he is in favour of a market economy or an interventionist, centralised economy. Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.144.

²¹² Von der Gablentz and economic policy Sondermaterial, ACDP, III-012-1063. Party executive board meetings, Berlin 5/6 March 1946.

²¹³ Speech by Jakob Kaiser in Düsseldorf, March 29, 1946. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, MF 2215 KAI. Inventar Nr. 60041523-9.

²¹⁴ Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.63f.

programme. Growing conflict and competition with the Soviets and with Adenauer's western CDU, meant Kaiser could not voice programme statements without careful consideration of the political climate and was forced to compromise some of his earlier political idealism. CDU leaders in the British and American zone had met prior to the conference, on 3rd April in Stuttgart, to discuss merging their zones and uniting their party. Adenauer subsequently wrote to Kaiser reporting²¹⁵ that western members had expressed disagreement at holding the party leadership election in the Russian zone and were, moreover, deeply concerned with elements of the CDUD's programme. The western CDU, he said, disagreed with the controversial and misleading statements such as "Wir sind Sozialisten" and with Kaiser's claim that Berlin was a synthesis between east and west. Finally Adenauer pointed out that members disputed that the '*bürgerliche Epoche*' was over and contested the claim that the communist manifesto was a feat of genius.

The subsequent attendance by 91 western representatives at the Berlin party conference can only indicate that Adenauer's written description of the level of opposition to Kaiser's programme was - if not blatantly untrue - then certainly exaggerated, to bolster Adenauer's own interest in taking the leadership. Amongst those present at the conference, Gradl remarked;

"So war der Charakter eines überzonalen, eines 'gesamtdeutschen' Parteitages wie schon in Bad Godesberg 1945 unverkennbar. Schon aus diesem Grunde war der Parteitag ein Erfolg."²¹⁶

The series of resolutions from the conference²¹⁷ provides an invaluable insight into the Union's culminate programme objectives. Declared commitment to a 'socialism with Christian responsibility' implied individual economic freedoms with selective

²¹⁵ The Stuttgart meeting was important for Adenauer since he could return to Christian Socialists in the Rhineland and report that the north and south German union leaders had protested against Kaiser's Christian Socialism. No copy of the minutes from the Stuttgart meeting exists and only a report of the meeting is in the file.Nr. 200A. Rudolf Morsey/H.P Schwarz (Hrsg), Bearb. Von Hans Peter Mansing, Briefe 1945-1947, Adenauer Rhöndorfer Ausgabe, Siedler, Berlin (West) 1983, p.208/209.

²¹⁶ Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.65.

²¹⁷ Wege in die Neue Zeit, Berliner Tagung der Union. Die Entschliessungen, Jg. 1946, Nr. 5, Union Verlag, Berlin. A total of 14 resolutions were passed covering a range of topics including monetary policy, communal policy, private property, food and agriculture, labour protection and social welfare.

nationalisation plans. Its most important demand was the implementation of a regulated economic order. One resolution was dedicated exclusively to the party's cultural policy and this revealed the importance of creating a new moral structure for society and the continued importance of culture as *Weltanschauung* in politics. Cultural policy had the unique function of underpinning economic and social policy. In a keynote address to the conference, Tillmann outlined the Union's 'spiritual' responsibility. The holocaust was not to be attributed to economic and social factors but to Germans' failed moral and spiritual integrity. Man's progress from the Enlightenment to the industrial revolution had caused society to worship materialism and reason over God and religion. As ethics and values disappeared, the power and politics of totalitarian ideologies replaced religion as the new form of *Weltanschauung*. 1945 should therefore be aimed at reversing that trend, replacing ideologies with religion, whilst also benefiting from man's technological achievements by combining these with Christian culture. The new post-war responsibility represented a challenge to find a third way - a synthesis of morals and industrial progress.

"Wir wollen die Ergebnisse der großen geistigen Epochen der neueren europäischen Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der modernen Technik nicht abtun oder irgend etwas rückwärts drehen, sondern sie in den geistigen Grundkräften unserer abendländischen Kultur neu fundieren, um so eine echte Synthese von Geist und Materie von Kultur und technischer Zivilisation zu finden." ²¹⁸

Christian ethics in future would not be limited to the private sphere but extended to the social and political realm. Again Kaiser²¹⁹ used the occasion to differentiate his programme from Soviet socialism;

"Unser Sozialismus ist wesensverschieden vom Marxismus. Das christliche Sozialgesetz kann uns sozialistische Wege führen, da es an eine bestimmte Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsordnung nicht gebunden ist. Aber im christlichen Sozialgesetz und im Marxismus begegnen sich zwei Weltanschauungen, die einander ausschließen.... Wir lehnen es ab, den Menschen im Grunde als das Ergebnis der

²¹⁸ CDU 2nd annual party conference ACDP I-171-001/2. Tillmann's speech in Sondermaterial ACDP III-012-1063 amongst speeches held at party executive board meetings, Berlin 5/6 March 1946.

²¹⁹ The speeches by Kaiser and western spokesmen including Andre, Arnold, Heinemann and Holzapfel, Josef Müller, Roos and Weber all spoke against separatism and regionalism tendencies and expressed their ongoing support for a united Germany. Kaiser called for a "Bekundung des Zusammengehörigkeitswillens über alle Zonengrenzen und Zonenschwierigkeiten hinweg" Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p.358.

wirtschaftlichen Umwelt zu sehen. Freiheit und Eigengesetzlichkeit der menschlichen Persönlichkeit sind uns unantastbare Lebensgesetze.”²²⁰

The conference concluded with a resolution in favour of Christian Socialism and with a unanimous vote to elect Kaiser and Lemmer as party leaders.

Kaiser’s depiction of Christianity as a *Weltanschauung* alongside Marxism is further developed in an article he wrote in the *Neue Zeit* entitled; “Um was es geht.”²²¹ Kaiser maintains that the three registered parties in the Soviet occupied zone were based on the three schools of thought - Marxism, Liberalism and Christianity. Liberalism was least decisive, he said, since the CDU had incorporated the best traditions of liberalism in its thinking, but rivalry remained between Marxism and Christianity. Subsequent articles emphasised the “geistige Entscheidung” that voters faced between Marxism and Christianity. This tactic reduced a party’s political programme to a singular political ideology and most alarming, equated Christianity with the ideologies of Marxism and Liberalism. The method was also employed by Adenauer in the west to demonize Marxism in order to minimise the threat of a SPD election victory. Powerful though it was, it entailed the risk of dividing Germany into east and west and so indirectly betrayed Kaiser’s own ‘*Brückentheorie*.’

The impact of the autumn elections in the Soviet zone on the CDU’s debate

A comprehensive review of the CDU’s disappointing performance²²² in the Soviet zone communal elections on August 1 and September 15, 1946 by executive committee member Dertinger concluded that policy was still too philosophical and lacked in practical relevance;

²²⁰ Speech Jakob Kaiser, party conference June 16-17, 1946 cited in Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.67.

²²¹ Um Was es geht, Neue Zeit, August 11, 1946.

²²² Communal elections in the Soviet Zone took place on 15th September and the Kreis and Land parliamentary elections on 20th October 1946. In the communal elections the results were CDU=18.7%, LDP 21.1%, SED 57.1% giving the SED an absolute majority. In the Kreistag elections CDU=35.2%, LDP=18.6%, SED = 50.1% also giving SED an absolute majority and the Landtag elections CDU=24.5%, LDP=24.6%, SED= 47.6% The LDP and CDU ran virtually neck and neck with the SED gaining only a relative majority. Günter Braun in Martin Broszat and Hermann Weber (Hg), SBZ Handbuch, op. cit., p.396f.

“Dringend erforderlich ist zunächst eine Klärung und vor allem eine Popularisierung dieser Ideologie. Aus der allgemeinen weltanschaulichen Darlegung müssen wir zu konkreten Formulierungen hinsichtlich der aktuellen Tagesfragen vorstossen.”²²³

Kaiser's own assessment of '*Die Union nach den Wahlen*'²²⁴ on November 6, 1946 at the extended zone executive committee also requests a pause for a *Gewissensforschung* to consider the party's image and objectives following poor regional election results. In an atmosphere of heightened Soviet dominance, Kaiser further modified his definition of socialism, noting that nationalisation was now not an absolute principle, but just one method of socialism alongside many others. The elusive goal of German unity was also made a policy priority, that must be met before the subject of the new economic order could be tackled. By insisting on the unlikely event of German unification however, Kaiser effectively signalled an indefinite postponement of the decision on economic reform. Kaiser expressed his growing concern at the ideological wrangling between the allies, the political rivalry between parties and even between the right and left wing in the CDU;

“Es ist kein Geheimnis geblieben, daß die Welt trotz der Niederringung Hitlers noch voll ideologischer Spannungen ist.... Was nützen all wohlgesetzten Wirtschaftsprogramme, was nützen radikale Parteigrundsätze, über die in bombastischen Worten debattiert wird: Sicherung des täglichen Brotes, des menschenwürdigen Obdaches, Erschliessung der kargen wirtschaftlichen Möglichkeiten, die uns noch geblieben sind, sind das Nächstliegende Verzweiflung und Hoffnungslosigkeit in den Herzen der Millionen zu tilgen, bleibt die erste Aufgabe.”²²⁵

Kaiser's specialist committee produced a document on December 6, 1946 entitled *Grundbegriffe des christlichen Sozialismus* that attempted to summarise the philosophical

²²³ It was felt that the CDU's chances had been actively impeded by the Soviet military and SED intervention. “Hinzukommt als wesentliches Merkmal der Ausgangslage dieses Wahlkampfes eine Wahlbeeinträchtigung verschiedenster Art und von ausserordentlichem Umfang. Nicht nur konnten wir teilweise nur 50% der wahlberechtigten Bevölkerung überhaupt erreichen, sondern darüber hinaus waren wir auch sonst in jeder Hinsicht organisatorisch-propagandistisch benachteiligt, und unsere Wähler und Aktivisten waren einer ausserordentlichen Wahlbeeinflussung ausgesetzt. Die Ausgangslage für die Wahlen war also denkbar ungünstig.” Report prepared by Dertinger for the executive committee meeting on 17th September 1946 following communal elections. ACDP, III-012-1063.

²²⁴ “... es zunächst der Einheit unseres Landes bedarf, um die lebenswichtigen Fragen der Neuregelung der Wirtschaft in Angriff nehmen zu können.” Jakob Kaiser. *Die Union nach den Wahlen*. November 6, 1946. In Christian Hacke (Hrsg), Jakob Kaiser. *Wir haben Brücke* op. cit., p.156.

²²⁵ Jakob Kaiser, *Die Union nach den Wahlen*. November 6, 1946. Printed in Christian Hacke (Hrsg), Jakob Kaiser. *Wir haben Brücke* ... op. cit., p.156.

and theological aspects of their political ideology and in particular Christian Socialism's relation to Marxism. Individual statements by committee members revealed that significant differences in opinion still prevailed over the economy. Despite basic philosophical agreement, Berlin's Christian Socialists frequently arrived at dramatically different policy formulations, and confirms that;

“Politik aus christlicher Verantwortung und sozialer Liebe zwar bestimmte politische Grundhaltungen ausschließt, aber nicht gleichzeitig sachlich eindeutige Ordnungsvorstellungen einschließt. Hier bleibt Raum zu durchaus pluralen Modellen.”²²⁶

Tiburtius²²⁷ emphasised free market competition as the principal driver of the economy but Gablentz's 'economic planning' concept, is less clear about whether it envisages a regulatory framework or more pervasive powers of intervention by the state. It appears that committee member Gablentz had chosen to ignore Kaiser's conscious shift in programme, and continued to recommend industries for nationalisation and restrictions on private ownership. The important fact remains that Christian Socialism as understood by Kaiser and by some members of his specialist committee was open to interpretation as a neo-liberal economic system.

In preparation for the second party conference on September 6-8, 1947, Kaiser disregarded his own committee's programme suggestions and chose Karl Arnold to address the conference. Arnold had the advantage not only that he was minister president for the western state of North Rhine-Westphalia but was also a member of the Christian trade unions and campaigned for German unification. It was hoped that Arnold would raise the profile of the CDU in the eyes of the Soviets.²²⁸ Arnold's speech²²⁹ makes no mention of Christian Socialism, but the conference resolutions agreed on central

²²⁶ Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.137ff.

²²⁷ Tiburtius, op. cit., p.29ff.

²²⁸ Sharply criticising the over zealous expropriation activities of the Soviet authorities Arnold accuses the Soviets of using socialisation to bring about Marxist collectivism. “Sie (die Enteignungsaktion) ist hier ausgeweitet worden zu einer bewußten Änderung der gesamten Wirtschaftsstruktur, zu einer Sozialisierung nicht aus sachlicher Notwendigkeit, sondern aus einem Dogmatismus einseitiger marxistischer Vorstellung.” Karl Arnold, 7. September 1947, Theater am Schiffbauerdamm, Berlin. Speech printed in J.B Gradl op. cit., p.186 (177-189). Also in ACDP I-294-012.

²²⁹ Gradl was assigned with writing Arnold's conference speech.

economic planning, public ownership and co-decision rights in industry.²³⁰ Nationalisation was significantly curtailed and now became more the exception than the rule. Alternative market economic mechanisms including tax, credit and interest, price and customs policies were recommended to achieve similar control to nationalisation. The socialist elements contained in Kaiser's previous visions of a new order had been noticeably weakened.²³¹

Kaiser's references to Christian Socialism did not continue for very long after the 1946 autumn elections. Until this point Christian Socialism had been useful in warding off insinuations that the CDU was a '*bürgerlich*' party. After this date however, the encroaching and more dangerous socialism of the SED and the suspicion that the word socialism continued to arouse in the west, forced Kaiser to revise his Christian Socialist programme and to re-emphasise market economics. A speech held in Cologne on April, 16, 1947 best exemplifies the modification of Kaiser's programme. Kaiser still insisted that 'a new order' was necessary, but significantly no longer absolutely insisted on it being socialist. He sought to reassure western audiences that a new order does not equate with a loss of wealth and prosperity;

"Es gibt Leute, die meinengepflegte Lebensformen gingen zugrunde, wenn sich die Union zur Notwendigkeit einer neuen Ordnung, *meinetwegen mit sozialistischem Vorzeichen*, bekennt Es muß ausgeräumt werden mit der Auffassung, als bedeute die Ablösung der kapitalistischen Wirtschaftsordnung eine Proletarisierung des deutschen Volkes." ²³²

Kaiser redrew the Union's profile from a socialist party to a 'socially progressive party,' recommending wealth distribution measures to ensure social justice and congratulating the merits of middle class conservatism;

"Ich habe stets auf dem Standpunkt gestanden, daß nach Auffassung der Union zu jedem sozialen Neuordnungswillen ein Stück konservativen Geistes kommen muß. Es

²³⁰ "Sie (die Enteignungsaktion) ist hier ausgeweitet worden zu einer bewußten Änderung der gesamten Wirtschaftsstruktur, zu einer Sozialisierung nicht aus sachlicher Notwendigkeit, sondern aus einem Dogmatismus einseitiger marxistischer Vorstellung." Karl Arnold, 7th September 1947 op. cit.

²³¹ Manfred Wilde op. cit., p.294.

²³² Jakob Kaiser. Speech in Cologne. 16 April 1947. Printed in: Christian Hacke (Hrsg), Jakob Kaiser. Wir haben Brücke p.209f (205-217).

gibt keine gesunde politische und soziale Neuordnung ohne die Erhaltung wertvollen Geistes und wertvollster Eigenschaften, wie das deutsche Bürgertum sie verkörpert hat."

National representation

By the autumn of 1946, Kaiser's anxiety that actions by the SED and the Soviets were isolating the Soviet zone from the west, led to the suggestion for an all-German body of representatives from all zones to pressure the allies to confront the issue of German unity.²³³ The campaign for 'National Representation' became Kaiser's new goal which he pursued until the middle of 1947. The inspiration came from American Foreign Secretary Byrnes, who in a speech in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946 endorsed a merger of the US and the British zones and invited other zones to set up joint German administrations to manage Germany as one economic area in accordance with the Potsdam agreement. Kaiser took the speech by Byrnes and the willingness²³⁴ by Soviets to settle a peace treaty once a German government had been established, as a sign that preparations for a provisional federal German government could go ahead. Kaiser assumed the British would follow the US suggestion and was confident that the French would also agree, based on Foreign Secretary Bidault's approval for a central German administration, at the Paris Conference on July 12, 1946. Yet to Kaiser's amazement, his idea to reach a compromise between all party differences and between all allied powers collapsed when agreement could not be reached.²³⁵ Mentalities and views in the west, and in particular their views on German unity were too disparate and lacked the minimum requirement of an *'intaktes Nationalgefühl'*.²³⁶ Kaiser held onto the belief in a national representation, a permanent council of German parties that would be a powerful negotiating aid to secure the CDU greater influence and freedom in the antifascist block;²³⁷

²³³ Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.78.

²³⁴ Speech by Molotow on July 10, 1946.

²³⁵ Disagreement between the allies erupted over issues such as reparation payments, conditions for US aid and suspicion of the Soviet expansionist aims also made any hope of a German administration illusory. The reality was that allied powers in the east and the west were more interested in establishing their own specific political and economic system and their own spheres of influence than in supporting a joint administration or even a committee of German party politicians. Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p.387.

²³⁶ Hans Peter Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik*, Luchterhand, Neuwied/Berlin 1966, p.336.

²³⁷ "In den vorgesehenen Gremien hätten die Befürwörter einer freiheitlichen-rechtstaatlichen Demokratie überwogen, und mit ihrem Rückhalt hoffte Kaiser den Pressionen der SED und SMAD besser widerstehen zu können." Ibid., p.336.

“Es war der Sinn der Forderung nach einer nationalen Repräsentation und nach einem Konsultativrat, die Verbreitung der Basis gegen den Kommunismus auf gesamtdeutscher Ebene zu schaffen.”²³⁸

From the summer of 1947 and following the Soviet's rejection of the Marshall Plan, Kaiser strengthened his opposition to the Soviet military. He signalled a change of course in what has been termed his 'Opposition Speech'²³⁹ at the extended executive meeting on July 12, 1947. Kaiser's programme now suffered opposition on two fronts, from those politicians committed to a western political orientation and from the Soviet military who pressured Kaiser's CDU to conform to block politics.²⁴⁰ Kaiser voiced his severest criticism yet of Soviet occupation policy and the discrimination mounted against the CDU, marking the beginning of the end of his party leadership.²⁴¹

“Die Union kann keine Politik decken, die dazu dient, unter Führung der SED etwas wie einem Einheitsblock, den Weg zu bereiten, der nach und nach Instrument einer Politik wird, die mit den Grundsätzen der Union nichts mehr zu tun haben können.”²⁴²

By November 24, the Soviet military presented their own proposal for an all German body, a *Volkskongress* to represent the parties of the Soviet zone at the forthcoming London Conference of foreign ministers. The CDU rejected the proposal on the grounds that the west German parties were not included²⁴³ and because it contravened the party's

²³⁸ Jakob Kaiser, “Der Kampf der Christlichen Demokraten in der Sowjetzone”, in: Politisches Jahrbuch CDU/CSU, op. cit., p.198.

²³⁹ ‘Oppositionsrede’ by Jakob Kaiser, 12 July 1947. Meeting of the extended executive committee of the CDU in the eastern zone, Berlin. Printed in Christian Hacke (Hrsg), Jakob Kaiser. Wir haben Brückeop. cit., p.246-257.

²⁴⁰ Rainer Zitelmann, Adenauers Gegner, Streiter für die Einheit, Straube, Erlangen/Bonn/Wien 1991, p.36.

²⁴¹ Kaiser's speech provoked the SED member Kratin to seek opinions from the regional CDU Landesvorsitzenden across the Soviet zone on the Marshall Plan and Blockpolitik. The fear of threats and reprisals for a negative response or sharing in Kaiser's criticism of the Soviet military authorities ensured that their statements were positive. The SED planned to use these submissions by the CDU Länder chairmen to undermine Kaiser and prevent his reelection at the forthcoming 2nd Union conference in September in Berlin.

²⁴² ‘Oppositionsrede’ by Jakob Kaiser, 12th July 1947, op. cit., p.253.

²⁴³ Manfred Koch, op. cit., p.11. Kaiser formulated his opposition in a letter to SED representative Pieck on 25th November “daß in diesem Augenblick eine Erklärung der Parteien unserer Zone dieses Bild der Zerrissenheit nur noch deutlicher hervortreten lassen würde.” Cited in Werner Conze, Jakob Kaiser, Politiker zwischen Ost und Westop. cit., p.186.

commitment to restoring German unification. In Kaiser's mind, the idea of the *Volkskongress* signalled the beginning of the division of Germany.²⁴⁴ The Soviets coerced representatives from the CDU regional states to attend the first meeting of the *Volkskongress* on December 6 and 7, circumventing the opposition by the CDU leadership. Kaiser meanwhile used the invitation to address the conference of the CDU's *Sozialausschüsse* in Herne, in western Germany on November 30, 1947 not to talk about trade union policy or Christian Socialism and its relation to the Ahlen programme, as anticipated, but to make a last desperate appeal for western dialogue with the Soviet authorities to avert the threat of a division of Germany.²⁴⁵

It was only a matter of time before the Soviet military authorities would retaliate to Kaiser's open display of opposition. The occasion came at the meeting of the zone's executive board on December 12, when the Soviet military leader Kratin brought a vote of no confidence against Kaiser, claiming he had become isolated in his party and lacked the trust of the occupation authorities. Members of the CDU executive were internally divided over their loyalty to Kaiser. The five *Landesverbände* still basically supported Kaiser, but they desperately needed to counter mounting Soviet threats and personal hostility inflicted on individuals in their regions. The party executive therefore took the decision to oust Kaiser.²⁴⁶ After Kaiser and Lemmer had been removed on December 19, 1947, Hickmann the new chairman of the six *Landesverbände* in the Soviet zone claimed Kaiser and Lemmer had not been sacked but had merely been; "vorläufig für

²⁴⁴ "Aus unserer gesamtdeutschen Verpflichtung konnten wir uns dieser zonal beschränkten und politisch einseitigen Veranstaltung nicht anschließen. Wir mußten befürchten, daß dieser Kongreß nicht dem deutschen Zusammenhalt dienen würde." Jakob Kaiser, *Die Gegenwart*, Jg 3, Nr 3/4, February 1948, p.2.

²⁴⁵ He had first spoken out on his policy for Germany at a speech entitled "Die deutsche Situation vor London", in the Friedrichspalast in Berlin on 16th November 1947, in anticipation of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers. The content of the speech denied the occupation powers the right to divide Germany and emphasised need for Germany to formulate its own standpoint vis a vis the occupation authorities, outlined his position on Oder-Neisse border, the Saar and reparations issue but still voiced his wish to reach an understanding with the Soviets and to strive for synthesis between personal freedoms and socialist obligations.

²⁴⁶ "Die Landesverbände der sowjetischen zone beabsichtigen, sich solange von der zonenleitung zu trennen, bis die Basis einer vertrauensvollen Zusammenarbeit zwischen dieser und der SMAD wiederhergestellt ist. Diese Regelung soll trotz des Vertrauens zu Jakob Kaiser erfolgen, weil sonst eine vertrauensvolle Zusammenarbeit in den Landesverbänden mit der SMAD nicht möglich und die Fortsetzung einer eigenständigen Unionsarbeit in der zone notwendig ist." The *Telegraf* newspaper from 21.12.1947 in ACDP III-012-923 gives a detailed report of the dismissal of Kaiser and Lemmer.

funktionsunfähig erklärt.”²⁴⁷ The dismissal coincided with the London conference of foreign ministers, just four days earlier, in which ministers failed to reach a solution that would have united all allied zones. This led to the Soviets to abandon their hope of uniting Germany under communism, and so they turned their attention to consolidating socialism in the Soviet zone only.²⁴⁸

At the inter-zonal meeting of the CDU, on December 28 and 29, one week after Kaiser and Lemmer’s dismissal, a total of 34 union politicians from the Soviet, British and US zones showed symbolic support and sympathy for Kaiser. They declared that until a formal election voted to change the leadership at the next zone party conference, Kaiser and Lemmer remained the legitimate representatives of the Soviet occupied zone, affirming that Berlin retained “*das volle Vertrauen der Gesamtunion.*” This had little tangible benefit for the CDU in Berlin, since they could no longer function as an autonomous party. The SED and the Soviet military authorities had moreover successfully coerced the *Landesverbände* in the Soviet zone to oppose the CDU party leadership and adopt the SED and Soviet line. Kaiser’s and Lemmer’s forced resignations also marked the end of party co-operation between the east and the west CDU.²⁴⁹ The *Telegraf*²⁵⁰ newspaper remarked at the time that the gradual erosion of the CDU’s representation in the block undermined any previous opposition that the party had held;

“Es wäre auch dagegen noch Widerstand möglich gewesen, wenn nicht nach und nach einzelne aus der Front herausgebrochen worden wären. Sie tragen die Verantwortung dafür, daß nunmehr die Bewegung zusammenbricht, denn darüber wird wohl kein Zweifel mehr bestehen: das Fortbestehen der CDU in der Ostzone wäre eine reine Farce. Die CDU hat in der Ostzone kein politisches Gewicht mehr.”

²⁴⁷ Formally the legal status of Kaiser and Lemmer as party leaders had not been changed. The Soviet military authorities had merely raised the profile of the chairmen of the CDU groups in the Länder of the Soviet zone to that of the highest representative level of the party and shifted the hitherto sole leadership role held by Kaiser to the three directors Hickmann, Lobedanz and Dertinger.

²⁴⁸ Norbert Mattedi, *Gründung und Entwicklung der Parteien in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1945-1949*. Hrsg. Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen. 1966. Bonn & Berlin Deutsche Bundes-Verlag, p.103.

²⁴⁹ Hans Helmich, *Das Sozialistische Erbe der CDU. Zur Vereinigung der bundesrepublikanischen CDU mit der ehemaligen Blockpartei*. Diplomarbeit. Berlin 1992. p.22.

²⁵⁰ The *Telegraf*, 21.12.1947.

The CDU in Berlin had set out in 1945 to become a right of centre *Volkspartei* representing all working and middle classes in the whole of Germany, to uphold property rights and a market economy but also to introduce new social reforms to prevent the formation of monopoly industries and exploitative economic practices, to improve industrial democracy and worker-employer relations. The slogan Christian Socialism had not been a feature of Hermes' ideology and was not adopted by Kaiser until he took over the party leadership and needed a label to publicise his arrival and the party's future programme. Christian Socialism both satisfied the Soviets and the Christian Socialists in the west, of Kaiser's good socialist credentials. Kaiser's Christian trade unionist background lent the party a naturally left-wing stance and once he became party leader Kaiser was in a more powerful position to implement those economic policies that had been left out by the liberal members of the party in the founding document from June 1945. Yet Kaiser possessed a genuine idealism about socialism and the need to introduce social reform measures in society, and grew aware that a socialist campaign could tap into votes from estranged SPD supporters once the SPD and KPD had merged to form the SED. But ironically Kaiser had to then learn to abandon Christian Socialism as a slogan and as a left-wing programme once the true Soviet ambitions had begun to materialise and the west CDU modified its socialist discourse. Kaiser realised that the skill of formulating a programme lies not in producing dogma but in observing and reflecting the *Zeitgeist*, and he learnt therefore where and when to place new emphasis on conservative *bürgerlich* traditions.

But Kaiser's Christian Socialism was also never sufficiently defined, and may suggest that the term was more opportunistic than of real substance. Hacke remarks;

"Aber nüchtern muß man feststellen, daß die Künstlichkeit des Begriffs symbolisch für die Künstlichkeit des Konzepts steht."²⁵¹

Suckut agrees that the slogan Christian Socialism was hollow;

"So gelang es der CDU nicht, ihr Sozialismus-Konzept über einige Grundaussagen (betriebliche Mitbestimmung, Verstaatlichung der Schlüsselindustrien, wirtschaftliche Rahmenplanung des Staates) hinaus, mit konkreten Inhalt zu füllen."²⁵²

²⁵¹ Christian Hacke, op.cit., p.21.

The impact of Kaiser's rhetoric of Christian Socialism was undoubtedly powerful, and brought tactical benefits, but it was precisely these socialist visions contained in his Christian Socialism, the efforts for trade union recognition and industrial democracy that also succeeded in making a lasting impact on the western CDU's programme. Adenauer, who was now clearly taking the lead in the CDU's development, could not have proceeded with a more liberal policy line, without giving due attention to the socialist wing of die-hard Kaiser supporters across the party's diverse programmatic spectrum.²⁵³ Hacke²⁵⁴ remarked that the history of Kaiser's influence is a history of a political failure. Yet at the beginning of this section, Hacke was cited for his warning that when attempting to judge the success or failure of Jakob Kaiser in the east CDU, a distinction must be made between his conceptual ideas and his practical politics. On this point Schwarz²⁵⁵ believes that if only the allies had succeeded in resolving their differences, the third way political programme devised by Kaiser would have had every chance of success if implemented in a future German government;

"Seine Brücke-Konzeption" entsprach in geradezu idealer Weise der ambivalenten Situation der Jahre 1945-1947. Kam es wirklich zu einer Einigung der Siegermächte, so hatte dieser Kurs keine schlechten Aussichten, zur Politik einer allfälligen deutschen Regierung zu werden."

Irrespective of the merits of Kaiser's political vision, aimed at avoiding the division of Germany through its role as a bridge between east and west, and Christian Socialism as the synthesis, a third way between Marxist collectivism and western style capitalism, it was the harsh political realities of the Cold War that gained the upper hand. Kaiser's overriding aim had been to avoid the isolation of the CDU in the Soviet zone by the west whilst maintaining the authority of the Berlin executive for future national party leadership.²⁵⁶ As the sole champion of western civilisation in Berlin, he believed it to be

²⁵² Siegfried Suckut, *Die CDU in der DDR. Zu Funktion und Funktionswandel* op. cit., p.703.

²⁵³ Uhl agrees: "Es muß allerdings Jakob Kaiser und der CDUD sehr hoch angerechnet werden, daß sie den vereinigten Sozialisten lange Zeit einen Vertrauensvorschuß gaben, der die Grundlage für Dialog und Kooperation ist." Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.150.

²⁵⁴ Christian Hacke (Hrsg), *Jakob Kaiser. Wir haben Brücke* op. cit., p.9.

²⁵⁵ H.P Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik*, op. cit., p.299.

²⁵⁶ Kaiser was not ignorant of the fact that his claim to all-party leadership was fiercely contended by Adenauer in the British Zone and by Dirks and Kogon, the Christian Socialists in the American zone.

his duty to strive for German unity,²⁵⁷ but his failure and political naiveté lay in making German unification a prerequisite for introducing all other reforms. Unlike Adenauer, Kaiser had failed to fully anticipate and successfully master the political reality of the emerging east-west conflict.

²⁵⁷ Manfred Wilde, *op. cit.*, p.351.

5.2. Berlin and the Soviet zone *Länder*

From the outset the Berlin CDU(D) did not hide its ambition to become the party's national representative and home of the party's central office headquarters, with Jakob Kaiser as CDU leader. Yet the party's record for managing the five regional states in the Soviet zone - Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia, reveals complaints about Kaiser's democratic credentials and leadership skills. Poor information transfer and inadequate channels of communication from the CDU's head office in Berlin to the regions of the Soviet zone, resulted in widespread ignorance about the party's programme content and direction. This was compounded by censor and discrimination by the Soviet authorities of the CDU party newspaper '*Die neue Zeit*'. Lamenting the inadequacies of the zonal party headquarters in Berlin, the Brandenburg state parliament for example, suggested as late as autumn 1947²⁵⁸ to the CDU party in Saxony, to set up a network of CDU parliamentary representatives across the Soviet zone to exchange their own views on legislation. Earlier that year on April 19 and 20, 1947 the chairmen of the CDU *Landesverbände* in the Soviet occupation zone (except Thuringia which did not have a chairman at the time) met in Halle specifically to discuss problems experienced with Berlin. Dertinger,²⁵⁹ General Secretary for the CDU in Berlin was also invited, to learn that the regions did not feel sufficiently involved in shaping the party's political direction, expressing their wish; "an der Gestaltung der Dinge stärker und verantwortlich beteiligt zu sein."²⁶⁰ Kaiser and Lemmer attempted to improve co-operation with the *Landesverbände* in the Soviet zone by increasing the number of sub-committees at the *Reichsgeschäftsstelle* in Berlin and then inviting representatives from the regional states to participate. Yet the initiative never really took off. Invitations to meetings were lost and there was a slow and half-hearted take up of

²⁵⁸ Letter from Brandenburg CDU Landtagsfraktion to Saxony CDU Landtagsfraktion on 14th October 1947. ACDP, III-035 -041.

²⁵⁹ The CDU's General Secretary in Berlin, Dertinger descended from the right of the Weimar Republic political spectrum. He had taken part in the Kapp-Putsch, went into the management of the Stahlhelm and then entered Franz von Papen's close circle of advisers.

²⁶⁰ Memo by Dertinger on 25.4.1947 in ACDP, VII-010-2037 also cited in Frank Dietze, "Entscheidungsstrukturen und -prozessen in der Ost-CDU 1945-1952" in; Michael Richter/Martin Rissmann (Hrsg.), *Die Ost CDU. Beiträge zu ihrer Entstehung und Entwicklung*, Böhlau, Köln/Weimar/Wien 1995. p.55.

posts.²⁶¹ The *Landesverbände* across the Soviet zone were therefore to some extent also to blame for their lack of interest in policy work at Berlin central office. In a speech entitled *Der Wille der Union* Pfarrer Kirsch²⁶² noted that the CDU would have been more successful in the zone if the party had dealt more efficiently with Soviet and SED injustices and had solved their inferior press and propaganda services.

Aside from organisational factors, the priest Kirsch also hints that the chief impeding factor dogging the establishment of an interdenominational party was east Germany's sectarian traditions. In the case of Saxony he notes;

“die seelische Struktur unseres sächsischen Volkes gerade für den Ruf der Union sehr ungünstige Vorbedingungen bietet.”

Berlin, with a Protestant majority in the region, had shown the most political allegiance to liberal, conservative parties during the Weimar period. The political traditions of the Centre Party, the trade union movement and the Social Question that had preoccupied the predominantly Catholic west since the 19th century, were all factors of marginal historic relevance to the Protestant regions of the east. Discussions show that Protestants did not envisage socialist reform ideas to correct the mistakes of history, but the prevailing belief was that politics and morals were mutually exclusive. Resolving this would involve closer assimilation of elements of Evangelical Social Ethical Teaching (*christliche Soziallehre*) to fuse politics and personal morality in society. The distinct lack of reference to socialist traditions in programmes of the east is representative of the regions' wider ignorance of Socialism. This was demonstrated by remarks by the priest Bitter at the CDUD's meeting in Annaberg-Buchholz²⁶³ in March 1946, shortly after Kaiser first began to incorporate the word socialism into his speeches. The priest recounts that he did not even understand what Kaiser meant by the word 'socialism.' In an effort to trace the significance of the word socialism, Bitter claims he was forced to consult the theories of *christliche Soziallehre* only to conclude that 'Socialism' aspired to

²⁶¹ Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p.24.

²⁶² Ludwig Kirsch, *Der Wille der Union*, ACDP, III-035, p.71.

²⁶³ Pfarrer Bitter, 20.3.46 in Saxony ACDP, III-035-075.

the same social objectives as 'Christian social teaching,' only by a different name.²⁶⁴ The Christian Socialism that developed in the Berlin CDU leadership was not peculiar to east German traditions but was an import from the west. Both leaders, Andreas Hermes and his successor Jakob Kaiser were Catholics who descended from the Centre Party tradition and trade union movement in the Rhineland, who had escaped to Berlin at the end of the war. Based on its political history, the east German region would not therefore naturally have leaned towards Socialism, in its widest or narrowest sense, had it not been nurtured by socially conscious Catholics and then subsequently enforced through Marxist-Socialism by the Soviet military occupation.

In 1945 Socialism was a *Leitmotiv* that succeeded in uniting Christian democratic forces in the west, but it rarely featured in any of the first programmes in the east. If the CDU programme found any purchase with the average Protestant in east Germany, it was on account of its support for a liberal economy, 'democratic'²⁶⁵ rights and individual freedoms, rather than for its Christian socialist message. The party's initial profile in the eastern states was that of a centre-right, socially conscious, liberal party. Communitarity was engendered through references to *bürgerlich* traditions characteristic of so many of the former Weimar parties. The politically diverse composite traditions that constituted the CDU, classified by Heidenheimer²⁶⁶ as Christian Socialist, liberal, capitalist and social conservative, thus received greater or lesser commitment in their manifestos depending on the region of origin of the CDU. Not until Kaiser's advocacy of Christian Socialism at the beginning of 1946 did the eastern regions even begin to perceive the CDU as a 'Socialist' party. Christians in the Soviet zone showed closer affinity to the liberal party (LPD) programme than to the socialism of the Social Democrats, in contrast to Catholics in Hesse for example, who had always been sympathetic to the idea of a coalition with the SPD. Given the rapid intervention of the Soviet military in the

²⁶⁴ The Sächsische Volkszeitung, the party organ of the German Communist Party made much political mileage out of this admission by the priest in its commentary on 29th March 1946 where it criticised Pfarrer Bitter for diverting from the line taken by its party chairman Kaiser who in his 13.2.46 speech had declared that "Die Ordnung, der die bürgerliche Ordnung Platz zu machen habe, eine sozialistisch sein wird." They accused Pfarrer Bitter of "von Sozialismus ein Zerrbild entworfen and exposed the priest by stating "Wer vertritt nun die wirkliche Meinung der CDU über den Sozialismus – der Vorsitzende der Christlichen – Demokratischen Union, Kaiser oder der Pfarrer Bitter aus Marienberg?"

²⁶⁵ Here the use of 'democratic' must be understood in the context of its Weimar party definition, namely liberal-conservative.

²⁶⁶ Arnold J. Heidenheimer; op. cit., p.233.

development of the CDU in the Soviet zone and its pressure on groups to conform to the model of the Berlin CDU, the eastern states were forced to adopt Berlin's programme and support the Berlin party executive, even if local frustration continued to be directed at Kaiser's leadership.

Four different impulses have been identified for Christian Democratic groups starting up in the Soviet zone states.²⁶⁷ Firstly those who sought to re-establish the Catholic Centre Party,²⁶⁸ secondly those who looked to establish a *Christlich-Soziale Partei*, influenced by Weimar's former *Christlich Soziales Volksdienst* and the Christian trade unions, thirdly from the autumn of 1945 the foundation of a *Demokratische Partei* as a united liberal-democratic party, as a result of secessionists from LDP and CDU groups, and fourthly the foundation of the CDU in Berlin, whose programme provided a blueprint for party political initiatives in Brandenburg and in the vicinity of Berlin.²⁶⁹ The co-founder of the Berlin CDU, J. B. Gradl²⁷⁰ notes, that although CDU initiatives already began in the summer of 1945 in Saxony, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg and Thuringia, in many places there were serious start up difficulties and local resistance to the Christian democratic idea, as this section will highlight.

In the same way that monastery priests, Welty and Siemer initiated political activities among Christian democrats in the west, influential Church leaders were also influential in setting up local CDU groups in the east, and included the priests Ludwig Kirsch (Chemnitz) and Hugo Hickmann (Dresden), and members of the *Bekennende Kirche* Adalbert Küntzelmann (Chemnitz) and Martin Richter (Dresden). A certain *Konkurrenzdenken* reigned between the Protestant and Catholic communities in establishing confessional representation and influence in the east CDU.²⁷¹ Since Centre

²⁶⁷ The classification was devised by Günter Wirth, "Die Beteiligung der CDU und der Umgestaltung der DDR in den fünfziger Jahren" in: *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 3, Heft 1, Mai 1990, p.125-151.

²⁶⁸ In Cottbus the authorities forced the re-emergence of the Centre Party. On June 30 Willy Heller held a speech to this effect, yet once the news of the CDU development in Berlin transpired the group which had so far only registered but not yet received a license was renamed CDU.

²⁶⁹ Communication restrictions meant that the Berlin programme did not usually reach further than the neighbouring region of Berlin.

²⁷⁰ Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.31.

²⁷¹ Ralf Baus, "Die Gründung der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands in Sachsen 1945" in: *Historisch Politische Mitteilungen*, Archiv für Christliche Demokratische Politik, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Hrsg), Böhlau, Köln/Weimar/Wien 2/1995, p.99 (83-117).

Party members initiated most of the CDU groups, many Protestants were sceptical of the new movement and so aimed to quickly reach parity in Protestant representation. In September 1947, Catholics made up no less than 40% of CDU members in the six states of the Soviet zone, even though Catholics only represented 11% of the population. Catholics were dominant in the CDU in Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia. Only in Saxony did Protestants reach parity;

“Im Land Sachsen mochten es die Protestanten als Verhandlungserfolg werten, als sie schließlich die konfessionell paritätische Besetzung des ersten Führungsgremiums erreichten.”²⁷²

In the populations of Thuringia and Saxony, postwar migration brought a shift in the ratio of Catholics to Protestants in the Catholic areas of the east. In Upper Silesia and south west Prussia for example Catholics came to represent a third of the population.²⁷³

5.3. Mecklenburg - West Pomerania

In the first few months after the CDU *Landesverband* for Mecklenburg-West Pomerania was formed in Schwerin, it experienced rapid expansion. By December 1945 it had a total of 238²⁷⁴ local CDU affiliated groups, that aided the positive reception of Berlin's July *Aufruf* in Mecklenburg.²⁷⁵ Ernst Lemmer from the CDU in Berlin also appeared at many CDU public conferences in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania to personally promote the Berlin programme.

Although the Mecklenburg CDU became quickly linked to the development in Berlin, it is proud to record that it began independently of any other Christian democratic developments;

“In unserem Lande hat sich zunächst die Partei selbständig gebildet, ohne von Berlin oder dem Westen dazu einen Anstoß erhalten zu haben.”

²⁷² Siegfried Suckut, Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU(D), op. cit., p.521.

²⁷³ Südwestdeutsche Union (Halbmonatszeitschrift), December Nr.1-2 Jg. 1946, p.8.

²⁷⁴ Landesverband Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Arbeitsberichte, July 1947 in ACDP, III-036- 082.

²⁷⁵ Heinrich Albert in Der Weg der Union. Mecklenburg. Verlag 'Der Demokrat' Schwerin. 1947, p.7-10.

It admits to joining the CDU because its programme was broadly in line with Berlin's views, in particular in its desire to maintain contact with the west and south allied zones and in campaigning for German unity, but pledged its unrelenting commitment to a political direction that was "*Christlich, antifaschistisch, demokratisch und sozialistisch*," and a '*Partei der Mitte und des Ausgleichs*.'²⁷⁶

Siegfried Witte, the minister for economics in Mecklenburg was keen to stress that the CDU was not a *Wirtschaftspartei* of the type that had characterised the party system in Weimar, with a focus on representing the exclusive interests of a certain branch of industry. This, he said, had led to the neglect of political issues;

"Unsere Väter und wir selbst sind wirtschaftlich allzu tüchtig und allzu arbeitsam gewesen. Wir sind viel zu sehr in der Arbeit unserer Betriebe aufgegangen und haben die Politik früher den Feudalen und dann später den Abenteurern überlassen."

He criticises the obsession with Marxism and the primacy of economic interests in society;

"Allzu sehr liebe Freunde hat sich auch bei uns der marxistische Grundsatz eingelebt, eine Art vulgärer Marxismus breit gemacht, daß die Wirtschaft das entscheidende, daß wirtschaftliche Verhältnisse die Geschichte der Völker und der Menschen bestimmen."²⁷⁷

In future, he claims, a planned economy shall serve the people "*im Sinne des christlichen Sozialismus*."²⁷⁸

There was a suggestion in Mecklenburg for a programme of Democratic Federalism. Prof Dr U. Noack communicated this proposal to v. d. Gablentz in Berlin in August 1945²⁷⁹ in the hope that his ideas would be incorporated into the CDU programme.

²⁷⁶ Dr. Reinhold Lobedanz, *Der Weg der Union*, Verlag 'Der Demokrat,' Schwerin 1947, p.5-7.

²⁷⁷ Dr Siegfried Witte, Minister for economics, minutes of the Landesversammlung, 18th May 1947, in ACDP, III-036- 082.

²⁷⁸ Dr Siegfried Witte, in *Der Weg der Union* op.cit., p.38.

²⁷⁹ Prof. Dr U. Noack, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, ACDP, I-155-030/5.

Gablentz responded cautiously, showing tacit agreement with federalism, but warned that federalism held a different connotation in Mecklenburg than in the Rhineland and in Bavaria, where it risked developing into narrow regionalism. He concluded;

“Wir dürfen auch grundsätzlich Dinge über den Föderalismus in grösserem Kreise nur sagen, wenn wir gleichzeitig den anderen Pol, der Reichseinheit mit auf das stärkste betonen und auch dessen verfassungsmässige Sicherung verlange.”

Here Gablentz not only reveals early concerns at the possible subdivision of Germany into independent federal regions but indicates his party's goal to secure political power and maintain Berlin as the capital of a united Germany.

5.4. Thuringia

The most significant Christian democratic groups in Thuringia were formed in Weimar and Eichsfeld with a revival of the former right wing party, the *Christlich Soziale Volkspartei* (CSVP). The first meeting was initiated by Max Kolter in Weimar on July 20, 1945 during which he was nominated vice president with Georg Grosse as his deputy. Here Kolter related the development of the CDU in Berlin, noting that an interdenominational party had been established; “die auf dem ethisch sittlichen Fundament der christlichen-germanischen Kultur stehen”²⁸⁰ A twelve point programme was drafted and submitted to General Zhukov, head of the Soviet military administration, requesting a license to form a *Landesverband* for Thuringia. Point eight of programme outlined clear aims for a free market economy with limited nationalisation of certain industries;

“Wiederaufbau des Wirtschaftslebens auf der Grundlage freier Initiative. Vereinigungsfreiheit zur Wahrung und Förderung der Arbeits- und Wirtschaftsbedingungen. Sozialisierung von besonders wichtigen Betrieben (Kohle und Strom).”²⁸¹

²⁸⁰ The word ‘Germanisch’ did not however feature in the Berlin programme.

²⁸¹ Thuringia Landesverband, ACDP, III – 031-199.

There is noticeably less reference to socialism in the Thuringia discussions than in comparable programme developments in the west with greater accent placed on democracy. Land reform legislation introduced by the Soviets in September, which aimed to confiscate private land and property from all identified war criminals without compensation and subsequently redistribute it to small farms, migrants and refugees, was broadly accepted by Thuringia, but they campaigned alongside Kaiser in Berlin for the introduction of co-operative schemes that permitted private property ownership and compensation payments for confiscated land and property.

The official party foundation took place on July 22, with 52 representatives invited from former liberal-democratic or *bürgerlich* parties. Yet the Thuringia CDU never progressed with its programme discussions beyond this stage and the original twelve point plan was never published. Instead it chose to follow the Berlin development;

“Auf eine Veröffentlichung des Programms wurde verzichtet, da ein schnellmöglichster Anschluß mit der CDU in Berlin gesucht werden sollte.”²⁸²

In his opening speech at the first state party conference on April 13-14, 1946 in Erfurt, deputy chairman of the Thuringia executive Georg Grosse, spoke of the desire for members of the old democratic parties, by which he also included the KPD and the Centre Party, to join forces with the liberal-democratic camp to form one unified democratic party;

“mit dem bürgerlichen Lager zur Bildung einer einheitlichen demokratischen Partei zu kommen.”

The political developments in the east, he said, had been eclipsed by the actions of the Berlin CDU. By immediately publicising its programme, the Berlin CDU became ‘*richtungsgebend*.’ The Berlin development was also significant for Thuringia, since the need to respect parity amongst parties until elections, prevented the opportunity to merge the region’s Centre Party, the *Bekennntniskirche*, the *Christlich-Sozialen Volksdienst*, the *Landespartei* and the *Volkspartei* into one new party. Allegiance to the CDUD instead

²⁸² Ibid.

soon became inevitable. Grosse attempted to eliminate potential rumours that the CDU would become a reactionary imitation of the old Centre, claiming the CDU did not back specifically Catholic or Protestant policies but Christian ones. As late as April 1947, at the second party conference in Erfurt, the party still gave the impression of an independent and self-confident party, reticent to forego its political principles and determined to legitimate key elements of its own political programme.²⁸³ In a speech by the newly elected chairman, Otto Schneider, clarification was given to their specific understanding of Christian socialism in economic policy and included a variety of business structures and forms, both private and public, in an effort not to alienate the sceptical liberal Protestant voter.

Discussions suggest that liberal, middle class '*bürgerlich*' traditions were not so tainted in the east as they were in the west, where programmes graphically portrayed liberal-capitalist individuals as *Steigbügelhalter*²⁸⁴ for Hitler and liberalist behaviour as symptomatic for the rise of National Socialism. In the *Neue Zeit* the Berlin CDU's Dovifat²⁸⁵ specifically emphasises the importance of liberal elements in the new order;

"In einer starken Vereinigung demokratischen und christlichen Willens sind auch echte liberale Elemente." ... "Wer die liberale Grundhaltung und ihr individualistisches Streben nicht zum Anlaß individualisierender Abspaltung nimmt, sondern zur Entfaltung persönlicher Kräfte zur zupackenden Nothilfe und friedlichen Neuordnung der Welt, der gehört in die neue, in die christliche Demokratie."

Individual developments in the east advocated a return to liberal Protestant traditions in a right of centre, '*bürgerlich*' party and support for a capitalist economy with limited and temporary central economic planning. To some extent the discrepancy between east and west reveal a failure on the part of eastern groups not to sufficiently acknowledge the consequences of past liberal economic practices, but may also indicate the willingness by Christian Socialist groups in the west, to exploit Protestant complicity in the National

²⁸³ Markus Kiefer, Gründung und Anfänge der CDU in Thüringen 1945-1952, Hrsg. von der CDU Thüringen, Erfurt (no date), p.52.

²⁸⁴ The Berlin Aufruf programme from June 1945 read; "Groß ist die Schuld weiter Kreise unseres Volkes, die sich nur allzu bereitwillig zu Handlangern und Steigbügelhaltern für Hitler erniedrigten."

²⁸⁵ Dovifat, Neue Zeit newspaper Nr. 7, (no date).

Socialist catastrophe, to denigrate liberalism and to help promote a superior Catholic agenda.

Thuringia's economic policy objectives were outlined in '*Wirtschaftspolitik – Ihre Aufgaben und Ziele im Sozialismus christlicher Verantwortung*.'²⁸⁶ Although adopting the Berlin phrase 'Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung' the party insists that it did not advocate a socialist programme per se, but a pragmatic, flexible approach to politics;

“Wie all menschliche Ordnung sich zwischen den beiden Polen Freiheit und Bindung entfaltet, so muß auch die Wirtschaftspolitik diese Spannung bewältigen. Unser christlicher Realismus überschätzt die Fähigkeit des Menschen ebensowenig, wie er die Gefahren einer die Persönlichkeit aufhebenden Bindung unterschätzt... Freiheit und Lenkung müssen beide da sein in der Wirtschaftspolitik, denn beide sind unerlässlich. Was zu betonen ist, bleibt eine psychologische und technische Frage, nach den Bedingungen des Falles zu unterscheiden.”

These remarks signal a desire for a third way economy with its key components of 'freedom with responsibility' and echo programmes endorsed by Christian Realists, ordo-liberals and more moderate Christian Socialists in the west. On account of historical circumstances, the current trend favoured *Bindung* over *Freiheit*. The post-war situation in Germany called for a *straffe Planung* in a *öffentlich gelenkte Wirtschaft* to overcome industrial monopolies exploiting their economic freedom and curtailing the freedom of the individual, but did not permanently commit Germany to any particular economic system;

“Das endgültige Verhältnis von Planung und Freiheit hängt von der weltwirtschaftlichen und weltpolitischen Entwicklungen ab, die wir nicht bestimmen, die wir nicht übersehen können.”

²⁸⁶ In a set of documents entitled 'Stoffsammlung zu den Redebeispielen' a number of programmatic issues are illuminated including the economy, democracy and constitution, cultural policy, social policy, labour policy, and agricultural policy. The material dates from 5th and 6th March 1946 following ratification at the executive meeting in Berlin, and must originate therefore with the CDUD programme discussions in Berlin and forwarded to Thuringia and other regions and Landesverbände for distribution and campaigns. CDU Landesverband Thüringen ACDP, III, p.31-227.

Gradl has also noted that the CDU Landesverband in Saxony chose to set up a rhetorics school for members of the CDU in the Soviet zone to educate and inform on the thinking behind Christian democracy which may reflect on the fact that its ideas were less familiar and less consolidated in the east than in the west, where the traditions of the Centre Party and Catholic Social Theory were more firmly rooted. Johann Baptist Gradl, op.cit., p.31.

This left the option open to revise the level of state intervention in the future once post-war recovery was underway.

Economic measures would stabilise the economy, avoid unemployment, and ensure a fair distribution of basic goods in a '*vorsorgende Gesamtplanung*' prescribing a comprehensive management of agricultural, industrial, manufacturing and financial services. In time however economic planning could be scaled down to the task of monitoring economic policy;

“Es ist sogar dringend zu wünschen, daß diese Planung mit der Zeit gelockert wird, daß sie sich weithin mehr auf bloße Beobachtung des Wirtschaftsgeschehens beschränken kann und daß nur noch eingegriffen werden muß, wenn die Beobachtung ergibt, daß einzelne Glieder in der Wirtschaft nicht mehr das richtige Verhältnis zueinander entwickeln.”

Small business enterprise furthermore was fully endorsed;

“Im Rahmen einer solchen öffentlichen gelenkten Wirtschaft werden sich neue Wirkens- und Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten für selbstständige Existenzen ergeben und die alten erhalten lassen.”

Public ownership was envisaged for basic industries and tighter controls on privately owned large scale industry. Following the example of Berlin, 'economic socialism' thus translated to state monitoring but not wholesale confiscation. It did not translate to nationalising all means of production, but to selective nationalisation of private monopoly industries seen as a threat to society. Private ownership was fully supported since it corresponded to Christian teaching of the role of the individual and personal freedoms in society. In industrial relations policy, industries were described as "*Arbeitsgemeinschaften*" enlisting co-determination rights for employees in industry with the direct participation of trade unions representatives. It proposed that the German economy should develop in three stages: an initial planned 'emergency' economy to reinstate the food, transport, construction and agricultural industries, followed by town planning, construction and currency reform before entering the final phase of an 'ordered' or managed economy, the '*wieder geordnete(n) Wirtschaft*.'²⁸⁷ Socialism is no

²⁸⁷ "Jetzt hat die Allgemeinheit das Eigentum an Bergwerken, Kraftwerken und einigen anderen monopolistischen Grossbetrieben übernommen. Im übrigen steuert sie durch ein Rahmenprogramm, die

more than a '*Sozialismus der Tat*' and emphasised for its moral and not its economic content;

“Blosse soziale Neigungen oder sogenannte soziale Einstellungen genügen dabei keineswegs. Dieser Sozialismus christlicher Verantwortung ist zunächst eine geistige Grundhaltung.”

The very notion of an interdenominational Christian democratic party forced Protestants in the east to confront their old vexation over the relationship between Church and State in Germany that originated with the question about the role of the pope and the Kaiser during the Reformation, the 19th century *Kulturkampf* and the *Kirchenkampf* during National Socialism. A pamphlet entitled *Warum Christlich? Warum Union?* was distributed among church goers on Sundays directly targeting public concern with mixing politics and religion.²⁸⁸ A further document entitled *Die Christlich-Demokratische Union und ihre Grundsätze im Neuaufbau Deutschlands* adopted the Catholic argument that the 19th century had been the *Jahrhundert der bürgerlichen Welt*. It read;

“Die innerlichen kalten und gleichgültigen egoistisch um ihre Interessen pendelnden Menschen sind Deutschlands Unglück, die auch nicht in Jahren grimmiger Volksnot sich zu einer Überzeugung bekennen..... Die innere Gesinnungslosigkeit, die mangelnde Kampf- und Opferbereitschaft im Politischen ist eine der Hauptmängel des deutschen politischen Charakters. Es ist dies 'politische Treibholz', diese heute hier und morgen dort stimmende kalt und gedankenlose politische von jedem Winde zu bewegenden Masse, die eine schwere Gefahr für die Demokratie darstellt und eine der Ursachen war, daß Hitler sich in die Macht schwang.”

This avowal of Catholic doctrine indicates a willingness to learn from the lessons of Christian Social Teaching, to democratise society, analyse the mistakes of the illiberal past and passivity in politics and teach people to take responsibility in society.

Yet there is some evidence of resistance within the Thuringia CDU against adopting Berlin's programme of Christian Socialism, that reveals reactionary tendencies in the party. The dispute erupted in the CDU group in Erfurt and communicated in a letter to

Investitionen und den Aussenhandel So könnte eine Wirtschaftspolitik aussehen, in der Freiheit und Lenkung im richtigen Verhältnis zueinanderstehen.”

²⁸⁸ “Die Sorge vor einer Vermengung von Politik und Religion und einer konfessionellen Beschränkung einer politischen Bewegung, ACDP, III 031-61.

the central CDUD division in Berlin in June 1946 summarising the position of the Erfurt CDU two years after its foundation. Its author was group representative Walter Weber, a former anti-fascist, persecuted in the Third Reich for resistance activities. He complained that some in the party did not adhere to the course laid down by Kaiser and Lemmer towards a *Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung*, in particular those in the economic committee and in the party leadership. Weber reveals;

“Dem diametral entgegen sind in unserer Ortsgruppe insbesondere muß hier das Referat Wirtschaft erwähnt werden, Bestrebungen im Gange, die mehr oder weniger offen in klarstem Gegensatz zu diesen Zielen Jakob Kaisers stehen. Es zeichnen sich hier immer deutlicher zwei Richtungen ab und es ist zunächst noch so, daß die Richtung, die auf Seite Jakob Kaisers ... von den entgegengesetzten Bestrebungen kraft ihrer Stärke bzw. ihrer Stellung in der Partei vollkommen an die Wand gedrückt wird. Bestrebungen in der Richtung zum sozialistischen Ziel auf christlicher Grundlage durchzustossen, werden, soweit möglich abgedrosselt und auf ein totes Gleis geschoben, wo nach Ansicht der Gegner dieser Ziele unsere Bestrebungen in dieser Richtung kraftlos und handlungsunfähig werden müssen.”

The issue extended into a protracted dispute between Erfurt, the Thuringia *Landesverband* and the CDUD in Berlin. By August 1947 Walter Weber emphasised the need for “Festhalten und klares Herausstellen zum Mindesten eines klaren Zieles und Kurses” insisting Thuringia should once and for all commit to Kaiser’s programme.²⁸⁹ Yet this was met with steadfast opposition from Weimar party executive representative Rücker, who, according to Weber, explained; “es Diktatur wäre, zu fordern, daß wir alle das gutheissen müßten, was Kaiser wolle” adding that Weber’s demands were nothing less than Nazist. According to Weber, certain individuals in Thuringia’s CDU executive avoided all discussion about *Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung*. They believed their Christianity was inherently socially responsible and it was therefore superfluous to further reinforce Socialism in the programme;

“.... was hier gemacht wird, das ist das, daß man jede Auseinandersetzung über das Wort Sozialismus, das diese Kreise überhaupt nicht hören wollen, abwürgt und damit

²⁸⁹ On 8.7.1947 in a letter to the CDU Landesvorstand he says that after yesterday’s Parteiversammlung in Erfurt he wants to clarify a few points : “Ich betone auch an dieser Stelle, daß ich bewußt und ausdrücklich n i c h t gefordert habe, ein 100 % als Dogma festzusetzendes Programm – dass ich auch n i c h t gefordert hatte, dass man die Vorschläge von Herrn Dr. Geflitter unwidersprochen annehmen müsse, was ich forderte war, zum Allermindesten endlich die Grundprinzipien des Sozialismus auf christlicher Grundlage, wie sie Jakob Kaiser und Lemmer immer wieder verkündeten, als für uns bindend anzuerkennen und auf dieser Basis vorwärtszuschreiten.”

abtun möchte, daß man sagt, mit dem Wort Christentum ist unser Sozialismus genügend erwiesen.”

Weber however sought to give socialism a stronger, more autonomous political profile, protesting;

“Wir CDU-Mitglieder der anderen Richtung, die hinter Kaiser steht, sind absolut anderer Überzeugung und mit einem Abschieben unserer sozialistischen Ziele auf das Christentum sind wir nicht einverstanden.”

The letter finally reiterates the frustration felt in Thuringia, over the lack of a consolidated and distinct political direction in the CDU. Weber denies allegations by party leaders Herr Rücker Herr Dr. Fleckner and Herr Dorsch,²⁹⁰ leader of the committee for economic and social policy, that he was pursuing a “*diktatorisches Nachlaufen für Kaiser.*” He concludes his letter on a pessimistic note;

“Ich sehe seit langem bereits zu, wie so viele Erfurter Geschäftsleute sich in unserer CDU einnisten und teils vordrängen und ich kann nun nur den Schluß ziehen, daß ich als überzeugter Antifaschist den Weg, den die CDU in Erfurt geht, nicht mehr gutheissen kann. Meine Tätigkeit in und für die Partei kann sich künftig nur darauf erstrecken, abzuwarten, ob sich meine Befürchtungen bewahrheiten werden, daß reaktionäre Kreise in unserer CDU mehr Einfluss bekommen als die antifaschistischen Mitglieder. Ich sehe dann allerdings ziemlich schwarz für die Partei.”

Those CDU members that upheld their loyalty for Kaiser's policies and programme were indeed ‘systematically removed.’²⁹¹

²⁹⁰ Weber further expresses his disgust that Herr Dorsch had been made responsible for economic decisions in the Thüringen CDU since Dorsch was a former member of the Deutschnationalen, and guilty of causing the downfall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of National Socialism. Since taking up his position in the economic committee he had furthermore created in Weber's opinion “einen verheerenden Eindruck von der hier herrschenden geistigen politischen Verfassung”

²⁹¹ Markus Kiefer, op. cit., p.12.

5.5. Saxony²⁹²

Saxony was the most populated state in the Soviet zone and witnessed some of the most important autonomous political developments outside of Berlin²⁹³ in its two main centres of Christian democratic activity- Chemnitz and Dresden.

Before 1933 Saxony was not a region in which the Centre Party had established a foothold, gaining on average only between 3 and 4% of the vote.²⁹⁴ The Catholic priest and former Centre party chairman of Saxony state, Ludwig Kirsch was the driving force behind the group in Chemnitz and by June 15 had initiated the foundation of a Christian party with former Centre and *Christlich-Sozialen Volksdienst* (CSVD) members, in advance even of the launch of the Berlin *Aufruf*.²⁹⁵ The programme for the *Christliche Volkspartei* (CVP) for the Chemnitz region,²⁹⁶ dated July 1945, is characteristic of the programmes from the Catholic dominated CDU in the west, blaming the decline in Christian values for the national socialist catastrophe. Kirsch saw the main task in resolving confessional divisions between Protestants and Catholics and in an open letter which featured as a preamble to the programme, Kirsch called for a; “bewußten Rückkehr zu wahrhaft christlichen Grundsätzen auch in Politik und Wirtschaft.”²⁹⁷ The programme is followed by eight points including reinstatement of the rule of law, the guarantee of democratic liberties in the realm of religion, freedom of speech and freedom of conscience and instilling ‘*echt-demokratische Gesinnung*’ in the state bureaucracy. The word Socialism does not feature once in the entire programme.

²⁹² Since the few archive sources available reveal that Christian democratic circles in Saxony-Anhalt mirrored the programme developed in Berlin, a separate examination of the region Saxony-Anhalt has been spared here.

²⁹³ Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p.126.

²⁹⁴ Odenbach, Joachim, *Die Entwicklung der Ost-CDU in Sachsen nach 1945*, (Magisterarbeit), Universität Leipzig, 1993, p.21.

²⁹⁵ Ralf Baus, op. cit., p.87.

²⁹⁶ *Aufruf der Christlichen Volkspartei*, Kreis Chemnitz, 4 July 1945 in NL Karl Buchheim ACDP, I-188-002/1.

²⁹⁷ Open letter by Ludwig Kirsch, Chemnitz July 4th, 1945 in Ralf Baus, *Die Gründung der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands in Sachsen 1945*, Sonderdruck, Neues Archiv für sächsische Geschichte 67, Band 1996, Hrsg. Karlheinz Blaschke, Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger Weimar GmbH & Co, 1997, p.267f.

Without any knowledge of the CDU group in Berlin,²⁹⁸ Pfarrer Mühr of the *Bischoflichen Rates* rallied Protestant and Catholic Christians and former Centre Party members to Dresden on July 8,²⁹⁹ to discuss the CVP Chemnitz programme as a possible platform for the foundation of Dresden's party, the *Christlich-Sozialen Volkspartei*, (CSV) which was intended to become the party to represent Saxony. On July 21, a total of 71 participants founded the *Freunde der Christlich-Sozialen Volkspartei* in Dresden with Protestant theologian and former President of the Evangelical *Landessynode* Prof. Hugo Hickmann³⁰⁰ as chairman. The *Christlich-Soziale Volkspartei* nevertheless sparked protest among Protestants in Dresden, including Johannes Dieckmann a former member of the right-wing *Deutsche Volkspartei* (DVP), who argued that the name *Christlich* in the title could evoke the dangerous impression that other parties were somehow less Christian than the CSV. Hickmann defended the Dresden party, stating that unlike the Chemnitz *Christliche Volkspartei* which made an exclusive claim to practise Christian politics, the choice of *Christlich- Soziale Volkspartei* for the party name in Dresden merely sought to underpin "welche weltanschauliche Grundlage und welche Ausrichtung für unser politisches soziales Wollen maßgebend ist."³⁰¹

Since two-thirds of the population in Saxony were Protestant³⁰² Hickmann³⁰³ was confident that the party leadership should reside with the Protestant CSV in Dresden, and so pleaded with other Protestant and Catholic members of the clergy to look to Dresden for its leadership instead of Berlin. Yet the CSV's claim to head the Saxony party headquarters in Dresden was soon contested by Christian democrats in the Chemnitz group, in particular its leader Ludwig Kirsch. Kirsch disagreed above all with

²⁹⁸ Manfred Wilde, op. cit., p.126.

²⁹⁹ Niederschrift über die am 8.7 1945 im Hause Gottfried Kellerstr. 50 stattgefundene Besprechung zur Gründung der Christlich sozialen Volkspartei. LV-Sachsen ACDP, III-035-001. Also printed in Siegfried Suckut, "Parteiensystem zwischen Demokratie und Volksdemokratie" in; Hermann Weber (Hrsg), *Dokumente und Materialien zum Funktionswandel der Parteien und Massenorganisation in der SBZ/DDR. 1945-1950, Wissenschaft und Politik*, Köln 1982, p.132.

³⁰⁰ Hugo Hickmann was previously closely affiliated to Friedrich Naumann's Christian social movement before becoming a member of the right wing *Deutsche Volkspartei* (DVP) in 1919.

³⁰¹ Correspondence between Johannes Dieckmann and Hugo Hickmann 21st and 24th July, 1945, cited in Ralf Baus, op cit., p.86.

³⁰² Ibid., p.104.

³⁰³ In a letter from 7th Sept 1945, Hickmann had demanded that "die evangelischen Kreise nicht zurückstehen, sondern die Führung übernehmen wie sich das gehört!" ACDP III-035-016.

the modifications the Dresden group had made to the original Chemnitz programme, incorporating German nationalistic language into its version.³⁰⁴ The original Chemnitz programme had emphasised the restoration of Christian, spiritual values and in a Catholic minority saw interdenominational co-operation as the prime objective in the party. Kirsch was all too conscious of the influence *Weltanschauung* had played in German politics in the past and frequently appealed for a Christian tolerance and a new political pragmatism, a middle way between *Weltanschauung* and practical politics;

“Gerade das deutsche Volk muß lernen, Politik ohne Leidenschaft zu machen und dem kühlen, sachlichen Verstande den Vorrang zu lassen..... im politischen Leben geht es in erster Linie nicht um Feststellung von Dogmen, wie im religiösen Bereich, sondern um die praktische Wegfindung für die realen Dinge des aktuellen Lebens. Gewiß stehen oft hinter den entgegengesetzten Vorschlägen weltanschauliche Grundsätze .. aber da nun einmal ein Millionenvolk nicht aus Menschen einer einheitlichen Weltanschauung besteht ... so muß mit aller Sorgsamkeit, Klugheit und nicht zuletzt auch Geduld ein mittlerer Ausweg gefunden werden.”³⁰⁵

By August, conciliatory changes had been made to the Dresden programme and the Soviet authorities agreed to register the CSV on condition that it and all other regions in Saxony adopted the Berlin party name Christian Democratic Union. A working committee³⁰⁶ of twelve individuals was selected as the leading CDU executive for the *Landesverband* in Saxony,³⁰⁷ closely affiliated to the CDU(D) in Berlin. The competition between Chemnitz and Dresden for Saxony's party leadership thus automatically terminated. The ten-point programme demanded reinstatement of the rule of law, freedom of conscience, speech and religion and in a later amended version also demanded protection of private property ownership rights “als Grundlage

³⁰⁴ Ralf Baus, op. cit., p.102.

³⁰⁵ Ludwig Kirsch, Kompromisse? in *Südwestdeutsche Union*, (Halbmonatszeitschrift), 10. October 1947, Nr.19. 2 Jg. p.4.

³⁰⁶ The task of the working committee was to bring Protestant and Catholic individuals together. It secretly began producing its guidelines before the party had been granted a license and without the knowledge of the soviet occupied authorities and in a letter dated 2nd August 1945, party chairman Hugo Hickmann instructs the group to silently recruit men and women for the cause who can then become active once permission was granted. He stipulates that although over 90% of members were not formerly affiliated to any party, NSDAP members should be allowed to apply and each application is given individual consideration. Saxony Landesverband ACDP, III-035, p.61.

³⁰⁷ Hans Zillig, In der Mitarbeit gewachsen und gereift. Zur Geschichte des Landesverbandes Sachsen der CDU 1945-1952. CDUD, Berlin (Ost) 1978, p.14-17.

wirtschaftlicher Selbstständigkeit und persönlicher Unabhängigkeit.”³⁰⁸ Before the programme was finally ratified on August 14, 1945, the Dresden group, now also aware of the existence of the Berlin programme, made a last attempt to define its leadership ambitions. It formulated a separate programme for Saxony which it intended to use for applying for a party license from the Soviet authorities. Only in the event that this programme was rejected, would they concede to accepting the Berlin *Aufruf*.³⁰⁹ Even after its subsequent union with the Berlin CDU(D), the Saxony *Landesverband* in Dresden remained proud of its independent foundation and whenever possible continued to use its original name, the CSV, alongside CDU.

Although Dresden and Chemnitz have been noted as the centre of Christian democratic activity in Saxony, a separate Christian democratic development in Leipzig also merits a brief reference to complete the spectrum of party initiatives in the Soviet zone. It was Karl Buchheim who, together with liberals and Christians, formed a *Demokratische Partei Deutschlands* on July 10, 1945, unaware that parallel developments were taking place in Chemnitz and Dresden.³¹⁰ Lengthy debate in Greifswald over whether the Democratic Party should join up with the LDP or the CDU finally opted for the CDU, further demonstrating the proximity in programme and political philosophy between the Christian democrats and the liberals in the east. A similar union in the west between the CDU and the liberal *Freie Demokratische Partei* (FDP) certainly in the early years of vehement anti-liberal attitudes, would have been inconceivable for Rhineland Catholics to contemplate.³¹¹

The Democratic Party's programme in Leipzig originated with the document '*Deutscher Sammlungsblock*'³¹² in July 1945, aimed at all those;

³⁰⁸ Richtlinien für die Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands, ACDP, III-035-061 and III-035 – 115.

³⁰⁹ Niederschrift über die am 7.8.1945 stattgefundene Sitzung des Arbeitsausschusses der CSV, ACDP, III-035-001. Cited in Rolf Baus, op. cit., 1995, p.105.

³¹⁰ Johann Baptist Gradl, op. cit., p.30.

³¹¹ Only Adenauer managed to break with this tradition by seeking cooperation with FDP liberals no less with a view to welcoming them as a future coalition partner.

³¹² Its true source is unknown.

“.. welche an die besten durch den Nationalsozialismus unterbrochenen oder umgefälschten menschlich-christlich-abendländischen Überlieferungen unseres Volkes auf breitester Grundlage anknüpfen wollen.”

In contrast to other programmes of the period, specifically the Berlin *Aufruf*, which called for a complete overhaul of the last two hundred years of German history, the DP clearly envisaged a continuation where the Weimar parties had left off in 1933. The programme contained 21 points, including protection of private property and freedom of business enterprise. A summary was published on July 21, as the “*Aufruf der Demokratischen Partei Deutschlands*.” The programme revealed the liberals’ dominance in the group. The demand for a *religiösem Geist* featured last in the programme statements, after freedom of speech, legal rights, a strong currency and fair wages;

“Zwar kam hierin das Profil der christlich orientierten Mitgründer deutlich zum Ausdruck, doch fehlten Hinweise darauf, daß die neue Partei auf den Fundament des Christentums und der Überwindung der Spaltung der Konfessionen ruhen sollte.”³¹³

Co-founder in Leipzig and member of the extended executive committee, Ernst Eichelbaum reveals that there were two strands in the party, a *weltliche* and a *christlich-orientierte*³¹⁴ which soon led to the Christian wing breaking off to form their own party. Once they learned of the Berlin CDU development, contact was established at the beginning of August with Hermes and Kaiser, with a view to joining the Berlin movement, as they were now also under pressure to do by the Soviet military authorities. After his first meeting with Hermes, Eichelmann observed;

“Wir hatten sehr bald die Erfahrung gemacht, daß die Christen in Sachsen keine aktiven Calvinisten waren, sondern vielfach und gerade, je kräftiger ihr Glaube war, zur politischen Passivität neigten, d.h nicht in den politischen Kampf mit Gegnern und Andersmeinenden hineinwollten, sondern lieber nachgaben und sich in ‘duldendem Gehorsam’ gefallen liessen, was die anderen taten.”³¹⁵

³¹³ Rolf Baus, op. cit., p.93.

³¹⁴ Ernst Eichelbaum, Wie es in Leipzig begann, ACDP, NL I-188-002/2.

³¹⁵ Ernst Eichelbaum, CDU in Leipzig 1945-1948. Bericht über die Anfänge der CDU in der sowjetischen besetzten Zone Deutschlands, Leipzig, August 1982, ACDP, I-201-001/7 in III-002-024/1 Landesverband Berlin 1945-.

A further split occurred within the already fractured DPD as members opted to join the Liberal LPD party instead of the Berlin CDU. The remaining Christian Democrats in Leipzig thus abandoned the attempt to form their own party and instead adopted elements from the Berlin initiative and the Chemnitz programme. The result was a concise nine point programme³¹⁶ in plain, straightforward language claiming Christianity provided a guarantee against fascism and militarism. It made no mention of socialism, Marxism or liberalism, but called for the establishment of a true democracy. Like Dresden it supplemented the core content of the Chemnitz programme with the following addition;

“Die CDU tritt ein für den Wiederaufbau unseres zerschlagenen Wirtschaftslebens auf der Grundlage des Privateigentums, der Beschränkung der staatlichen Eingriffe auf das Notwendige und der selbstverantwortlichen Mitarbeit aller Schaffenden in Stadt und Land.”

Protestants could still not hide their scepticism at the fusion of religion and politics. Georg Klause³¹⁷ admits during the inaugural speech at the foundation of the CDUD in Oelsnitz, Saxony, that “Unklarheit die weiterhin das Verhältnis des Christen zur Politik verdunkelt” delayed the party’s foundation six months, as fellow religionists struggled with finding affinity with politics;

“Dadurch daß sich die Christen aus dem politischen Raum zurückzogen oder sich in ihm, dann aber eben nicht als Christen betätigten, überliessen sie das Feld den Dämonen.”

In the work, *Luthers Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Christentum und Politik*, Pfarrer Werner Hartung³¹⁸ from Störmthal in Leipzig quotes Oswald Spengler’s *Untergang des Abendlandes* when he says; “Ein Herrscher, der die Religion in der Richtung auf politische, praktische Ziele verbessern will, ist ein Tor.” Hartung then goes

³¹⁶ “Leitsätze der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands, Unterbezirk Leipzig, 1945.” NL-Karl Bucheim, ACDP I-188. Also printed in; Günter Rüther im Auftrag der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Hrsg), *Geschichte der christlich-demokratischen und christlich-sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland*, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Band 216, Qu. 175, Bonn 1987, p.701.

³¹⁷ Georg Klause speech at the foundation of the CDUD Oelsnitz in Bobenneukirchen (no date). Manuscript was distributed for campaigning on 7th March 1946, Sachsen ACDP, III-035-075.

³¹⁸ Prof. Werner Hartung in III-035-075.

on to quote the Liberal Party (LDPD) representative Dr Kült³¹⁹ who once claimed for his own party;

“wir lehnen es ab unsere Politik unter dem Staat orientieren zu wollen von der Religion her. Und zwar tun wir das aus Ehrfurcht vor der Religion... Staat und Politik haben ihr Blickfeld auf den Menschen und das Diesseits – Religion und Kirche auf das Jenseits: Staat und Politik brauchen als ordnende Norm das Gesetz – Religion und Kirche brauchen als ordnende Norm Glauben und Dogma. Ich glaube es genügt diese Gegenüberstellung, um zu zeigen, wie verkehrt es ist, Politik und Staat verquicken zu wollen mit Religion und Kirche, um das eine von dem anderen her orientieren zu können.”

The embrace of Liberal party principles reveals the persisting Lutheran influence on the political consciousness of the east, and the difficulty experienced in combining morality and Christian values with politics. Yet in the same speech Hartung also acknowledges Kant's³²⁰ phrase; “Die wahre Politik kann keinen Schritt tun, ohne vorher der Moral gehuldigt zu haben,” indicating that after 1945 Protestants were gradually reassessing their attitude to politics, and considering the consequences of having maintained a passive role during the rise of National Socialism.

In future it seemed as if the teaching of Catholic Social Theory and its insistence on social commitments and the fulfilment of individual responsibilities would take precedence over Protestant political indifference. Individuals would learn to accept that they were *Bürger zweier Welten*. Indeed after the initial Protestant opposition to the Catholic programmes from Berlin and Chemnitz, and with pressure by the Soviet military to conform to the Berlin programme, the Protestant regions of the Soviet zone finally gave their allegiance to the CDUD and its leader Jakob Kaiser. The politics of the Berlin programme consequently became the standard for all CDU groups in the Soviet zone. Throughout most of 1947 they managed to resist Soviet pressure to denounce Kaiser as an agent of western reactionary forces, and by 1948 most states declared support for Kaiser's programme of Christian Socialism.³²¹ Eichelmann³²² nevertheless highlighted the difficulty the slogan, Christian Socialism continued to cause;

³¹⁹ Dr. Kült in Der Morgen, Nr. 31 von 7.2.46 p.4.

³²⁰ Immanuel Kant, Anhang I, Zum ewigen Frieden, Insel Verlag, Werke in 6 Bände, V.703.

³²¹ The archive collection ACDP, III-031-147 contain the discussions over 'Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung.' Interesting is that the 4th Leipzig Jahrestagung in 1950 decided to set up a committee to

“Ich gestehe, daß ich nicht erst jetzt, sondern schon damals etwas Unbehagen bei diesem Begriff empfand, denn ich war mir klar und bekam das auch sehr bald vorgezeigt in den Antworten und Anreden russischer Offiziere, daß die unter einem Sozialismus ja etwas anderes verstanden als wir. Es erschien mir nicht völlig einwandfrei, dieses Doppelspiel der verschiedenen Ausdeutung desselben Wortes mitzumachen, und als ich 1948 erfuhr, daß im Westen dieser Begriff als zweideutig und bedenklich abgelehnt wurde, konnte ich das bejahen.”

By 1948 many CDU members were arrested by the Soviet forces and once Kaiser had technically been removed from his post as party leader (he was still the formally elected chairman and was now operative from west Berlin) individual state chairmen of the party steered their programme progressively closer to that of the Soviet military authorities.³²³ From 1947, for example, Thuringia conceded to participate in the Soviet *Volkskongress*³²⁴ and criticised Kaiser for not adhering to the zone's *Blockpolitik* system. Members of the party in Saxony criticised its chairman Hickmann who was increasingly willing to reach a compromise with the Soviets, causing many local CDU groups to disband in protest.

Early programme discussions in Thuringia, Saxony and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania indicate a tendency in the Protestant camp to develop in regionally independent political directions, reinstating some former party traditions from the Weimar Republic. The initiative for a joint interconfessional Christian party was primarily driven therefore by Catholic circles, who were at the same time also responsible for drafting the most significant programmes. Where Protestants were in the majority in the group such as in

discuss the Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung. This was followed up in a letter to all Landesverbände and Kreisverbände from the Hauptgeschäftsstelle in the Jägerstrasse on 6th March 1950. The results of the investigation were to be the basis of a party programme. Christian Socialism had therefore left a lasting legacy in some parts of the Soviet zone.

³²² Ernst Eichelbaum, CDU in Leipzig 1945-1948, Bericht über die Anfänge der CDU in der sowjetischen besetzten Zone Deutschlands, Leipzig August 1982, ACDP I-201-001/7 in III-002-024/1 LV Berlin 1945-.

³²³ Michael Richter, Die Ost CDU 1948-1952. Zwischen Widerstand und Gleichschaltung, Droste, Düsseldorf 1991, p.38-56.

³²⁴ 21 of the 23 members of the Thuringia Landesvorstand voted against continuing to support Kaiser. Those in the Kreisverbände who continued to support Kaiser, were gradually removed from their positions by the Soviets. Members were arrested, all meetings required permission, speeches were rewritten and censored so that Richter concludes “Im Frühjahr 1948 konnte von einer normalen Parteiarbeit der CDU Ortsgruppen keine Rede mehr sein.” Michael Richter, Die Ost CDU 1948-1952 ... op. cit., p.56.

Dresden and Leipzig, liberal economic features such as support for a free market and private property were upheld. Catholic programmes such as that which originated from Chemnitz however were most preoccupied with engendering spiritual renewal. Ironically the Catholic programmes employed more religious justification and arguably more ideological symbolism to communicate their political message, whereas the Protestant programmes were less historically reflective and arguably more pragmatic in tone. Yet the sincerity of social Protestant groups to reform the party system and to introduce true democracy via economic liberties remains questionable. Initiatives were rapidly subsumed by the Berlin CDU's version of Christian Socialism which may be the result of the Soviet intolerance of splinter parties and their coercion for groups to adopt the Berlin programme, or may have been a sign that Protestants were gradually learning to assimile Catholic values in the spirit of Christian (Catholic) social theory. This is plausible given the lack of a counter Protestant philosophy, that was equally capable of forging unity and consolidation among Protestant groups. Firstly the fear that the political diversity so characteristic of Protestant groups in the past could again give rise to a disunited and unstable party system and secondly Catholic concern that the primacy shown by Protestants to reinstating a liberal economy, could potentially engender exploitative capitalist patterns of behaviour in society, prompted Catholics to seize the upper hand in shaping the political future.

6. American Zone

6.1. Hesse

Hesse state was created by the allies in September 1945 from the former Prussian provinces of Hesse-Nassau and Hesse-Darmstadt to become the second largest state after Westphalia.³²⁵ The migration of post-war Catholic refugees to the area altered the traditionally Protestant population to an homogeneous mix of Catholics and Protestants in the new state of the American occupation zone.³²⁶ Hesse thus offered fertile and sturdy ground for the dissemination of Christian democratic thinking at regional and state level. By November 1945, no less than 48 Christian groups had been licensed in the state's municipalities.³²⁷ The core group of Christian Democrats to found the 'Frankfurt Circle' incorporated former left wing Centre Party members, intellectuals, Christian Socialists and trade unionists. In other parts of Hesse many groups also originated from the liberal-conservative parties in Weimar - the DDP, DVP, and CSVD, as well as the Centre Party. In the initial period, the CDU in Hesse could not therefore be classified as specifically right or left wing, although the emphasis in the literature so far has been directed to the left-wing socialist element. The party's economic and social policy for example reflected a variety of views.³²⁸ Northern and central Hesse were predominantly liberal-conservative. They thought the CDU provided a counterweight to the labour parties SPD and KPD, and a home for safeguarding their liberal economic interests and existing ownership structures. south Hesse on the other hand, was more religiously oriented, whilst trade unions and left wing Catholics in Frankfurt advocated a specifically Christian Socialist order.

³²⁵ The former province Rhinehessen was given to Rhineland-Palatinate.

³²⁶ The policy of the US allied occupiers blocked many socialist reforms in Hesse. The first Hesse constitution had planned for the nationalisation of basic industries, but this clause was eliminated by the Americans. See preface to Eugen Kogon, *Die Restaurative Politik. Zur Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band 3 der Gesammelten Schriften*, Michael Kogon und Gottfried Erb (Hrsg), Quadriga, Weinheim, Berlin 1996, p.23-48.

³²⁷ Arcadius R. Gurland, *op. cit.*, p.40.

³²⁸ Heinrich Rüschenschmidt, "Gründung und erste Jahre. Mitgestaltung und Rückschlag. Die CDU Hessen unter Werner Hilpert 1945-1952" in; Werner Wolf (Hrsg), *CDU Hessen 1945-1985. Politische Mitgestaltung und Kampf um die Mehrheit, Wissenschaft und Politik*, Berend von Nottbeck, Cologne 1986, p.16.

Wieck's³²⁹ early analysis of the CDU in Hesse suggests the prelate priest Dr Herr, who formed a Catholic committee, the *katholische Volksarbeit* at the end of the war in 1945, marks the starting point for the CDU. In a later study Rüschemschmidt³³⁰ contests that the *katholische Volksarbeit* committee as the CDP's starting point, maintaining that it originated with the *Katholische Aktion* committee in 1926, in which Walter Dirks³³¹ and former colleagues from the leftist Centre newspaper, the *Rhein-Mainische Volkszeitung* and Karlheinz Knappstein from the more radical socialist magazine *Die Deutsche Republik*, set up to campaign for Christian principles in society and for a potential successor to the Centre party that could protect the political interests and status of Catholics in Frankfurt. There was no mention of Protestants being incorporated as equal partners.

The *Katholische Aktion* was then revived on 20th April 1945 in Frankfurt as the *Katholische Volksarbeit* by Catholic priests Herr and Eckert and other member of the clergy and Catholic laity. Editors, journalists and intellectuals including Schulte, Knappstein, and Eugen Kogon featured prominently in the Frankfurt Christian Democratic Circle, significantly influencing the party's early programmatic direction. Kogon and Dirks had already begun to discuss launching a political cultural journal when they first met in June 1945, and gives an early indication that their longer term interests were primarily journalistic, not political.³³² Other individuals including Werner Hilpert, Jakob Husch Wilhelm Fay, Bruno Dörpinghaus, Josef Arndgen and Paul Friedrich Weber, were all dedicated to forming an interdenominational party with a Christian Socialist content. A second source of CDP members came from the *Bürgerrat*, a group set up to support the US military organisation in Hesse and comprising SPD, Catholics,

³²⁹ H.G Wieck, *Christliche und Freie Demokraten in Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden und Württemberg 1945/46*, Droste, Düsseldorf 1958.

³³⁰ Heinrich Rüschemschmidt, *Die Entstehung der hessischen CDU 1945/46. Lokale Gründungsvorgänge und Willensbildung im Landesverband, Staatsexam, Philipps Universität, Marburg 1979*. Published as *Gründung und Anfänge der CDU in Hessen*, Darmstadt, Selbstverlag der Hess. Hist. Kommission 1981, p.22f.

³³¹ Walter Dirks belonged to the left-wing Catholic tradition. Born in the Ruhr in 1901 worked from 1924 as cultural political editor and director for the left wing Centre Party party affiliated newspaper the 'Rhein-Mainischen Volkszeitung' and from 1933 for the only non-National Socialist newspaper the 'Frankfurter Zeitung' until it was banned in 1944. From this point on he turned his attention to what later became the *Frankfurter Hefte*.

³³² Martin Stankowski, *Linkskatholizismus nach 1945*, Paul Rugenstein, Köln 1974, p.67.

Protestants and Communists. They provided a platform for forging links with the Protestant Church, most notably Priest Otto Fricke.³³³ Over the summer of 1945, the group worked on producing a party manifesto, the Frankfurt Principles whose content rivalled not only the liberal Catholics in the Rhineland but also Christian Socialists in Berlin. A party license was granted in Frankfurt on September 15, 1945 and Werner Hilpert, following a six year internment in Buchenwald concentration camp, became the new party leader, and minister president for Hesse. He backed a concept that was;

“betont sozialen, in wirtschafts- und sozialpolitischer Hinsicht eng an die Sozialdemokratie angelehnten und auf Ausgleich und Harmonie ausgerichteten Politik.”³³⁴

As the Frankfurt group was almost exclusively Catholic, their initial discussions were chiefly concerned with the role of the Catholic Church in Germany's post-war reconstruction,³³⁵ Catholics' political representation before the American allies and the overall direction political Catholicism should take in 1945. Historically they had come to recognise that many political structures and ideas can be derived from Christian teaching for use in a social order, but Christian teaching did not provide a fixed and comprehensive framework for devising a political programme. Above all;

“Mehrere gute Katholiken können aus verschiedener Einsicht in die politische Welt mit gutem religiösen Gewissen zu verschiedenen politischen Lösungen und Entscheidungen kommen.”³³⁶

The Frankfurt group soon fractured into a right and a left wing group and each developed its own interpretation and application of Catholic Social Theory. There was anxiety over the group's intended target group, harking back to old Centre party dilemmas. Although the idea of a revival of the Centre generated less interest in Hesse as in Westphalia, any successor party to the Centre Party was nevertheless confronted by the old choice over whether it intended to prioritise the religious and cultural interests of all Catholics or the political ones of only a few? It had to decide whether it should

³³³ Hans Otto Kleinmann, *op. cit.*, p.39.

³³⁴ Heinrich Rüschenschmidt cited in Hans-Otto Kleinmann; *Ibid.*, p.74.

³³⁵ Marcel Schulte in a letter to H.G Wieck on 13th October 1953 in H.G Wieck, *op. cit.*, p.35.

³³⁶ Martin Stankowski, *op. cit.*, p.73.

continue as a Catholic based religious and cultural party similar to the Centre Party before 1914, keeping political activities to a minimum, or whether it should become like the Centre Party after 1918, a party with a particular programme and fixed political motives but which risked losing the support from Catholic voters who did not endorse the party's political programme. Despite the desire to remain a Catholic interest party, neglect of its political responsibility risked losing voters, and could also fail to reach its target for a governing mandate in parliament. In 1945, Brüning concluded that the Centre concept was irreconcilable with the need to fulfil its state political function and advocated founding a new interdenominational party.³³⁷ This also suggests that the CDU's advocacy of an interdenominational *Volkspartei* to solve cultural antagonisms between Catholics and Protestants was based on an evaluation of its own real power potential and influence. Protestant votes were needed more than any genuine Catholic desire to embrace Protestants and Protestantism in the party.

Christian Socialists in the CDP

The first of the two starkly contrasting programmatic directions to develop in the main centre of Christian Democratic activity in the Frankfurt CDP was that spearheaded by Walter Dirks and Eugen Kogon. Dirks was a former pupil of Theodor Steinbüchel, and Eugen Kogon had completed his doctorate on the *Korporativstaat des Faschismus* with the Austrian economist and social philosopher Othmar Spann. During the Weimar Republic, Kogon and Dirks belonged to Spann's universalist group, the *Studienrunde katholischer Soziologen* and helped to produce the Catholic Social Manifesto, a collection of authoritarian views of a society ordered by a system of hierarchical estates (*Berufsstände*) an alternative to the capitalist order. Kogon³³⁸ clarifies;

“Ein sehr verbreiteter Irrtum ist die Meinung, das berufsständisch-korporative System sei in erster Linie eine politische Angelegenheit. Nein es ist eine wirtschaftlich-soziale Angelegenheit und kann unter allen politischen Systemen mit Ausnahme zweier: der Diktatur und der formalen Parteidemokratie, sich segensreich entfalten. Die beiden Genannten allerdings widersprechen der berufsständischen Ordnung, weil sie die Selbstverwaltung aufheben.”

³³⁷ Hans Georg Wieck, op. cit., p.35f.

³³⁸ Eugen Kogon, “Berufsständische Wirtschaft und autoritärer Staat, 1933” cited in Josef Stegmann, Ibid., p.443.

Kogon thus envisaged a non- intervening state with only peripheral powers, leaving the economy to operate independently according to the rules of industrial democracy. The universalists³³⁹ had initially hoped that they could reconcile Social Catholicism with National Socialism but as Nazism began to reveal its true colours Kogon became a severe critic of fascism, for which he served a seven year internment at Buchenwald concentration camp. Like Dirks, Kogon believed that 1945 was the beginning of a new phase in history. His lack of support for a parliamentary democracy and his 1947 prognosis in the essay *Über die Situation*³⁴⁰ that capitalism and individualism had outlived themselves and would never be restored in Europe even with capital investment by the Americans reveals a degree of political naivete and idealism. Although still fundamentally anti-capitalist in outlook, by 1947 Kogon gradually modified his opinions. He no longer employed the term *Berufständische Ordnung* although he maintained this type of system was compatible with parliamentary democracy.

Dirks rejected the conservative explanation for the rise of National Socialism, namely that the loss of western morality and centuries of decline from the middle ages, through the Reformation, to the Enlightenment, to Nationalism and Socialism, to culminate finally in National Socialism. Dirks accused the conservative interpretation of German history, and its condemnation of socialism, for consciously feeding a *reaktionären Abendland-Mythos* and an *"Ideologie des besseren deutschen christlichen Bürgertums."*³⁴¹ The preoccupation with the decline of the morals and culture of western civilisation, the *Abendland*, he argues, failed to recognise the misplaced responsibility of the middle classes, or *Bürgertum* for the present chaos and their preoccupation with economic interests over political or social issues.³⁴² Dirks argued that conservatism propagated the myth that the disorientation, uncertainty, anarchy and evil in the west was due to society

³³⁹ See section I, chapter 1 of this study for a discussion of the universalist philosophy.

³⁴⁰ "Der Kapitalismus - als Signatur der Wirtschaft - ist im Sterben begriffen. Auch er wird trotz amerikanischer Kapitaleinführen zumindest in Europa nicht wiederkehren." Eugen Kogon, "Über die Situation" in; Frankfurter Hefte 2, 1947. Also reprinted in Eugen Kogon, *Die Restaurative Politik. Zur Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Band 3 der Gesammelten Schriften, Michael Kogon und Gottfried Erb (Hrsg), Quadriga, Weinheim/Berlin 1996, p. 27 (23-48).

³⁴¹ Franz Focke, op. cit., p.205.

³⁴² "Die abendländische Krise ist zu einem guten Teil die Krise des Bürgertums, ist nicht nur seine Bildungskrise, sondern schlicht und elementär seine ökonomische Krise." Walter Dirks, "Das Abendland und der Sozialismus" in; Frankfurter Hefte, Jg 1. June 1946, Heft 3, p. 75f (67-76).

having divorced itself from middle class values and behaviour. To regain a sense of order and proportion, conservatives will seek to reestablish a Christian order, but Dirks argues that this reinstates the same *bourgeois* values of capitalism and political impassivity, that had sparked the crisis in the first place. Dirks thus prescribes socialism as the best form for a new society. Conscious of its negative associations, he quickly qualifies the term;

“Man kann die handfeste, praktische, gerechte europäische Lösung der ökonomischen und sozialen Frage.. auch anders nennen als Sozialismus, aber wir wissen keinen anderen geschichtsgesättigten Ausdruck, der einerseits genügend prägnant und andererseits genügend unbestimmt (denn wir legen hier kein sozialökonomisches Programm vor) die Aufgabe bezeichnen könnte.”³⁴³

Dirks’ reference to the need for a party’s programme to be ‘geschichtsgesättigt,’ ‘genügend prägnant’ but also ‘genügend unbestimmt’ confirms the CDU’s concern with the force of ideological images, and their function in legitimating political programmes. But perhaps most importantly, Dirks’ vision of a socialist order did not seek to abolish capitalist values per se, but pragmatically looked for a fusion of both traditions. His socialism, he said, should be ‘penetrated’ with ideas of the European ‘*Abendland*.’

“Abendland und Sozialismus müssen einander durchdringen. In einer sozialistischen Ordnung muß sich die abendländische Grundsubstanz die aktuelle, realistische, faktische moderne Gestalt geben und zugleich das gute Gewissen im Sinn der sozialen Gerechtigkeit wiedergewinnen, das nicht in der Sehnsucht nach dem intakten Abendland (dem mittelalterlichen ‘Ordo’ vor dem bürgerlich-kapitalistischen Sündenfall) zu suchen und zu finden ist.”³⁴⁴

Dirks’ unique interpretation of socialism thus combines the best features of western liberal traditions with the provision of social justice inherent in Socialism to represent a politics of the third way. Unlike Jakob Kaiser in Berlin, Dirks did not envisage a Labour party for post war Germany, but one more radical than that. In May 1945 Dirks formulated what has been described as;

“vielleicht das erstaunlichste Dokument aus dem “christlichen” Lager zur Parteigründung nach 1945.”³⁴⁵

³⁴³ Ibid.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Martin Stankowski, op. cit., p.76.

In a 12-point programme he outlined his vision of a *Sozialistischen Einheitspartei*, a united front of communists, socialist democrats and Christians, who would jointly pave the way towards a *Zweite Republik*. His 'Socialist Theory' was not based on confessional, Church or Christian interests but on "die wesentlichen Elemente des Marxismus aus den Erfahrungen der letzten dreißig Jahre ergänzt und erneuert." Stankowski believes the programme did not find purchase because it was either too socialist, not sufficiently strategic or it underestimated the '*Beharrungsvermögen*' of traditional parties rapidly regrouping in 1945. Dirks only took up the idea of a Christian party once he found his initial programme to be unpopular with the anti-fascist community, yet he succeeded in retaining his most cherished of socialist ideas and transferring them to the Christian CDP. The social values in Dirks' socialism were freedom, security, justice and respect for the individual and he believed that a socialist, planned economy was the method to implement these values. Property ownership was endorsed provided *das Recht auf Eigentum* is not distorted as *Das Recht des Eigentümers*. Interesting is that Dirks also advocated socialism as a powerful force for forging European integration. The first point in the programme cited;

"Ein wirklicher Ausweg aus dem deutschen und europäischen Chaos kann nur in einem deutschen und europäischen Sozialismus gefunden werden."

Dirks's 1945 essay '*Rechts und Links*'³⁴⁶ further defines his version of Socialism but also addresses this study's interest in the implications of ideological perception of political terminology for practical politics. Terms, he reveals, do not always mean what we think they mean and can change in interpretation over time. In 1945, he notes, Socialism still retained its left-wing associations but also happened to be endorsed by all three main parties in Germany! Dirks wanted Socialism to adopt a wider definition, in order to lose its exclusively left-wing image and become a universally accepted term for all parties. The traditional left-right political divide, would then lose validity, allowing new dynamics and political definitions to occur. A more indirect or 'umwegigen' socialism could emerge to represent farmers, small businessmen and the 'so-called new middle

³⁴⁶ Walter Dirks, "Rechts und Links" in; Walter Dirks, *Sozialismus oder Restauration*, Politische Publizistik, Gesammelte Schriften 1945-1950, Fritz Boll, Ulrich Brückling, Karl Prümm (Hrsg), Band 4, Amman Verlag, Zürich 1987, p.94-108.

classes.' These groups will become the new 'right' wing in the reformed political spectrum, whereby their individualistic and middle class interests would equally be addressed by socialism. Dirks warns that should the party renege on its responsibility to socialism, it risked being hijacked by reactionary interests with motives to restore capitalism or by more radical left wing initiatives with disastrous consequences for the freedom of the individual. Dirks chose the CDU as the party of this new version of Socialism. By instilling their party slogan 'Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung' with real meaning, he says the party would play a key role in Germany's new political order, supporting economic democracy as an alternative to state socialism, support federalism over state centralisation, and uphold individual ethics and Christian values in the face of collectivism.³⁴⁷ This was neatly encapsulated by Dirks in the phrase;

"So müßte die CDU sich links entscheiden, um rechts werden zu können.... Entscheidet sie sich links so hat sie gute Aussicht, die neue deutsche Rechte zu werden."

Since Dirks equated traditional Christianity with a middle class ideology of tradition and the nation, he believed the move would liberate 'Christianity' to prevent conservative reactionaries from reclaiming exclusive 'ownership' of Christianity. In Dirks' view the CDU was the party that could cut across divisions in the political spectrum and could break down fixed, rigid perceptions of ideology and *Weltanschauung* that had hitherto hidden the path to a politics of the third way.³⁴⁸

The liberal, conservative wing in the CDP

Bruno Dörpinghaus represented the right wing strand in the CDP, that favoured a Christian party to enter a dialogue with trade, industry, the self employed and the

³⁴⁷ "Sie hätte gegen jeden Zentralismus den regionalen und wirtschaftspolitischen Föderalismus, gegen den Staatssozialismus die Wirtschaftsdemokratie, gegen den Kollektivismus den 'personalistischen Sozialismus' zu vertreten Aber alle diese echten Kräfte und ernsten Anliegen werden sich reaktionär und tödlich für das Ganze auswirken, wenn jene Grundentscheidung für den sozialistischen Gesamtentwurf ausbleibt." Ibid.

³⁴⁸ Although typifying a third way agenda here, Dirk's socialist programme often went beyond mere social reform measures. He demanded a full restructuring of the economy. "Es gibt hier eine deutliche Grenze zwischen der Sozialpolitik, die nicht notwendig das Wesen und damit das Ganze betrifft, sondern Teile angreift und also unsystematisch sein kann, und der sozialistischen Politik, die "aufs Ganze geht," aufs Ganze des sozialen Lebens." Walter Dirks, "Das Wort Sozialismus, Sozialismus oder Restauration" in *Politische Publistik 1945-1950, Gesammelte Schriften. Band 4*, Hrsg. Fritz Boll, Ulrich Brückling, Karl Prümm, Amman, Zürich 1987.

agricultural community; in short, with the middle class *Bürgertum*.³⁴⁹ As early as May 28, 1945, Dörpinghaus published a *Denkschrift* outlining the existing post war political spectrum of communists and social democrats, creating an obvious vacuum for a *Rechtspartei* built on Christian foundations. This reveals that the Christian party idea did not only originate from the conservative historical analysis of the loss of Christian faith, of Weimar's failings and of the causes of National Socialism as programmes were keen to convey, but was also based on a sober analysis of the probable party political line up in 1945, identifying where gaps had developed in voter representation. Image and ideology were then crafted accordingly. The *Denkschrift* remarks;

“Von dieser Partei ist folgendes zu sagen: Sie braucht, um ein tragendes Element des neuen Staates zu werden, *eine breite Basis*. Hierzu ist es erforderlich, daß die beiden großen Bekenntnisse Deutschlands das unverrückbare Fundament aufgeben....Sie muß es strikt ablehnen, irgendwelche Standesinteressen zu vertreten, und jeden Versuch von vornherein unterdrücken, wenn gewisse Kreise der Industrie, des Grosshandels, der Finanzwirtschaft oder Militarismus Anstrengungen machen, Einfluss zu gewinnen.”³⁵⁰

In contrast to other Christian Democratic programmes at the time, Dörpinghaus does not refer to the word ‘Christian,’ remarking simply that the party should be based on Christian principles and aimed at Centre Party voters, liberals and conservatives from the Weimar period. This may reflect a certain caution by Dörpinghaus, unwilling to touch on the sensitive issue of mixing politics and religion, and so risk offending the Protestant voters he wished to target. Unlike Dirks, Dörpinghaus did not believe in the possibility of co-operation between all anti-fascist groups and envisaged a more restricted *Volkspartei*, that excluded the traditional working class voter. He based this on the assumption that these groups would be represented by the social democrats and communists, or even by a newly founded *Soziale Volkspartei* which he predicted could emerge if the SPD failed to modernise its own programme and profile. He did not rule out the possibility either that this *Soziale Volkspartei* could co-operate with his envisaged *Rechtspartei*.³⁵¹ Protestants such as the priest Fricke, involved in early political

³⁴⁹ Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.94.

³⁵⁰ H.G Wieck, op. cit., p.44.

³⁵¹ The socialist members would only contemplate cooperation with the SPD. This was demonstrated in the CDP protocoll of meeting on 31.10.1945 in which Knappstein expressed his opposition to setting up a ‘Bürgerblock’ because this would provoke an ‘Arbeiterblock’ to be set up in opposition.

discussions, was positive to Dörpinghaus's suggestions. Dörpinghaus labelled his programme direction *Aktion der deutschen Erneuerung*, a movement aimed at a new morality in society, at European unification and at a parliamentary constitution. The 'Aktion' maintained rights of property ownership but restricted these to serving the vague notion of *Allgemeinheit*. It did not entail nationalising monopoly industries but made them subject to state monitoring. Importantly Dörpinghaus did not believe Socialism conflicted - or was a system to be contrasted - with capitalism. Socialism was more a correct frame of mind;

"Sozialismus ist für Dörpinghaus nicht – wie etwa für die Vertreter der "Frankfurter Leitsätze" eine Frage der Organisation bzw. der gesellschaftlichen und insbesondere der wirtschaftlichen Veränderung, sondern eine Frage der 'charakterlichen Haltung.'" ³⁵²

The Frankfurt Principles, September 1945

Like liberals in other Christian Democratic regions, Dörpinghaus had to bide his time. The more liberal overtones of Dörpinghaus' programme had difficulty at first competing with the more popular socialist programme by Dirks and other Catholic members. This was demonstrated by the Frankfurt Principles³⁵³ probably the most political³⁵⁴ of all the CDU programmes drafted in 1945 and 1946, and the most specific about which traditions they intend to restore or reform. They emphasise a 'new' Germany, one that differs not only from the previous twelve years but also from that before 1933 or even 1914, condemning the last two hundred years of *preußisch-deutscher Geschichte*;

"Wir wollen heute nicht einfach da fortfahren, wo unsere Vorgänger 1933 aufhören mußten, so als ob seitdem nichts geschehen wäre."

In language uncharacteristically plain and simple for a political manifesto, the Frankfurt programme campaigns for reform in all areas of society³⁵⁵ with strong emphasis on democracy. It condemned violence, racism and Germany's hegemonic striving for world

³⁵² Heinrich Rüschenschmidt, *Die Entstehung der hessischen CDU 1945/46* op. cit., p. 40.

³⁵³ Die Frankfurter Leitsätze, printed in O.K Flechtheim, op. cit., Band II, p.36-45.

³⁵⁴ Wolf Dieter Narr, op. cit., p.81.

³⁵⁵ The programme cited the areas youth, education, the relationship between State and the Church, the family and marriage, socialism and private property, the press, radio and currency,

domination. Unlike other programmes of the period, the Frankfurt Principles did not aim to conjure up images of the spectre of materialism or elevate Christianity as the bulwark against a renewed materialist threat. In this important aspect the Frankfurt programme can be distinguished from the more propagandistic style detectable in the language of the CDU in Cologne. Christianity remains the basis for all political activity on account of the Christian doctrine of the “unschätzbaren Wert des einzelnen Menschen,”³⁵⁶ but unlike the Christian Socialists in Cologne, the Frankfurt group was open to co-operation with all political groups and parties, Christians and non-Christians, including Marxist Socialists³⁵⁷ so long as they could demonstrate that they were equally committed to a Christian democracy;

“Daß das christliche Menschenbild in wesentlichen Zügen das gleiche ist, wie es auch vielen Nichtchristen als das einer weltlichen Humanität vorschwebt, werden auch sie mit uns zusammengehen können.”³⁵⁸

Kogon and Knappstein were the authors of the programme’s economic policy. Certain features bear striking resemblance to economic reforms suggested by Gablentz and Kaiser in Berlin and Welty in the Rhineland. Under the heading ‘Socialism and Property,’ however, the programme makes no explicit mention of ‘Socialism with Christian responsibility.’ Instead it expresses its commitment to an ‘economic socialism.’ Economic Socialism implied the transfer of primary industry, large manufacturing industry and banks into public ownership through wide scale planning and state control of all capital investment. It did not aim to increase the power of the state but to provide *Bedarfsdeckung* and the opportunity for extensive private property ownership for all.³⁵⁹ They envisaged a democratic socialism, that left sufficient room for private initiative and competition. Extending the term Socialism to ‘wirtschaftsdemokratischer Sozialismus’

³⁵⁶ Die Frankfurter Leitsätze, op. cit., p.38.

³⁵⁷ Rudolf Hars, Die Bildungspolitik der christlichen demokratischen Union in den Jahren 1945-1954. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Konservatismus in der deutschen Bildungspolitik, Peter Lang, Frankfurt/Main 1981, p.98f.

³⁵⁸ Die Frankfurter Leitsätze, op. cit., p.38.

³⁵⁹ At a joint meeting of Christian Socialists from Frankfurt and Berlin on 31.10.1945 Hermes spoke of his plan to unite all Christian democratic groups in the former Reich territory. After this visit the Frankfurt Group adopted the Berlin founding programme and published it under the name “Das Programm von Brot, Obdach und Arbeit”. An indeterminate change was made to the Berlin demand for Verstaatlichung in the Frankfurt version stating that industry would be transferred to “Gemeineigentum.”

illustrated that they did not want to be directly identified with the ideology Socialism.³⁶⁰ 'Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung' was a reflection of the prevailing economic and social circumstances in 1945/6 and a continuation of the Centre Party's social programme and the 19th century social reform movement. The Frankfurt version of Christian Socialism comprised three main aims 1. Economic Planning 2. Nationalisation 3. Industrial democracy (*Mitbestimmung*). Economic planning through the policy of '*Bedarfsdeckung*' was a response to economic not ideological motives, whilst the nationalisation of monopoly and key industries was seen as the way to enable social elevation of the lower socio-economic classes. It did not entail the end of private economy but, moreover, supported medium and small sized businesses as the cornerstone of the new economic system.

Knapstein's economic socialism was thus a combination of a planned economy with the western liberal understanding of free, responsible individuals, exemplified through the introduction of co-decision rights for employees in the industrial economy. 'Planning' envisaged a decentralised approach to policy on the basis of subsidiarity and involving trade unions, economic organisations and state administrations in the decision making process. Besides co-decision making, workers should also benefit from profit share schemes, as a part of the decentralisation of industrial ownership. Nationalisation is thus understood as *Vergenossenschaftung* or co-operative arrangements or *Vergesellschaftung* where state and groups in society share ownership and small and medium sized private businesses are to be retained.³⁶¹ The market is given an undefined, ambiguous position, but in his later essay '*Ja und Nein. Zur Politik der Frankfurter Hefte*'³⁶² Dirks modifies his stance to endorse the market economy;

"als das feinfühligste Instrument der Ermittlung der Verbraucherwünsche und als das reibungsloseste Instrument der notwendigen Steuerung der Verbraucherwünsche"

³⁶⁰ Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.94.

³⁶¹ Uhl is sceptical that Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung can successfully reconcile freedom with planning. Codecision, decentralisation and shared property ownership does not he says guarantee freedom of individual but indeed risks it being removed even more, op.cit. p.136.

³⁶² Walter Dirks, "Ja und Nein. Zur Politik der Frankfurter Hefte" in; Frankfurter Hefte 2, 1947, p.396 (384-402).

Kogon even defined their third way alternative as a "*Markt-Planwirtschaft!*"

The fate of *Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung*.

The foundation of the CDU Hesse on 25 November 1945, with former Centre member Werner Hilpert as Chairman and former DVP member and Protestant Erich Köhler as deputy, was later than in comparative regions. The CDP was formed in Wiesbaden and in Frankfurt in September, and in Kassel and ten other towns across Hesse in August. The CDUD in the Soviet zone "cannot be overestimated enough"³⁶³ for its impact on the foundation of interdenominational Christian parties in the north, east and central Hesse regions.

With time the CDU Hesse corrected the over-representation of Catholics in the party to achieve a more even balance of Protestant and Catholic members. None of the former left leaning Catholic 'intellectuals' and only one trade union representative were on the executive board. The intellectuals "wollten Anreger und Motor sein, aber keinesfalls in einen Apparat eingespannt werden"³⁶⁴ even if they continued to exert some influence on policy via the party's original chairman, Hilpert. Employee co-determination legislation in industry was devised by the *Oberurseler Kreis* and only pushed through Hesse state parliament by Hilpert, the then Labour Minister for Hesse.³⁶⁵ Marcel Schulte, co-founder the CDU Hesse, backs the claim that the intellectuals had no party political interest, but does not detract from the fact that they made an impact in the embryonic stages of the party, on a scale unparalleled with any other CDU group at the time. Schulte never accepted Berlin's version of Christian Socialism, saying that the combination was implausible, whereas Frankfurt's 'Socialism with Christian responsibility' directly sought to solve social problems from its theory of socialism. The Christian Socialist Eberhard Welty³⁶⁶ in the Rhineland, on the other hand, condemned Frankfurt's Socialism with Christian responsibility for implying that traditional socialism had a Christian foundation;

³⁶³ Heinrich Rüschenschmidt, *Die Entstehung der hessischen CDU 1945/46*, op. cit., p.136.

³⁶⁴ H.G Wieck (1958), op. cit., p.55.

³⁶⁵ Hilpert suffered some opposition in the Hesse parliament from the Evangelical Erich Köhler, but this subsided when Köhler later took up his new responsibility as President of the Economic Council.

³⁶⁶ Eberhard Welty, *Christlicher Sozialismus*, op. cit., p.140.

“Als gäben sie dem überlieferten Sozialismus ein christliches Vorzeichen oder eine christliche Grundlage.”

Welty was dismayed that Christian Socialism was being used so flippantly, criticising that;

“verschiedene ideen- und grundsätzlich sogar gegensätzliche Richtungen für sich beanspruchen, einen christlichen Sozialismus zu vertreten.”³⁶⁷

Whether Christian Socialism was primarily aimed at the social component of the original Catholic Christian Social movement and ‘Socialism with Christian Responsibility’ at incorporating more socialist aims into Christian thinking, as Narr³⁶⁸ has suggested, is a case for semantic definition, although the definition would suggest that the Frankfurt left was more socialist in its traditional sense. More interesting however is the importance shown by rival Christian democratic groups to slogan superiority, confirming that the description of a group’s ideology was crucial for gaining political legitimization.

Because of the inevitable correlation between either ‘Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung’ or Christian Socialism with the traditional understanding of collectivist Socialism, Jostock³⁶⁹ and others in the Rhineland had favoured the term Solidarism. Dirks saw Solidarism as an offshoot of the middle classes and an unsuitable response to the new social structure of post-war Germany. The solidarist, Oswald von Nell-Breuning conversely, criticised ‘Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung’ for committing itself to the revolutionary and unChristian³⁷⁰ methods of historical materialism, but did not admit to endorsing the ideology itself. Dirks had indeed once declared that his envisaged socialist party must be more than reformist, it must be in a preparatory, revolutionary state;

³⁶⁷ Ibid.

³⁶⁸ “Soll ersterer nur die Ziele der alten katholischen, christlich-sozialen Bewegung mit einem neuen, die soziale Komponente hervorhebenden Ausdruck erneut zur Geltung bringen, so will letzterer eine Rezeption sozialistischer Ziele durch Christen kennzeichnen.” Wolf Dieter Narr, op. cit., p. 79.

³⁶⁹ Paul Jostock, “Christlicher Sozialismus” in; Neues Abendland 3, 1948, p.33-37.

³⁷⁰ Oswald von Nell-Breuning, “Christlicher Sozialismus” in; Begegnung 2, 1947, p.149ff (145-149).

“Sie kann aber ebensowenig grundsätzlich reformistisch sein, sondern muß ihre Tagespolitik ständig unter die Kritik ihrer totalen sozialistischen Theorie und ihres totalen sozialistischen Zieles stellen, muß grundsätzlich mit der revolutionären Aktion rechnen und sie für den richtigen Augenblick vorbereiten.”³⁷¹

Socialism was the natural consequence to twelve years of fascism, the qualitative leap between the old capitalist system and a new classless society, but despite talk of revolution, Hars doubts that the concept of Christian Socialism, in Frankfurt or anywhere else bore any real relationship to Socialism, maintaining that;

“hier ein Sozialkonzept vorliegt, das der Tradition antisozialistischen Denkens in Deutschland noch nicht ganz entwachsen ist.”³⁷²

Advocating middle-sized industry, small traders and farmers, the protection of property and capital rights, are policies of a distinctly middle class conservatism and since Christian Socialism remained true to most of the basic values of middle class society, it can not be described as a revolutionary alternative to the much criticised ‘old’ order. The early programme theoreticians, whose Christian Socialist agenda was genuine and seriously intended, thus descended into the role of *Rechtfertigungsdenker* who provided the newly founded party with a theoretical programmatic guise that was driven by other motives to those the thinkers originally intended. The willingness to uphold the capitalist economy and former socio-economic structures also offers a decisive explanation as to why the neo-liberal and Christian conservative groups in the early CDU never actively mounted an effective opposition to Christian Socialism, but silently tolerated its development in the first two years of the party’s existence. Once the first consolidation phase during those early programme discussions was over and groups had experienced the moralising appeal of a *Gesinnungsozialismus*, confidence grew to back a more overtly liberal social market economic order.

Hars has termed the CDU’s efforts to legitimise its politics with a radical, reformist rhetoric to reflect the contemporary socialist mood, whilst trusting its traditional conservative solutions for policy implementation, a “Revolutionäres Gestaltungswollen

³⁷¹ Walter Dirks, Thesen zu einer ‘Sozialistischen Einheitspartei,’ May 1945, Gesammelte Schriften Band 4, op. cit., p.36.

³⁷² Rudolf Hars, op. cit., p.98f.

mit konservativen Gestaltungsideen.”³⁷³ Ambrosius³⁷⁴ also believes there is a contradiction in the Frankfurter’s synthesis of Christianity and socialism:

“gleichberechtigte Selbstverwaltung auf betrieblicher und überbetrieblicher Ebene, relativ intensive gesamtwirtschaftliche Planung und Lenkung bei prinzipieller Anerkennung des Wettbewerbssystems aber Erhaltung und Stärkung des privaten Eigentums. Die Fragen, wie unter diesen Umständen das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung verwirklicht werden konnte, wie die Trennung von Arbeit und Kapital aufgehoben und die Gemeinwohlbezogenheit tatsächlich hergestellt werden sollte, wurden nicht schlüssig beantwortet.”

The indication that there may have been discrepancies between the theoretical claims of the party manifesto and policy implementation is supported by a case concerning the plans for nationalising key industries in the drafting of the Hesse economic constitution (Article 41, 1946). CDU member Fedor Reuscher of Lüdenscheid in Westphalia remarked the constitutional demand that industry should be nationalised or “in Gemeineigentum überführt” does not detail the actual implementation legislation, so the question of how the law should be translated into practice was not “abschliessend geklärt.” The further issue of co-determination rights for employees in the management of company and economic decisions affecting the company, he notes, gained virtually universal support, but:

“Allerdings trifft hierfür vor allem die bereits angedeutete Feststellung zu, daß selbst eine eindeutige positive Entscheidung dieser Frage lediglich ein Programm bedeutet, dessen praktische Verwirklichung von vornherein noch recht problematisch erscheint. Das ‘Mitwirkungsrecht’ ist an sich nämlich ein unbestimmter Begriff.”³⁷⁵

The many levels of decision making powers could equally be interpreted as “blosse Anhörung”, or “Beratung” or “massgeblichen Mitentscheidung.”

In Frankfurt, as in Berlin and Cologne, the problematic term Socialism, never escaped its negative associations, despite specific attempts by party leaders to define what they

³⁷³ Wolf Dieter Narr, op. cit., p.76.

³⁷⁴ Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.19.

³⁷⁵ Paper by Fedor Reuscher in NL Dörpinghaus, ACDP, I-009-009/5.

meant by socialism. In the November 1946 edition of the Hesse CDU party newspaper Dirks addresses the controversy surrounding their use of the term Socialism;

“In fast jedem der unzähligen Gespräche, die in den letzten anderthalb Jahren bei vielen Gelegenheiten und besonders unter Christen über jenen ‘Sozialismus’ geführt wurden, in dem wir einen gangbaren und notwendigen Weg aus dem Abgrund zu einer sinnvollen Ordnung erblicken, fiel irgendwann einmal die Bemerkung: ‘in der Sache stimme ich Ihnen zu, aber können Sie das, was Sie wollen, denn gar nicht anders nennen?’ Auch brieflich wird immer wieder gesagt: Die Sache ja, - das Wort nein Es geht nicht um die Theorie - freilich auch um eine Theorie- sondern um einen wirklichen Weg zu einem wirklichen Ziel und es geht um die Einsicht, den Willen und die Tat derer, welche diesen Weg wirklich gehen sollen.”³⁷⁶

Whilst the tone of the Frankfurt Christian Socialists revealed the closest affinity to Marxist socialism of all other groups, its real influence on the continued development of the Frankfurt CDU must be understood to have been both short lived and geographically limited. The influence of the left-wing in the Frankfurt CDP had already reached its climax with the Frankfurt Principles and it was after this date that the right wing forces became more prominent.³⁷⁷ Events such as the refusal by the US military to back K.H Knappstein as the CDP’s nominated party chairman in Frankfurt in favour of the more liberal Centre figure Jakob Husch or the decision by Kogon and Dirks in April 1946 to retreat from the central activities of the party and dedicate themselves to setting up the *Frankfurter Hefte*, signalled a premature decline in influence of the Frankfurt group’s socialist programme. By the end of 1946 the left-wing programme direction of Knappstein and Dirks had lost all credible influence in the party and have been described them as ‘Offiziere ohne Mannschaften.’³⁷⁸ On his and Kogon’s departure, Dirks himself admitted that they were in fact better journalists than political organisers. Although they retained some influence on the Hesse CDU, Dirks distanced himself more and more from the party and drew closer to the SPD. Together with the other Christian Socialists Kogon, Schulte and Knappstein, Dirks remained affiliated to the CDU through the *Oberurseler Kreis* that went on to campaign for the idea of a Europe Union. Whilst Dirks’ socialist programme succeeded in defining the official party profile, the non-socialist advocates soon made up the majority in the party.

³⁷⁶ Walter Dirks, “CDU Mitteilungen,” November 1946, cited in Arcadius R. Gurland, op. cit., p.226.

³⁷⁷ Bernd Uhl, op. cit., p.94.

³⁷⁸ Arcadius R. Gurland, op. cit., p.81.

“Aufgewertet wurde die Haltung der konservativen Mitglieder, die im Gegensatz zu Dirks und Knappstein keinen “bewussten” sondern allenfalls einen “situationsgebundenen” Sozialismus vertraten.”³⁷⁹

The Frankfurter Hefte

Like Welty's pamphlet *Die neue Ordnung*, the *Frankfurter Hefte* continued Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung in a journalistic rather than in a practical political capacity, symbolising the overriding intellectual significance of the slogan above its direct political usefulness. The motive of co-editors Kogon and Dirks for founding the *Frankfurter Hefte* held less significance for progressing the cause of the Hesse CDU, but was aimed at defending Christianity from exploitation as a mixed class ideology.³⁸⁰ Indeed Dirks and Kogon had proclaimed that their journalistic objective with the *Frankfurter Hefte* was that the journal should not be party affiliated.

“Der Blick auf und für das Ganze schließt eine parteipolitische Bindung der Zeitschrift aus.... Sie wird sich aber andererseits nicht damit begnügen allgemein geistige Voraussetzungen der Politik zu klären, sondern eine bestimmte politische Konzeption für das Deutschland und das Europa der nächsten Zukunft ausbilden und vertreten.”³⁸¹

The *Frankfurter Hefte* supported a symbiosis between Christianity and Marxism, but in the first two years after its first edition, actual strategies defining how their visions should be implemented rarely appeared.³⁸² Focke³⁸³ agrees that the *Frankfurter Hefte*;

“stellten von Anfang an weniger ein fertiges, nur zu propagandierendes und zu realisierendes Programm eines Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung als vielmehr die Idee eines erst zu erarbeitendes Konzeptes and die Spitze ihrer publizistischen Pläne.”

³⁷⁹ Heinrich Rüschenschmidt, *Die Entstehung der hessischen CDU 1945/46*, op. cit., p.48.

³⁸⁰ “Sie stellen das einzige bedeutsame Beispiel für eine ernsthafte, über den bloßen ideologischen Schlagabtausch hinausgehende Auseinandersetzung zwischen Christentum und Marxismus innerhalb der CDU dar und enthalten die leidenschaftliche Warnung an die Christdemokraten, als politische Partei nicht noch einmal das Christentum durch Verfilzung mit bürgerlicher Ideologie zu diskreditieren.” Franz Focke, op. cit., p.204.

³⁸¹ Martin Stankowski, op. cit., p.72.

³⁸² “Konkretion und Realisierungsvorstellungenin den ersten zwei Jahren der Zeitschrift sehr selten [waren];” Ibid., p.72.

³⁸³ Franz Focke, op. cit., p.205.

In the Frankfurter Hefte, Socialism was upheld as a uniting symbol to unite the two basic groups anticipated to form a governing coalition - workers and those Christians who had found their way to socialism.³⁸⁴

Programmes beyond Frankfurt. Regional tendencies in Hesse

The Frankfurt Group had the least success in disseminating the messages of its programme to other regions of Hesse, on account of strong regional loyalties to middle class political traditions there.³⁸⁵ The Frankfurt Principles were distributed to all regional CDU/CDP groups across Hesse but this did not guarantee that the programme's contents were accepted.³⁸⁶ In fact opposition to Hilpert's and Köhler's Christian Socialism in some state regions led to complaints to the US military demanding that restrictions on party licenses should be lifted to allow these regions to found their own non-socialist parties. Further regional complaints to the CDP party executive in Frankfurt also failed to secure a democratic solution according to members' wishes.³⁸⁷

The Offenbach CDP was in fact the only group in Hesse to agree with Frankfurt's left-wing, social reformist, Christian socialist version of economic socialism. The Wiesbaden CDP chose to adopt and modify the Berlin *Aufruf* instead of the Frankfurt principles. It accepted the term 'economic democracy,' and its emphasis on state control of large industry, protection against monopoly developments in the economy, but disagreed with the alteration of existing private ownership structures. The *Deutsche Aufbau Bewegung* (DAB) in Darmstadt was a conservative Christian group that welcomed private ownership rights, albeit with social responsibility, making no mention of any nationalisation plans. Its programme was closer to Dörpinghaus's *Aktion der deutschen Erneuerung* than that of the CDP and their *Allgemeinen Grundsätzen* contained little

³⁸⁴ Stephen D. Berger, "The Development of Legitimizing Ideas" in; Rudolf Wildenmann (Hrsg), Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik, Band 3, Günter Olzog, München/Wien 1972, p.85 (p.9-173).

³⁸⁵ H.G Wieck, op. cit., p.52f.

³⁸⁶ Heinrich Rueschenschmidt, Die Entstehung der hessischen CDU 1945/46, op. cit., p.152.

³⁸⁷ Heinrich Rueschenschmidt, Gründung und erste Jahre.... op. cit., p.21.

concrete information about the political and economical future of Germany. The DAB co-founder Maria Sevenich despised the soporific nature of political programmes;

“Das Programm bedeutet nämlich eine Art Schlafmittel. Wenn man sein Programm hat, dann guckt man unter den Paragraphen nach, wie es da steht, und dann kommt das zustande, was man das Murksen von früher genannt hat. Wenn man eine geistig klare Grundlage hat, wie wir diese konkreten Aufgaben zu lösen haben, dann entsteht lebendige Verantwortung.”

The Darmstadt DAB was concerned with religious renewal and saw Christianity as a spiritual defence against Marxism.³⁸⁸ Darmstadt did not demand a separation of responsibility between Church and State as the Frankfurter Principles, but the Church was expected to fulfil a central role in social renewal, by helping to implement Christian principles in politics.³⁸⁹

The deeper one descends into northern Hesse the less one encounters the demand for restructuring the economy and for an upheaval of existing ownership structures. The Giessen group rejected any structural changes in the economy and demanded state protection for the free economy, whilst the Kassel CDU demanded competition and freedom of private initiative and the protection of private property rights to be kept sacrosanct. The Wetzlar CDP adopted the Frankfurt programme as a basis for drafting the Principles of the CDP Wetzlar, in October 1945, but exchanged the policy of ‘wirtschaftlichen Sozialismus auf demokratischer Grundlage’ into an explicitly liberal economic system which rejected planning as an economic steering mechanism altogether and tolerated it for exceptional circumstances only in the first few months after the war. Even the otherwise widely accepted reform of workers’ participation rights in industry was struck from the CDP’s programme in Wetzlar;

“Wir bekennen uns zur freien Wirtschaft, zur Entfaltung persönlicher Initiative und zum Wettbewerb der besten Leistungen. Daher lehnen wir die bürokratische

³⁸⁸ Maria Sevenich, “Die Union als Gottesarbeit” in: Dienst am Kreuz. Speech held at Godesberg meeting 14-16 December 1945. Schriftenreihe der CDU des Rheinlandes, 4, Köln 1946, p.6. A. H. Berning interestingly reported on the CDU meeting in Godesberg in the ‘Hessischer Nachrichten’ on 22.12.1945 describing it more as a ‘Fühlungnahme’ of various groups who had found their way to found a new party than the ambitiously portrayed ‘Reichstagung.’ ACDP, III- 155-001/1 CDU 1945-49.

³⁸⁹ Heinrich Rüschemschmidt, Die Entstehung der hessischen CDU 1945/46. Lokale Gründungsvorgänge und Willensbildung im Landesverband (Staatsexam) p.70.

Planwirtschaft ab, die die Verantwortung und die Arbeitsfreudigkeit hemmt Solange gewisse Rohstoffe und Arbeitskräfte infolges des Krieges besonders knapp sind, halten wir aus sozialen Gründen eine Weiterführung planwirtschaftlicher Massnahmen für erforderlich. Die Aufhebung aller planwirtschaftlicher Massnahmen muss daher gefordert werden, sobald die Vorbedingungen für die Wiederherstellung einer freien Wirtschaft gegeben sind. Wir stehen auf dem Boden der Erhaltung des Privateigentums, wir fördern jede Massnahme, die dem arbeitenden Volke den Erwerb von Eigentum, insbesondere Hausbesitz, ermöglicht.”³⁹⁰

A letter from Ernst Leitz jr³⁹¹ of the CDP in Wetzlar to Dörpinghaus in Frankfurt, comments on an article in the CDU-Mitteilungen, the CDU party organ for Hesse, on 9, December 1946 that had suggested that;

“Diese früheren Anhänger der CDU stießen also zur Partei nicht etwa weil sie für die Frankfurter Leitsätze mit ihrem klaren Bekenntnis zum *Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung*, sondern weil sie gegen die SPD und KPD gestimmt waren.”

Leitz reveals that the Frankfurt Principles had originally included provision for a land reform but this disappeared from the programme following pressure from within the party ranks that this could risk alienating the farmers and losing their vote. Leitz further adds that since the SPD did not have any leading personalities, the CDU was forced to include socialist elements in its party programme as a way of attracting the socialist SPD voter. Leitz concludes “Das hat mit christlicher Verantwortung wenig zu tun” suggesting socialism was only added as a tactical consideration.³⁹²

Catholics from the Centre Party and Protestants from the *Christlich-Sozialen Volksdienst* in Kassel, saw the opportunity for setting up a party as a counterweight to the SPD and KPD even if separate confessional parties would have been preferable. Kassel did not

³⁹⁰ Leitsätze der CDP Wetzlar in NL- Dörpinghaus, ACDP, 009/003.

³⁹¹ Letter from Ernst Leitz. Jr. a local businessman and member of the CDP Wetzlar, 13. December 1946 to Bruno Dörpinghaus in Frankfurt; in NL-Dörpinghaus I-009-006/2.

³⁹² Leitz adds that in Wetzlar many people who had experienced the nationalisation of many German businesses in Czechoslovakia after 1919 developed an antipathy towards the word “Gemeineigentum” which had been responsible for their businesses being raided by the Czechs. Hence he warned that despite the Catholic majority in the region the slogan ‘Christliche Verantwortung’ was not convincing and were sceptical of the promise that the introduction of Gemeineigentum could bring progress.

adopt the term Christian socialism or socialism with Christian responsibility, but chose to emphasise private initiative and free competition;

“In solcher Gemeinschaftsordnung muß weitester Raum für eine private Initiative bleiben, die Erstarres durch neue Entwicklung in Fluss bringt und durch Wettbewerb die bessere und preiswertere Leistung fördert.”³⁹³

The Marburg CDU employed the Hesse formulation *Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung* but “füllte sie aber so aus, daß ihre konservativen-deutsch-nationalen Vorstellungen gewahrt blieben.”³⁹⁴

Although Christian Socialists were the co-founders of the party, the drafters of the first official programme, and dominated the CDU Hesse party executive and leading positions in the party, the parallel opposition from other CDU groups in Hesse to the Frankfurt programme reveals that Christian Socialism did not represent the real views of Hesse state. Politically the ideas of Hilpert’s Christian Socialist wing were in the minority. Their gradual loss in influence (a failure to distance themselves sufficiently from Marxist interests almost certainly led to their irrevocable downfall) and their replacement by the more liberal figure and programme of Bruno Dörpinghaus is further evidence of the underlying trend towards a liberal, whilst at the same time social, market economic model.

³⁹³ “Richtlinien der CDU Kassel” in; J. Lengemann (Hrsg), 25 Jahre Christlich Demokratische Union in Kassel 1945-1970, Kassel 1970. Stenzel the Chairman of the CDU Kassel confirmed at the first meeting on 2.12.45 in the Gildehaus that it was not the aim to change the economic form, structure or methods, but of changing the ‘Geist,’ people’s attitudes, and the way that they behaved in the capitalist system.

³⁹⁴ Heinrich Rüschenschmidt, Die Entstehung der hessischen CDU 1945/46, op. cit., p.115.

6.2. North Baden

The north Baden development was divided between three different groups in the American zone regions of Karlsruhe, Mannheim and Heidelberg, before finally agreeing to form a *Landesverband* for north Baden in February 1946. Whilst its initiators were predominantly Centre Party figures, they were, unlike their south Baden counterparts in the French zone, not plagued by desires to revive the Centre Party, thus making the transition to an interdenominational organisation both smooth and straightforward.

A Christian democratic party (CDP), with a 'starken und unentwegten sozialen Einstellung' was formed in August 1945 in Karlsruhe. Since co-operation with the SPD and Liberals was unimaginable, their only remaining partners for political collaboration were the former conservative parties and members of the *Christlichen Volksdienst*.³⁹⁵ The group³⁹⁶ was exclusively Catholic, as sceptical Protestants could not be persuaded to join. The CDP's first political programme in September 1945 contained specific references to economic and social policies and was characteristic of the social reform measures advocated by trade union groups in other CDU regions, upholding private property and business ownership rights, but also the nationalisation of large, monopoly industries and measures for implementing economic democracy in industrial relations between employers and employees. The Mannheim CDP on the other hand could boast parity in confessional representation of its members even if its foundation did not occur until as late as October 1945 under Mannheim's former deputy chairman of the Centre Party, August Kuhn. Plans were underway in Heidelberg to found a Christian *bürgerlich* catch-all party, calling itself the *Christlich-Soziale Union*, CSU. Since the population was majority Protestant, there was little chance of a revival of the Centre Party. The first programme from November 29 contained many liberal economic elements and contrasts with the Mannheim and Karlsruhe programmes, due to its lack of nationalisation plans.³⁹⁷ Following the national meeting of the CDU in Bad Godesberg in December

³⁹⁵ Gerd Hepp, "Die CDU im Landesbezirk Nordbaden" in; Paul Ludwig Weinacht (Hrsg), op. cit., p.113.

³⁹⁶ Co-founders included Fridolin Heurich, Adolf Kühn, Wilhelm Baur and Robert Beck.

³⁹⁷ Gerd Hepp, op. cit., p.119.

1945, that aimed to unite all Christian democratic groups across Germany, north Baden's three centres of Christian democratic activity Karlsruhe, Mannheim and Heidelberg agreed to form a *Landesverband* for north Baden and to adopt the uniform party title CDU.

There was little to emerge from the north Baden CDU in the subsequent period that departed significantly from the early programmes in the region.³⁹⁸ The concern with dealing with urgent daily political issues meant there was little opportunity to formulate the party's more philosophical ideas. Close contact took place between the north Baden leadership and the CDU in Cologne and Berlin, in particular Berlin's Jakob Kaiser and the work of the Christian trade unions, and this meant attention was focused on events taking place there. It was only once relations with the east CDU worsened from 1947 that the region adopted the views adumbrated by Adenauer. North Baden's CDU member, Anton Schwan, harboured ambitions that the region's party newspaper, the *Südwestdeutsche Union* would become a central discussion forum for the party's political programme and the paper published regular reports on decisions within the CDU leadership as well as publishing its own programme guidelines for north Baden. In an article entitled '*Christentum – Demokratie – Sozialismus*' from August 1946, Schwan gives insight into the importance attached to ideology and *Weltanschauung* in shaping the CDU's identity in a period of economic, political moral and social reconstruction;

"Deutschland ist zerbrochen. Allenthalben sucht man Wege aus dem Zusammenbruch. Diese Wege sind nicht nur mit guten Vorsätzen, sondern auch mit Schlagwörtern gepflastert. Schlagworte tragen ihren Namen nicht umsonst: sie schlagen die Begriffe tot, die sie verlebendigen sollen." ³⁹⁹

He refers to the blanket claim by all of the political parties in 1945 to espouse the values Christian, democracy and socialism. Christianity, he feared, was being employed to enhance a party's political legitimisation;

³⁹⁸ Gerd Hepp, op. cit., p.123.

³⁹⁹ Christentum – Demokratie – Sozialismus, Südwestdeutsche Union, Halbmonatszeitschrift der CDU, Landesverband Nordbaden, 1 Jg August 1946, 1/2.

“Die CDU bezeichnet es als Grundlage ihrer Arbeit, die DVP anerkennt seinen ethischen Gehalt, die SPD behauptet, es praktisch am besten zu verwirklichen und selbst die KPD will es wenigstens tolerieren.”⁴⁰⁰

The trend to declare oneself Christian, democratic and socialist was equally a symptom of the current party system, and is condemned as ‘propagandistischen Geschwätz.’ He acknowledges however that ‘*Prinzipienreden*’ provoked more positive reactions from participants at election rallies than the focus on everyday political affairs. This he says is based on the belief that political decisions are deemed more legitimate if they are derived from ‘*Grundsätzlichen*’ or from moral principles. Schwan’s remarks indicate that *Weltanschauung* in 1945 was still important as a legitimating device for political decisions, not with demagogic intent, but for providing citizens with some direction and purpose in the moral and political vacuum that they faced after the war. It had traditionally been the nature of the German party system that historically only those parties that could demonstrate ideological integrity were deemed worthy;

“Die politischen Parteien waren in Deutschland immer Weltanschauungsparteien und sie sind auch heute wieder.”

Parties that attempted to represent only interests, not *Weltanschauung*, would thus always remain an ephemeral factor in the German party system;

“Die Atmosphäre über Deutschland ist zu sehr weltanschaulich gesättigt, als daß der deutsche Mensch sich ihrem Einfluss entziehen kann.”

This clearly coloured the CDU’s discussions of its political manifesto in 1945. Programmes should not only deal with solving immediate economic deficiencies in the post-war climate, but with also establishing a party’s political identity and its own strand of ideology with which it could compete with the SPD and KPD and their traditions of social democracy and Marxist socialism. Yet Schwan strongly criticised the use of Christianity as the foundation for the CDU’s party ideology, since this committed the party to adhere to the Christian sense of responsibility in conducting all its political affairs at all times. Any failure to do so would simply denigrate Christianity;

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid.

“die Unzulänglichkeiten einer betont christlichen Politik zu Lasten des Christentums verbucht werden.”

Committing itself to Christian behaviour placed the onus and responsibility on the CDU to deliver peace and democracy in Germany.

6.3. North-Württemberg⁴⁰¹

North-Württemberg offered little potential for an interdenominational Christian party. The Centre Party had gained a negative reputation among the population for its failure to reach political compromise in coalition during the Weimar Republic and for agreeing to the Enabling Act that facilitated the Nazis' rise to power.⁴⁰² Stegerwald's idea of an interdenominational *Volkspartei* from the 1920s coupled with mutual experiences of Protestants and Catholics in the resistance, were significant impulses in the Stuttgart region for a Christian political union. The Centre Party figure Anton Huber summarised in his memorandum "*Volkspartei für Frieden, Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit*," that it was imperative for a new Christian democratic union of middle class liberal groups to offer a programme of social reform to counteract the Marxist-socialism of the left wing parties and overcome the antagonism amongst the working classes towards the Church and the role of Christianity in politics. Joseph Ersing, who co-founded the Berlin CDU, but then returned to Stuttgart in July 1945, was instrumental in promoting Berlin's CDU model of interdenominationalism in north-Württemberg. Although some willingness was expressed by former members of the *Christlich-soziale Volksdienst* (CSVD) to join in a political union of Catholics and Protestants, Protestant church representatives, notably Theodor Wurm, continued to express strong disapproval for developing a political programme on the basis of Christianity, and so denied the CSVD Church support for its interdenominational initiative in 1945.

⁴⁰¹ In September 1945 Eisenhower had ordered North Baden and North Württemberg to become one state, Württemberg-Baden, triggering the protracted dispute over the founding of a separate south west state. North Baden fought to retain its independence within Württemberg-Baden and from 1948 campaigned for unification with its southern partner, south Baden. See Gerd Hepp, op. cit., p.123ff.

⁴⁰² Karl Schmitt, "Die CDU in Landesbezirk Nordwürttemberg" in; Paul Ludwig Weinacht (Hrsg) op. cit., p.139.

Other Protestant contenders for an interdenominational party were members of the former DDP and DP parties. After a series of meetings during the summer of 1945, the Centre Party group agreed to co-operate with the CSVD. Together with further representatives from the *Bauern- und Weingärtnerbund* they formed the *Christlich-soziale Volkspartei* (CSVP) whose programme closely reflected the contents of the Berlin *Aufruf*. Liberals proceeded to revive the *Deutsche Volkspartei*. Yet political groups in the regions and localities of north-Württemberg almost overwhelmingly opted to follow the CSVD model in setting up regional political affiliations in the localities. All subsequent attempts to integrate the DVP, including the personal intervention by Berlin's Andreas Hermes in Stuttgart in January 1948, failed. Hermes' influence plus the impact of the meeting of the CDU in Bad Godesberg in December 1945 led the CSVP at their first party conference on January 13, 1946 to change their name to CDU. But the marriage of Catholics and Protestants in north-Württemberg did not remain harmonious for long as disputes over imbalance in confessional representation in the party during 1946-1948 revealed that interdenominationalism demanded more than a political fusion simply for the purpose of gaining more votes at elections. Success demanded a genuine will to co-operate with former political adversaries to stage meaningful social, economic and political reform.

7. French Zone

7.1. Rhineland-Palatinate

The birth of the CDU in Rhineland-Palatinate is characterised by its stubborn and fragmented development. The state of Rhineland-Palatinate was not created until August 30th, 1946 and the CDU did not form a *Landesverband* there until February 1947.⁴⁰³ Separate Christian political developments began in 1945 in the individual provinces of the Palatinate, in Rhinehesse and in Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau, before finally consolidating into two independent Christian parties- the CDP in Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau and the CDU in the merged region of Rhinehesse-Palatinate. When Rhinehesse-Palatinate and Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau then joined to become Rhineland-Palatinate, both state level parties continued to maintain separate identities for local elections. In fact;

“Die Vereinigung dieser beiden regional geprägten Parteien ergab sich nicht zwingend aus einem Gleichklang der Ziele und Interessen, sondern war eine verhältnismäßig späte Reaktion auf die französische Grenzziehung.”⁴⁰⁴

French military influences exerted the most dominant influence on the course and the content of programme discussions among the region's Christian parties. The parties themselves were also too concerned with the correct choice of party name and too harnessed by their own entrenched confessional attitudes and traditional political bias to develop any real new programme for Germany's economic and social reform. Without French military regulations permitting only one Christian party to be licensed in each of the two regions, a political union of Protestants and Catholics, a new CDU party, would almost certainly not have emerged. There was every sign that the former Weimar parties such as the *Christlich-Sozialen Volksdienst*, the *Demokratische Partei*, the *Deutsche Volkspartei*, the *Bayerische Volkspartei* and the Centre Party would have gradually

⁴⁰³ “Die Konferenzen zur Konstituierung eines Landesverbandes hatten den Charakter von Koalitionsgesprächen zwischen zwei ideologisch völlig verschiedene Parteien, nicht aber zwischen Schwesterparteien....” The discussions were “aus engstirnigem Prestigedenken geführt, ohne Rücksicht auf gemeinsame Ziele und programmatische Ideen.” Weitzel Kurt, *Von der CSVP zur CDU*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1982, p.190.

⁴⁰⁴ Anne Martin, “Die französische Besatzungspolitik und die Gründung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz” in; *Historisch Politische Mitteilungen*, Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik, Böhlau, Köln/Weimar/Wien 2 Jg. 2/1995. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Hrsg), p.131.

reinstated themselves across the culturally diverse region. The question of a federal versus a central structure for Germany was an important feature of the discussions, since federalism offered an opportunity to retain regional independence. Hostility to a centralised Germany was so great in some areas, that individuals looked to nurture closer relations with the French and suspicions even suggested that some groups entertained separatist desires. The Frenchman General Bouley⁴⁰⁵ for example recorded in December 1945, that Catholic groups in Germany had presented him with the idea of an independent *Franken-Reich* consisting of the regions of Westphalia, Rhineland, Hesse, Palatinate, Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria and Austria!

The following will consider how Christianity Democracy emerged in each of the three regions, Palatinate, Rhinehesse and Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau.

7.2. Palatinate

The Mayor Gustav Wolff and former Centre Party chairman priest Johannes Finck championed the idea of interdenominationalism in the Palatinate as a way of replacing the former Centre Party and the Bavarian *Volkspartei* with a new type of German party.⁴⁰⁶ The Christian trade unionist Adam Stegerwald shared personal exchanges with Wolff after the war and Stegerwald's account of Germany's political and moral dilemma 'Wo stehen wir?'⁴⁰⁷ in 1945 was printed and distributed across the Palatinate. It was in fact Stegerwald who encouraged Wolff to set up a party to prevent Protestants and Catholics from embarking on separate political developments. Helmut Kohl⁴⁰⁸ confirmed from early discussions that he himself held with Wolff, that many of the initiatives for the CDU in the Palatinate were derived from the close and regular contact the party had with the programme developments in the Berlin CDUD. The speeches by Hermes,

⁴⁰⁵ Anne Martin, *Die Entstehung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz*, V. Hase & Koehler, Mainz 1995, p.77.

⁴⁰⁶ Kohl points out that a large majority of Catholics in the Palatinate were conservative and critical of western democracy and liberalism and more in favour of forming a "römisch-katholisch Staatspartei." Helmut Kohl, *Die politische Entwicklung in der Pfalz und das Wiedererstehen der Parteien nach 1945*, Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Philosophischen Fakultät der Ruprecht-Karls Universität zu Heidelberg, 1958, p.70.

⁴⁰⁷ Adam Stegerwald, *Wo stehen wir?* Fränkische Gesellschaftsdruckerei, Würzburg 1945.

⁴⁰⁸ Helmut Kohl, op. cit., p.84.

Kaiser and Lemmer and others from the Godesberger meeting were for example also distributed in the Palatinate.

Yet by the end of November 1945 no agreement had been reached between Protestant and Catholic groups, prompting Finck and the Catholic prelate Martin Walzer to apply for a French military licence to refound the Centre as an interdenominational party. The claim that they were not an exclusively Catholic party and were open to Protestant members, is starkly reminiscent of the empty declaration made by the Centre Party in the 19th century, that had roused Julius Bachem in his famous article from 1906 to rally the Centre Party into abandoning its Catholic ghetto and throw open its doors to Protestants. Finck and Wolff nevertheless succeeded in bringing together over 40 prominent personalities to Neustadt, in December 1945, to make a final attempt at consensus between Protestant and Catholic circles. A proposal was finally made in January 1946 to start an interdenominational Christian Democratic Party (CDP), but the sincerity of their commitment has been doubted;

“Jener erste Schritt war jedoch nur dazu angetan, die Differenzen zu verschleiern, nicht sie zu beheben. Anders als der Wortlaut des Antrags vermuten ließ, hatten sich die katholischen-klerikalen Kräfte noch nicht dazu durchgerungen, Protestanten in ihrer Partei zu dulden, geschweige denn, sie als gleichberechtigte Partner anzuerkennen.”⁴⁰⁹

The application was backed by ten signatures of three former Centre Party members, two BVP, three DDP and one DVP, a configuration that revealed the Palatinate CDU as an amalgamation of middle class liberal parties. Walzer's name did not feature on the license application since Walzer would not relinquish his desire for a Catholic party based on the old Centre. In the meantime he had joined forces with Centre Party members in Rhinehesse to form a *Christlich Soziale Union* for Rhinehesse and Palatinate. This fixation on sectarian and Catholic religious principles has been criticised for neglecting current social circumstances.⁴¹⁰ Martin⁴¹¹ is able to confirm Wolff's claim that Walzer and his CSU group in Rhinehesse had been in close negotiations with the

⁴⁰⁹ Anne Martin, *Die Entstehung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz*, op. cit., p.73.

⁴¹⁰ Kurt Weitzel, *Von der CSVP zur CDU*, op. cit., p.43.

⁴¹¹ From recently released sources in the French military archives in Colmar.

French military over the future political structure for Germany, but adds that French military sources would not go so far as to support the thesis that they gave support to German separatist tendencies. Both Finck's and Wolf's CPD and Walzer's CSU applications were rejected by the French military however on the grounds that only one Christian party would be licensed. By January, the Palatinate CDP opted to change its name to CDU in order to harmonise with the wider Christian democratic movement across Germany.⁴¹²

Protestant liberals not willing to join Catholics in the new CDU also made a separate application for a '*Christlich Sozialen Volksbund*,' but anticipating its rejection by the military or the compulsion to join the CDU, rapidly changed its name to *Sozialer Volksbund* to circumvent the French ruling on granting only one Christian party a license. The emergence of the *Sozialer Volksbund* demonstrates the animosity Protestants still felt towards political co-operation with Catholics. This had to a certain extent been alleviated by their shared resistance against Hitler and by the more recent Treysa conference during which prominent Protestant representatives, including the former Chairman of the *Christlich Sozialer Volkdienst*, Friedrich Risch, declared their support for the CDU as a vehicle to end sectarian antagonism, "politische Gegensätze zwischen Protestantismus und Katholizismus auszuräumen."

7.3. Rhinehesse

Mainz was the centre of Christian democratic activity in Rhinehesse. In April 1945 the former Centre Party member Lorenz Diehl drafted his visions '*Gedanken über künftige politische Entwicklungen*'. Diehl expressed sympathy towards the idea of founding a new '*christliche, demokratische, und soziale Volkspartei*,' one that whilst predominantly oriented around the former Centre Party, should also welcome Protestants. Protestant liberals had been a major influence in Rhinehesse before 1933 but links had not been forged between the confessions before Nazi resistance fostered solidarity among the Church communities. In September 1945, Diehl met with members of the former

⁴¹² Kurt Weitzel, *Vom Chaos zur Demokratie. Die Entstehung der Parteien in Rheinland-Pfalz 1945-1947*, LZ für politische Bildung Rheinland-Pfalz, Mainz 1989, p. 26.

Weimar party, the *Christlich-sozialen Volksdienst* including its chairman in Hesse, Wilhelm Greb, to choose the clumsy name *Zentrum – christlich-Demokratisch-Soziale-Volkspartei* (CSVP), demonstrating the party's dilemma in attempting to simultaneously address the problems of the past and the future.⁴¹³ Individuals looked to retain continuity with the Centre Party but also to begin meaningful co-operation with Protestants. Yet there was disagreement, not only amongst some Centre Party members, who held on to conservative traditions of serving an exclusive Catholic electorate, but also from those advocates of a CSVP over the party's basic political position in the party spectrum;

“auch in den Vorstellungen ihrer Befürworter taten sich Gegensätze auf, die zu unterschiedlichen Standortbestimmungen der neuen Partei im Rechts-Links Spektrum und zum Nebeneinander prononciert föderalistischer und eher auf die Einheit Deutschlands gerichteter Strömungen führten.”⁴¹⁴

Diehl never intended the CSVP to become a;

“Auffanglager für alle nun politisch heimatlos gewordenen Menschen, Rechtsreaktionäre, Deutschnationale und liberal-demokratischen Kreise”⁴¹⁵

but advocated a centre-left party, committed to the ideas of the Christian trade union movement. His main aim was to transfer Catholic-socialist ideas into a new party rather than recreate Catholic predominance and a political representation for Catholic interests.⁴¹⁶

During the autumn, Protestants met with members from the *Bekennende Kirche* and from other liberal parties before agreeing to form a joint Programme Commission with Catholics in December. Protestants set about drafting the CSVP's programme showing its commitment to democracy, freedom, respect for the individual and freedom of

⁴¹³ Kurt Weitzel, *Von der CSVP zur CDU*, op. cit., p.37.

⁴¹⁴ Anne Martin, *Die Entstehung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz*, op. cit., p.68.

⁴¹⁵ This clashed with the Berlin CDUD's principle of welcoming “alle liberalen Kreise, auch sämtliche Konfessionen, alle die Kreise, die nicht in dem Programm der SPD und KPD ihr Heim finden, einschließlich jüdische Mitbürger aufnehmen.” The Mainz CSVP was crucially never conceived of as a catch-all party for liberal, democratic groups. It feared that opening the programme to influences from Berlin and Cologne would cause its Catholic principles to become diffuse. Kurt Weitzel, *Von der CSVP zur CDU*, op. cit., p.41.

⁴¹⁶ Anne Martin, *Die Entstehung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz*, op. cit., p.79.

expression. Protestants and Catholics thus first concentrated on achieving consensus within their own camps before committing themselves to an interdenominational union.⁴¹⁷ Even then, efforts were often half-hearted and slow to sacrifice their sectarian traditions. By the time the preparatory committee met in January 1946 to discuss the draft, the programme corresponded closely to that of the Centre Party's before 1933, retaining most of the previous Catholic principles but no real commitment to interdenomination. This indicates that Diehl remained fundamentally sceptical of accommodating the liberals, who he blamed for Weimar's downfall. Yet the CSVP interestingly also distanced itself from the left-wing, reformist Christian Socialism backed by the Christian trade unions in Berlin and the Rhineland. The CSVP supported an open market and individual property ownership and rejected social reforms that could change existing ownership structures such as nationalising industry. On closer inspection the CSVP revealed itself to be a conservative, liberal Catholic party, whose interests were more *bürgerlich* than proletarian. Although the liberal elements, such as the economic and social paragraphs on ownership rights and social obligations, originate from the former Protestant Weimar party- the *Christliche Soziale Volksdienst*, similar liberal policies were also demanded by Centre Party members, suggesting that;

“die wirtschafts- und sozialpolitischen Aussagen der CSVP auch *ohne* die evangelische Seite in diesem Sinne zustande gekommen wären.”⁴¹⁸

Independent Christian democratic activities in the Protestant dominated town of Worms, displayed more support from the Centre Party for a neo-liberal course, and former members expressed their desire to co-operate with earlier representatives of Weimar's Democratic Party (DP) and *Deutsche Volkspartei* (DVP), in a party of the '*bürgerliche Mitte*' committed to Christianity and democracy.⁴¹⁹ They opted to call themselves the CDU, not the CSVP as in Mainz. At the first founding conference of the Worms CDU on January 11, 1946, no working classes were represented. No less than 41% of

⁴¹⁷ Kurt Weitzel, *Von der CSVP zur CDU*, p.45.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.55.

⁴¹⁹ The military occupiers did not permit supporters of the former liberal parties DDP and DVP to cooperate with the Worms group and many conferences were banned. Not until January 1946 could they resume activity freely; *Ibid.*, p.67.

participants were self-employed individuals, characterising the middle class, liberal tone of Christian parties in Rhinehesse.⁴²⁰

At first the moves to set up the *Christlich Soziale Volkspartei* in Rhinehesse went unnoticed by the CDU in the Palatinate⁴²¹ and their application, like the parties in the Palatinate, was also rejected by the French authorities. In February 1946, the CDU in the Palatinate struck up agreement with a further Christian group in Rhinehesse, the Oppenheimer Circle, who were keen to set up a Centre style party, open to co-operation with Protestants. By March 5, 1946, they formed a joint CDU *Landesverband* or state council for Hesse-Palatinate, based largely on Palatinate's terms, but with both regions retaining a certain degree of regional autonomy.⁴²² Critical of the Palatinate group's close links to the Rhineland CDU in Cologne and the Hesse CDU in Frankfurt, Diehl kept up opposition to full merger with Palatinate and his party in Mainz stubbornly held on to their own name CSVP. Some CSVP members in Rhinehesse however began to abandon the idea of an independent political party and left to join the Rhinehesse-Palatinate CDU, thereby forcing Diehl to finally withdraw the CSVP's license application;

“Während hier (CSVP in Mainz) der weltanschauliche Charakter der Partei in allen Verlautbarungen und programmatischen Aussagen zutage tritt, zeigte sich in der Pfalz ähnlich wie in anderen Gebieten die Tendenz, aus der CDU eine säkularisierte Partei zu machen, um Konsequenzen aus der Zentrumsgeschichte zu ziehen.”⁴²³

Once the CDU for Rhinehesse-Palatinate had resolved the question of its underlying political principles it could concentrate on their practical application.⁴²⁴ The first joint party conference for Hesse-Palatinate was held on August 24th, 1946 in Mußbach where

⁴²⁰ Ibid., p.67.

⁴²¹ Helmut Kohl, op. cit., p.77.

⁴²² Hans-Otto Kleinmann, op. cit., p.47. During Weimar there had not previously been any connections between the Centre Party members in Rheinhesse and the Centre Party in the Palatinate and this helps to explain some of the initial cooperation difficulties. The Bavarian region of the Palatinate was traditionally oriented towards Munich whilst Rheinhessen was traditionally linked as a Hessen province to Darmstadt. Cooperation between them was the result of French military policy to fuse the two regions.

⁴²³ Kurt Weitzel, Von der CSVP zur CDU, op. cit., p.70.

⁴²⁴ “Die nun gestellte Aufgabe hieß, die ideologischen Grundlagen und Vorstellungen der Partei im politischen Alltag in die Praxis umzusetzen, zu überprüfen, inwiefern sich die Vorstellungen der CDU realisieren liessen.” Kurt Weitzel, Von der CSVP zur CDU, op. cit., p.93.

they launched a pragmatically formulated programme.⁴²⁵ Many former Centre Party members were particularly keen to be involved in the new Christian democratic movement to ensure their interests were adequately represented.⁴²⁶

7.4. Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau

Trier and Koblenz became the main centres in the province Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau for a comparatively smooth and rapid development of an interdenominational CDP. The support given by Catholic bishops to a new Christian democratic party was particularly decisive in helping the movement take root in Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau.⁴²⁷ Since Catholics were in the majority in the region there was little need for a party that stood specifically in defence of Catholic interests.⁴²⁸ Yet former Centre Party member Jakob Diel, who later became the first President of the Rhineland-Palatinate parliament, was against establishing a Christian 'catch-all' party.⁴²⁹ The French military was suspicious of the Centre Party and by adhering to its ruling that only one Christian party would be permitted, only gave its backing to the CDU. In September 1945, Christian democrats drafted a set of programme points based on the Cologne Principles but it took until the first party conference on 31 January, 1946 to ratify the programme. The delay indicates there was still widespread hesitancy in the population to join a 'democratic' middle class, *bürgerlich* party.⁴³⁰ Despite some differences in policy, the Trier group agreed to join the CDP in Montabaur and Koblenz, a party that had modelled itself on the same lines at the Cologne group and together they produced the 'Koblenz Principles.'

The CDP in Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau was more conservative in its programme than the CSVP in Rhinehesse or the CDU in Palatinate and sought to distance itself from the

⁴²⁵ Helmut Kohl, op. cit., p.85.

⁴²⁶ "damit die Rechte des katholischen Volksteils in dem nun werdenden neuen Verhältnissen gewahrt werden könnten." Anne Martin, Die Entstehung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz, op. cit., p.70.

⁴²⁷ Ibid., p.66.

⁴²⁸ Anne Martin, Die französische Besatzungspolitik und die Gründung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz, op. cit., p.134.

⁴²⁹ Ibid., p.134.

⁴³⁰ ACDP III-028 -032/1.

direction of the Berlin CDUD. There was every reason to expect support for an initiative to revive the Centre Party in 1945, since the Centre Party in Trier gained 46.1% of votes at the last free elections in March 1933, compared to 30% for the NSDAP.⁴³¹ Almost all Christian democrat activists in the region⁴³² were former Centre Party members and Christian trade unions, and their party application indicated that it was their aim to extend their particular influence over the whole region;

“Aus diesem Antrag wird deutlich, daß das grundlegende Prinzip des alten Zentrums eine Volkspartei zu sein, die alle Stände umfasst von der neuen Partei übernommen worden war.”⁴³³

7.5. Baden-Württemberg

Originally the preserve of the French, the region of Württemberg was forced to concede to sharing its territory when the American military authorities arrived in Stuttgart in July 1945. South Württemberg and south Baden were subsequently assigned to the French zone whilst north Baden and north Württemberg came under control of the American occupied zone. This division into a north Württemberg and a south Württemberg (called Württemberg-Hohenzollern) further corresponded to existing confessional and socio-economic divisions with a Catholic dominated, largely agricultural south and a Protestant, industrial north. Not until 1952 did the *Länder* merge to form the new federal state of Baden-Württemberg. The early development of Christian democratic parties in these provinces were thus shaped by their own different political and sectarian traditions and subject to the unique policies of their respective American or French military occupiers. The following reveals that they all arrived at a different political interpretation of Christian Democracy.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² Protocoll September 20th, 1945, ACDP, III-028 -032/1.

⁴³³ Herr Dr Zimmer in Herr Dr Zimmer and Frau Dr Mathilde Gantenberg, Die Gründungsgeschichte der CDU in Trierer Land 1945/6, 1955, ACDP III-028 -032/1.

7.6. South Baden

Separated from its northern counterpart in the American zone, south Baden underwent a unique development under its French occupiers. The French did not licence political parties until the end of 1945 and stipulated that they adopt federalist, 'anti-Reich' policies. Parties were criticised by the French allies for postulating a future German nation state in its programmes or for even mentioning 'Germany' in its party title. Parties were not permitted to form affiliated *Landesverbände* belonging to a national *Reichspartei* and were restricted to forming regional parties at state level only.⁴³⁴ Ironically such draconian French military policies corresponded to Baden's own peculiarly separatist mentality which sought to keep Baden *badisch* and resist re-integration into a centralised Germany. In 1945 there was little motivation in the Catholic dominated region to reconfigure those party alignments that had existed before 1933. A successor party to the Centre Party could comfortably rely on summoning Catholic support in 1945 and the desire to return to its former traditions encouraged a strong regional focus amongst Baden Christian democrats. The suggestion of a trans-zonal party aspired by the wider CDU was met with little enthusiasm. As was common to other regions of the south-west there was also a unique feeling of moral superiority in Catholic dominated Baden with a tendency to apportion the blame for National Socialism to the former liberal parties. Prussian notions of centralism and militarism were portrayed as alien to their culture and history;

"Die Berufung auf das Naturrecht entsprang dem Bedürfnis, sich vom Nationalsozialismus nicht nur programmatisch abzugrenzen, sondern diese Programmatik auch weltanschaulich, gewissermassen philosophisch zu fundieren. In dem man derart die Gegenwart von einem Wertesystem aus betrachtete, das keiner geschichtlichen Relativierung unterlag, hatte man es auch leichter, sich in den Wirrnissen der Zeitläufe zurechtzufinden."⁴³⁵

⁴³⁴ Paul-Ludwig Weinacht, "BCSV und CDU in Baden" in; Die CDU in Baden-Württemberg und ihre Geschichte, Paul Ludwig Weinacht (Hrsg), Kohlhammer, Stuttgart/Köln/Mainz/Berlin 1978, p.83.

⁴³⁵ The propagation of a so-called 'Entlastungsphilosophie' helped to absolve the Catholic south of any responsibility for National Socialism and apportioned blame to the Protestant and Prussian north. Peter Fässler, *Badisch, Christlich und Sozial. Zur Geschichte der BCSV/CDU im französischen besetzten Land Baden (1945-1952)*. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1995, p.110f.

An order based on Christian Natural Law, since it was devised by God, would by contrast be immune to such abuse and interference by State power.

Some of the early Christian political movements in the region included the *Christlich-Soziale Vereinigung* and the *Vereinigung Abendland*. The *Christlich-Soziale Vereinigung* was backed by Christian trade unions from south Baden and south Württemberg (Württemberg-Hohenzollern) who met in December 1945 to discuss how they could steer party programmes towards improving workers' social, political and economic interests in a type of Labour Party. Here it was Hermann Hessler's objective to ensure that liberal Catholics did not gain the upper hand in the new party as they had many decades earlier;

“die reaktionären Elemente, oder richtiger gesagt die kapitalistisch denkenden Kreise in der Partei zurückzudrängen, damit sie nicht, wie mitunter im früheren Zentrum, wo sie als die eigentlichen Geldgeber oft den Kurs bestimmten, die Oberschaft gewinnen und das alte Spiel wieder von neuem beginnt.”⁴³⁶

Their programme views mirrored those of the trade unionist-Christian Socialist wing of the CDU in other parts of Germany such as Berlin, Frankfurt and the Rhineland, calling for workers' protection legislation, employment rights, and social insurance but are a further example of how a Labour Party concept could not compete with the conservative, liberal Catholics who were opposed to any radical notions of anti-capitalist, socialist reform. The *Vereinigung Abendland* was a Christian conservative group conceived to mark a departure from Germany's history of Prussian war ideology and Prussian world leadership ambitions in favour of a “Rückbesinnung auf das gemeinsame christliche und humanistische Erbe des Abendlandes”⁴³⁷ which harked back to the traditions of the Middle Ages, such as authority of the Church and Christianity.

The first Christian parties to appear were an interdenominational *Christlich-soziale Volkspartei* in Neustadt and a *Christlich-Soziale Union* in Konstanz in the summer and autumn of 1945. At the Neustadt party conference in January 1946, suggestions by the local activist Paul Fleig of the Konstanz group, to change the Neustadt party title to Christian Democratic, were resisted through fear that they would be forced to consider

⁴³⁶ Ibid., p.55.

⁴³⁷ Ibid., p.43.

liberal views in their programme and so hinder implementation of Christian ideas. This was based on the assumption that those members who wanted to include 'democratic' in the title, did so, because they wanted to attract former liberals to join. The word 'democratic' was still largely equated with liberal Protestants and 'socialism' with Christianity and Catholics. 'Democracy' and all that its meaning evoked, offered a powerful instrument with which to appeal to co-operation with the Protestant communities. In Freiburg, the Priest Ernst Föhr campaigned to reinstate the Centre Party but unashamedly rejected co-operation with Protestants. Somewhat conceitedly he argued, that for the benefit of gaining some extra votes from former 'Volksdienst' voters, the Centre Party should not sacrifice its fundamental principles for a '*weltanschaulichen Mischmasch*.'⁴³⁸

The real pioneers of a Christian interdenominational party in south Baden however was the *Christian Arbeitsgemeinschaft* (C.A.G), formed in Freiburg in July 1945 and which became the main centre for Baden's long-term Christian party. Freiburg political initiatives have already been shown to be significant for their influence on the development of the Social Market Economy. Initiators included Catholic and Protestant professors from Freiburg university⁴³⁹ and active members of the resistance including Constantin von Dietze and Franz Büchner who believed that the Christian confessions should unite against the emerging threat from Bolshevism in a broad based Christian party - a *Christlich-soziale Volksunion*. They drew on the views of the economic theorist

⁴³⁸ H.G Wieck, *Die Entstehung der CDU und die Wiedergründung des Zentrums im Jahre 1945*, Droste, Düsseldorf 1953, p.110.

⁴³⁹ In 1945 the Beckerath group in Freiburg updated its 1942 currency policy audit to assist the American occupiers in effecting an efficient transition of the war-economy. No less than 20 audits were also prepared for the French military in Freiburg. In each case the recommendations met with little enthusiasm and found minimum implementation by the US and French militaries, who were following their own political and economic occupation agenda for Germany. In September 1947 the group's economic programme, in particular currency policy, received renewed interest at the so-called conference of High school teachers' in Rothenburg as part of the initiative by Gerhard Albrecht to re-establish the 'Verein für Sozialpolitik'. Many of the seventy participants did not agree with the prescribed nature of the proposals laid out in the "wirtschaftspolitisches Sofortprogramm" criticising them as too liberal and market oriented. Nevertheless the programme was sent to Erhard and later to all those responsible for economic affairs for example in the Bizone, in the regional state (Länder) governments, and the Reichsbank successor institute, the Bank deutscher Länder. All attempts at a revival of the group and its activities were eventually abandoned once the Economics Council (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat) in the Economics' Administration for the Bizone (Verwaltung für Wirtschaft des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes) was formed in January 1948. Beckerath was nominated the Economics Council's deputy Chairman and later Chairman, a position he occupied until his death in 1964.

Walter Eucken and the Freiburg School of political economists for their vision of a new social and economic order for Germany after the war. No less than 40 prominent names from both denominations, including the Centre Party members Fleig, Zürcher and Person, pledged support for the *Volksunion* idea. By December 16, Fleig and Zürcher had formulated a programme for what became known as the *Badisch-Christlich-sozialen Volkspartei* (BCSV). It advocated a federal structure for Germany, a democratic bicameral system and the rule of law. Reflecting third way ordo-liberal economics, the programme rejected both collectivism and private industrial monopolies. The principle of competition was at the heart of the economic order, whilst the State had responsibility for macro-economic decisions, for the '*planvolle Gesamtordnung des Wirtschaftslebens*'. Although private property was favoured the state had the power to nationalise branches of the economy if it furthered the interests of the community.

In the early months of its development however the BCSV contended with its more reactionary Centre Party wing, led by Leo Wohleb, who also later became the BCSV's party leader at the foundation of the CDU Landesverband for Baden in Karlsruhe in February 1946. The social elements in Christian democracy were weakened by the predominance given to Baden's specific regional interests.⁴⁴⁰ Whilst the party aimed for Christianity to form the basis of the new society, the commitment to being 'Christian' and 'socialist' was pure rhetoric that primarily aided party integration. By emphasising the *Badisch* element, traditionalists like Wohleb could thus resurrect the region's conservative, liberal traditions. Its programme reflected the existing socio-economic structure of Baden's population promising a '*mittelständisch und genossenschaftlich orientierte soziale Marktwirtschaft*' with seldom any mention of socialist policies. There was no significant industrial proletarian base in the region and the population was either agrarian or small and medium sized self-employed manufacturing businesses. There was thus little incentive to instigate radical change of previous ownership structures. The BCSV is thus best described as a conservative movement that sought a continuation of the status quo.

⁴⁴⁰ Peter Fässler, op. cit., p.207ff.

Other former Centre Party figures in the party such as Gröber,⁴⁴¹ sought to steer the party back to a reformist Christian socialist programme adopted by other regions of the CDU. Protestants in the party also pressed for the BCSV to change its name to harmonise with the CDU in other parts of Germany, but this did not happen until as late as November 1947 and even subsequent to this, the party retained its traditional *Badisch* and Centre Party character. The party newspaper, the *Südwestdeutsche Union*, launched as a forum for programme discussions, warned of the party's parochial tendencies;

“Man bedauert, daß sie nicht den gleichen Namen hat wie die christlich-demokratischen Parteien in den übrigen Zonen was ihrer eigentlichen Anschauung und ihrem gemeinsamen Willen entspräche und sie auch nicht immer in den Verdacht der Eigenbrötelei und eines überspannten Föderalismus brächte.”⁴⁴²

Only during the course of 1946/7 did the opposition to Wohleb's conservative Centre Party style programme succeed in directing the party towards the socially diverse nature of the CDU as a true *Volkspartei*.⁴⁴³ The religious basis adopted by the BCSV's programme was therefore suspicious.⁴⁴⁴

As in other CDU groups across Germany, differing political trends within the BCSV in Baden, from trade unionist, to representatives of the Catholic conservative *Mittelstand*, to ordo-liberals, resulted in a delay in the drafting of the party's 'Economic and Social Guidelines' until as late as April 1947 whilst compromise was being sought. It finally appeared however that the Catholic liberals had succeeded in pushing through their programme whilst partially acknowledging ordo-liberal objectives. The programme recognised competition in the economy as the central organising factor and with

⁴⁴¹ Gröber was an ambiguous character. He had been involved in instrumenting the Reichskonkordat with Hitler believing a compromise could be reached with the NS regime. Gröber's Hirtenbriefe nevertheless criticised the Church during the national socialist regime, for only staging its protest once Christian figures came under attack.

⁴⁴² Südwestdeutsche Union, Halbmonatszeitschrift der CDU, Landesverband Nordbaden. 1 Jg. August 1946, 1/2, Bad Carl Fuerst from Offenburg, p.12.

⁴⁴³ Peter Fässler, op. cit., p.129.

⁴⁴⁴ “Die religiöse Tonart, die in der Parteiprogrammatik angeschlagen wurde, konnte auf grossen Zuspruch hoffen, baute sie doch auf den von der katholischen Kirche vermittelten Ordnungsvorstellungen auf. Zudem ermöglichte die weltanschaulich-religiöse Deutung der Zeitlage dem Einzelnen, Gedanken an eventuell vorhandenen Schuld zu verdrängen, und dem Schuldig gewordenen, wieder reumütig in den Schoß der christlichen Gemeinschaft zurückzukehren.” Peter Fässler, op. cit., p.114.

reference to the principles of Natural Law, maintained its commitment to private ownership. Class antagonism would be avoided through emphasis on social partnership between workers and employers, and the development of a new *Gemeinschaftsdenken*, yet the BCSV did not interpret their aims as socialist. The word Socialism was used for its contemporary relevance and to prevent it being permanently confiscated by their political opponents. The word never found its way into the BCSV programme and when it was used it was also meant in a practical sense of decent and fair treatment of workers and security for old aged and sick or as an expression of solidarity and brotherly behaviour in society. The BCSV can therefore also be seen as proof of the compatibility that exists between Freiburg ordo-liberal thinking and a liberal Catholic conservatism, the dualism that later provided the model of the CDU's social market economy.

7.7. Württemberg-Hohenzollern

Discussions between Protestants and Catholics in south Württemberg, the French occupied state of Württemberg-Hohenzollern were slow to start up, choosing to first observe Christian party developments in other regions of Germany. The foundation of the *Christlich-soziale Volkspartei* in the American occupied town of Stuttgart, north-Württemberg in October however, propelled Württemberg-Hohenzollern into action. Following Order no. 23 by the French military that permitted the formation of political parties on 13 December 1945, former Centre Party leader Franz Weiß campaigned almost single-handedly⁴⁴⁵ to attract Centre Party and *Volksdienst* members to join a new interdenominational political movement. The first programme from January 6, 1946 corresponded closely to Christian Socialism in other regions of the country. Later versions in March of that year gave even more emphasis to the Christian and social components, but fell short of the Berlin programme's express condemnation of the '*bürgerliche Gesellschaftsordnung*.' As with other Christian Socialists across the country, there were competing views as to whether the economic programme should primarily draw on Christian social teaching or on socialist principles, but the need to respond to more immediate and acute concerns in the region's towns and communities by

⁴⁴⁵ Uwe Dietrich Adam, "Die CDU in Württemberg-Hohenzollern" in; Paul Ludwig Weinacht (Hrsg), op. cit., p.168.

providing housing and material provisions, pushed such ideological and seemingly long-term decisions, off the agenda.

Programmes, Power and Personality 1947-1949

8. Consolidation in the CDU

8.1. CDU in the Bizone

When the US proposed merging the British and the American zones in the summer of 1946 to form a 'Bizone,' the primary concern was to bring economic autonomy but not yet political autonomy¹ to the region. Speaking before the US military and the German minister presidents for the American zone in Stuttgart on September 6, 1946, US foreign minister J.F. Byrnes noted, that it was the express wish of the US people, for Germany to regain its own government. Adenauer registered this as an early indication of US intentions,² presenting the CDU with a window of opportunity to become a powerful political party in Germany.

Once the Bizone had been inaugurated in the autumn of 1946, its institutions subsequently underwent three separate phases of development.³ In the first phase, which lasted until mid 1947, there were five independent administrations or *Verwaltungen*. These were modified in the second phase when the Bizone expanded to form the 'Wirtschaftsrat des vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes.' A further restructuring took place in at the beginning of 1948, augmenting the influence of the economic department or administration in the *Wirtschaftsrat*, called the '*Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*.' During the last stage in 1948, the Bizone developed into the Trizone when the French zone joined forces with the British and American allies. The *Wirtschaftsrat* continued to operate in

¹ Uwe Uffelman, *Der Weg zur Bundesrepublik. Wirtschaftliche, gesellschaftliche und staatliche Weichenstellungen 1945-1949*, Schwann, Düsseldorf 1988, p.79. See also Günter Plum's introduction to *Akten zur Vorgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Band 3, Juni -Dezember 1947, Bearb. von Günter Plum, Hrsg. von Bundesarchiv und Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Oldenbourg, München 1982, p.4.

² Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, op. cit., p.106.

³ Tilman Pünder, *Das bizonale Interregnum*, Grotes, Waiblingen 1966.

this form until its activities were terminated in 1949. The entire development was underpinned by two strategies. The first and most decisive strategy during the Bizone's lifetime was pursued by the British and American allies, (although the US quickly emerged as the most dominant and decisive). The second strategy was determined by the actions of German political representatives⁴ nominated to run the Bizone institutions. The influence of the German political parties and representatives depended entirely on the degree of freedom granted by their respective military occupier to participate in shaping social and economic policy. It is not the aim here to examine the British and American allied policy on Germany⁵ but to focus on the second level of influence, on the policies pursued by the German representatives, specifically those pushed through by the CDU parliamentary group in the Bizone.

It is also beyond the scope of this investigation to examine the CDU's involvement and the thrust of its policy objectives in all of the Bizone's separate institutions during all three stages.⁶ It will focus only on those individual committees, departments and bodies in which CDU representatives actively participated in the development of Germany's social-economic order, questioning whether the policy line adopted by the CDU's parliamentary representatives in the Bizone between 1946 and 1949 was in line with the party's political thinking in the American and British zones or if it deviated from the party's existing programme, in particular the official CDU programme for the British zone, the Ahlen programme.

The CDU's Hermann Pünder and director of the Bizone's *Verwaltungsrat* from 1948, later noted that in the years after 1949 there was a tendency to portray the CDU's political representatives in the Bizone as all having been in favour of market economic reforms. But this conceals the reality of the level of scepticism towards introducing a

⁴ Conrad F. Latour, Thilo Vogelsang, *Okkupation und Wiederaufbau. Die Tätigkeit der Militärregierung in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1944-1947*, Studien zur Zeitgeschichte, Hrsg. Vom Institut für Zeitgeschichte, DVA, Stuttgart 1973, p.163.

⁵ This has been well documented. See for example Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, Green Press Publishers, Westport Connecticut 1950. John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany*, Stanford University Press, California 1968. Wolfgang Benz, *Von der Besatzungsherrschaft zur Bundesrepublik. Stationen einer Staatsgründung. 1946-1949*, Fischer Taschenbuch, Frankfurt/Main 1989.

⁶ For a detailed account of the institutional arrangements of the Bizone see T. Pünder, *op. cit.*

liberal economy still shown by many members at the time.⁷ The remark indicates a young, disparate, disoriented party, wrangling with its members' commitment to both social reform and conservative, liberal traditions - a party desperate to avoid the laissez-faire economy of the past, but anxious of the political consequences of adopting socialism. At the heart of this section's inquiry is the question how Erhard's Social Market Economy, which was adopted as the basis for the CDU's Düsseldorf manifesto and its campaign slogan for west Germany's first federal elections in 1949, was able to satisfy the diverse cross-section of the party's political aspirations.

Bizone administrations

The establishment of joint administrations for the British and American zones served the allies' primary aim of solving acute food shortages and stagnating industrial output. There was also a clear desire for the zones to merge by Germans in the US zone, since they would benefit from a share in the economic potential of the Rhine-Ruhr region.⁸ The Bizone administrations were also set up in response to the growing realisation that the original aims⁹ to set up central German run administrations jointly with the French and the Soviet zones were unlikely ever to succeed. The economic imperative for forming the bizone administrations quickly revealed that economic matters were also inextricably linked to questions of the state's political framework.¹⁰ It was illusory to imagine that economic co-operation could take place between the zones without paying equal attention to the region's political structure.

After the establishment of the Bizone's institutional and administrative bodies confronted German political representatives were confronted with the decision over what basic form

⁷ "Heute wollen sie alle 'dafür' gewesen sein und von jenen Schwierigkeiten will kaum einer heute noch etwas wissen." Hermann Pünder, "Die Entstehung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft während des 'bizonalen Interregnums.'" Aus der Amtszeit des Frankfurter Verwaltungsrates 1948/49" in; Ludwig Erhard. Beiträge zu seiner politischen Biographie. Festschrift zum fünfundsiebzigsten Geburtstag, Poppyläen, Frankfurt/Main, Berlin-Wien 1972, p.186.

⁸ Walter Vogel/Christoph Weisz (Bearb.), Bundesarchiv und Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Hrsg.), Akten zur Vorgeschichte der BRD 1945-1949. Band I, September 1945-December 1946, R. Oldenbourg, München/Wien 1976, p.28.

⁹ On 20 July 1946 US military governor McNarney had recommended one economic system to be applied across all four occupied zones. The British military were in favour but the suggestion was rejected by French and Soviet forces.

¹⁰ Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.7.

the German economy should take - a central, state planned or a free market oriented economy. Until this point, the parties had had little direct influence over the management of individual administrations in the British and the American zones. as this task had been carried out by appointed German officials who had often come to enjoy close relations with the military authorities. German political parties and the trade unions frequently came into conflict over policy issues with German state administration officials and the minister presidents in the British and American zones. This political alienation meant that until now political parties had exercised the freedom to discuss and air their policy recommendations without restraint¹¹ or interference, but also without any real influence. The establishment of the Bizone however offered parties the first real forum to shift attention from their philosophical, ideological and largely hypothetically formulated programmes to focus on the practical application of their ideas in a real life political environment. State level governments however were now forced to cede decision making powers to Bizone departmental level, where representatives were drawn from the German political parties and a fairer sharing of power was gradually attained.¹² Demands by the parties for an immediate parliamentary structure to be set up in the Bizone, went unheeded as long as the US and British allies insisted that the joint institutions constituted no more than an economic merger of the two zones.¹³

Early indications that the Bizone's first phase would fail, were evident. The five administrations were divided geographically between both zones, to avoid being forced to nominate a capital city and give the appearance of political fusion.¹⁴ But problems resulted when insufficient co-ordination and information exchange took place between ministries and states showed uncertainty where and with whom powers lay.¹⁵ Besides clashes between Germans' insistence on introducing a parliamentary structure and the allies' economic objectives for the region, conflict among Germans themselves added a

¹¹ Walter Vogel/Christoph Weisz, op. cit., p.27.

¹² Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.54.

¹³ Walter Vogel/Christoph Weisz, op. cit., p.84.

¹⁴ Wolfgang Benz, "Vorform des Weststaats: die Bizone 1946-1949" in; Theodor Eschenburg, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Jahre der Besatzung 1945-1949, Band 1, DVA, Stuttgart 1983, p.377.

¹⁵ Wolfram Werner (Bearb), Bundesarchiv und Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Hrsg), Akten zur Vorgeschichte der BRD 1945-1949, Band II, Januar-Juni 1947, Bearbeit. von Wolfram Werner, R. Oldenbourg, München/Wien 1979, p.25.

further obstacle to building cross party co-operation in the Bizone. The impasse developed as the states in the American and the British zones competed to install their own representatives in senior administrative positions and to secure their own state's ideological legitimacy in every Bizone institution.¹⁶ Each zone attempted to impose its own zonal model of economic and political organisation on the nascent Bizone. States in the British zone for example, sought to maintain the centralised economic model that they had become familiar with in the British zone administration or *Zonenbeirat*, whilst the states in the American zone defended the federalist structure of its *Länderrat*.¹⁷ Adenauer was actively involved in discussions to reform the structure of the British zone *Zonenbeirat*, and put forward recommendations that would increase the overall influence of political parties.¹⁸ He argued that the parties were more democratically accountable to the people in the British zone than the military nominated German administrators, but vehemently rejected the American zone *Länderrat* model for the British zone.¹⁹

Ironically the dispute over whether a federal or a centralised economic order should be adopted for the new Bizone mirrored the conflict that had, until now, characterised the CDU's own regional discussions. Although the CDU groups in the south German states of the US zone recognised a degree of central economic planning was unavoidable for tackling the urgent economic difficulties of post-war reconstruction, they nevertheless feared that their traditional southern *mittelständisch* style economy could become subsumed by the industrial might of the Rhine-Ruhr region. With the exception of

¹⁶ The *Länderrat* of the American zone elected its candidates for the Bizone. In the British Zone, selection was less democratic as individuals were nominated by the British military authorities.

¹⁷ Werner Abelshauser, *Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945-1948. Rekonstruktion und Wachstumsbedingungen in der amerikanischen und britischen Zone*, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, DVA Stuttgart, 1975. p.72ff. See also Wolfgang Benz, *Vorform des Weststaates... op. cit.*, p.376ff.

¹⁸ Activities surrounding the initiation of the Bizone unfolded chiefly between the Länder and the zonal authorities as leaders of the political parties were given little opportunity to participate. Wolfram Werner, *op. cit.*, p.86.

¹⁹ In view of his own leadership style, it is ironic that Adenauer should argue; "der süddeutsche Zustand alles andere als erstrebenswert ist. In Süddeutschland haben sie - ich drücke mich da vorsichtig aus - den Führergedanken, in dem sie den Länderchefs mit einem großen Stamm von Beamten immer frei und willkürlich schalten und walten lassen. Ich kann namens meiner Partei erklären, daß wir den Führergedanken überall dort erkämpfen, wo er sich bemerkbar macht." Konrad Adenauer, minutes of "Tagung des Hauptausschusses des Zonenbeirats der britischen besetzten Zone in Bad Godesberg, 14. Dezember 1946" in; Walter Vogel/Christoph Weisz, *op. cit.* p.1130ff. Theodor Steltzer disagreed with Adenauer arguing that the British Zone 'Zonenbeirat' should look instead to adopting the political model of the *Länderrat* and focus on building joint Bizone institutions, not separate ones in each zone.

Hesse, the south German states put up a fierce resistance to full economic merger with the British zone. Ongoing battles between differing British and American occupation policies also frequently led to a conflict of interests for German representatives, since they were not always clear whether they were representing their political party, their state government or their military occupier. The south German state representatives for example had been issued specific guidelines by the American military for conducting negotiations with British zone representatives in the Bizone, which prompted them to defend free market economics, private business rights, and to reduce bureaucratic planning to a minimum.²⁰

Political parties in the British zone had been freer than their counterparts in the American zone to publicly articulate their policies and their programmes since they were not directly answerable to the British military authorities. The British zone Bizone institutions were more party political in tone²¹ and the CDU party in particular had succeeded in establishing itself as a credible force there. The Ahlen programme had been ratified in the North Rhine-Westphalia parliament, bringing widespread nationalisation plans to the region, and an elevated status to the CDU in the British zone as a whole. Compared to the disparate regional CDU parties in the American zone states, the British zone CDU also boasted a superior organisation. It had concentrated the party's activities in North Rhine-Westphalia and had formed a special *Zonenverband* and a *Zonenausschuß* for representatives from the CDU in all states of the British zone. In terms of a political manifesto, neither the CDU in the US zone states or the CDU in the northern states in the British zone had a programme to compete with the Ahlen programme of the CDU in North Rhine-Westphalia. Without the political weaponry of a popular party manifesto, the CDU in the south-west state governments of the US zone lacked the consolidated, united voice with which it could effectively counter the British zone proposals and so contributed to their gradual loss of political influence, whilst Adenauer's CDU in the British zone, gained in political ascendancy.

²⁰ Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.64f.

²¹ Walter Vogel/Christoph Weisz. op. cit., p.28.

Of the five²² administrations or *Verwaltungsräte* established in the Bizone in January 1947, it quickly emerged that the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft* or Economics Committee, would become the most powerful.²³ Situated in Minden in the British zone, site of the former British zone *Zentralamt für Wirtschaft*, it was perhaps inevitable that the new *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft* should inherit the centralist structures that characterised the British occupation, even though this further aggravated the south German states of the American zone.²⁴ The SPD currently held the leadership of individual economic ministries in all eight Bizone states, and soon the *Verwaltungsrat für Wirtschaft* also looked as if it would become a SPD domaine. Indeed after an initial brief period in which Hesse's Rudolf Mueller (LPD) held the leadership of the *Verwaltungsrat für Wirtschaft*, the position was taken over by the SPD's Victor Agartz in January 1947. On visiting Minden, the social democrat and general secretary of the south German *Länderrat* Erich Roßmann, expressed concern that the Bizone administrations in the British zone were being set up with 'treibhausartiger Raschheit',²⁵ a deliberate move so as to present the decision over the Bizone's future political course with a fait accompli. Roßmann knew the power potential housed in the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*, remarking that those who had the command of the economy would become the country's future leaders.²⁶ After his nomination, Agartz set about installing a centrally administered *Bewirtschaftungssystem*, that as Erhard later claimed, if it had been allowed to continue, would have led to a continuation of the strict war economy.²⁷ This immediately triggered

²² These were the departments Economy, Food and agriculture, transport, finance, post and telecommunications. They were headed by a 'Verwaltungsrat' or Executive Committee.

²³ The worsening economic outlook and catastrophic food shortages led the committee's later leader, Ludwig Erhard, to remark; "Es war der erste Ausdruck für das Erkenntnis, daß der Wiederaufbau der deutschen Wirtschaft einer gemeinsamen deutschen zentralen Verwaltung bedarf." Ludwig Erhard, "Das Aufbauwerk der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft" in; Politisches Jahrbuch, CDU/CSU, 1. Jg, 1950, p.116.

²⁴ Their protest was voiced by Ludwig Erhard, representative for Bavaria. See minutes of the meeting of the 'Verwaltungsrat für Wirtschaft' on 26th September 1946, Walter Vogel/Christoph Weisz, op.cit. p.871ff.

²⁵ Aufzeichnung Roßmann, cited in Wolfgang Benz, Von der Besatzungsherrschaft op. cit. See also Christoph Weisz, "Deutsche Überlegungen zur Bildung der Bizone. Erich Roßmanns Reise in die Britische Zone im August 1946" in; Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Jg 22, Heft 1, Januar 1974. p.204-225.

²⁶ Erich Roßmann on 10. September 1946 in Walter Vogel/Christoph Weisz, op. cit., p.872.

²⁷ Ludwig Erhard, Das Aufbauwerk der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft, op. cit., p.116.

opposition not only from the more liberal CDU groups in the states of the US zone,²⁸ but also from the CDU's Christian Socialist wing in the CDU in the British zone, who also vehemently opposed Agartz's extreme Marxist-Socialism. CDU antagonism towards Agartz thus sparked an unprecedented campaign of attacks on the SPD's economic dominance, indirectly strengthening the position of the liberals within the CDU²⁹ who campaigned for a more liberalised economy. Besides voicing criticism, the CDU did not offer their own viable alternative to Agartz's much derided economic policy, and is a clear indication that by 1947 the CDU had still not managed to sufficiently consolidate liberals and socialists in its own ranks to produce a party consensus on economic policy.

Wirtschaftsrat für das Vereinigte Wirtschaftsgebiet

When the Moscow meeting of allied foreign ministers in March and April 1947 failed for the fifth time to formulate a joint occupation policy for all four allied zones, the US and British allies agreed to undertake a reform³⁰ of their Bizone, concentrating on economic reconstruction in the western zones, in the knowledge that this would lay the foundation of west European integration.³¹ The existing five administrations of the Bizone were restructured to create what officially became known as the *Wirtschaftsrat für das Vereinigte Wirtschaftsgebiet* with a capital city in Frankfurt and comprising a separate economic council- the *Wirtschaftsrat*, an executive council - the *Exekutivrat*, plus a number of executive directors - *die Direktoren*.³² The inauguration of the second stage of the Bizone, the *Wirtschaftsrat für das vereinigte Wirtschaftsgebiet*, has since been regarded as the birth place of the Social Market Economy and the beginning of the development of a west German government.³³ By introducing a parliamentary structure

²⁸ The south German Economics ministers opposed Agartz because they feared distortion of "die Angelegenheit auf das politische Gebiet gespielt." See minutes of the meeting of the 'Verwaltungsrat für Wirtschaft on 26 September 1946,' in Walter Vogel/Christoph Weisz, op. cit., p.872.

²⁹ Wolfgang Benz, *Vorform des Weststaats*. op. cit., p.382. The US and UK allies welcomed Agartz's appointment no more than the CDU. The allies would have preferred a non party affiliated individual for the position.

³⁰ Das Abkommen über Neugestaltung der zweizonalen Wirtschaftsstellen, May 1947.

³¹ Hans Peter Schwarz, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik*, Luchterhand. Neuwied/Berlin 1966, p.81.

³² Members of the *Wirtschaftsrat* were elected by the Länder parliaments, the Executive Council comprised one representative from each Land government. The individual administrations were assigned individual directors to manage their separate activities.

³³ "Die Ereignisse im Wirtschaftsrat waren für die Entwicklung des parlamentarisch-demokratischen Lebens in Deutschland ebenso von Bedeutung wie für die gesamte zukünftige Politik der Westzonen, insbesondere für die Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik." Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.91.

to the *Wirtschaftsrat*, the Bizone as a whole became more democratic in structure and the *Wirtschaftsrat's* legislative powers meant resolutions became binding for the individual states. The opportunity to put economic policies into practice with a degree of legal permanency in the region was quickly identified by the CDU group. US general Clay's decision to select the *Wirtschaftsrat's* candidates according to their party's parliamentary majorities in the constituent states of the Bizone³⁴ was a move that not only advanced democracy but most importantly, resulted in the predominance of Christian Democratic and Liberal Party representatives over Social Democrats. The Americans believed that the new *Wirtschaftsrat* could manage economic policy with a broader perspective than the individual state governments had done so far³⁵ and would be better equipped than the previous five independent administrations to co-ordinate activities. State minister presidents and their local administrators began redirecting their political focus from responsibility to their state parliaments, towards backing the aims of their party political affiliation instead. The status of the parties progressively surpassed that of the zones' state parliamentary representatives.

The socio-economic spectrum of the twenty CDU representatives in the *Wirtschaftsrat* was almost as diverse as that in the CDU party itself, although those from industry, banking professions and private businesses outnumbered those from trade union backgrounds.³⁶ Having failed to consolidate a unified party programme among the diverse strands in the CDU in the two years since its foundation, the party's parliamentary group could not be issued with clear instructions of the political line it should now follow in the *Wirtschaftsrat*. Even the predominance of liberal members did not guarantee that the CDU parliamentary group would steer a liberal, economic course. It soon emerged that the *Wirtschaftsrat's* socio-economic policy as a whole would not be driven by pragmatic and objective cross-party initiatives to resolve Germany's economic issues, but by fiercely competitive ideologies of the main political parties. Party

³⁴ This translated to 20 representatives from the CDU/CSU, 20 from SPD, 4 from FDP 3 from KPD, 2 from the Centre, 2 from DP and 1 from WAV. Rainer Salzmann, *Die CDU/CSU im Frankfurter Wirtschaftsrat. Protokolle der Unionsfraktion. 1947-1949, Band 13*, Droste, Düsseldorf 1988. p.8.

³⁵ General McBeady, opening speech at the first meeting of the Economic Council, 25th June 1947, Frankfurt/Main in: Christoph Weisz/Hans Woller (Bearb.), *Wörtliche Berichte und Drucksachen des Wirtschaftsrates des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes 1947-1949*, Institut für Zeitgeschichte u.d. Dt. Bundestag (Hrsg.), Wissenschaftliche Dienste, München/Wien/Oldenbourg 1977, Band I.

³⁶ Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.88.

representatives were often politically motivated personalities, chosen for their political nous rather than their economic expertise. At the launch of the *Wirtschaftsrat*, Friedrich Holzapfel, who became the CDU's parliamentary committee leader in the *Wirtschaftsrat*, also spoke of the many ambiguities that continued to disable the CDU's profile as a nationally unified party. He called for a new economic policy to solve the '*jämmerliche Situation*,' that had come about through the dismantling of Germany's industrial infrastructure and the stifling of production.³⁷ He wanted to overturn the socialist programme of the Bizone's first phase to embrace a freer market, but he then paradoxically went on to reaffirm the validity of the Ahlen Programme as the basis for the party's economic policy. The contradiction in Holzapfel's own remarks show that it was still too soon for the CDU to commit itself to a liberal economic strategy. Further consolidation and conciliatory discussions were needed in its ranks to accommodate and restrain the loose canons in its socialist wing.³⁸ The *Wirtschaftsrat* would eventually provide the forum for the CDU to actively move its programme towards a more liberal agenda, but for the sake of party unity, politicians meanwhile cautiously continued to chant from the same Ahlen hymn sheet.

The CDU's participation in the *Wirtschaftsrat* became immensely significant for the CDU's programme as a whole. The CDU parliamentary group was now the only group in the entire party dedicated to developing the party's economic policy. Policy discussions in the mainstream party had virtually ground to a halt and economic policy had not been properly addressed since the publication of the Ahlen Programme. The Economic and Social Committee that had helped to draft the Ahlen programme in the British zone had last met in January 1947. Adenauer's decision in March to split the Committee into a separate economic committee led by Franz Etzel and a social committee led by Albers, reflected a shift in priority from social policy to economic reform, but was also an act that would undermine and weaken the Christian Socialists in the British zone and correspondingly strengthen the party's liberal wing. Etzel's

³⁷ Friedrich Holzapfel, 25. Juni 1947, Wörtliche Berichte und Drucksachen des Wirtschaftsrates des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes 1947-1949. Hrsg. Institute für Zeitgeschichte u.d. Dt. Bundestag. Wissenschaftlich. Dienste. Bearb. Christoph Weisz /Hans Woller. München, Wien, Oldenbourg. 1977. Band I, p.7.

³⁸ It soon emerged that the views of the trade unionist representatives in the Wirtschaftsrat's CDU parliamentary group were more liberal than those in the CDU's social pressure groups, the Sozialausschüsse.

economic committee later formulated the first draft of the party's election winning Düsseldorf Programme in 1949.

The CDU participated in a *bürgerliche* majority in the *Wirtschaftsrat*, sharing a coalition with the Bavarian Christian Socialist Union (CSU) and the Democratic Party (DP) and enjoying support from the FDP, Centre and WAV when voting on most major issues.³⁹ The liberal coalition further occupied all five⁴⁰ Executive directorships in the Bizone. The CDU, otherwise accustomed to sharing power in many state government coalitions with the SPD, was now freed of socialist policy constraints. The CDU *Regierungspartei* with its liberal majority in the *Wirtschaftsrat* was now in a stronger position to reject the SPD's socialist proposals, and gradually socialism could be pushed to the periphery of the *Wirtschaftsrat's* agenda.⁴¹ The CDU's own Christian Socialist strand, now also facing a liberal majority, learnt to abandon its earlier hopes of a socialist coalition with the SPD.⁴² The CDU parliamentary group could now focus exclusively on developing liberal solutions to the Bizone's economic chaos.

Based on the number of CDU majorities in the regional parliaments, Holzapfel claimed the CDU therefore represented the strongest party in the Bizone, and this granted his party the automatic right to nominate the President of the *Wirtschaftsrat*. After expressing initial disagreement, the Communists (KP) and the Social Democrats (SPD) withheld their protest and allowed the CDU's Erich Köhler to take up the Presidency. Remembering earlier experiences with the SPD's Victor Agartz, the CDU was also keen to nominate the candidate for the director of the *Wirtschaftsrat's* most important administration, the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*. The CDU knew this position was more than managing current economic shortages, it was an opportunity to define the Bizone's entire future economic strategy. Adenauer was not a member of the *Wirtschaftsrat*, but

³⁹ Peter Horn and Bruno Hessenmüller, "CDU Verantwortung im Zweizonen-Wirtschaftsrat" in: Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU, Bruno Dörpinghaus/Kurt Witt (Hrsg), 1 Jg, K.G Lohse, Frankfurt/Main 1950, p.108.

⁴⁰ The five 'Direktoren' or administrations were directed by Economics Johannes Semler (CSU), Food, Agriculture and forestry Hans Schlange-Schöningen (CDU), Finance (Schiewind), Transport (Walter Strauss) and Post (Christian Blank) (CDU).

⁴¹ A.R.L Gurland, op. cit., p.387.

⁴² Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.92.

as the leading figure of the CDU in the British zone, he had not only exercised decisive influence in nominating individuals for the *Wirtschaftsrat*⁴³ but also made frequent personal interventions in the CDU parliamentary party. His decision to intervene on behalf of the nomination for the post of director of the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft* was indicative of the profile and influence the position would wield. Adenauer⁴⁴ spelt out the consequences if the CDU were to sacrifice this significant post to the SPD at the occasion of the second meeting of the CDU parliamentary group in the *Wirtschaftsrat*; "die CDU in der britischen Zone einen Stoß erhalte, von dem sie nicht mehr erholen werde."⁴⁵ The SPD argued that since the CDU's interests were dangerously close to the former capitalist-liberals, the SPD should occupy the post of director of the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*.⁴⁶ Finally the SPD volunteered to go into opposition⁴⁷ allowing the CSU's Johannes Semler to be unanimously elected as director.⁴⁸ The CDU parliamentary group in the *Wirtschaftsrat* insisted that its candidate should be someone who was '100% behind Ahlen'⁴⁹ yet Semler, who was an advocate of social justice and a state monitored economy for an interim period during economic reconstruction, remained a liberal figure whose commitment to the socialist principles of Ahlen was at best tenuous. He saw the revival of the German coal industry and export market as the key to economic

⁴³ Rainer Salzmann, op. cit., p.10.

⁴⁴ Adenauer welcomed the CDU and SPD controversy over the post of director of the economics department; "Adenauer wünschte, daß die CDU vor den Augen der Wähler als scharf konturierte politische Alternative zur Sozialdemokratie erschiene, war daher auf öffentliche Distanz zur SPD bedacht und mißbilligte das Frankfurter Einheits- und Harmoniegebetue." Volker Hentschel, Ludwig Erhard. Ein Politikerleben, Olzog, München 1996, p.44.

⁴⁵ Rainer Salzmann, Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949, op. cit., Sitzungsprotokoll 22. Juli 1947, p.2.

⁴⁶ "Es gibt reichlich Gründe in der Vergangenheit dafür, warum wir in die Gestaltung des Wirtschaftslebens ausüben wollen. Eine Reihe dieser Gründe sind geliefert worden von Leuten, die ihnen (zur CDU) näher stehen als uns." Erich Schöttle, 2nd meeting of the Vollversammlung of the Wirtschaftsrat in Christoph Weisz /Hans Woller, Wörtliche Berichte und Drucksachen des Wirtschaftsrates op. cit., p.26.

⁴⁷ Adenauer welcomed the concession by the SPD to go into opposition as this signalled a move towards a more parliamentary model of a party in government and a party in opposition. Länder governments largely still fell back on coalition arrangements for the post war period of reconstruction. The SPD incorrectly anticipated that the Länder would ultimately wield more power than the Bizone administrations.

⁴⁸ The CDU offered the SPD the post of director of the Economics Council in exchange for three of the eight economic ministries dominated by the SPD but was not accepted.

⁴⁹ Rainer Salzmann, Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949, op. cit., Sitzungsprotokoll, 21. Juli 1947, op. cit., p.43-44.

regeneration and the removal of state subsidies and a realistic pricing policy as essential
“wenn wir zu einer freien Wirtschaft wieder kommen wollen.”⁵⁰

Although the CDU policy line in the *Wirtschaftsrat* still required considerable clarification within the party as a whole, the nomination of a CDU representative as director of the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft* marked the beginning of a more aggressive profiling of the CDU's programme, one that would sufficiently contrast to the SPD's programme in future anticipated elections. A large gulf continued to divide the programme pursued by the CDU in the Bizone and that followed by mainstream CDU groups in the states and regions. This is exemplified by debates conducted in the regional land parliaments of Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria, where the CDU continued to campaign for the nationalisation of key industries. A number of CDU party members also observed the new style of confrontational politics between the parties in the *Wirtschaftsrat* with scepticism. Christian socialists including Karl Arnold and Jakob Kaiser remained committed to building consensus politics and cross-party initiatives in economic and social policy. Criticism also came from south German CDU representatives, Walter Strauß and Heinrich Köhler and the Bavarian CSU figure Hans Ehard, who all expressed their disagreement with the parliamentary group's tactical politicking in the *Wirtschaftsrat*. It was an issue which provoked Heinrich Köhler, Württemberg-Baden's representative in the Executive council, to resign on August 9, 1947. Observing general unrest that the nomination of the economics director was causing in the CDU party, the *Wirtschaftsrat*'s President Erich Köhler even recommended ceding his post to a SPD figure⁵¹ after all, much to the consternation of the rest of the CDU parliamentary party.

Subsequent CDU regional party conferences would be a test of the true level of support within the party for the growing strength of the liberal wing determining CDU policy in the *Wirtschaftsrat*. The CDU's first party conference in Recklinghausen, North-Rhine Westphalia, on August 14-15, 1947, was an opportunity for party leaders to provide

⁵⁰ Johannes Semler in Rainer Salzmänn, *Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949*, op. cit., Sitzungsprotokoll on 11. October 1947, op. cit., p.16.

⁵¹ Rainer Salzmänn, *Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949*, Sitzungsprotokoll, 8. August 1947, op. cit. p.54-56.

clarification and justification for the apparent shift in party policy based on developments in the *Wirtschaftsrat*. Yet Holzapfel, himself a member of the liberal wing of the party, offered little clarification in his speech on economic and social policy. In his own speech Adenauer also upheld the Ahlen programme as a; “Markstein ... in der Geschichte des deutschen Wirtschafts- und Soziallebens,”⁵² but did not neglect to emphasise the importance of the ‘*Machtverteilende Prinzip*’ in political and economic policy to avoid a centralisation of state power, and arguably was steering towards a more liberal interpretation of the Ahlen programme.⁵³ Adenauer still wanted to dilute the Christian Socialist influence in the party, but had not yet signalled that he was in favour of a full-blown, liberal, market economic course. His intention it seemed was simply to bring about a more flexible interpretation of Ahlen.⁵⁴ Franz Etzel concluded the CDU’s conference at Recklinghausen with a treatise on how the Bizone’s economic system had failed under the previous SPD direction, indicating that the system of centralised economic planning was both corrupt and inefficient. He recommended expanding the social policy of the Ahlen programme into an economic programme as a way of solving the current chaos;

“Wir müssen unser Ahlener Programm, das im wesentlichen ein soziales Programm ist, hinaus zu einer konstruktiven Wirtschaftsform kommen.”⁵⁵

The statement signals a new interpretation of Ahlen. Until this point there had never been any doubt that Ahlen represented a comprehensive economic programme, indeed its subtitle called it an Economic and Social Programme. Etzel was correct to point out that the contents of Ahlen had never been sufficiently specific to offer clear guidelines for an economic system, yet his comment indicates his intention to now use the programme’s

⁵² Konrad Adenauer at the 1st Party Conference of the CDU in the British Zone, 14th - 15th August, 1947. Helmut Pütz, Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der Britischen Besatzungszone. Dokument, Bonn 1975, p.334 (330-351).

⁵³ Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.96.

⁵⁴ Born in the Catholic Rhineland Adenauer was at heart anti-liberal. He showed himself to be in favour of an institutional, sectoral rather than a national, free market approach to managing economic policy. His endorsement for a more liberal market programme for Germany, did not come until 1948 when he observed that the success of Erhard’s economic formula would serve his wider political aims of European integration.

⁵⁵ Franz Etzel, Erster Zonenparteitag im Städtischen Saalbau in Recklinghausen am 14. und 15. August 1947; in Christlich Demokratische Union der Britischen Zone, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Heft Inventar-Nr. 60066680.

vagueness to introduce more pronounced liberal elements into the party through a separate economic programme.

Jakob Kaiser also attended the Recklinghausen conference, to voice the growing suspicions of many in the Christian Socialist wing of his party, who thought that the party should focus on a '*Neugestaltung*' of society and not on '*Restauration*' of former capitalist structures. Yet Kaiser was also closely observing a changing tide of opinion in the party and appeared to be uncomfortable when he now spoke of the '*Sozialistische Zug der Zeit*.' From summer 1947 Kaiser had begun to lose his influence with some key Christian Socialists in the west, as they began to view Adenauer's new liberal course more favourably. The tendency was encouraged by the threatening development of Soviet style socialism in the east, but also by the worsening economic situation in the west, where centralised economic planning was failing to correct social imbalances. The CDU in the Soviet zone also held their party conference in the summer of 1947, on September 6-10, in Berlin, just four weeks after the meeting in Recklinghausen. At the meeting, Kaiser no longer spoke of Christian Socialism but merely of '*die soziale Haltung*,' a considerably diluted form of socialism, to bind forces between all CDU groups, and advocated a '*gesunde Mitte*' between capitalism and collectivism. Karl Arnold's address to the Berlin party conference also denied audiences of anticipated criticism of Adenauer's new course, evidence that even Arnold, one of the staunchest of Christian Socialists had begun to see liberal market economics as more promising than Christian Socialist solutions.

Against the background of obfuscatory party political statements by leading members of the CDU, Walter Strauß, Semler's deputy director at the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*, criticised the Bizone parties' failure to devise a viable and comprehensive economic system and for focusing; "mehr auf parteihistorischer oder emotionaler, als auf erkenntnismäßiger Grundlage beruhte."⁵⁶ The CDU had veritably succeeded in formulating its own policies on a theoretical level, but it sorely lacked a pragmatic individual who could translate those ideas into practice in the Bizone. Erhard remarked shortly before stepping up to take up that challenge;

⁵⁶ Walter Strauß, *Wirtschaftsverfassung und Staatsverfassung, Recht auf Staat in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, Tübingen 1952, p.165.

“das Experimentieren der Verwaltung mit verschiedenen Bewirtschaftungsformen offenbarte, welch schwankende Stellung die Verwaltung zwischen Theorie und Praxis der Wirtschaftslenkung innehatte.”⁵⁷

From August 1947 the CDU acquired a more pragmatic approach to policy. The introduction of the Marshall Plan from the summer of 1947, confirmed some benefits of following British and US liberal objectives in the *Wirtschaftsrat*. The western allies for example had agreed to permit an increase in west German production and exports to revive the economy. This prompted the CDU *Zonenausschuß* in the British zone to support the initiative by producing a document entitled; *Die neue Wirtschaftspolitik in Frankfurt*, backing the liberalisation of consumer goods manufacturing, curtailment of the existing *Bewirtschaftungssystem* and welcoming the introduction of market economic principles into the economic system. Positive endorsement of US allied policies also enabled the CDU to win greater influence in the *Wirtschaftsrat* over the more principled and rigid approach of the SPD.

The real test of where the CDU stood on central economic planning policies came with the so-called *Bewirtschaftungsnotgesetz*. CDU representative of the *Wirtschaftsrat*'s smaller economic committee, the *Wirtschaftsausschuß*, Alex Haffner, criticised the decision by the *Wirtschaftsrat* to introduce this emergency legislation to relieve immediate pressures in the economy. The issue soon developed into the first serious policy dispute between the SPD and the CDU parliamentary group in the *Wirtschaftsrat* in the autumn of 1947.⁵⁸ Failing to formulate an equivocal position, the CDU is accused of reverting to its customary '*dilatorische Taktik*.'⁵⁹ Haffner quickly resumed the party line set of Ahlen, suggesting that the CDU still believed planning was necessary; "Wir sind die letzten die sich gegen eine solche (planvolle Wirtschaftsführung) sträuben." But pressure from its liberal coalition partner, the FDP, forced the CDU to refrain from using the word 'planning' and to actively stage opposition to the *Bewirtschaftungsgesetz*,

⁵⁷ Ludwig Erhard, *Das Aufbauwerk der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft ...* op. cit., p.117.

⁵⁸ "... bei dem grundlegenden 'Bewirtschaftungsnotgesetz' klappten die Gegensätze der Grundauffassungen, so daß dieses Gesetz gegen die Stimmen der SPD verabschiedet werden mußte." Peter Horn/Bruno Hessenmüller, op. cit., p.109.

⁵⁹ Georg Müller, *Die Grundlegung der westdeutschen Wirtschaftsordnung im Frankfurter Wirtschaftsrat 1947-1949*, Haag & Herchen, Frankfurt/Main 1987, p.98.

demanding relaxation in the economy and more market freedom. The inter-party debate over the *Bewirtschaftungsnotgesetz* revealed the Union's inchoate and confused economic policy.⁶⁰ There was still no guarantee that the future economic system would be based on a market economy any more than that it would be a centrally planned system. Despite a core of liberal representatives in the CDU, many members in the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft* still favoured some degree of economic planning,⁶¹ prompting real doubts whether Semler had in fact made any headway as director of the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft* in promoting a more liberal course.⁶²

The 'second' *Wirtschaftsrat für das Vereinigte Wirtschaftsgebiet*

At the December 1947 meeting of foreign ministers in London a final attempt to co-ordinate all four allied policies on a joint strategy for Germany failed and confirmed the western allies' (now also including the Benelux states) desire to form an independent west German state. Organisational difficulties emerged within the Bizone, prompting a third re-shuffle of its internal structure. US General Clay reported that;

"the Bizone organisation would not be fully effective until it became something very close to government even though it was not called one or given any powers of sovereignty."⁶³

Kaiser in Berlin and Adolf Süsterhenn from the south west CDU expressed their concern that the reshuffle meant the beginning of a separate west German state. The restructuring of the Bizone administrations was certainly akin to that of a parliamentary system; the *Wirtschaftsrat* formed a parliament, the new *Länderrat* an upper house, and the new *Verwaltungsrat* the cabinet. The structure of the *Wirtschaftsrat* remained the same but doubled the number of members to produce a liberal majority of 44 CDU/CSU/DP and

⁶⁰ "Die Fraktion schwankte zwischen einem schnellen Abbau der Bewirtschaftung und der Rückkehr zu einer freien wettbewerblichen Marktverfassung und dem Aufbau eines Systems, das zwar ebenfalls möglichst viel Freiheit ließ, auf eine direkte Planung und Lenkung aber nicht verzichtete. Eine Entscheidung über die endgültige ordnungspolitische Auffassung stand weiterhin aus." Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.143.

⁶¹ This was modified once the *Wirtschaftsrat* augmented its political influence over the direction of the *Verwaltung* and could intervene in the implementation, the 'Durchführungsverordnung' of the 'Bewirtschaftungsgesetz.'

⁶² Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.142.

⁶³ Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, Greenwood Press Publishers, Connecticut 1950, p.175.

eight FDP MPs against 40 SPD and 6 KPD MPs. The *Länderrat*, a replacement for the former Executive Council, became a representative council for the Bizone states with rights to veto resolutions and legislation imposed on it by the *Wirtschaftsrat*. Köhler himself had argued that only through a commitment to federalism would the *Wirtschaftsrat* succeed.⁶⁴ The *Länderrat* was thus a response to this and other criticisms by individual minister presidents that they had become marginalised by the power of the *Wirtschaftsrat*. The *Länderrat* therefore granted individual states more influence in shaping policy in the *Wirtschaftsrat*. Finally the *Verwaltungsrat* was erected as an umbrella organ to manage the activities of the individual *Direktoren*,⁶⁵ or administrations. The directors of all individual administrations were CDU personalities including the *Verwaltungsrat*'s co-ordinating director, Hermann Pünder⁶⁶ and were elected by and subordinate to the *Wirtschaftsrat*.

The restructuring process introduced more conservative-liberal CDU individuals into the *Wirtschaftsrat*, who resisted any compromise with the SPD on socialist policies, and more strongly backed the interests of the German *Mittelstand*. President Köhler sought to allay suspicions of growing liberalism in the group, assuring members that the economic council had not changed as a result of the allied restructuring of the *Wirtschaftsrat* and denied rumours suggesting meetings had secretly been held to discuss the foundation of a separate west German state.⁶⁷ There were fears in the CDU parliamentary party that coalitions forged between the CDU and SPD in some state

⁶⁴ "Seiner politischen Überzeugung nach besteht die Stärke der CDU in ihrem politischen und kulturellen Bekenntnis zum Föderalismus. Der Wirtschaftsrat soll deshalb der Zusammenfassung der föderativen Elemente auf der bizonalen Ebene dienen, ohne dabei die Währung der gesamtvölkischen Interessen außer Acht zu lassen." Erich Köhler in Rainer Salzmann, *Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949*, Sitzungsprotokoll 23 February 1947, op. cit., p.140.

⁶⁵ The administrations were led by Erhard (Economy), Frohne (Transport), Schlange-Schöningen (Food), Hartmann (Finance) and Schuberth (Post).

⁶⁶ Uwe Uffelman, *Der Weg zur Bundesrepublik. Wirtschaftliche, gesellschaftliche und staatliche Weichenstellungen 1945-1949*, Schwann, Düsseldorf 1988, p.81.

⁶⁷ "Es haben im Bereich des Wirtschaftsrates weder geheime Konferenzen stattgefunden noch sind Verfassungsentwürfe ausgearbeitet worden." Erich Köhler, at the 9th meeting of the *Wirtschaftsrat*, on 18th December 1947 in; Christoph Weisz /Hans Woller, op. cit., p.238. This statement contradicts Köhler's earlier admission at a CDU meeting in Frankfurt in November 1947 when he pointed out the *Wirtschaftsrat* would potentially become a powerful instrument with which it could influence political events. "Eines stelle ich fest, der Wirtschaftsrat ist allen theoretischen Reden zum Trotz eine gesetzgeberische Realität geworden, und er wird es bleiben und wird es mehr denn je sein werden und sein müssen." Erich Köhler, *Ohne Illusionen - Politik der Realität*. Reden. Walther Gericke, Wiesbaden 1949, p.36.

parliaments, could risk derailing the liberal programme now being pursued by the CDU/DP coalition in the *Wirtschaftsrat*. The decision by the CDU in Lower Saxony to form a coalition with the SPD in spring 1948 for example, provoked Holzapfel to intervene, warning them their actions were not consistent with the CDU's policy line in the *Wirtschaftsrat* and could have 'intolerable economic consequences.'⁶⁸ This highlights the unresolved conflict between the CDU's agenda in the *Wirtschaftsrat* and that pursued by CDU representatives in the state governments and the regional CDU state parties, but also of the increasing power of the CDU parliamentary party in the Bizone to determine policy for the whole of the party. Many CDU members in the individual states remained sceptical of the motives of its representatives in the *Wirtschaftsrat*, criticising above all the lack of democratic accountability in the *Wirtschaftsrat*, where representatives had not been democratically elected by their own party.

Comments by Semler in January 1948 criticising the allies for the region's ongoing economic crisis, swiftly led to his dismissal as director of the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*.⁶⁹ On March 2, 1948 at the 12th meeting of the *Wirtschaftsrat*, a successor was nominated, not from the ranks of the CDU/CSU, but a non-party affiliated liberal, Ludwig Erhard. CDU representatives had been slow to elect a candidate, preferring to leave the post vacant until they had decided on their political economic course, but this was denounced by the SPD candidate Schoettle in the *Wirtschaftsrat* as a tactical move to delay the decision in view of the forthcoming currency reform.⁷⁰ The candidate election was planned to take place on March 1, but was postponed as the CDU attempted to remove Ludwig Erhard's name from the list of seven other nominees. Appeals not to disrupt the CDU's coalition with the FDP however finally persuaded members to accept

⁶⁸ Rainer Salzmann, *Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949*, Sitzungsprotokoll, 6 April 1948, op. cit., 170f.

⁶⁹ For details on Semler's dismissal, see Wolfgang Benz, *Von der Besatzungsherrschaft...* op. cit., p.86-88.

⁷⁰ "eine bewußte Taktik im Hinblick auf mögliche wirtschaftspolitische Entscheidungen." Minutes of 12th meeting of the *Wirtschaftsrat* on 2.3.1948, in; Christoph Weisz /Hans Woller, op. cit., p.332. Blum also points out that the members of the 'Verwaltung für Wirtschaft' department were also hesitant to commit themselves to any fixed economic policy before the currency reform had been implemented. For example the Verwaltung chose deliberately not to respond to the law put forward by the *Wirtschaftsrat* to relieve the hoarding of goods in case this could interfere with the currency reform and subsequent economic plans. Reinhard Blum, *Soziale Marktwirtschaft*, J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1969, p.264.

Erhard's candidature.⁷¹ Erhard did not gain a majority. He received only 47 votes from the *Wirtschaftsrat's* 104 MPs of which no more than a dozen could have been CDU/CSU votes. He would not have been elected if the SPD had given a clear 'no' vote instead of indignantly returning blank slips into the voting urn. All blank slips were classed as abstentions, with the result that Erhard secured sufficient yes votes to become the new director of the Bizone's *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*.⁷²

8.2. *Excursion* - Ludwig Erhard

Before discussing Erhard's successful move to director of the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*, it is necessary to briefly explore the background to Ludwig Erhard's thinking, his early intellectual influences and his experiences. This will complete the historical perspective for analysing the origins of the Social Market Economy and shed light on the motivations driving Erhard's policy decisions.

Despite vehement opposition from the CDU parliamentary group to Erhard's candidature for the directorship of the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*, Erhard did not in fact represent the free market individualist-capitalists or even descend from the tradition of classical economic liberalism, as was feared. He was a moderate, socially responsible economist whose early, less known, political-economic beliefs contrast sharply with his later defence of market liberalism. Liberal elements did not become a feature of Erhard's thinking in fact until 1947. His own background and experiences mirror Germany's historical dilemma over the alternatives of a planned or a free market economy that had dominated the previous century of socio-economic policy. Erhard always maintained that Germany's market economy was a 'specific' type of market economy exclusive to Germany's own peculiar situation and history.

Erhard differed to his more ideologically bound contemporaries however through his ability to develop practical and workable solutions to programme issues. Erhard was also

⁷¹ See Rainer Salzmann, *Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949*, op. cit., Sitzungsprotokoll Nr.35 am 23.2.48, p. 138-145; Sitzungsprotokoll Nr. 39 am 29.2. 48, p.151-152; Sitzungsprotokoll Nr. 43 am 1.3.48, p.156-157; Sitzungsprotokoll Nr. 45, 2.3 1948; op. cit.

⁷² Volker Hentschel, op. cit., p.53.

adept at modifying his belief in a socialist, planned economy in the early 1940s, to advocate a mixed economy in 1946/7, to fully endorsing the liberal economy in 1948/9. Such flexible convictions reveal Erhard was not so much an original thinker, but one particularly skilled at acquiring and adapting others' theories to suit the current economic climate. He could quickly condemn socialism when faced for example with the need to discredit the SPD's programme or to undermine the influence of the Christian Socialists in the CDU. Erhard shaped his programme as political reality unfolded, continually assessing and adapting his vision of a socially responsible liberal market economy and its suitability for the prevailing economic and political climate and as an acceptable programme to the CDU. This unique and dynamic approach coupled with personality and rhetorical skill, helped Erhard succeed in injecting pragmatism into the CDU's hitherto ideologically-driven discussions.⁷³ Erhard exploited the ambiguities of ideological terms to deconstruct biased thinking among the many CDU groups and then introduce a new style of more flexible, programme discourse that allowed for the implementation of differing degrees of market mechanisms and state intervention depending on current economic and political conditions. This third way thinking was later expressed in the phrase Social Market Economy, but was preceded by other ordoliberal phrases such as liberal socialism, Rüstow's liberal interventionism, or *marktkonforme* policies, that aimed at monitoring the level of state intervention to avoid a retreat into collectivism.

Background and Influences

Background

With a quintessentially liberal⁷⁴ background in the Protestant dominated city of Fürth in Bavaria, a Catholic father and Protestant mother, Erhard learnt the importance of religious tolerance from an early age. As a doctoral student of the political economist, philosopher and medic Franz Oppenheimer at Frankfurt University, Erhard was introduced to the third way between capitalism and socialism through Oppenheimer's

⁷³ "Bei Erhard kann man feststellen, daß ein nicht unwesentlicher Teil seiner konkreten Politik durch das Instrument der Rede gestaltet wurde." Karl Hohmann (Hrsg), Ludwig Erhard, Gedanken aus fünf Jahrzehnten. Reden und Schriften, ECON Verlag, Düsseldorf/Wien/New York 1988, p.17.

⁷⁴ A.J Nicholls, "Ludwig Erhard and German Liberalism - An ambivalent relationship?" in; Jarausch, Konrad H. And Jones, Larry Eugene (eds), In Search of a Liberal Germany. Studies in the History of German Liberalism from 1789 to the present, Berg, New York/Oxford/Munich 1990, p.390.

theory of 'liberal socialism.' Oppenheimer's ideas on the relationship between the state and the economy, competition and a rejection of industrial monopolies exerted a marked influence on Erhard's own post second world war programme of 'social liberalism'.⁷⁵ From 1928 to 1942 Erhard carried out research at the *Nürnberger Institut für Wirtschaftsbeobachtung*, on behalf of the Nazi's *Reichsgruppe Industrie*, and it was during this time that Erhard made the acquaintance of Alfred Müller-Armack and the resistance figure Carl Goerdeler, whose views later impacted on Erhard's own understanding of liberalism after 1945. Until 1942 however Erhard advocated state control of the economy, and claimed free trade was incompatible with social harmony or with serving society. He did not believe in market driven pricing but in setting prices based on national political objectives. He anticipated that the state should set economic goals and define industry's objectives, whilst industry specific *Unternehmerverbände* affiliated to the *Reichsgruppe Industrie* would set guidelines for private businesses. Individual consumer freedom could be guaranteed within a state monitored market economy.⁷⁶ Erhard was of course forced to work within the constraints of Nazi tolerance in the Nuremberg institute, and it is questionable whether he exercised any real degree of conceptual freedom in his policy formulations. The discrepancy between these views and those he later endorses, is nevertheless evidence of Erhard's capacity for tailoring his views to the prevailing political and economic trends and in supplying ready, pragmatic solutions to the government of the day.

When Erhard left the Nuremberg institute in 1942, he received substantial personal and financial support from top rank officials at the *Reichsgruppe Industrie* to set up his own consultancy. Here Erhard embarked on devising concepts for rebuilding the economy and industry and financing the war deficit after an anticipated lost war. In his 268 page *Denkschrift* from 1943/4, he concluded;

"..das erstrebenswerte Ziel bleibt in jedem Fall die freie, auf echten Leistungswettbewerb beruhende Marktwirtschaft mit den jener Wirtschaft immanenten Regulativen."⁷⁷

⁷⁵ See Karl Hohmann, Ludwig Erhard 1897-1977, Eine Biographie, ST Verlag, Ludwig-Erhard Stiftung e.V. (Hrsg), Bonn 1997.

⁷⁶ Volker Hentschel, op. cit., p.35f.

⁷⁷ Ludwig Erhard, "Kriegsfinanzierung und Schuldenkonsolidierung, Denkschrift 1943/44, Schlußkapitel March 1944" in; Karl Hohmann (Hrsg), Gedanken op. cit., p.50.

After a necessary post-war transition period of state economic control, Erhard believed in liberating the economy from the “*Fesseln der staatlichen Bevormundung.*” Yet his subsequent *Gutachten* from the summer of 1945 adds;

“die sichere Grundlage für den Neuaufbau der Wirtschaft nur aus den höheren Erkenntnissen über die Struktur der *spezifisch deutschen Wirtschaft* (my italics) ... fließen kann. Damit rückt auch der Gedanke der Planung in den Vordergrund. Der Verfasser, der sich grundsätzlich zur Idee der freien Wirtschaft bekennt, glaubt nicht eigens betonen zu müssen, daß er der wirtschaftlichen Planung und Organisation keinen originären Wert zuerkennt, aber die Einsicht gebietet zu berücksichtigen, daß die deutsche Wirtschaft in dieser und der nächsten Phase ihrer Entwicklung solcher Hilfen nicht wird entraten können.”⁷⁸

His contradictory views reveal a degree of uncertainty and inexperience with openly espousing free market economics in 1945, combined with the belief that Germany's version of free market economics should continue to be bound by its own specific tradition of state intervention in the market economy.

Employed by the US military from October 1945 as economics minister for Bavaria, there are further signs of reassessment and reorientation in Erhard's thinking. In a series of articles he wrote for the US military newspaper, *Die neue Zeitung*, from September 1946 to the spring of 1948, when he was appointed director of the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*, Erhard outlined the contours of his economic policy and tries to consolidate inconsistencies in his own ideas. The articles reveal a man personally undergoing the transition from advocating state planning to free market economics. In September 1946⁷⁹ he maintains the necessity of a planned economy, but registers the important difference;

“Zwischen der allseits anerkannten Notwendigkeit einer sozial ausgerichteten planvollen Wirtschaft und der vollen, das heißt totalen Planwirtschaft.”

⁷⁸ Ludwig Erhard, “Gutachten zum wirtschaftlichen Wiederaufbau. Auszug 1945” in; *Ibid.*, p.54.

⁷⁹ “Zonenausschuss und Wirtschaftseinheit” article in *Die neue Zeitung*, 23 September 1946 in; *Ibid.*, p.67.

An article that featured in the *Neue Zeitung* a month later entitled *Freie Wirtschaft und Planwirtschaft*, shows Erhard seeking to resolve his own conceptual dilemma through reconciliation of economic alternatives, in a mixed economic structure. He writes;

“Es ist charakteristisch, daß die abweichenden Auffassungen immer in der Zuspitzung auf scheinbar unversöhnliche Extreme - hie freie Wirtschaft, dort Planwirtschaft, hie Sozialismus, dort Kapitalismus, Ausdruck finden, während die tatsächliche wirtschaftliche Entwicklung uns fragen lassen sollte, ob nicht von beiden Fronten her Einflüsse wirksam sind, die auf eine Annäherung der Standpunkte schließen lassen.”⁸⁰

He appeals to a new, modern interpretation of planned and free economies, and to a new, post-war redefinition of socialism and capitalism;

“Wer unter freier Wirtschaft nach wie vor immer nur das hemmlungslose Freibeutertum der früh- und hochkapitalistischen Ära zu verstehen geneigt ist, wird der Dynamik hochentwickelter Volkswirtschaften so wenig gerecht wie der beziehungslose Individualist, der Planwirtschaft schlechthin mit Verödung und Bürokratisierung einer seelenlosen Wirtschaft gleichsetzt. Nichts anderes verhält es sich mit den Begriffen Kapitalismus und Sozialismus. Es ist für die Gegenwart durchaus einseitig, unter kapitalistischer Wirtschaft eine auf der Ausbeutung der arbeitenden Menschen beruhendes Wirtschaftssystem zu verstehen und Sozialismus mit völliger Nivellierung und Beseitigung jeglicher wirtschaftlichen Freiheit gleichzusetzen.”⁸¹

A modern capitalist system he claims no longer precludes “*die volle Berücksichtigung sozialer Erfordernisse*.” It would appear from the above quote that Socialism and capitalism, can become compatible ideologies. The new message reads that policy is not based on rigid dogma, but remains negotiable with inbuilt flexibility to adapt to political change and incorporate the best of both systems. This becomes the formulae to Erhard’s future success to change fixed attitudes in the CDU and to break the deadlock in CDU negotiations over economic and social policy alternatives.

Influences

⁸⁰ Ludwig Erhard “Freie Wirtschaft und Planwirtschaft,” in: *Ibid.*, 14 October 1946, *Ibid.*, p.69f.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

Müller-Armack⁸² described the concept of the Social Market Economy as “*ein der Ausgestaltung harrender, progressiver Stilgedanke.*” In other words, the exact contours of the Social Market Economy were not defined. Liberal and Christian Socialist *Weltanschauungen* could therefore conceivably be combined. This flexibility aptly suited Erhard’s relative inexperience in practising ordo-liberalism. When Armack introduced the concept of the Social Market Economy in *Die Wirtschaftsordnung, sozial gesehen*⁸³ he challenges the traditional view that social responsibility was only inherent in a socialist order as socialists claimed and that centralised economic structures were the only way of responding to social needs in society. Neo-liberalism moreover did not mean contempt for social measures either. Before change could take place however, uncontested orthodox beliefs that had made terms and concepts historically bound and definitions rigid needed to be revised - “eine Umwertung überlieferter Begriffe vorzunehmen” - a prescription that was indeed followed by Erhard. Müller-Armack argued that market economic structures offered the best framework for providing for social needs;

“Wenn uns eine “Soziale Marktwirtschaft” d.h. eine nach den Regeln der Marktwirtschaft ablaufende, aber mit sozialen Ergänzungen und Sicherungen versehene Wirtschaftsordnung vorschwebt, geschieht dies in der Überzeugung, daß keine andere soziale Ordnung den gleichen Grad von sachlicher Produktivität und technischer Fortschrittlichkeit mit der Möglichkeit persönlicher Freiheit und sozialer Gestaltung vereinigt. Sie allein bietet... eine Ordnung in der durch weitgehende Neutralisierung der Machtpositionen und eine Aufteilung der Macht ein erträgliches Minimum gesellschaftlichen Zwanges der Entfaltung persönlicher Freiheit nicht im Wege steht.”⁸⁴

Müller-Armack saw the post war task as that of *redefining* the contours of the liberal market economy, by keeping its essential principle but infusing it with social content. He saw the market as a mechanism superior to state planning but did not believe markets could regulate themselves and maintain their own equilibrium or perform an automatic distribution of wealth.

⁸² Alfred Müller-Armack, *Wirtschaftslenkung und Marktwirtschaft*, Verlag für Wirtschaft und Sozialpolitik, Hamburg 1947, p.88.

⁸³ Alfred-Müller Armack, “Die Wirtschaftsordnung sozial gesehen” in; *Ordo-Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Küpper Bondi, Walter Eucken/Franz Böhm (Hrsg), Opladen 1948, Band 1, p.125-154.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.149.

As a practitioner more than a theorist, Erhard never belonged to a specific group of ordoliberalism. As their theories pervaded academic circles from the 1930s, Erhard would most certainly have come across them. Once the 1948 West German currency reform was agreed, Erhard gained confidence from reading ordoliberal theories in steering Germany towards a market economy.⁸⁵ Ordoliberal theory provided him with the necessary legitimisation for his future practical policy manoeuvres. It was Röpke, whom Erhard met in Geneva in 1948, who also made a significant impact on Erhard's thinking.⁸⁶ In the ordoliberal tradition of Röpke and Müller-Armack, Erhard became concerned with the spiritual and the economic elements of the social market. He disagreed with the individualist ordoliberals who focused too narrowly on economic measures and who failed to consider individuals' interdependence on other aspects of society. A system that offers a third way between collectivism and laissez-faire, he argued, did not guarantee that society will choose to always follow that course. It is doubtful that any economic system can claim to be inherently moral, since it ultimately relies on the moral of the people who operate within it, and confirms the importance of developing an ethically grounded approach to economic policy, drawing on all aspects of an individual's life.

In tune with this strand of ordoliberals, Erhard also distanced himself from old style liberalism.⁸⁷ He believed that the 'new' way economics would in contrast to 19th century laissez-faire economics, promote the much neglected aspect of social harmony. Erhard's speech at the CDU's second party conference in August 1948 illustrates this;

"Nicht die freie Marktwirtschaft des liberalistischen Freibeutertums einer vergangenen Ära auch nicht das 'Freie Spiel der Kräfte' und dergleichen Phrasen, mit denen man hausieren geht, sondern die sozial verpflichtete Marktwirtschaft, die das einzelne Individuum wieder zur Geltung kommen lässt, die den Wert der

⁸⁵ "So geriet der Ordoliberalismus zum dogmatischen Bezugspunkt seines Denkens, das der Pragmatik seines Handelns einen prinzipiellen Rückhalt gab." Volker Hentschel, *op. cit.*, p.64.

⁸⁶ Erhard's later use of terminological extremes to describe the planned economy descends from Röpke's vocabulary in particular terms such as 'Termitenstaat' and 'Kollektivismus.' Daniel Körfer, *Kampf ums Kanzleramt, Erhard und Adenauer*, DVA Stuttgart 1987, p.32.

⁸⁷ It must be noted that the rejection of liberalism was part of a longer trend amongst ordoliberals. From 1924 Keynes had already begun to talk of *The End of Laissez Faire*. John Maynard Keynes, *Sidney Ball lecture delivered at the University of Oxford 1924*, published London 1926. Cited in Herbert Ehrenberg, *Die Erhard Saga. Analyse einer Wirtschaftspolitik, die keine war*, Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart 1965. In the 1940s the need to correct the mistakes of the centralised economy of National Socialism became a more urgent objective.

Persönlichkeit oben anstellt und der Leistung dann aber auch den verdienten Ertrag zugute kommen läßt, das ist die Marktwirtschaft moderner Prägung."⁸⁸

The concept and the content of the Social Market Economy idea were thus derived from Alfred Müller-Armack and other ordo-liberals. Erhard's conversion to ordo-liberalism also clearly entailed a reform of his own politics. Once Erhard had discovered the Social Market Economy's potential in west Germany's political campaign, he adopted it as his own.⁸⁹ During a period in the *Sonderstelle für Geld und Kredit* in Bad Homburg, where he and other prominent economists were assigned the development of German recommendations for currency reform, he demonstrates the progressive move towards ordo-liberal theories. A further article in *Die Neue Zeitung* on June 23rd, 1947 entitled *Sprachverwirrung um die Wirtschaftsordnung* reflects the process of revision underway in Erhard's own thinking, but perhaps more importantly, the title confirms the significance of political terminology in legitimating a political programme and how the misunderstanding of political concepts can distort reality. Erhard learnt to systematically exploit this phenomenon to renegotiate the meaning of established ideologies. The article summarises Erhard's attempt to revise the rigid dichotomy in attitudes towards planned and free market economic alternatives;

"Wenn heute in breitesten Schichten die Meinung vorherrscht, daß die Anhänger sozialistischer Ideen unbedingt für die Planwirtschaft eintreten müßten, während die Verfechter der Marktwirtschaft notwendig als Vertreter eines kapitalistischen Systems zu gelten hätten, so muß dem widersprochen werden."

Whilst abhorring exploitive capitalist activity Erhard believes the market economy had been misrepresented and portrayed as synonymous with the 19th century's version of unbridled capitalism;

⁸⁸ Ludwig Erhard, Rede vor dem 2. Parteikongreß der CDU der Britischen Zone am 28 August 1948 in Recklinghausen, "Marktwirtschaft im Streit der Meinungen" in; Ludwig Erhard, *Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik. Der Weg der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft*, Econ., Düsseldorf / Wien 1992, Erstausgabe 1962, p.69. Speech is also printed in Helmut Pütz, Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der britischen Besatzungszone, op. cit. p.658 (657-691).

⁸⁹ Hentschel doubts if Erhard had incorporated the economic relevance of the Social Market Economy. "Man kann des Eindrucks sich schwer erwehren, daß Erhard sein ordoliberales Verständnis von Marktwirtschaft in Müller-Armacks Worte kleidete, ohne das Verständnis Müller-Armacks Begriff anzupassen." Volker Hentschel, op. cit., p.83.

“Die sozialen Störungen, die der aufkommende Kapitalismus im Gefolge hatte, waren Begleiterscheinungen einer technischen Revolution und einer falschen Auslegung der sogenannten liberalen Freiheiten, nicht Wirkungen des marktwirtschaftlichen Prinzips an sich.”⁹⁰

He blames “*eine fatale Verwechslung von Ursache und Wirkung*” in historical perceptions. Erhard’s mixed arguments for and against socialism and capitalism, free market economies and planned economies could be seen as a sign of Erhard’s inability to fully commit himself to a market economy or uncertainty over the best economic system for Germany.⁹¹ But although Erhard is equivocal on these issues, his search for a synthesis between socialism and capitalism is entirely compatible with the nature of ordo-liberal or third way thinking. His unique approach demonstrates his capacity for seeking pragmatic political solutions. In attempting to reconcile socialism and capitalism, if only at a semantic level, Erhard must be credited for setting in motion a new style of consensual politics, that contained the potential to resolve traditional antagonisms inherent in the German party system. By redefining the meaning of traditional ideologies and in particular changing often false perceptions of the market economy, Erhard was able to encourage dialogue between socialists and liberalists and thus aptly supported the Christian Democratic objective of an all-embracing *Volkspartei*.

8.3. Erhard, the CDU and the Social Market Economy

Those who voted for Erhard as the new director of Economics of the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*, may have surmised that his election could entail a dramatic turnaround of the whole economic system,⁹² since Erhard and a group of other specialists had drawn up a concept of reform in October 1947 in the specialist department, ‘Sonderstelle Geld und Kredit’ and produced “unabhängig und unbeeinflusst von den Militärregierungen und den politischen Parteien” the Homburger Plan in February 1948, which they handed to the allies as their suggestion for a currency reform. Under Semler’s direction, the majority of the CDU parliamentary party had backed the *Wirtschaftsrat*’s central economic policy

⁹⁰ Karl Hohmann (Hrsg), Gedanken op. cit., p.75.

⁹¹ Volker Hentschel, op. cit., p.46.

⁹² Volkhard Laitenberger, “Auf dem Weg zur Währungs- und Wirtschaftsreform. Ludwig Erhards Wirtschaftspolitik im Frühjahr 1948” in; Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B23/88, 3/6 1988. p.34.

aimed at restoring production in heavy industry. DP representative Mühlenfeld⁹³ was now anxious that Erhard's nomination would entail a rejection of this strategy in favour of restoring the consumer goods industry.⁹⁴ Jakob Kaiser travelled to Frankfurt specifically to block the vote of 'the liberal' Erhard, expressing the sentiments of Christian Socialists who were still reluctant to trust the market to provide social justice.

The CDU programme commitments were tested at the 14th meeting of the *Wirtschaftsrat* on April 21, 1948, where Erhard appeared as the newly elected director of the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*, to give a detailed presentation of his proposal for economic reform. The SPD representative, Kreyßig argued that his programme statement had been more of a "ein verworrenes Durcheinander-bringen von Begriffen" than a clear presentation of economic policy⁹⁵ He accused Erhard of failing to produce a coherent economic framework, and his opportunistic exploitation of the timely arrival of Marshall⁹⁶ aid and the currency reform to re-introduce 'freie Unternehmertum'. Erhard's speech did not mention the role of the trade unions, or co-determination policies for employees and so marked a distinct departure from the CDU's Ahlen programme. Industrial democracy had been a core feature of the Ahlen programme, yet even the more socialist inclined members in the CDU parliamentary group in the *Wirtschaftsrat*, had paid suspiciously little attention to co-determination policies and had regularly

⁹³ Letter from Mühlenfeld to Holzapfel on 19th March 1948 in; NL-Holzapfel 32, cited in; Ibid., p.34.

⁹⁴ See discussion from 18th meeting of the CDU parliamentary group in the *Wirtschaftsrat* on 12th October 1947 in; Rainer Salzmann, op. cit., p.76-90. Here the call for state control of industry was tempered however by its insistence that central administration was purely temporary.

⁹⁵ Dr Kreyßig (SPD) at the 14. Vollversammlung des Wirtschaftsrates des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes 1947-1949 in; Christoph Weisz/Hans Woller, op. cit., p.446.

⁹⁶ The CDU parliamentary group was further criticised for undemocratic behaviour in handling the issue of Marshall Plan aid and its dominance of the economic council in an article by the New York Times on 10 May 1948. The German representatives in the Bizone were reported to have requested Marshall aid totalling a third of the total amount the US had allocated for all 16 European countries. This request, it states could only have originated from "den bürgerlichen Vertretern" since the SPD had not been permitted to take part in drafting the *Wirtschaftsplan*. "Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie hat im *Wirtschaftsrat* in Opposition gehen müssen, weil die bürgerlichen Parteien ihr nicht den Einfluss einräumen wollten, der ihr schon rein zahlenmässig gebührt. Nichtsdestoweniger hätten die bürgerlichen Vertreter des *Wirtschaftsrats*, wenn sie nur eine blasse Ahnung von Demokratie hätten, eine derartige weitgehende Forderung nicht ohne Verständigung mit der Sozialdemokratie erheben dürfen, wie das in England und den Vereinigten Staaten ganz selbstverständlich wäre." NYT Press release cited in appendix to minutes, Rainer Salzmann, *Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949*, Sitzungsprotokoll 10. Mai 1948, op. cit., p.194f.

blocked trade unions involvement in the council's negotiations.⁹⁷ Erhard's presentation of his neo-liberal strategy gave priority to market-led economics, competition and private business enterprise⁹⁸ even if his pronouncements may have appeared more of a declaration of desires than guidelines for a practical political programme.⁹⁹ He employed ordo-liberal terminology to damn a state planned economy rather than give wholehearted support to an, as yet untested, social market economy. He nevertheless aimed to divert attention away from rigid ideologies as a way of overcoming political infighting amongst liberals and socialists;

“Die herkömmlichen Vokabeln, wie freie Wirtschaft oder Planwirtschaft, wurden in der Parteien Streit schon so stark abgenutzt und verwässert, daß sie für ernsthafte Darlegungen unbrauchbar geworden sind.”¹⁰⁰

By eliminating the phrases ‘planned economy’ and ‘free market economy’ Erhard believed he could avoid having to choose between them. Erhard had identified the currency reform and Marshall aid as methods to initiate economic liberalisation. The currency reform would clear the way to abolishing the system of centralised economic *Bewirtschaftung*, to introduce tax reform and remove price fixing.;

“Es bedarf - und das ist zwingend - der Wiederherstellung geordneter Geldverhältnisse. Nur durch dieses Mittel allein ist wieder eine wirtschaftliche Ordnung sicherzustellen.”¹⁰¹

⁹⁷ In June 1948 for example trade unions staged a strike following a rash decision by a select number of members of the Wirtschaftsrat to install Mr Hermann Reusch in the ‘Hauptausschuss of the Wirtschaftsrat.’ Reusch was described by labour representative Anton Storch as a liberal capitalist. Liberal representatives Dr Bucerius and Dr v. Campe were against trade unions participating in the Wirtschaftsrat’s Hauptausschuss as a ‘dritte Gewalt’ at such a ‘delicate stage of political and economic developments.’ Rainer Salzmänn, Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949, op. cit., Sitzungsprotokoll, 4. Juni 1948, op. cit., p.206-216.

⁹⁸ “Unsere Wirtschaftspolitik muß nur dahin zielen, daß diese Mittel nicht ausschließlich für ein paar große öffentliche Programme Verwendung finden, sondern daß durch geeignete Konstruktion auch der private Kapitalbedarf der Industrie und hier vor allem auch wieder der kleineren und mittleren Betriebe, befriedigt wird.” Ludwig Erhard, Rede vor der 14. Vollversammlung des Wirtschaftsrates des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes in Christoph Weisz /Hans Woller (Bearb), op. cit., p.443.

⁹⁹ “Ein Fanfarenstoß für die freie Marktwirtschaft kam dabei noch nicht heraus. Es fiel Erhard immer noch leichter, die staatliche Bewirtschaftung zu verdammen, als die Marktwirtschaft zu preisen.” Volker Hentschel, op. cit., p.57.

¹⁰⁰ In the run up to the elections in 1949 Erhard paradoxically redeploys the terminology of political extremes for distinguishing the CDU’s programme from the SPD’s.

¹⁰¹ Ludwig Erhard, 14th meeting of the Vollversammlung of the Wirtschaftsrat in Christoph Weisz /Hans Woller, op. cit., p.437.

The advent of currency reform had in truth taken all parties, trade unions and business representative committees by surprise,¹⁰² and they had not drafted any political programmes in preparation for the economic transition. Erhard's liberal reform programme was therefore only supported by a very select *Vertrauensvorschuß* of liberals, who hesitated before speaking out in favour of a liberal economy. Kreyßig accused Haffner and the CDU parliamentary party for having consciously encouraged Erhard's new liberal economic course¹⁰³ when Haffner signalled a positive reception to Erhard's programme;

“Wir haben Vertrauen zu dem neuen Direktoren der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft, daß er diese Wiederherstellung der Marktwirtschaft, des Wettbewerbs, die allein die Produktion steigern kann, schnell und radikal durchführt. Schon jetzt müssen alle Vorbereitungen getroffen werden”¹⁰⁴

Haffner qualified his enthusiasm however by adding that other CDU members in the *Wirtschaftsrat* only agreed to Erhard's programme; ‘in großen Zügen.’

By spring 1948, the French had also agreed to join in the preparations for currency reform and the establishment of the *Bank deutscher Länder*, even though principles of ‘trizonal’ fusion were still under discussion.¹⁰⁵ On June 17 and 18, 1948, two days before the launch of the currency reform, the *Wirtschaftsrat* voted on the ‘most important parliamentary decision of the German post-war period.’¹⁰⁶ Erhard's *Gesetz über Leitsätze für die Bewirtschaftung und Preispolitik nach der Geldreform* set about defining the type of economic system that should follow the currency reform, the issue

¹⁰² Georg Müller, op. cit., p.111.

¹⁰³ “Das, was Herr Dr Haffner eben für seine Fraktion erklärt hat, unterstreicht noch deutlicher was der augenblicklich größte Teil dieses Hauses vom Direktor der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft verlangt und wahrscheinlich von ihm auch dann verlangen wird, wenn dieser Direktor von sich aus bei dieser Prozedur oder diesem Vorhaben langsam vorgehen würde oder langsam vorgehen möchte.” Dr Kreyßig, 14th meeting of the Vollversammlung of the *Wirtschaftsrat* in Christoph Weisz / Hans Woller, op. cit., p.446.

¹⁰⁴ Alex Haffner, 14th meeting of the Vollversammlung of the *Wirtschaftsrat*. in; Ibid p.445.

¹⁰⁵ Lucius D. Clay, op. cit., p.205.

¹⁰⁶ Hermann Pünder, “Die Entstehung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft während des bizonalen Interregnums - Aus der Amtszeit des Frankfurter Verwaltungsrates 1948/49” in; Gerhard Schröder (Hrsg), Ludwig Erhard. Beiträge zu seiner politischen Biographie. Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag, Bonn 1971, p.361.

that had most preoccupied the CDU's entire programme discussions. The CDU's response would determine whether it agreed to lifting state control in the economy and replacing it with free market competition. The CDU's representative in the *Wirtschaftsrat*, Wilhelm Naegel, gave his party's wholehearted support to the reading of the bill, since he believed it offered a method for abolishing the defunct *Zwangsbewirtschaftungssystem*;

“Dann muß man dem freien Spiel der Kräfte, der gesunden Kräfte in der Wirtschaft wieder eine Möglichkeit zur Entfaltung geben, dann muß man eben versuchen, auf diesem Weg wieder das gutzumachen, was staatliche Zwangswirtschaft verdorben hat.”¹⁰⁷

The bill was fiercely opposed by the Christian Socialists in the CDU's *Sozialausschüsse* with the exception of Theodor Blank who believed it was compatible with the interests of the trade unions, the German people and with the CDU's economic programme as a whole.¹⁰⁸ Surprisingly, Anton Storch, director of the new labour administration in the *Wirtschaftsrat* from August 1948, also supported Erhard's liberal policies and himself spoke up for minimum state intervention in the economy.¹⁰⁹ The positive reception shown by the labour representatives Blank and Storch towards Erhard's legislation was decisive in securing a yes vote by the rest of the CDU parliamentary group in the *Wirtschaftsrat*.¹¹⁰ Without their endorsement, the socialist wing of the party would almost certainly not have agreed to passing the *Leitsatzgesetz*. Erhard's law was passed by 52 votes in favour and 37 against, without the support of the SPD or KPD, initiating an immediate revision of the *Bewirtschaftungsnotgesetzes*.

It is impossible to understand the reasons for the CDU's positive response to the law and the subsequent development towards a market economy without acknowledging the

¹⁰⁷ 18th Volksversammlung des Wirtschaftsrat on 17.6.48 in Christoph Weisz/ Hans Woller, op. cit. p.631.

¹⁰⁸ Theodor Blank 18th Volksversammlung des Wirtschaftsrat on 17.6.48, in Christoph Weisz/ Hans Woller, op. cit., p.655.

¹⁰⁹ Georg Müller, op. cit., p.284.

¹¹⁰ Fritz Hellwig, “Das Programm der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft 1949 und seine politische Umsetzung bis zur Gegenwart” in; Soziale Marktwirtschaft, Ordoliberalismus und Christliche Soziallehre. 35 Jahre Düsseldorfer Leitsätze der CDU, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Arbeitsheft 5, Klaus Weigelt (Hrsg), Wesseling-Eichholz 1984, p.25.

contribution of the *Wissenschaftliche Beirat*, the new sub-committee of the *Verwaltung für Wirtschaft*, formed in January 1948 with individuals from the Rothenburg group of neo-liberals including Beckerath, Böhm, Eucken, Hoffmann, Lamp and Müller-Armack.¹¹¹ In September 1947 they had produced a document entitled *Grundsätzen eines wirtschaftspolitischen Sofortprogramms*. The Committee's recommendations subsequently became Erhard's blueprint for introducing social economic reform.¹¹² The *Wissenschaftliche Beirat* had produced an audit on April 18, recommending a relaxation of price and wage policies and the abolition of *Zwangsbewirtschaftung* following the introduction of the currency reform.¹¹³ It concluded that;

“Die Währungsreform ist nur sinnvoll, wenn eine grundlegende Änderung der bisherigen Wirtschaftslenkung mit ihr verbunden wird ... Die Steuerung durch den Preis dient dazu, das Sozialprodukt zu steigern. Dies ist die wichtigste sozialpolitische Aufgabe des Augenblicks.”

It should be noted that currency reform itself had been drafted and implemented entirely by the western allies with only token recommendations from the German representatives. The *Wirtschaftsrat*'s proposals for tax reform, for example proved unacceptable to the allies and the role of the *Wirtschaftsrat* was reduced to reviewing allied reform proposals only. Curtailment of their sphere of influence plus dissatisfaction with allied policies incited many members of the CDU parliamentary group, including Lower Saxony's Dr Gereke, to threaten resignation and withdrawal of German party political support to the allies. CDU representative Dr Seeling¹¹⁴ reported pessimistically on the *Wirtschaftsrat*'s achievements in the first year of its existence and demanded an independent public office to monitor activities since the “*Wirtschaftsrat* nicht gewillt sei, noch länger als Verbrämung für die Massnahmen der Besatzungsmächte zu dienen.” At the *Wirtschaftsrat*'s meeting on June 14, Seeling finally tendered his resignation, but Erhard

¹¹¹ Reference to section on ordo-liberals in Freiburg CDU.

¹¹² Georg Müller, op. cit., p.113f.

¹¹³ ‘Maßnahmen der Verbrauchsregelung, der Bewirtschaftung und der Preispolitik nach der Währungsreform’ Der Wissenschaftliche Beirat bei der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes. Gutachten 1948-bis Mai 1950. Hrsg. Bundeswirtschaftsministerium, Otto Schwartz & Co, Göttingen 1950, p.25ff.

¹¹⁴ “In keiner entscheidenden Situation hat der Wirtschaftsrat zeigen dürfen, dass er seiner Verantwortung gewachsen sei. Mit der Währungs- und Steuerreform sei jedoch der historische Augenblick gekommen, um die tatsächliche Kompetenz des Wirtschaftsrates auszuloten.” Dr Seeling in Rainer Salzmann, Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949, Sitzungsprotokoll 4. Juni 1948, op. cit., p.213.

and Holzapfel warned that if the CDU group refused to carry out allied policies then the allies would surely find a party that would, and the CDU would always be remembered for having failed to take on that challenge itself. It was important that the CDU learnt to endorse allied policy in order to gain control in the *Wirtschaftsrat* and ultimately in leading a future German government.¹¹⁵

Meanwhile some leading CDU members could not suppress their criticism of Erhard's liberal economic reforms and the disastrous effect that they were having on prices and salaries. On August 17, the CDU jointly debated with the SPD whether Erhard should be forced to resign. Despite the show of no-confidence, Erhard survived the motion by 47 votes to 35. The CDU in Baden-Württemberg, Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia, normally known for their liberalism, were also accustomed to coalition with the SPD in their state parliaments and were among those who opposed Erhard's programme. Anxiety over price increases during the summer of 1948 also created opposition from the CDU in the *Länderrat*, headed by Karl Arnold. Arnold urged the *Länderrat* to place a ban on Erhard introducing any further price relaxation, suggesting responsibility for price fixing should be passed to an independent *Preisamt*. All CDU representatives gave the *Länderrat* unanimous agreement and the decision was forwarded to the *Wirtschaftsrat*. But firm support for Erhard from Punder, Schlange-Schöningen and other members of the *Wirtschaftsrat* however resulted in the *Länderrat's* appeal finally being rejected. Paul Bausch, deputy chairman of the north Würtemmberg CDU signalled his opposition by calling for a "grundsätzlichen Kurswechsel der Frankfurter Politik" and coalition with the SPD.¹¹⁶

Erhard sought to allay such fears and criticisms of his policy at the CDU's 2nd party conference in Recklinghausen, on August 28, 1948.¹¹⁷ To convince the CDU of his market economic reform programme, he reassured delegates that a market economy did not eschew economic planning and order.

¹¹⁵ Georg Müller, op. cit., p.279.

¹¹⁶ Gerold Ambrosius, op. cit., p.184.

¹¹⁷ Ludwig Erhard, August 28, 1948, in; Helmut Pütz, Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der Britischen Besatzungszone, op. cit., p.658.

“die Marktwirtschaft völlig falsch angedeutet wäre, wenn man ihr etwa Planlosigkeit vorwerfen würde.”¹¹⁸

Erhard exploited ideological terminology to his advantage, positioning the two alternative economic systems in the east and in the west as the choice between *Zwang* and *Freiheit*. Although the SPD condemned the *Zwangswirtschaft* as fiercely as the CDU, maintaining there were significant distinctions between a *Zwangs*-, a *Plan*- and a *gelenkte Wirtschaft*, Erhard hoped to discredit the SPD by condemning economic planning. In the run-up to the first federal elections, sloganeering with political extremes became Erhard's chief political weaponry to demarcate the programme of the CDU from that of the SPD. He distinguished between the control economy and socialism or even Marxism of the Social Democrats, and a free, socially responsible economy and democracy of the Christian Democrats. Albers responded to Erhard's speech, firstly expressing the scepticism that the liberal tone of Erhard's policies generated amongst the trade union wing of the CDU, but then diluting his criticism by demonstrating 'respektvolle Reverenz' for the CDU in the *Wirtschaftsrat*.¹¹⁹ By the end of the conference it appeared as if Erhard had rallied the party behind his Frankfurt programme. When trade unions went on strike on November 12, as a protest against the market economy, Albers dutifully kept to the party line. In truth, Albers feared the economic agenda favoured by the Christian Socialists too closely resembled that of the SPD's and knew that failure to give the CDU his formal trade union backing could threaten the CDU's governing status in the *Wirtschaftsrat* and bring unwarranted advantage to the SPD.

Only once the currency reform and new market economic structures had begun to yield positive results could a detectable change be observed in the CDU's attitudes towards Erhard's programme.¹²⁰ The *Sozialausschüsse* representatives in the *Wirtschaftsrat* voiced their support for Erhard's programme and early demands by Christian Socialist for a radical restructuring of the economy were toned down, requesting only minor policy adjustments to correct social injustices and deficiencies. Crucially the Christian Socialists lacked an equivalent institutional framework to the *Wirtschaftsrat*, to promote

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Johannes Albers, in; Ibid., p.700ff.

¹²⁰ Gerhard Stoltenberg, *Wendepunkte - Stationen deutscher Politik. 1947-1990*, Siedler, Berlin 1997, p.19.

their alternative policy of co-operation with the SPD and the trade unions. Meanwhile even Kaiser had agreed to a 'sozial gesteuerten Marktwirtschaft.'¹²¹ This growing polarisation between the right wing coalition in the *Wirtschaftsrat* and the SPD also meant more liberal minded CDU representatives could force the weaker left wingers into submission.¹²² Threatening to stage a left wing opposition to Erhard's course could seriously risk damaging the CDU's parliamentary majority in the *Wirtschaftsrat* and expose the level of party disunity.

After almost a year in the *Wirtschaftsrat*, the CDU parliamentary group had still not reached consensus on policy and action. Disunity existed between the CDU in the states and the CDU parliamentary group in the *Wirtschaftsrat*, as well as between the organs of the *Wirtschaftsrat* themselves. In desperation Köhler had made an appeal in spring 1948 for the party to show at least the appearance of unity;

"die Politik des Verwaltungsrats in toto so geführt werden müsse, dass nach außen hin der Eindruck der Geschlossenheit zwischen Fraktion und Verwaltungsrat bestehe."¹²³

Adenauer's North Rhine-Westphalian CDU condemned the haphazard political management in Frankfurt and the dissenting economic opinions by directors in the *Verwaltungsrat* administrations, insisting that individuals should either back Erhard's programme or resign. Indeed in November 1948, Alex Haffner, formally a loyal supporter of Erhard's reforms, did indeed resign as leader of the Economic Committee, frustrated with the *Wirtschaftsrat*'s internal political bargaining and for its alleged neglect of real economic issues.

By 1949, economic conditions showed signs of improvement and Erhard experienced the first signs of praise when he delivered a long speech advocating a liberal market

¹²¹ Erich Kosthorst, Jakob Kaiser, Bundesminister für gesamtdeutsche Fragen 1949-1957, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1972, Band 4, p.48.

¹²² Horst Albert Kukuck, "Etappen im Ringen um eine Wirtschaftskonzeption der CDU 1945-1949" in; Lothar Albertin und Werner Link (Hrsg), Politische Parteien auf dem Weg zur parlamentarischen Demokratie in Deutschland. Entwicklungslinien bis zur Gegenwart, Droste, Düsseldorf 1981, p.255.

¹²³ Rainer Salzmann, Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949, Sitzungsprotokoll, 18. Oktober 1948, op. cit., p.284.

economy, at the CDU's *Zonenausschuss* meeting in Königswinter on February 25, 1949, where members met to decide on an election strategy for the forthcoming federal elections. The need for a suitable economic policy had intensified, but committee member Fritz Hellwig reported; "there were still serious misgivings in the CDU about embarking on (Erhard's) economic course."¹²⁴ Prior to the meeting Erhard privately communicated his campaign recommendations to Adenauer, prompting Adenauer to see the meeting as an opportunity to forge an official link between Erhard, his programme and the CDU's election strategy.¹²⁵ Adenauer publicly praised Erhard's speech for its simplicity and clarity;

"Dieser Vortrag war so klar und lichtvoll und hat namentlich die grundlegenden Wahrheiten so deutlich und überzeugend in Erscheinung treten lassen Er hat in seiner Rede das Geheimnis jedes Erfolges wirken lassen, die Dinge zurückzuführen auf möglichst einfache und klare Begriffe."¹²⁶

Albers retorted that Erhard's speech was "mehr oder weniger das Prinzip einer liberalen Wirtschaft" and signalled a significant departure from the spirit of Ahlen. Erhard insisted that if he had been advocating the classic liberal economy, he would not now be showing his allegiance to the CDU. His social policy beliefs, he said were almost certainly closer to those of Albers, but added that he had not intended to address social policy in his speech. A separate social policy programme, he stressed, should be developed to co-exist alongside the Ahlen programme. Adenauer also assured the group; "Mit dem Ahlener Programm, zu dem ich restlos stehe, hat das nichts zu tun."¹²⁷ Not until Erhard's illuminating speech had Adenauer fully realised the benefits of espousing a market economy in political campaigning. His aim was merely to develop a manifesto for the purpose of the elections only, noting that;

".. alle solchen Programme und programmatischen Sätze haben keinen Ewigkeitswert, sondern sollen sich mit den Dingen beschäftigen, die jetzt akut sind.

¹²⁴ Fritz Hellwig, op. cit., p.27.

¹²⁵ Volkhard Laitenberger, Ludwig Erhard. Der Nationalökonom als Politiker. Mit einem Vorwort von Helmut Kohl, Muster Schmidt, Göttingen/Zürich 1986, p.77.

¹²⁶ Stenographische Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Zonenausschusses der CDU der Britischen Zone am 25. Februar 1949 in Königswinter (Stegerwaldhaus), in Helmut Pütz, Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der Britischen Besatzungszone. op. cit., p.854.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p.863.

Akut ist im kommenden Wahlkampf die Frage: Planwirtschaft oder Marktwirtschaft.“¹²⁸

Jakob Kaiser voiced agreement to Erhard's liberalism;

“Es sind unverlierbare Bestandteile, die erhalten werden müssen. Es ist genau so mit den Konservativen, was böse Leute meist als reaktionär bezeichnen. Es darf nicht verlorengehen, und es ist die Aufgabe unserer Partei, diese unverlierbaren Werte mit dem, was neu werden muß - ... in eine Harmonie zu bringen.“¹²⁹

Adenauer had gained not only an economic programme but, in Erhard, also a man who could present his programme with practical success, someone who was a good campaigner, and a popular economics minister once the election was won.

Independent to Erhard's efforts in Frankfurt, the CDU's own Economic Programme Committee of free market advocates, including Franz Böhm, Bernhard Pfister, Hugo Scharnberg and Franz Etzel had continued on a less active level to develop its own economic programme. More than a year after commencing its task the committee was also called upon to report to the party in Königswinter in February 1949. Etzel had distributed copies of the committee's draft economic programme and was scheduled to follow Erhard's speech. Adenauer's enthusiastic reception of Erhard's speech and his immediate insistence that Erhard's speech should become the basis for the CDU's new economic programme hopelessly overshadowed any subsequent announcement that Etzel was to make, and led Etzel to restrict his presentation to a few modest words only;

“Ich stimme damit überein, daß die Fassung eines Programms eine dringende Notwendigkeit ist. Sie ist auch insofern notwendig, als wir durch ein solches Programm nach außen den schlechten Eindruck verwischen, der immer wieder dadurch entsteht, daß von den verschiedensten Parteistellen, vor allem auch von unseren Ministern in den verantwortlichen Funktionen, immer etwas anderes getan wird, als es die Frankfurter Wirtschaftspolitik macht.”

Etzel conceded that their own programmatic endeavours had yielded little result;

¹²⁸ Ibid., p.858.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p.859.

Social Market Economy should be implemented. The preamble promised individuals the maximum of economic benefits, social justice and protection for the economically weak, sovereignty for the consumer, free competition, and an ordered monetary system. The preamble also offered justification for its apparent policy U-turn;

“Nachdem die Kritiker durch die Entwicklung der Ereignisse widerlegt worden sind, melden sie sich erneut mit dem Vorwurf, unsere Wirtschaftspolitik führe zurück zu kapitalistischen Formen und zu altem Liberalismus unsozialer, monopolistischer Prägung. Nichts liegt der CDU ferner als ein solcher Weg.”

Unlike earlier programmes the Düsseldorf programme reflected a new pragmatism and relevance to political developments, marking a departure from the idealistic and ideological tone of Ahlen's *Grundsatzprogramm* towards a new style of *Aktionsprogramme*, an election manifesto targeted specifically at the first west German parliamentary elections. It seeks recognition for economic recovery, triggered, as it claims, by currency reform and a commitment to social market economic principles;

“Der 20. Juni brachte den Umschwung. Die von der CDU vertretene Wirtschaftspolitik führte zu einer wirtschaftspolitischen Wende.... Der Währungsreform allein hat diesen Umschwung nicht herbeigeführt ... Der wesentliche Impuls aber kam aus der Inkraftsetzung marktwirtschaftlicher Grundsätze. Diese marktwirtschaftlichen Grundsätze wurden durch die von der CDU vertretene ‘soziale marktwirtschaft’ am 20. Juni 1948 zur Grundlage der deutschen Wirtschaftspolitik gemacht.”

The primacy of economic reform, already detectable in the Ahlen programme, was continued in the Düsseldorf Programme, highlighting the economy's importance as an election winning issue. Maintaining commitment to the third way of economic ‘*Freiheit und Bindung*,’ the programme hoped to placate both liberal and socialist strands in the party. Ordo-liberal theories are evident throughout the document, outlining safeguards for the control of monopoly industries and reiterating its support for industrial democracy,¹³⁴ already a feature of Ahlen, to ward off criticism that its aims were a

¹³⁴ Reflecting the priorities of the CDU parliamentary group in the Wirtschaftsrat, the Düsseldorf principles made only a very vague reference to employee co-determination rights in industry, claiming that the emphasis on monitoring monopolies and protecting competition in the economy would lead “neben den im Ahlener Programm genannten Mitteln zu wahrer Wirtschaftsdemokratie und deshalb nennen wir sie die ‘soziale Marktwirtschaft.’ A central independent commission should be set up to monitor money value, free choice of employment and careers, whilst private ownership participation of

restoration of the free, unregulated market. Equally it sought to ensure that state economic planning extended only to macro-economic management in a combination of tax and monetary policies and regulations for trade, investment and social policies but excluded state interference in manufacturing, employment and supply levels. Nationalisation plans are rendered secondary, superfluous even; "Das Sozialisierungsproblem erhält zugleich durch sie (die Soziale Marktwirtschaft) eine nachgeordnete Bedeutung." Whilst the social policies and ownership principles that characterised Ahlen are acknowledged, they are only vaguely upheld in Düsseldorf; "nach der marktwirtschaftlichen Seite hin ergänzt und fortentwickelt." The document otherwise contained no specific social policy reference and follows on from Adenauer's statement at Königswinter that the Düsseldorf programme and the Ahlen programme were to be supplemented by a separate social programme, although this never materialised. Düsseldorf positioned itself primarily as an economic programme, and claimed the Social Market Economy framed a comprehensive social, political and cultural order for society based on the central tenet of the individual;

"Es sind also nicht nur wirtschaftliche und soziale Überlegungen, sondern auch politische und kulturelle Gründe, die uns verlassen, die soziale Marktwirtschaft zu fordern. Wir sehen in ihr eine Wirtschaftsordnung, die zu echter Freiheit führt. Wer frei sein will, muß sich dem Wettbewerb unterwerfen."

Since the Düsseldorf manifesto had to account for two political viewpoints in the party, the liberal and the Christian Socialist, it was not surprising that it should become the most comprehensive of all the CDU's programmes.¹³⁵ After a long line of philosophical debate and political enquiry into the best socio-economic programme to adopt, the Düsseldorf principles were for the CDU;

"der letzte Akt, bei dem ein geistiges Ringen um die Konzeption einer neuen Wirtschafts- und Sozialordnung seinen vorläufigen Abschluß fand, ein Akt, mit dem dann die Partei in die Bundestagswahl 1949 ging."¹³⁶

the means of production must be constitutionally guaranteed. The Düsseldorf Principles printed in O.K. Flechtheim, (Band II), op. cit., p.61.

¹³⁵ Georg Müller, op.cit., p.302.

¹³⁶ Fritz Hellwig, op. cit., p.25.

With Erhard as one of its main protagonists, the Social Market Economy became the central slogan of the CDU's election campaign and one which brought a narrow victory of 31% against the SPD's 29.2% in the federal elections on August 14, 1949. The real task of fulfilling its political mandate however was only just beginning for the CDU. The controversy over a market economy or a planned economy¹³⁷ had *still* not been successfully resolved by the CDU despite the party's tacit acceptance of the Düsseldorf Principles as the basis of their election campaign.¹³⁸ The election result of 31% for the CDU was less than a third of the votes cast and despite a significant 12% support from the votes cast for the FDP, they still did not reach an overall majority.¹³⁹ Following the disappointing election results, some prominent voices in the CDU renewed their demands for forming a coalition with the SPD. Adenauer called a meeting on Sunday August 21, with Erhard and several other prominent politicians, to his house in Rhöndorf, to discuss coalition with the SPD.¹⁴⁰ Here Erhard argued that a coalition with the SPD would jeopardise his entire economic policy. Adenauer was surprisingly less resolute, reserving judgement until he had consulted the CSU's Hans Ehard. Only once the CSU had refused coalition with the SPD, did Adenauer argue that after winning the election on Erhard's Social Market Economy, it would be foolish to now dispense with it and indeed also with Erhard. Critics in the party who were still in favour of coalition with the SPD retorted that the election had narrowly been won not because but *despite* of Erhard. In truth, they said, it had been the '*christlichen Kitt*' that had won them the

¹³⁷ The 'provisional' constitution or Basic Law was completed in May 23, 1949. A controversial debate had been sparked over whether the new constitution should decide on a specific economic order or whether it should leave this area of legislation open. Finally no mention was made of an economic order, Gerhard Stoltenberg,, op.cit. p.269.

¹³⁸ Once the Bizone was to be represented by German and not allied personnel, the CDU fraction highlighted the need for young talented Germans; "die sich aus der eigenen deutschen Kenntnis heraus in das Spannungsverhältnis marktfreie Wirtschaft – Planwirtschaft einfühlen könnten," revealing that the choice of economic order had by no means been clarified. Rainer Salzmann, Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949, Sitzungsprotokoll, 12. April 1949, op. cit., p. 385-387.

¹³⁹ Erhard announced he would stand as a candidate for the CDU in Nordrhine-Westphalia and in Ulm-Heidenheim only two months before the election. He justified his decision to the liberal FDP, in particular to its leader Theodor Heuss, explaining that the CDU needed a liberal figure like himself to ensure that they stay true to a liberal course. Yet Erhard also knew that the success of his programme depended on widescale public support. The Volkspartei character of the CDU was thus more promising than the smaller FDP. Karl Hohmann, Ludwig Erhard 1897-1977, op. cit., p.14.

¹⁴⁰ See Rudolf Morsey, "Die Bildung der ersten Regierungskoalition 1949. Adenauer's Entscheidung von Frankfurt und Rhöndorf am 20. und 21 August 1949" in; Historisches Jahrbuch, Band 97/98, 1978. And Rudolf Morsey, "Die Rhöndorfer Weichenstellung vom 21. August 1949. Neue Quellen zur Vorgeschichte der Koalitions- und Regierungsbildung nach der Wahl zum ersten Deutschen Bundestag" in; Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 28. Jg. 1980.

election. Members had nevertheless been aware of the tactical necessity of showing agreement to Erhard's programme, to create the appearance of party unity. Without Erhard's workable programme the CDU had embarrassingly little to show for its five years of intense debate over economic and social policy, both in the party and in the *Wirtschaftsrat*. Their saving grace was their timely realisation that a stubborn refusal to accept political compromise on this occasion would have spelt the final death knell of the Christian Democratic Union.

Conclusion

This study was concerned with the historical development of a politics of the third way in German Christian Democracy. It began by investigating the core ideas of Christian Democracy in early expressions of conservatism and liberalism as understood by Catholics and Protestants and followed their evolution through 19th and early 20th century derivative ideologies to include Christian Socialism, Solidarism, Christian Liberalism, Ordo-Liberalism, Christian Realism, Liberal Socialism, Social Liberalism, Democratic Socialism, and Democratic Federalism. Against the century's backdrop of ideas and historical political traditions, the Christian Democratic Union emerged in 1945 with the aim of producing a third way socio-economic programme, uniting Catholics and Protestants in one all-embracing *Volkspartei* and consolidating diverse ideological forces into one, inclusive ideology - Christian Democracy. It was precisely the polarity between earlier ideologies and the extremist tendencies that they housed, that prompted the search for an alternative, centrist position. The CDU hoped to channel the polemical debate between socialist and liberalist visions of a new order towards a more pragmatic third way, whilst bridging the sectarian divide between Catholics and Protestants. Its task focused on reinventing and realigning earlier traditions and often bigoted political ideas, into a new and more workable philosophy acceptable to Protestants and Catholics.

Comprehensive analysis in the first section of the study, of the early influences in Christian Democracy, illustrated this intense sectarian divide between liberal and social versions of social and political organisation. Socialism was inherent in Catholic Social thinking, in beliefs in a strong, autocratic state, in notions of '*Gemeinwohl*' and '*Gemeinschaft*,' in Romantic visions of solidarity, and in the system of estates, guilds and social hierarchy. Liberal values on the other hand characterised Calvinist Protestantism, the belief in the powers of reason of the individual, in economic liberties and political rights as citizens of the state, and in the principles underpinning Enlightenment thinking. Because the hundred years between the 1840s and the 1940s were spanned by a clash of values and vested interests, many significant parallels in *Weltanschauung* between Protestants and Catholics were masked. Religious antagonism

had fuelled political animosity and ignored the potential inherent in the ideologies of the so-called 'interest' and '*Weltanschauung*' parties, for creating a third way alternative, overlooking liberalism and socialism as oxymoron terms. The conservatism of Lutheran-Protestantism was shown to have similar traits to the conservative-romantic strand in Catholicism.¹⁴¹ The Jesuit-Solidarist strand of Catholics and liberal Calvinist Protestants jointly believed in developing a socially responsible form of capitalism and can therefore be considered as early social marketeers. Liberal Catholics, such as Emmanuel von Ketteler and his programme of Christian Liberalism, actively sought to solve social ills *through* the capitalist system, and not by abolishing it, as more extreme conservative and socialist Catholics advocated. By encouraging Catholics to enter a dialogue with liberalism, to reassess their prejudiced views of what liberalism stood for, Ketteler hoped that they would embrace the freedom and tolerance that defined early liberal values.

Besides Ketteler, the study revealed other dedicated social reformers in political Protestantism and political Catholicism, who had launched significant initiatives for an interdenominational 'catch-all' political party, and made recommendations for a third way socio-economic programme. Figures such as Heinrich Brüning, Friedrich Naumann, Carl Bachem, Adolf Stöcker, or Adam Stegerwald had sensed there was sufficient scope for political dialogue in Germany, for closing Germany's troublesome gap between liberalist and socialist traditions, yet their efforts persistently failed due to society's intractable and rigid adherence to sectarian *Weltanschauung*. Political deadlock between parties peaked during the Weimar Republic, finally extinguishing all impetus for co-operation. The shared core beliefs of Catholic and Protestant '*Weltanschauungen*,' which could have enabled individual liberalism to be married to social obligation in a new third way, were disregarded.

There was a progressive and conscious movement underway in late 19th and early 20th century political Catholicism, to adapt and redefine the contours of its political programme to align its ideas more closely with liberal-conservatism. Once resentment towards the Protestant state in the *Kulturkampf* began to subside, a considerable number

¹⁴¹ Both showed authoritarian tendencies that fanned the flames of Germany's nationalist-fascist aspirations

of Centre Party Catholics grew more supportive of the capitalist system, but regrettably also began to support the more sinister, nationalistic aspirations of the Protestant state. Conservative Catholics' visions of a social and political order closely conformed to the authoritarian-monarchical system that characterised the German *Kaiserreich*. Many Catholic industrialists found the expansionist policies of the Protestant Reich favourable for advancing their own economic interests, and urged the Centre Party to exert its political influence more emphatically.

Both political initiatives, the more sinister conservative variety that became the precursor to fascism, and the social-reformist movement, confirm that latent potential for an inclusive political alternative existed in the German political system well before the CDU arrived in 1945. The National Socialists, as the first attempt at a *Volkspartei* failed in that mission. The second *Volkspartei*, the CDU, succeeded in harnessing that potential by focusing on Christian based politics.

Throughout the period, Christianity had failed to reconcile the hostile relationship between Protestants and Catholics. The ineffectual, self-obsessed and weak '*Weltanschauungspartien*' and the nationalistic, interest-driven '*Interessenparteien*' nurtured in Bismarck's semi-absolutist state and sustained in the Wilhelmian and the Weimar periods, prevented a Christian bond ever cementing. Sectarian antagonism was kept alive until the point when in Hitler's Third Reich, Christianity itself came under threat. Without sufficient resistance from Protestants and Catholics, the political willingness or a stable political and economic democracy, the rise of the degenerate Nazi Party, was unstoppable. It is lamentable however that an event as catastrophic as National Socialism was first required before a Christian solidarity and genuine co-operation could be forged between Protestant and Catholic confessions and their affiliated parties. The memories, experiences and guilt shared by political parties and the Christian Churches in enabling National Socialism to take root, unavoidably imposed a moral imperative on post-war Protestants and Catholics to undertake reform and fulfil their political responsibility in society. In 1945, Christianity would not only become a moral obligation but a factor that could secure democracy and unity in a new political order.

Concluding section 1, chapter 3 outlined the significant influence of ordo-liberals in promoting a Christian, social liberalism and in laying early foundations for Erhard's Social Market Economy. Ordo-liberalism outlined a third way programme of socio-economic management, whilst its spiritual strand of ordo-liberalism - as endorsed by Röpke and Müller-Armack - emphasised the need for a moral basis on which to practise market economic liberalism. The efforts of the ordo-liberals fulfilled an important bridging function in the transition from the old order and National Socialism, towards a politics of the third way.

Not surprisingly the first task of the first regional manifestos to appear by young Christian Democratic parties in 1945 and 1946, the focus of section two, were preoccupied with providing religious and philosophical explanations for the aberrations of German political history. By opening this forum for discussion, the CDU was then able to actively shape and modify how Germany's former ideologies were perceived, as a way of serving its own political ends. Programmes described not only the failing of the previous century, but centuries of moral and religious decline from the middle ages, through the Reformation, to the Enlightenment, condemning secularism and materialism as evils which had bred nationalism, liberalism and socialism, before their culmination in National Socialism. The conservative myth that depicted a loss of faith and morality, helped to advance the CDU's political credibility as the new defender of Christian western civilisation. Appealing to Germany's disorientation and insecurity as a defeated nation, Christian Democratic programmes could claim that only by imposing a Christian order on society, with its emphasis on social justice, community and individual responsibility, could the current crisis be adequately addressed. A Christian order, they argued, would anchor democracy and secure those individual freedoms, that had been violated under Weimarian liberalism and the Third Reich's National Socialism and which, they claimed, were now again under acute threat from the totalitarianism of Soviet socialism and the socialism of the Social Democrats.

It was not surprising that this conservative legacy should continue in the intense ideological climate of 1945. As *Weltanschauungsparteien*, German parties historically had been accustomed to explaining the political situation with religious and philosophical arguments. The CDU's choice to focus their manifestos on the ideologies of materialism,

secularism, liberalism and capitalism, demonstrates the unmitigated importance of *Weltanschauung* in shaping and explaining German political history after 1945. Few Christian democratic programmes highlighted the more tangible factors of the economic climate in the 1930s, global depression, rampant inflation, chronic levels of unemployment or Weimar's divided party political system as contributory factors in bringing about National Socialism. Their experiences told them that *Programme*, *Aufrufe*, *Leitsätze* or speeches and manifesto statements, grounded in sound moral principles and religious piety would provoke a more positive reaction from participants at election rallies. Reference to traditions and *Weltanschauung* provided citizens with direction and purpose in the moral and political vacuum that they faced after the war.

Furthermore Christianity helped the CDU in establishing its political identity and its new party ideology, with which it could compete with the SPD's and Communist Party's (KPD) longer, more established ideologies of Social Democracy and Marxist Socialism. The CDU could creatively employ its Christian credentials and commitment to liberal democracy to win ideological legitimacy and proof of its moral and political integrity. The preoccupation with ideology as a political resource however, underpinned the CDU's justification for a conservative Christian order with which to defend western civilisation from the evils of materialism. The post-war political spectrum of communists and social democrats had left a vacancy for a right-wing party and an attractive and promising opportunity for seizing mass political support from the pool of alienated conservative voters. The *Abendland* argument was propagated to help advance the CDU's political ends, revealing the need for a new party to combine a coherent system of ideas, concepts and historically established principles with political pragmatism and a degree of tactical myth-making, if it were to gain political recognition. Troeltsch's comment from 1912 that; "Without a definite mental and spiritual background, a system of this kind (capitalism) cannot become dominant"¹⁴² adds insight into the political mechanisms at play. In the same way, the CDU concentrated on establishing a religious and ethical substratum to underpin its political programme, in order that a market economy was given the best possible opportunity to flourish in a stable political democracy.

¹⁴² Ernst Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress. A historical study of the relation of Protestantism to the Modern World*. Williams & Northgate, London 1912, p.133.

Significant regional and confessional differences of the first programmes by Christian Democratic groups revealed an initial continuation of ideological and sectarian interests during the development of the CDU. Each regional group sought to legitimate their view of 'reality,' and to pursue their own agenda in the new Germany, based on historical tradition and experience, promoting either more federal or more centralised solutions to socio-economic policy. Catholics in the CDU were conscious of the political discrimination that they had suffered in the past, and were keen to secure wider power and influence in the future party system. Yet it took some Catholics in regional Christian democratic groups a long time to accept that the old Centre Party idea of exclusively representing Catholic interests had failed, and could not be repeated. Only by extending party representation to a wider electorate would a successor party to the Centre stand to gain a parliamentary majority. Catholic enthusiasm for an interdenominational *Volkspartei* must be explained as much by the Catholics' realisation of their own dilemma over their future power and influence, as by any genuine, altruistic desire to embrace Protestantism in the spirit of interdenominationalism. Recurring patterns of political continuity in 1945 with earlier conservative, liberal or social reformist traditions also revealed a repeat of the readiness by some Catholics to strike an accord with Protestant liberalism, as many Centre party members had earlier proposed. Not only could this alliance widen Catholics' influence but it meant Catholics of a liberal persuasion could continue to practise capitalism, albeit with corrective social measures, whilst legitimately endorsing a liberal-capitalist new order after 1945.

Whilst some conservative Protestant groups supported the Christian western civilisation myth, other Protestants recognised the vehement anti-liberal rhetoric in the programmes of many Catholic regions in the west as Catholic criticism of the Protestant *Bürgertum* and ideological propaganda to promote a Catholic reform agenda, making Protestants sceptical of forming a political alliance with Catholics. By highlighting Protestant complicity in National Socialism, Catholics could conveniently assuage their own guilt in facilitating Nazism. Many Protestant dominated programmes, particularly those from the eastern Soviet zone, upheld liberal, middle class '*bürgerlich*' traditions, and promoted liberal democracy as a way of reinstating capitalism, which they maintained was the key to economic revival. This contrast in programmes between Catholics and Protestants and

between east and west may point to a failure of Christian Democrats in the east to fully acknowledge the wrongs of liberal Protestantism, or Protestants' political passivity and support of unbridled capitalist activity. In actual fact they articulated the views of many in the northern states of the British zone, and in the south-west states of the American zone, who quietly also supported a revival of liberal-economic values.

It could be further concluded that the 'ideologisation' of the post-war situation by Christian conservatives, and the specific nature of its Christian *Abendland* argument actively encouraged a revival of capitalism in German society, the very thing that it claimed it was condemning, since capitalism is a prominent feature of western liberal democracies. Whilst there may be some truth in this, it does not adequately explain the motivations of many genuine third way thinkers in the CDU, or diminish the very real beliefs that had existed throughout the century to combine Christianity with democratic politics to provide a stable, conservative order. It was the Protestant Bonhoeffer who sought to reassure that endorsing capitalism was not in itself corrupt, provided it was also socially responsible. It was not people's striving for wealth per se, that put a nation in jeopardy, but individual and secular attitudes threatened society and its moral and ethical fibre. Catholic socialists, who were hasty to condemn capitalism in 1945, therefore risked throwing the *social* market economy baby out with the bathwater of 19th century *laissez-faire* capitalism. By adding 'Christian' to their party name, the CDU also pledged that politics in future would be performed according to Christian principles and to Weber's maxim of a 'Politics of Responsibility.' Any future abuse of political power would mean an implicit betrayal of the Christian faith. This dramatic revival of Christianity and of Christian based politics after 1945, and of a commitment by Protestants and Catholics to unite in an interdenominational party, must therefore be seen to represent the most fundamental shift that had occurred in German political thinking since the beginning of the German party system.¹⁴³

¹⁴³ Waldemar Besson called the CDU's new direction in 1945, the alignment with Western European style democracies, a 'neue Traditionslinie' for Germany, implying that the turning point was so radical and so profound that it also meant the end of Germany's previous foreign policy traditions. Waldemar Besson in; *The Conflict of Traditions. The Historical Basis of West German Foreign Policy in Britain and West Germany.* Karl Kaiser & Roger Morgan. Oxford University Press, London, 1971. p.61-80.

Catholic Social Teaching had never presented a barrier to interdenominational co-operation and as a doctrine did not defend a specific form of state, constitution, political system or a particular type of economic and social order. The new era of pragmatism after 1945 combined with the effective restraints imposed by the allied powers on party political activity, meant that even the persistence of political and sectarian tendencies and the display of loyalty to 19th and early 20th century reform agendas, would not be allowed to hinder progress. The allies' measures forced Christian Democrats of a liberal, conservative or socialist persuasion, to join forces, to consolidate their areas of programme agreement and reconcile their areas of difference. Often without realising, socialists and liberalists in both confessions campaigned for the same aim; namely to resurrect individual economic freedom, but underwritten by state guarantees to intervene in the economy where necessary to restore social justice and equality. Regional groups conflicted over the exact nature of liberal or socialist policies in the system, such as the level of state intervention in the economy or the freedom that should be granted to economic monopolies, the number and nature of nationalised industries, or the role and power of the employee in industrial relations, in co-operative decision making and share ownership schemes, but the basic consensus remained the same. The strict monitoring of events by the western European allies, ensured that political parties acted pragmatically and abandoned partisan *Weltanschauung*, instilling a new era of party political thinking. By relinquishing parochial confessional allegiance and class based politics, Germany's political parties were finally liberated from the environment of mistrust and suspicion in which they had been born and educated. Weber's prognosis of the 'Politics of Responsibility' had triumphed over the past practice of the 'Politics of Intention'.

All parties in 1945, the regional CDU parties included, were obliged often irrespectively of their true political intentions, to prove not only their Christian faith, but also their democratic and socialist credentials. The deployment of these terms in the CDU's regional programme pronouncements did in truth reflect many of the party's historical traditions, but undeniably Christianity, democracy and socialism were terms that helped to enhance a party's political legitimacy in 1945. By boasting socialist qualities for example, the CDU could effectively deflect accusations that it was middle class, liberal-reactionary or even fascist. The factor of *Weltanschauung*, that inextricable and complex historical link between religion and politics in German society, further explains why the

defence of socialism or liberalism by regional Christian Democratic programmes, did not neatly translate to a desire by socialists to construct a centralised economy and by liberalists to implement a market economy, as is normally understood in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. German ordo- or neo-liberalism stood for a reformed liberalism, a liberalism that was imbued with social responsibility and is markedly distinct from Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism.¹⁴⁴ German neo-liberals desired that the correct spirit or ethos was instilled in society, that people adopt either a more liberal or a more socially responsible attitude. In the post-fascist mood of 1945, moral reform became as important as reform of the economic and political system. The promotion of liberalism after 1945 was not to resurrect an exploitative *laissez-faire* economy, but to incorporate social measures in its economic policies. Even the 19th century German Historical School had maintained Germany's economy was unique, arguing that state intervention in the German economy would always be required to counter imbalances which arose from the arrival of industrialisation and capitalism. The economy still formed the point of departure for many liberals, but it was intended to serve the good of society and not understood exclusively as liberal economic freedom. So whilst conservative Catholics chose to find fault with the liberal economy of old, often for partisan reasons more than any strong aversion to capitalism, there was no reason why it could not find common ground with the German neo-liberalism of a Social Market Economy. Even the liberal market economy envisaged for Germany in 1945, would be constrained by its historically social commitment.

When other regional groups across the states and zones advocated a Christian Socialism, it also did not always imply that they were striving to bring about a socialist utopia through a radical upheaval of the social order - the conventional route for revolutionary socialist movements. German Christian Socialists in actual fact backed a programme with many restorative, conservative features, committed to private property ownership and to the middle class agricultural and small manufacturing industries. The 'socialism' they projected, paradoxically represented little more than support of private ownership, free market economics, industrial democracy and the prevention of economic monopolies. With a few notable exceptions, Christian Socialists broadly upheld the basic

¹⁴⁴ This is usually associated with Thatcherism and Reaganism and denoting free market philosophies of the 'new right' conservatives.

values of middle class society and would not accurately be described as a revolutionary alternative. The concept 'Socialism' also fulfilled an important moralising function in the immediate post-war period, reflecting first and foremost, a *Gesinnungsozialismus* rather than a radical economic programme. In the initial wake of fascism in 1945, Christian Socialists in the main centres of Frankfurt, in Berlin, North Rhine-Westphalia, as well as in other regions, benefited from demonstrating socialist credentials and a socialist political programme, since socialism initially appeared to be the answer to Germany's social, political and economic ills. Yet deep-rooted traditional German fears of socialism plus the proximity of the term to the SPD's programme, caused some Christian Democrats, most notably Adenauer, to harbour real doubts that its party's Christian Socialist wing was seeking affiliation with the parties on the left, and risked Marxist Socialism gaining a foothold in Germany. It was thus the historically problematic term 'socialism' and not its content per se that alienated conservative circles. By the time the first CDU party conference was held in Godesberg in December 1945, the definition of the phrase had already been sufficiently modified to reinforce its advocacy of a mixed economic structure, preventing any genuine left-wing programme from developing further.

The continuity of earlier conservative and liberal party movements to regional Christian Democratic groups emerging in 1945, dispels any suggestion that the post second world war period was a tabula rasa in socio-economic policy. But Section 3 of this study revealed that the Social Market Economy, which finally emerged between 1947 and 1949, was new in one very important aspect. It was the first time that an attempt at a third way had successfully been forged in a whole century of trying. Whilst individual elements of the programme were similar to earlier reform plans, the combination of liberal, social and conservative elements in one programme was unique. The circumstances in which the Social Market Economy was launched and the attitudes of the people now implementing those policies had also begun to change. Had the CDU in the *Wirtschaftsrat* or in the party at large, stubbornly rejected Erhard's course or failed in the final hour to demonstrate unity behind the Social Market Economy, this would inevitably have led to the demise of the CDU. A new era of pragmatism and an ability to compromise was beginning to crystallise. Like the century of Christian Democratic movements before, the CDU in the years between 1945 to 1949 had failed independently

to consolidate its ideological differences and to develop its own socio-economic concept. Without the Social Market Economy to act as the CDU's election campaign in the 1949 federal elections, the risk of the young party disappearing into political oblivion was sufficiently great to silence those dissenting voices in the CDU. Erhard, who at this stage was still not politically affiliated to the CDU, had not launched his economic plan in the same way as previous CDU political programmes. He introduced his programme as a plan that would bring practical measures to solve the economic crisis during economic reconstruction and this meant that his ideas were not subjected to the usual intense scrutiny normally applied to the CDU's party programmes. The party was accustomed to formulating profound philosophical and historical arguments for their political strategies and Erhard's modern, unconventional and pragmatic approach was not immediately recognised as a programme that could permanently and decisively reform west Germany's future political and economic order.

Erhard's third way Social Market Economy is best described as a framework for practising liberal democracy more than a defined party political manifesto. It offered a way of synthesizing competing traditions in German society and the flexibility for devising politics in either a more liberal or a more socialist direction. The controversy over a planned or a free market economy that had dominated the CDU's discussions and the century of ethical, socio-economic debates before, was ironically never conclusively resolved in the post-war period. Even the Basic Law drawn up in 1949 avoided a specific definition of the type of economy Germany had adopted. Although until recently the Social Market Economy was judged as an economic policy and for its success in bringing west Germany's economic miracle, it is clearly more accurate to analyse it for its ideological and symbolic qualities. The conceptual ambiguity of ideological terms such as socialism and liberalism, inevitably meant that the CDU's new third way programme, as a hybrid of liberal and social philosophies, would feature the same degree of ambivalence. Parties were accustomed to using political terminology as ideological weaponry to undermine their political opponents and resulted in socialism and liberalism undergoing periods in which they alternated between being terms of abuse and aspirational political goals.

It is also the nature of the third way that its parameters are not clearly delineated, and that it defies an all-encompassing and permanent definition. Policy in the third way is negotiable and flexible, allowing for either a more socialist or a more liberalist interpretation depending on political circumstances and demands in the economy. CDU politicians between 1945 and 1949 could draw manifold political advantages from this in-built ambiguity. Formulating policy with a degree of vagueness enabled their programmes to be modified at a later date without being seen to betray or contradict earlier statements. Despite the shift in thinking between the first Cologne Principles, the Ahlen Programme and the Düsseldorf Principles for example, the party was able to retain a semblance of ideological continuity in its programme statements. Through the political language of its programmes, the CDU succeeded in masking areas of intractable policy disagreement in the party, in concealing disputes between its members and in hiding areas of weakness or uncertainty over policy direction. Jakob Kaiser, Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard in particular, were exemplary at exploiting political language as a political resource. They formulated programme statements that withheld firm policy commitments when the outcome of events could not be predicted. Erhard for example was reluctant to back a market economy until he could be assured of the currency reform's success. Adenauer was liberal in his thinking but cautious about abandoning socialism until he could be assured that a market economy would be accepted politically. The political chameleon and opportunist Jakob Kaiser altered his political hue from liberal to socialist, then back to liberal, to reflect the new *Zeitgeist* and rapid changes in political climate.

Ludwig Erhard was judged for his success in modifying and realigning Christian democracy's former ideologies. By transforming the party's perceptions of liberalism and socialism, he challenged entrenched prejudices and successfully convinced his sceptics that prosperity, social responsibility and justice could simultaneously be obtained within a capitalist system. Importantly, Erhard reversed the belief that had prevailed within the trade union and political Catholic movement in the late 19th and early 20th century, that social change must come about through an explicit *social* policy. Social change via *economic* policy characterised Erhard's new mantra, emphasising the importance of free market enterprise, but always flanked by a commitment to social responsibility. Erhard's programme rehabilitated liberalism from being a pejorative term

in the 19th and early 20th century, denoting exploitative *laissez-faire* capitalism and Protestant discrimination of Catholics, to denoting a positive affiliation to liberal-democracy that guaranteed political and economic freedoms for the individual and future prosperity for the nation. Erhard's mixed professional experience and thinking, his earlier support for both socialist and liberalist economies at different moments in his own history, and finally his success in dynamically uniting liberal and socialist traditions, epitomise Germany's search for an alternative third way programme. With the Social Market Economy, Erhard successfully broke the deadlock in the CDU's programme discussions, convincing party members that pragmatism could win over dogma and reverse the tradition in which parties and individuals acted according to fixed, historical *Weltanschauung*. The more radical socialists could be persuaded to shed their historical antagonism towards capitalism and overcome their prejudices towards the market economy, the more moderate Christian Socialists who had never harboured anti-capitalist sentiments provided social provisions were accounted for, could nurture their affections for the market economy, whilst liberals learnt to accept that with freedom also comes responsibility in society.

It was the rhetoric of the Social Market Economy more than its economic formula that suggested Germany could reach a synthesis of its conflicting political traditions. This synthesis is not the result of opposing forces which become permanently reconciled in one final conclusion, as this would imply stagnation and political inertia. Rather the dialectics of ideological opposites remained in a state of dynamic flux, and could help lead to a higher level of dialectical synthesis. Debate and disagreement were intrinsic to performing third way politics, requiring flexible pragmatism and creativity in policy making. The Social Market Economy was not bound by dogma or fixed economic and social criteria and principles, indeed its role was more advisory than prescriptive. Significantly, the Social Market Economic system succeeded in generating consensus not only initially within the different political strands in the CDU, but later across Germany's entire party political spectrum. The SPD most notably gave their formal recognition to the Social Market Economic principles in Bad Godesberg in 1959.

The Social Market Economy had grown from a century of initiatives to create an economic solution that could provide social welfare *and* prosperity. Those early

endeavours by Catholic and Protestant social reform movements and the subsequent conservative, socialist and liberal parties in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, were important foundations for the CDU's first programmes, providing a collection of political ideas which could be adapted to suit the climate of 1945. The importance that has been ascribed to the more active political Catholic social reform movement or to the Centre Party, has clearly underplayed the role of political Protestantism and conservative liberalism in the development of the CDU's programme. The contribution by Protestant social reformers in the 19th century, the inherently flexible nature of Evangelical social ethics, Calvinism's link to democracy and to the spirit of capitalism, Weber's call for a Politics of Responsibility, the vision of some of Weimar's liberal parties, such as the DDP, who campaigned for a Social Capitalism, the extensive achievements of the ordoliberalists for devising a socially responsible market economy, the high degree of support for liberal programmes in the states of the eastern Soviet zone, the northern *Länder* of the British zone and the south-west *Länder* of the American zone, and finally the liberal programme of the Social Market Economy, have all been insufficiently acknowledged factors in the liberal and the Protestant origins of Christian Democracy.

A sufficient degree of compatibility between the principles and *Weltanschauung* of Catholics and Protestants and between their ambiguous interpretations of liberalism and socialism made a future for the Christian Democratic idea possible. Indeed it could be said that the CDU prospered not despite but rather as a result of its inherent heterogeneity in philosophies and programme. Neither confession was obliged to renounce their own religious beliefs, and neither Protestantism nor Catholicism subsumed the other in terms of validity of their principal values. Each confession brought very important and very different qualities to the relationship from their ethical teachings and their historical traditions. The more active role of Christianity in politics tempered Protestantism's traditional passivity, whilst an appreciation of Catholic Social Teaching led to a revision of how Protestants viewed the relation between religion and politics. Catholicism on the other hand learnt to modify its indiscriminate criticism of Protestant liberalism and to see its benefits in promoting democracy and prosperity through a Social Market Economy.

Bibliography

Abelshauser, Werner, *Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945-1948. Rekonstruktion und Wachstumsbedingungen in der amerikanischen und britischen Zone*. Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, DVA, Stuttgart 1975, (p.375).

Abelshauser, Werner, *Die Rekonstruktion der westdeutschen Wirtschaft und der Besatzungspolitik. Politische und ökonomische Stabilisierung Westdeutschlands 1945-1949*. Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1977.

Abelshauser, Werner, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1980*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main 1983.

Abelshauser, Werner, *Wirtschaft und Besatzungspolitik in der Französischen Zone 1945-1949. Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die Französische Zone 1945-1949*, Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1983.

Adam, Uwe Dietrich, "Die CDU in Württemberg-Hohenzollern, Die CDU Baden-Württemberg und ihre Geschichte", in; Weinacht, Paul Ludwig (Hrsg.), W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart/ Berlin/Köln/ Mainz 1978, (p.168).

Adenauer, Konrad, Rede gehalten aus Anlass einer politischen Grosskundgebung am 7. April 1946, Bonn 1946.

Adenauer, Konrad, *Erinnerungen 1945-1953*. DVA, Stuttgart 1965, (p.52, p.106).

Adenauer, Konrad, *Rede des ersten Vorsitzenden der CDU für die britische Zone. Grosskundgebung in Dusseldorf 12 May 1946*. Schriftenreihe der christlichen demokratischen Union des Rheinlandes Heft 10 (MF2213 ade),

Agethen, Manfred, "Die CDU in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1953" in: Fröhlich, Jürgen, *Bürgerliche Parteien in der SBZ/DDR. Zur Geschichte von CDU, LDP(D), DBD und NDPD 1945-1953*, Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln 1994 (p. 47-48).

Albers, Johannes, *Erbe und Aufgabe*. Bericht über die Tagung der Sozialausschüsse der CDU der Britischen Zone in Herne, Westfalen am 21-22. Februar 1947.

Albers, Johannes, "Sozialausschüsse, das soziale Gewissen der Union" in: Dörpinghaus, Bruno, Witt, Kurt, *Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU*. 1. Jahrgang, K.G Lohse, Frankfurt/Main 1950.

Albers, Johannes, *Gedenken an den Essener Kongress 1920, Essener Kongress 1950 der christlichen demokratischen Arbeiternehmerschaft*. Hrsg. von den Sozialausschüssen der christlich-demokratischen Arbeitnehmerschaft CDU/CSU. Adam Stegerwald Haus, Königswinter 1950.

Albers, Johannes, *Die Aufgabe der christlichen demokratischen Union im Leben des deutschen Volkes*. Rede des Vorsitzenden der CDU Köln in der Aula der Kölner Universität (no date).

Altrichter, Helmut, "Sozialismus oder Marktwirtschaft? Die Diskussion um die wirtschaftliche Neuordnung in den Westzonen 1945-1948", in: Ruffmann K.H, Altrichter H, *Modernisierung versus Sozialismus. Formen und Strategien sozialen Wandels im 20 Jahrhundert*. Deutsche Gesellschaft für zeitgeschichtliche Fragen, Erlangen 1983.

Ambrosius, Gerold, *Die Durchsetzung der sozialen Marktwirtschaft in West Deutschland 1945-1949*. Studien zur Zeitgeschichte, 10. Beiträge zur Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik in Deutschland nach 1945, DVA, Stuttgart 1977 (p.15-33, 54-64, 88-96, 141f, 184).

Anselm, Reiner, Verchristlichung der Gesellschaft? Zur Rolle des Protestantismus in den Verfassungsdiskussionen beider deutschen Staaten 1948/49, in: Kaiser Jochen C,

Manteuffel A.D (Hrsg), *Christentum und Politische Verantwortung. Kirchen in Nachkriegsdeutschland*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1990.

Anzenbacher, Arno, "Solidarität und Subsidiarität", in: *Die politische Meinung*, Jg 42, Nr. 326, St. Augustin 1997.

Arendt, Hannah, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, London 1973.

Aris, Reinhold, *History of Political Thought in Germany from 1789 to 1815*. Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., London 1965 (p.279).

Arndt, Adolf, "Die Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland und das Befreiungsgesetz", in: *Frankfurter Hefte*. Heft 5, Jg. 1, 1946.

Arnold, Karl, "Unser Ziel - Sozialer Frieden", in: *Gerechtigkeit schafft Frieden*, 73. Deutscher Katholikentag. Bochum von 31. August - 4. September 1949, Generalsekretariat des Zentralkomitees der Deutschen Katholikentage, Paderborn, Bonifacius 1949.

Arnold, Karl, "Der Soziale und der sittliche Geist in der Demokratie", bei der Gründungs-Versammlung der CDU in Düsseldorf, 24. November 1945, in *Schriftenreihe der CDU des Rheinlandes*, Heft 3, Köln (p.14).

Arnold, Karl, "Rede des Ministerpräsidenten anlässlich des Parteitages der Christlich-Demokratischen Union für Berlin und die russische Besatzungszone am 7. September 1947", in: Gradl, Johann Baptist, *Anfang unter dem Sowjetstern. Die CDU 1945-1948 in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands*, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von Nottbeck, Köln 1981.

Aschoff, Hans Georg, "Protestantismus und Staat im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Geschichte der christlich-demokratischen und christlich-sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland", in: Günther Rüther (Hrsg) *Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*. Band 216, im Auftrag der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Bonn 1989 (p.61,71).

Assmussen, Hans, "Die Stuttgarter Erklärung", in: *Die Wandlung. Eine Monatsschrift*. 3 Jg. 1.Heft. Januar, Unter Mitwirkung von Karl Jaspers, Werner Kraus und Alfred Weber. Hrsg von Dolf Sternberger, Lutherstrasse 59, Heidelberg 1948.

Bachem, Hans, "Programme sind kurzlebig", in: Kraft, Lothar und Reddemann, Gerhard, *Mit der Union in die Zukunft. Grundlagen, Kritik, Aufgaben, Vorschläge, Perspektiven.*" Verlag 'die Entscheidung', Bonn 1969.

Badstübner, Rolf, "Der christliche Sozialismus und die Verfälschung des marxistischen Sozialismusbildes als Bestandteil der imperialistischen Strategie und Taktik", in: *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, Heft 17, Band I, 1969.

Banchoff, Thomas, "Historical Memory and German Foreign Policy. The cases of Adenauer and Brandt", in: *German Politics and Society*, Vol. 14, 1996.

Barzel, Rainer, *Die Geistigen Grundlagen der Politischen Parteien*. Verlag Goetz Schwippert, Bonn 1947 (p.145).

Bauer, Gerhard, *Vom Zentrum zur CDU. Hundert Jahre christlicher Politik an der Saar*, Buchverlag Saarbrückener Zeitung, Saarbrücken 1981.

Bauer, Gerhard, *Die CDU im Saarland*. Dissertation zur Erlangung eines Doktors der Universität des Saarlandes, Saarbrücken 1980.

Baus, Ralf, "Die Gründung der Christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands in Sachsen 1945", in: *Historische Politische Mitteilungen. Archiv für Christlich*

Demokratische Politik, 2. Jg, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Hrsg), Böhlau Verlag, Köln, Weimar, Wien 1995 (p.99, p.267).

Becker, Winfried, "Die CDU im demokratischen Neubeginn 1945/1946. Motive der Gründung und parteipolitischer Standort," in: Guenter Rüther (Hrsg), *Geschichte der christlich-demokratischen und christlich-sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland*. Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von Nottbeck, Köln 1986 (p.98,p.108, p.353).

Becker, Winfried, "Staats- und Verfassungsverständnis der christlichen Demokratie von den Anfängen bis 1933", in: Guenter Rüther (Hrsg), *Geschichte der christlich-demokratischen und christlich-sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland*. Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von Nottbeck, Köln 1986.

Becker, Winfried, *CDU und CSU 1945-1950, Studien zur politischen Bildung*. Band 13, Hrsg. im Auftrag der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung von Klaus, Gotto. Archiv für christlich demokratische Politik, v. Hase & Koehler Verlag, Mainz 1987.

Becker, Winfried, "Die Zentrumspartei und die Enzyklika Rerum Novarum", in: *Rheinische Vierteljahresblätter (Sonderdruck)*, Hrsg. W. Besch, H.L Cox, W. Janssen, M. Nikolay Panter, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn 1992 (p.130, 263, 273-276).

Becker, Dierk-Eckhard, Wiesendahl, Elmar, *Ohne Programm nach Bonn oder die Union als Kanzler-Verein*. Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag, Hamburg 1972.

Becker, Karl Wilhelm, "CDU & Ideologie", in: *Politische Soziale Korrespondenz*, Nr.12, Jg. 18.

Beetham, David, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*. George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London 1974 (p.11).

Beetham, David, *The Legitimation of Power. Issues in Political Theory*. Macmillan, London 1991.

Bell, Daniel, *The End of Ideology. On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*. The Free Press, New York 1962 (p.395).

Benz, Wolfgang, "Vorform des Weststaats: die Bizone 1946-1949", in: Theodor Eschenburg, *Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Jahre der Besatzung 1945-1949*, Band 1, DVA, Stuttgart 1983 (p.376f, p. 382).

Benz, Wolfgang, "Föderalistische Politik in der CDU/CSU. Die Verfassungsdiskussion im Ellwanger Kreis 1947/48", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 25 Jg, 1977, (s. 776-820).

Benz, Wolfgang, "Grundgesetz der Alliierten? Die Entscheidung für die Staatsgründung im Sommer 1948", in: *Die Politische Meinung*, Jg 24, Nr. 184, Mai/Juni 1979.

Benz, Wolfgang, *Von der Besatzungsherrschaft zur Bundesrepublik. Stationen einer Staatsgründung 1946-1949*. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1989 (p.86-88).

Berger, Stephen, Stephen D. Berger, "The Development of Legitimizing Ideas" in; Rudolf Wildenmann (Hrsg), *Sozialwissenschaftliches Jahrbuch für Politik*, Band 3, Günter Olzog, München/Wien 1972, (p.9-173).

Bergsdorf, Wolfgang, *Herrschaft und Sprache*. Neske, Pfullingen 1983 (p.28, 65).

Bergsträsser, Ludwig, *Geschichte der politischen Parteien in Deutschland. Deutsches Handbuch der Politik 2*. Günter Olzog Verlag, München 1960 (p.13-16.p.48).

Berkennkopf, P. Paul, *Stimmen der Zeit, Monatschrift fuer das Geistesleben der Gegenwart*, Herder, Freiburg, October 1947.

Bertsch, Herbert, *CDU/CSU Demaskiert*. Rütten & Loening, Berlin 1961.

Besson, Waldemar, "The Conflict of Traditions. The Historical Basis of West German Foreign Policy. The Factor of Tradition", in: Kaiser, Karl, Morgan, Roger, *Britain and West Germany. Changing Societies and the Future of Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, London 1971 (p.61-80).

Besson, Waldemar/Jasper, Gotthard, "Das Leitbild der modernen Demokratie. Bauelemente einer freiheitlichen Staatsordnung", in: *Schriftenreihe Band 300, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*, Bonn 1990.

Beyme, Klaus von, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*. Gower, Aldershot 1985.

Beyme, Klaus von, *Die grossen Regierungserklärungen der deutschen Bundeskanzler von Adenauer bis Schmidt*. Carl Hanser Verlag, München, Wien 1979.

Beyme, Klaus von, "Theoretische Probleme der Parteienforschung", in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Jg 24, H3, 1983 (p.250).

Billstein, Reinhold, *Neubeginn oder Neuordnung. Dokumente und Materialien zur politischen Weichenstellung in der Westzone nach 1945*. Paul Rugenstein, Köln 1984.

Birke, Adolf. M., "Bischof Kettelers Kritik am deutschen Liberalismus", in: Schmidt, Martin/Schwaiger Georg (Hrsg), *Kirchen und Liberalismus im 19. Jahrhundert*. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1976.

Blackbourn, David / Eley, Geoff, *Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung. Die gescheiterte bürgerliche Revolution von 1848*. Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main 1980.

Blank, Bettina, *Die westdeutschen Länder und die Entstehung der Bundesrepublik. Zur Auseinandersetzung um die Frankfurter Dokumente vom Juli 1948*. R. Oldenbourg Verlag, München 1995.

Blank, Theodor, "Vom Ahlener Programm zu den Düsseldorfer Leitsätzen - Zur Dogmengeschichte der CDU", in: Müller-Armack Alfred, Schmidt Herbert B (Hrsg), *Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik im Zeichen der sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Festgabe für Franz Etzel*. Seewaldverlag, Stuttgart-Degerloch 1967 (p.40).

Blüm, Norbert, "Christlich-sozial. Dazwischen!" in: Schönbohm, Wulf & Braun, Günter E. (Hrsg), *CDU Programmatik. Grundlagen und Herausforderungen*. Günter Olzog Verlag, München 1981.

Blum, Reinhard, *Soziale Marktwirtschaft*. J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1969 (p.264).

Blumenberg-Lampe, Christine, *Das wirtschaftspolitische Programm der 'Freiburger Kreise'. Entwurf einer freiheitlichen-sozialen Nachkriegswirtschaft. Nationalökonomien gegen den Nationalsozialismus*. Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin 1973 (p.15,37,55,130-133).

Blumenberg-Lampe, Christine, "Franz Böhm. Die Konzeption der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft", in: Buchstab, Günter, Klaus, Gotto, *Die Gründung der Union. Traditionen, Entstehung und Repräsentanten*. Olzog, München 1990.

Blundell, John and Gottschalk, Brian, *Beyond Left and Right*. Institute of Economic Affairs. London 1997.

Böhm, Franz, "Der Sprung in die Marktwirtschaft", in: *Ludwig Erhard. Beiträge zu seiner politischen Biographie. Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag*. Propylaen Verlag 1972, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Wien 1972.

Böhme Hans, "Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung in beiden Teilen Deutschlands zwischen 1945 und 1949", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B19/69, 1969.

Böhr, Christoph, "Werte und Wirkungen. Zur politischen-praktischen Bedeutung christlicher Grundwerte", in: *Die neue Ordnung*, Nr. 39, 1985.

Böhret, Carl, "Probleme Politischer Entscheidung am Beispiel der Auseinandersetzung um ein Mitbestimmungsgesetz in Württemberg-Baden 1945/1949", in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* Jg 8, 1967.

Börner, Rolf, *Der Antikommunismus - ein Hauptbestandteil der modernen bürgerlichen Ideologie. Als Christen dem Sozialismus verpflichtet*, Hrsg der Parteileitung der Christlich Demokratischen Union, Union Verlag, Dresden 1961.

Boese, Franz, *Geschichte des Vereins für Sozialpolitik 1872-1932*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1939 (p.4).

Bolton, Seymour R., "Military Government and the German Political Parties", in: *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*. Vols 267-272, 1950, (p.55-667).

Borchardt, Knut, "Wirtschaftliche Ursachen des Scheiterns der Weimarer Republik", in: Erdmann Karl Dietrich, Schulze Hagen, *Weimar. Selbstpreisgabe einer Demokratie. Eine Bilanz heute*. Droste, Düsseldorf 1980.

Boyens, Armin, "Das Stuttgarter Schuldbekenntnis vom 19. Oktober 1945- Entstehung und Bedeutung", in: *Vierteljahresshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 19, 1971.

Bracher, Karl Dietrich, "Demokratie und Ideologie im Zeitalter der Machtergreifungen", in: *Vierteljahressheft für Zeitgeschichte*, Jahr 31, Heft 1, 1983.

Bracher, Karl Dietrich, *The Age of Ideologies - A History of Political Thought in the Twentieth Century*, Methuen, London 1984.

Brakelmann, Günter, *Die Soziale Frage des 19. Jahrhunderts. Teil II. Die evangelisch-soziale und die katholisch-soziale Bewegung*. Luther Verlag, Witten/Ruhr 1962 (p.35-37, p. 46, p.80).

Brakelmann, Günter, Jähnichen, Traugott, *Die Protestantischen Wurzeln der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Ein Quellenband*. Gütersloher Verlagshaus, Gütersloh 1994 (p.341, 375-380).

Brickwedde, Friedrich, *Die Frühgeschichte der westfälischen CDU*, Hausarbeit zur Erlangung es Magistergrades der philosophischen Fakultät der Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität zu Münster, 1978 (p.10).

Briefs, Goetz, "Liberalismus und katholische Soziallehre. Bilanz der Gemeinsamkeiten", in: *Die Politische Meinung*, Heft 52 Jg 5, 1960 (p.36).

Broszat, Martin, Weber, Hermann, *SBZ Handbuch. Staatliche Verwaltungen, Parteien, gesellschaftliche Organisationen und ihre Führungskräfte in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1945-1949*. Oldenbourg, München 1990 (p.396, 515).

Buchheim, Karl, *Geschichte der christlichen Parteien in Deutschland*. Koesel Verlag, München 1953.

Buchhaas, Dorothee, *Die Volkspartei. Programmatistische Entwicklung der CDU 1950-1973*. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1981.

Buchhaas-Birkholz, Dorothee, *Zum politischen Weg unseres Volkes. Politische Leitbilder und Vorstellungen im deutschen Protestantismus 1945-1952. Eine Dokumentation*.

Restauration oder Neuanfang in der evangelischen Kirche. Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1989,(p.10).

Buchheim, Christoph, "Die Währungsreform 1948 in Westdeutschland", in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Jg 36 Heft 2, 1988.

Buchheim, Hans, *25 Jahre CDU Rheinland. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und zum Selbstverständnis der Christlich Demokratischen Union.* Publistik und Werbung, Köln 1970.

Buchstab, Günter, *Zur Geschichte der Sozialausschüsse. Die schwierige Rolle der CDA zwischen CDU und DGB. Vortrag auf dem ZAK Jahresseminar 1985 für Mitglieder des Stegerwald-Bundes am 14.5.1985,* Stiftung für Christlich-Soziale Politik und Bildung, Königswinter 1985.

Buchstab, Günter, "Andreas Hermes. Die Tradition christlicher Grundwerte und Parteien," in: Buchstab Günter, Klaus, Gotto, *Die Gründung der Union. Traditionen, Entstehung und Repräsentanten,* München, Olzog 1990 (p.114).

Bücker, Vera, "Der Kölner Kreis und seine Konzeption für ein Deutschland nach Hitler", in: *Historische Politische Mitteilungen.* Archiv für christlich demokratische Politik, 2 Jg, Hrsg. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Böhlau Verlag, Köln, Weimar, Wien 1995.

Bührer, Werner, "Auftakt in Paris. Der Marshall Plan und die deutsche Rückkehr auf die internationale Bühne 1948/49", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* Jg 36 Heft 3, 1988.

Bürgerliche Parteien in der SBZ/DDR. Zur Geschichte von LDP, CDUD, NDPD und DBD 1945-1953, Tagung der Friedrich Naumann Stiftung vom 13. bis 15. Dezember 1993 in Gummersbach, *Jahrbuch zur Liberalismus Forschung,* Jg 6, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1994 (p.47).

Cary, Noel D., *The Path to Christian Democracy. German Catholics and the Party System from Windthorst to Adenauer*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusettes/London England 1996 (p.4, 31, 61,137-138, 165-171).

Chodinski, Hans Joachim, *Der Einfluss der Niedersächsischen CDU auf die Bundespartei (unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Programmentwicklung)*. Schriftliche Hausarbeit im Rahmen der wissenschaftlichen Prüfung für das Lehramt an Gymnasien 1979.

Clay, Lucius D., *Decision in Germany*. Green Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticut 1950 (p.175, 205).

Conze, Werner, *Jakob Kaiser. Politiker zwischen Ost und West 1945-1949*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1969 (p.15, 20-24, 38, 186).

Conze, Werner, Kosthorst, Erich, Nebgen Elfriede, *Jakob Kaiser - Bundesminister für gesamtdeutsche Fragen 1949-1957*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1972 (p 9, 48, 103).

Coote, Nicholas, "Catholic Social Teaching", in: *Social Policy & Administration*, Vol. 23, No.2 August, 1989 (p.150).

Cornides, Wilhelm, *Die Illusion einer selbstständigen französischen Deutschlandpolitik (1944-1947)*, Europa-Archiv, Jahr 9, 1954.

Curtius, E.R, *Essays on European Literature*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1973.

Dahrendorf, Ralf, *Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland*. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München 1968.

Delanty, Gerhard, *Inventing Europe. Idea, Identity, Reality*. Macmillan, London 1995.

Deuerlein, Ernst, *CDU/CSU 1945-1957 Beiträge zur Zeitgeschichte*. J.P Bachem, Köln 1957 (p.8, 16, 25-28, 30).

Deuerlein, Ernst, "Deutschland nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg 1945-1955", in: *Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion*, Dr Albert Hachfeld, Konstanz 1964.

Deuerlein, Ernst, "Das erste gesamtdeutsche Gespräch. Zur Beurteilung der Ministerpräsidenten-Konferenz in München 6/7 June 1947", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B23/67, 1967.

Deuerlein, Ernst, "Frankreichs Obstruktion deutscher Zentralverwaltungen 1945", in: *Deutschland Archiv*, Jahr 4 Nr.1, Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln 1971.

Deuerlein, Ernst, "Vom totalitären Führerstaat zur parlamentarischen Demokratie. Voraussetzungen und Stufen der Entwicklung zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in: *1919-1969. Parlamentarische Demokratie in Deutschland*, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Heft 86, Bonn 1970.

"Die Stuttgarter Erklärung", in: *Die Gegenwart*, Jg 1, Nr. 18/19, 1946.

Die Generaldebatte, Erster Parteitag der CDU der Britischen Zone am 14/15 August 1947, Hrsg. Zonensekretariat der CDU der britischen Zone, Köln, Marienburg 1947.

Die Neuen Verfassungen. Ein Vergleich, Verlag der westdeutschen Rundschau, Wuppertal 1947.

"Der Weg der Union - Mecklenburg" in: *Der Demokrat*, Schwerin 1947 (p.5-10, p.38).

"Die Juli-Tagung der Union", Entschliessungen des erweiterten Parteivorstandes zur politischen Lage, in: *Union teilt mit*. Nachrichten der christlich demokratischen Union, Nr. 8. August, 1948.

"Die Länder und der deutsche Staat. Die Stellung der CDU und CSU zum Verfassungsproblem", in: *Die Gegenwart*, Jg 3, Nr. 15, 1948.

Die Enzyklika Pius' XI Quadregesimo Anno, Amtlicher deutscher Text, Hrsg. vom Erzbischöflichen Seelsorgeamt, Köln, Düsseldorf 1946 (p.48f).

Dieckmann, Walther, "Sprache in der Politik, Kampf um Wörter? Politische Begriffe im Meinungsstreit", in: Greiffenhagen, Martin, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn 1980.

Dietze, Frank, "Entscheidungsstrukturen und -prozesse in der Ost-CDU 1945-1952", in: Richter, Michael, Rissmann, Martin (Hrsg), *Die Ost CDU. Beiträge zu ihrer Entstehung und Entwicklung*. Böhlau Verlag, Köln, Weimar, Wien 1995 (p.55).

Dirks, Walter, "Das Abendland und der Sozialismus", in: *Frankfurter Hefte*, 1 Jg, Heft 3, 1946, (p.67-76).

Dirks, Walter, "Ja und Nein. Zur Politik der Frankfurter Hefte", in: *Frankfurter Hefte* 2. Jg, Heft 2, 1947, (p.384-402).

Dirks, Walter, "Das Wort Sozialismus, Sozialismus oder Restauration" in: Fritz Boll, Ulrich Brückling, Karl Prümm (Hrsg), *Politische Publistik 1945-1950, Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 4, Amman Verlag, Zürich 1987.

Dirks, Walter, "Thesen zu einer 'Sozialistischen Einheitspartei,'" May 1945, in: *Politische Publistik 1945-1950. Gesammelte Schriften* Band 4, Amman Verlag, Zürich 1987 (p.36).

Dirks, Walter, "Die geistige Aufgabe des deutschen Katholizismus", in: *Frankfurter Hefte*. Heft 2, Jg. 1, 1946.

Dirks, Walter, "Programmpunkte zum Thema Christentum und Sozialismus", in: *Frankfurter Hefte*, Heft 3, Jg 2, 1947.

Dirks, Walter, "Rechts und Links, Sozialismus oder Restauration", in: *Politische Publizistik 1945-1950. Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 4, Amman Verlag, Zürich 1987 (p.94-108).

"Diskutiert das Wirtschaftsprogramm der CDU", in: *Union teilt mit*, Nachrichten der christlich demokratischen Union, Nr. 9 September, 1948.

Dornsteiff, Franz, "Weltanschauung. Kurzgefasste Wortgeschichte", in: *Die Wandlung. Eine Monatsschrift*, 1 Jg. 12. Heft, March 1945/6.

Dufheus, Josef Hermann, "Christen in der Demokratie. Die CDU als Weltanschauungspartei", in: *Die Politische Meinung, Sonderdruck*, Heft 96, 1964.

Dumont, Louis, *German Ideology: From France to Germany and Back*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1994.

Duverger, Maurice, *Political Parties*. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London 1954.

Ebbighausen, Rolf, Kaltenborn, Wilhelm, "Arbeiterinteressen in der CDU? Zur Rolle der Sozialausschüsse", in: Dittbeiner, Jürgen, Ebbighausen, Rolf, (Hrsg), *Parteien System in der Legitimationskrise. Studie und Materialien zur Soziologie der Partei*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1973.

Eckhard-Becker, Dierk, Wiesendahl, Elmar, *Ohne Programm nach Bonn oder die Union als Kanzlerwahlverein*. Rowohlt, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1972.

Edelmann, Murray, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Chicago and London 1967 (p.39).

Edelmann, Murray, "Politische Sprache und politische Realität," in: Greiffenhagen, Martin, *Kampf um Wörter? Politische Begriffe im Meinungsstreit*, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn 1980.

Ehler, Klaus, *CDU in der DDR, oder was wir von unseren Brüdern und Schwestern lernen können*. Edition Verständigungshilfe, PLAN-Verlag, Köln 1969.

Ehrenberg, Herbert, *Die Erhard Saga. Analyse einer Wirtschaftspolitik, die keine war*. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart 1965.

Eldersveld, S.J *Political Parties. A Behavioural Analysis*, Rand McNally, Chicago 1964

Endres, Elisabeth, *Die Literatur der Adenauerzeit*, Steinhausen, München 1980.

Epstein, Klaus, "Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik" in *Historische Zeitschrift*, 197, 1963.

Erhard, Ludwig, "Das Aufbauwerk der Verwaltung für Wirtschaft", in: Dörpinghaus, Bruno, Witt, Kurt, *Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU*, 1. Jahrgang, K.G Lohse, Frankfurt am Main 1950 (p.116f).

Erhard, Ludwig, *Germany's Comeback in the World Market*, Jarrold & Sons, Norwich 1953.

Erhard, Ludwig, *Prosperity through Competition*, Thames & Hudson, London 1958.

Erhard, Ludwig, "Verführt Wohlstand zum Materialismus?", in: *Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU*, 4. Jahrgang, Hrsg von der CDU/CSU Deutschlands, Kommunal Verlag, Recklinghausen 1960.

Erhard, Ludwig, *Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik. Der Weg der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft*. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf 1962 (p.69).

Erhard, Ludwig, *Wohlstand für alle*. Econ Verlag, Düsseldorf 1958.

Erhard Ludwig/Müller-Armack Alfred, *Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Manifest '72*, Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main 1972.

Erhard, Ludwig, "Über Parteiprogramme", in: *Gesellschaftspolitische Kommentare*, Nr 17, 1. September 1970, (s.208).

Eschenburg, Theodor, "Erinnerungen an die Münchener Minister Präsidenten-Konferenz 1947", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Nr. 20. Heft 4, 1972.

Eschenburg, Theodor, "Regierung, Bürokratie und Parteien 1945-1949. Ihre Bedeutung für die politische Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg. 24, DVA, Stuttgart 1976.

Eschenburg, Theodor, *Jahre der Besatzung 1945-1949*, Band 1, DVA, Stuttgart 1983 (p.377).

Esser, Karl Albert, *Die Sozialausschüsse der Christlich-Demokratischen Arbeiternehmerschaft und Ihre Entwicklung von 1967 bis 1983*, Diplomarbeit, Technische Hochschule Aachen, Aachen. No date.

Esser, Lutz, "Union und Sozialausschüsse", in: *Soziale Ordnung*, Nr. 10, 1968.

Etzel, Franz, *Die christlichen Grundlagen der Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik, Vortrag auf der Landestagung des Evangelischen Arbeitskreises der CDU des Rheinlandes*, Köln 1960.

Eugen Kogon, Michael Kogon und Erb, Gottfried, (Hrsg), *Die Restaurative Politik. Zur Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Band 3 der Gesammelten Schriften. Quadriga, Weinheim, Berlin 1996 (p.23-48).

Eugen Kogon Red., Michael Kogon, *Ideologie und Praxis der Unmenschlichkeit. Erfahrungen mit dem Nationalsozialismus*. Gesammelte Schriften Band 1, Beltz Quadriga, Weinheim/Berlin 1995.

Evans, Ellen Lovell, *The German Centre Party 1870-1933. A study in Political Catholicism*. Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondal & Edwardsville 1981.

Evans, Richard J.(Ed.), *Society and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany*, Croom Helm, London 1978.

Fack, Fritz Ullrich, *Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Stationen einer freiheitlichen Ordnung*. Ploetz, Freiburg, Würzburg 1990.

Fack Fritz Ullrich, "Ordnungspolitiker und Kanzler in schwerer Zeit", in: *Die politische Meinung*, Jg 42, 326, St. Augustin 1997.

Fässler, Peter, Badisch, *Christlich und Sozial. Zur Geschichte der BCSV/CDU im französischen besetzten Land 1945-1952*. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1995 (p.110, 207ff, 114, 129).

Falter, Jürgen W., "The First German Volkspartei. The Social Foundations of the NSDAP", in Rohe, Karl (Hrsg), *Elections, Parties and Political Traditions. Social Foundations of German Parties and Party Systems, 1867-1987*. Berg, Oxford, Providence 1990 (p. 53-81).

Fanfani, Amintore, *Catholicism, Protestantism and Capitalism*, Sheed & Ward, London 1935 (p.143, 152).

Feuer, Lewis S., *Ideology and the Ideologists*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1975 (p.2).

Fischer, Alexander, *Der Einfluss der SMAD auf das Parteiensystem in der SBZ am Beispiel der CDUD, Parteienanfänge in der sowjetischen besetzten Zone. Zwei Vorträge*, Archiv für christliche demokratische Politik der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Hrsg), Deutscher Bundestag, Sankt Augustin, 1992 (p.26).

Fischer, Alexander, "Andreas Hermes und die gesamtdeutschen Anfänge der Union", in: Fischer Alexander, Agethen Manfred, *Die CDU in der sowjetisch besetzten Zone / DDR 1945-1952. Aktuelle Fragen der Politik*, Heft 4, Ernst Knoth GmbH, Sankt Augustin 1994 (p.10, 17).

Fischer, Fritz, "Der deutsche Protestantismus und die Politik im 19. Jahrhundert", in: *Historische Zeitschrift*, Nr. 171, 1951 (p.473-518).

Flechtheim, O.K, *Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945*, Band I. Dokumenten Verlag, Berlin 1962 (p.1, 20).

Flechtheim, O.K, *Dokumente zur parteipolitischen Entwicklung in Deutschland seit 1945* Band II, Dokumenten Verlag, Berlin 1963 (p.27-30, 36-45, 48-61).

Flechtheim, O.K, *Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Hoffmann und Campe, Hamburg, 1973 (p.132).

Fleischer, Otto Heinrich, "Gabe und Aufgabe des Protestantismus", in: *Frankfurter Hefte*, Heft 11, Jg 2, 1947.

Flohr, Heiner, *Parteiprogramme in der Demokratie*. Otto Schwarz & Co., Göttingen 1968 (p.62).

Focke, Franz, *Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung. Die Idee eines christlichen Sozialismus in der katholischen-sozialen Bewegung und in der CDU*. Peter Hammer Verlag, Wuppertal 1981 (p.199, 204f, 211, 219ff, 299).

Frank, Paul, "Zum Begriff der Wirtschaftsordnung", in: *Die neue Ordnung*, Jg 3, 1949, Heft 6, Kerle Verlag, Heidelberg 1949.

Fratzscher, Arnold, *CDU in Niedersachsen. Demokratie der ersten Stunde*, Niedersachsen, Landeszentrale für politische Bildung, 1971 (p.33-35).

Fricke, Dieter, *1830-1945 Die bürgerlichen Parteien in Deutschland. Band 1. Handbuch der Geschichte der bürgerlichen Parteien und anderer bürgerlichen Interessenorganisationen vom Vormärz bis zum Jahre 1945*. VEB Bibliographisches Institut, Leipzig 1974 (p.269).

Friedensburg, Ferdinand, *Es ging um Deutschlands Einheit. Rückschau eines Berliners auf die Jahre 1945*, Haude & Spener, Berlin 1971 (p.51).

Friedrich, Carl J, *Tradition and Authority*, The Pall Mall Press, London 1972.

Friedrich, Carl J., "Nationaler und Internationaler Föderalismus in Theorie und Praxis", in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Jg 5, Heft 2, 1964.

Friedrich, Wilhelm Graf, "The German Theological Sources and Protestant Church Politics", in: Lehmann, Harmut/Roth, Günther (Ed), *Weber's Protestant Ethic. Origins, Evidence, Contexts*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993 (p.32, 46).

Fritzsche, Robert, "Entnazifizierung. Der fast vergessene Versuch einer politischen Säuberung nach 1945", in: *Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B24/72, 1972.

Fröhlich, Jürgen, *Bürgerliche Parteien in der SBZ/DDR. Zur Geschichte von CDU, LDP(D), DBD und NDPD 1945-1953*, Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln, 1994.

Frommelt, Reinhard, "Die CDU und das liberale Erbe", in: Schönbohm, Wulf & Braun, Günter E. (Hrsg), *CDU Programmatik. Grundlagen und Herausforderungen*, Günter Olzog Verlag, München, 1981.

Fuerst, Carl, in: *Südwestdeutsche Union*, Halbmonatszeitschrift der CDU, Landesverband Nordbaden, Jg 1, August, Offenburg 1946 (p.12).

Funk, Lothar (ed.), *The Economics and the Politics of the Third Way. Essays in Honour of Eric Owen Smith*, Volkswirtschaftliche Schriftenreihe, Bd 30, Lit Verlag, Hamburg-Münster -London 1999.

Gablentz, Otto Heinrich von der, "Zur Problematik christlich-sozialer Parteien", in: Fijalkowski, Jürgen, *Politologie und Soziologie. Otto Stammer zum 65. Geburtstag*. Westdeutscher Verlag, Köln, Opladen 1965.

Gasser, Manuel, "Auf den Spuren des Nationalismus", in: *Erwacht Deutschland schon wieder? Der Monat*, 1 Jg. Heft 8/9, 1949.

Geiger, Theodor, *Ideologie und Wahrheit*. Humboldt Verlag, Stuttgart-Wien 1953 (p.66, 600).

Gerstenmaier, Eugen, "Adenauer und die Macht", in: Blumenwitz, Dieter, Gotto, Klaus, Maier, Hans, Repgen, Konrad, Schwarz, Hans-Peter (Hrsg), *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit. Band 2 Beiträge der Wissenschaft*. Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, Stuttgart 1976.

Gerth H.H, Wright, Mills C (Ed), *Max Weber. Essays in Sociology*. Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., London 1948.

- Giddens, Anthony, *The Third Way - The Renewal of Social Democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge 1998.
- Gillespie, Richard and. Paterson, William E, *Rethinking Social Democracy in Europe*. Cass, London 1993.
- Gillingham, John, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe 1945-1955. The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991.
- Gimbel, John, *Amerikanische Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland 1945-1949*. S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1968.
- Gimbel, John, *The American Occupation of Germany*. Stanford University Press, California 1968.
- Gimbel, John, "Die Konferenzen der deutschen Ministerpraesidenten 1945-1949", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 31/71, 1971.
- Gimbel, John, "Byrnes' Stuttgarter Rede und die Amerikanische Nachkriegspolitik in Deutschland", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Nr. 20, Heft 1, 1972.
- Glaser, Hermann, *1945. Ein Lesebuch*. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt 1995.
- Glees, Anthony, *Reinventing Germany. German Political Development since 1945*. Berg, Oxford 1996.
- Golo, Mann, "Demokratie in Deutschland 1919 und 1949", in: *1919-1969. Parlamentarische Demokratie in Deutschland, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*. Heft 86, Bonn 1970, (p.23-35).

Gottschalch, Wilfried, Karrenberg, Friedrich, Stegmann, Franz Josef. Hrsg. Helga Grebing. *Geschichte der sozialen Ideen in Deutschland. Deutsches Handbuch der Politik*, Günter Olzog, München-Wien 1969 (p.376,344, 563-694).

Grabbe, Hans-Jürgen, "Die Deutsch-Alliierte Kontroverse um den Grundgesetzentwurf im Frühjahr 1949", in: *Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte* Jg 26, 1978.

Grabbe, H.J, "Die deutsch-alliierte Kontroverse um den Grundgesetzentwurf im Frühjahr 1949", in: *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, Bd. 26, 1978.

Gradl, Johann Baptist, *Anfang unter dem Sowjetstern*. Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von Nottbeck, Köln 1981 (p. 14-78, .177-189)

Grafen, Franz von Galen, *Rede in Füchttorf am 9. November 1947*, Warendorf 1947.

Graml, Hermann, "Die verdrängte Auseinandersetzung mit dem Nationalsozialismus", in: Broszat Martin (Hrsg), *Zäsuren nach 1945. Essays zur Periodisierung der deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte*, München, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 1990.

Grasser, Ulrich, "Die CDU und die Junge Union", in: Dittbeiner, Jürgen, Ebbighausen, Rolf, (Hrsg), *Parteien System in der Legitimationskrise. Studie und Materialien zur Soziologie der Partei*. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1973.

Grebing, Helga, *Geschichte der deutschen Parteien*, Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden 1962, (p. 36, 47, 83-91).

Grebing, Helga, *Konservative gegen die Demokratie. Konservative Kritik an der Demokratie in der Bundesrepublik*, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Köln, Frankfurt am Main 1971.

Greiffenhagen, Martin, *Kampf um Wörter? Politische Begriffe im Meinungsstreit*, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn 1980 (p.39).

Greschat, Martin, *Protestanten in der Zeit. Kirche und Gesellschaft in Deutschland vom Kaiserreich bis zur Gegenwart*. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1994.

Gross, Erwin, "Die unbekannte Schuld der Kirche", in: *Die Wandlung. Eine Monatsschrift*, 3 Jg. 1.Heft. Januar, Unter Mitwirkung von Karl Jaspers, Werner Kraus und Alfred Weber, Hrsg von Dolf Sternberger, Lutherstrasse 59, Heidelberg 1948.

Günther, Roth, "Weber - the would-be Englishman", in: Lehmann, Harmut/Roth, Günther (Ed), *Weber's Protestant Ethic. Origins, Evidence, Contexts*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993 (p.32, 80, 121-131).

Gundlach, Gustav, *Die katholische Soziallehre und die liberale Wirtschaftsordnung, Christentum und Liberalismus*, Forster Karl (Hrsg), Karl Zink Verlag, München 1960.

Gundlach, Herlind, *Die Sozialausschüsse zwischen CDU und DGB. Selbstverständnis und Rolle 1949-1966*. Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde. Philosophische Fakultät der Rheinischen Friedrichs-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn, Bonn 1983.

Gurland, A.R.L, *Die CDU/CSU Ursprünge und Entwicklung bis 1953*, Dieter Emig (Hrsg), Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Köln, Frankfurt am Main 1980 (p. 27-40, 81, 208, 226, 387).

Hacke, Christian, "Ein deutscher Patriot im Gegenstrom der Nachkriegsentwicklung. Zum 100 Geburtstag von Jakob Kaiser", in: *Deutschland Archiv*, Jahr 21, 1, 1988 (p.178).

Hacke, Christian, (Hrsg), *Wir haben Brücke zu sein. Reden, Äusserungen und Aufsätze zur Deutschlandpolitik*. Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von Nottbeck, Köln 1988 (p. 9-21, 44, 86-99, 156, 205-217, 246-257).

Hahn, Gerhard, *Bibliographie zur Geschichte der CDU und CSU 1945-1980*. Forschungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte, Stuttgart 1982.

Hahn, H.J, *German Thought and Culture*, Manchester University Press, Manchester 1995.

Hahn, Wilhelm, "Die CDU als Problem der evangelischen Theologie", in: *Demokratische Bewährung*, Staatsbürger Verlag, Bad Godesberg 1965 (p.79-96).

Halpern, David and Mikosz, David, *The Third Way*. Nexus, London 1998.

Hanks, Patrick (Editor), *Collins Dictionary of the English Language*, Collins, London, Glasgow 1985.

Harnop, Hans, Baumhauer, Albert , Mitarbeit Joseph Hammer, *Dokumente zur christlichen Demokratie, Deutschland, Österreich, Schweiz*. Eichholz 1969 (p.10-12).

Harnoss, Hans, Baumhauer, Albert, Mitarbeit Hammer, Joseph, *Dokumente zur christlichen Demokratie. Deutschland, Österreich, Schweiz*, Hrsg. Von der Politischen Akademie Eichholz der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung für politische Bildung und Studienförderung e.v., Bonn 1969.

Harry, Liebersohn, "Weber's Historical Concept of National Identity", in: Lehmann, Harmut/Roth, Günther (Ed), *Weber's Protestant Ethic. Origins, Evidence, Contexts*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993 (p.13).

Hars, Rudolf, *Die Bildungsreformpolitik der christlich-Demokratischen Union in den Jahren 1945-1954. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Konservatismus in der deutschen Bildungspolitik*. Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1981 (p.16, 98).

Hartrich, Edwin, *The Fourth and Richest Reich. How the Germans conquered the Postwar World*. Macmillan Publishing, New York 1980.

Haselbach, Dieter, *Autoritärer Liberalismus und Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Gesellschaft und Politik im Ordoliberalismus*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1991 (p.122).

Hasinger, Albrecht, "Programme sind Ideen, Grundsatzprogramm der CDU. Diskussion des Entwurfs", in: *Soziale Ordnung* 4/76. Dokumentation, Hrsg. Jakob Kaiser Stiftung, Köln 1976.

Hauenstein, Fritz, *Der Freiburger Kreis, 20. Juli 1944*. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (Hrsg), Bonn 1969 (p.42-46).

Hauenstein, Fritz, "Die Arbeitsgemeinschaft Erwin v. Beckerath" in; Norbert Kloten, Wilhelm Krelle, Heinz Müller, Fritz Neumark (Hrsg), *Systeme und Methoden in den Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Erwin v. Beckerath zum 75. Geburtstag*, Mohr, Tübingen 1964, p.56-60

Hawkes, David, *Ideology*, Routledge, London 1996 (p.55,93).

Heck, Bruno, "Demokraten oder Demokratisierte? Eine notwendige Auseinandersetzung", in: *Die Politische Meinung, Sonderdruck*. Nr. 128 III, 1969.

Heck, Bruno, "Adenauer und die Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands", in: Blumenwitz, Dieter et al. *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit*. Band 2, Beiträge der Wissenschaft, Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, Stuttgart 1976 (p.187-203).

Heck, Bruno (Hg), *Die CDU und ihr Programm. Programme, Erklärungen, Erschliessungen*. Verlag Ernst Knoth, Melle 1979.

Heer, Friedrich, "Der Linkskatholizismus", in: Grobowsky Adolf, *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Band V, Carl Heymann Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1958.

Heidenheimer, Arnold J., *Adenauer and the CDU. The Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague NL 1960 (p.22, 123-128, 233).

Heinrich, Rüschemschmidt, *Die Entstehung der hessischen CDU 1945/46. Lokale Gründungsvorgänge und Willensbildung im Landesverband*, Staatsexam, Philipps Universität, Marburg 1979. Veröffentlicht unter dem Titel *Gründung und Anfänge der CDU in Hessen*, Darmstadt, Selbstverlag der Hess. Hist. Kommission 1981 (p.22, 40-52, 70, 115).

Heinrich, Rüschemschmidt, "Gründung und erste Jahre- Mitgestaltung und Rückschlag. Die CDU Hessen unter Werner Hilpert 1945-1952", in: Wolf, Werner (Hrsg), *CDU Hessen 1945-1985. Politische Mitgestaltung und Kampf um die Mehrheit*, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von Nottbeck, Köln 1986 (p.16-21).

Heitzer, Horstwalter, *Der Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland im Kaiserreich 1890-1918*. Matthias Grünewald Verlag, Mainz 1979 (p.146).

Heitzer, Horstwalter, *Die CDU in der Britischen Zone 1945-1949. Gründung, Organisation, Programm und Politik*, Forschungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte, Band 12. Im Auftrag der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1988 (p.105, 93-126, 178, 483).

Helmich, Hans, *Das sozialistische Erbe der CDU. Zur Vereinigung der bundesrepublikanischen CDU mit der ehemaligen Blockpartei* (Diplomarbeit), Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 1992 (p.22).

Hemmer, Lars, *Christlicher Sozialismus als wirtschaftliche Ordnung*, Schriftliche Hausarbeit im Rahmen der ersten Staatsprüfung für das Lehramt für die Sekundärstufe II, 1995.

Henke, Klaus Dietmar, *Politik der Widersprüche. Zur Charakteristik der französischen Militärregierung in Deutschland nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg. Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die Französische Zone 1945-1949*. Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1983.

Hentschel, Volker, *Ludwig Erhard. Ein Politikerleben*. Olzog, München 1996 (p.35-57, 64-84)

Hepp, Gerd, "Die CDU im Landesbezirk Nordbaden", in: Weinacht, Paul Ludwig (Hrsg.), *Die CDU in Baden-Württemberg und ihre Geschichte*. W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz 1978 (p.113-123).

Herbst, Ludolf, "Krisenüberwindung und Wirtschaftsneuordnung. Ludwig Erhards Beteiligung an der Nachkriegsplanungen am Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges", in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Jg 25, 1977.

Hermes, Anna, *Und setzt Ihr nicht das Leben ein. Andreas Hermes - Leben und Wirken. Nach Briefen, Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen*. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart 1971 (p.292-315).

Hermes, Anna, *Andreas Hermes - Leben und Wirken. Nach Briefen, Tagebuchaufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen*. Seewald Verlag, Stuttgart 1971 (p.200).

Hermes, Peter, *Die CDU und die Bodenreform in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands im Jahre 1945*. Verlag der Saarbrückener Zeitung, Saarbrücken 1963.

Hermes, Peter, "Sozialismus oder Volkspartei. Andreas Hermes und die Gründung der CDU in Berlin 1945", in: *Die politische Meinung*, Nr. 193, Jg 25, 1980 (p.78).

Hickel, Rudolf, "Soziale Marktwirtschaft", in: Greiffenhagen, Martin, *Kampf um Wörter? Politische Begriffe im Meinungsstreit*, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn 1980.

Hilty, Carl, *Einige Gedanken über die Gründung christlich-sozialer Vereine*, Verlag von U. Siebert, Bern 1896 (p.32).

Hilty, Carl, *Theoriker und Idealisten der Demokratie*, Bern und Solothurn, Verlag von Jent & Gassmann, 1868.

Hindess, Barry, "No end of Ideology", in: *History of the Human Sciences*, Vol. 9, No.2 Sage, London 1996, (p.79-98).

Hintze, Peter (Hg), *Die CDU Programme. Eine Dokumentation der Ziele und Aufgaben*. Bouvier Verlag, Bonn 1995 (p.IX).

Hoefling, Wolfram, "Funktionsprobleme des Vereinigungssystems der CDU", in: Kaack, Heino, Roth R. (Hrsg), *Handbuch des deutschen Parteiensystems, Band 1*. Leske & Budrich, Opladen 1980.

Hoersken, Heinz Adolf, "Sozialausschüsse auf dem Prüfstand EAN und CDA im Gespräch", in: *Schriftenreihe der Evangelischen Akademie Baden*, Herrenalber Protokolle 61, 1989.

Hoerten, Heinz, "Die Frankfurter Hefte und Konrad Adenauer", in: Dieter Blumenwitz, Gotto, Klaus, Hans Maier, Konrad Repgen, Hans Peter Schwarz (Hrsg) *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit*, Band 2 Beiträge der Wissenschaft, Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, Stuttgart 1976.

- Hofmann, Josef, "Sicherung und Gefährdung der Person in der Demokratie", in: *Die Neue Ordnung* Jg 1, 1946/47, Heft 2, Kerle Verlag, Heidelberg 1946/7.
- Hohmann, Karl, *Ludwig Erhard. Gedanken aus fünf Jahrzehnten*. Reden und Schriften, ECON Verlag, Düsseldorf, Wien, New York 1988 (p.17, 50, 75).
- Hohmann, Karl, *Ludwig Erhard 1897-1977. Eine Biographie*. Ludwig Erhard Stiftung e.V (Hrsg.), ST Verlag, Bonn 1997 (p.14).
- Horn, Peter & Hessenmüller, "CDU Verantwortung im Zweizonen-Wirtschaftsrat", in: Dörpinghaus, Bruno, Witt, Kurt, *Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU*, 1. Jg, K.G Lohse, Frankfurt am Main 1950 (p.108f).
- Huber, E.R, *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789*. Band 2, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1960 (p.345-370).
- Hudemann, Rainer, *Französische Besatzungszone 1945-1952. Die Deutschlandpolitik Frankreichs und die Französische Zone 1945-1949*. Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1983.
- Huelst, Dirk, "Kritische Theorie und Ideologiekritik", in: Neumann, Franz (Hrsg), *Handbuch Politischer Theorien und Ideologien*. Rowohlt, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1977.
- Hüttenberger, Peter, "Die Anfänge der Gesellschaftspolitik in der Britischen Zone", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 21, 1973.
- Hunold, Albert, *Wirtschaft ohne Wunder*. Eugenrentsch Verlag, Erlenbach-Zürich 1953 (p.106).

Jäger, Wolfgang, "Adenauers Einwirkung auf die programmatische Entwicklung der CDU 1945-1949 in der Frage der Wirtschaftsordnung", in: Blumenwitz, Dieter et al, *Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit*, Bd 2, Stuttgart 1976 (p.427-451).

Jäger, Wolfgang (Hrsg), *Partei und System. Eine kritische Einführung in die Parteienforschung*. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1973 (p.15).

Jarausch, Konrad H., Jones Larry-Eugene (ed.), *In Search of a Liberal Germany. Studies in the History of German Liberalism from 1789 to the present*, Berg, New York, Oxford, Munich 1990 (p.390).

Jochmann, Werner, "Stoecker als nationalkonservativer Politiker und antisemitischer Agitator," in: Jochmann, Werner, Brakelmann, Günter, Greschat, Martin, *Protestantismus und Politik. Werk und Wirkung Adolf Stoeckers*, Hans Christians Verlag, Hamburg 1982 (p.129).

Jochmann, Werner, Stoeckers Eintritt in die Politik und die Gründung der Christlich-Sozialen Arbeiterpartei, in: Jochmann, Werner, Brakelmann, Günter, Greschat, Martin, *Protestantismus und Politik, Werk und Wirkung Adolf Stoeckers*, Hans Christians Verlag, Hamburg 1982.

Jones, Larry-Eugene, "Adam Stegerwald und die Krise des deutschen Parteiensystems", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 27, 1979 (p.1).

Joseph Joos, "Die politische Ideenwelt des Zentrums", in; Ungerer Emil (Hrsg), *Wissen und Werken*, Braun, Karlsruhe 1928 (p.23).

Paul, Jostock, "Christlicher Sozialismus", in: *Neues Abendland* 3, 1948 (p.33-37).

Jürgensee, Kurt, "Die britische Besatzungspolitik 1945-49. Zur Frage nach einer Konzeption in der britischen Deutschlandpolitik", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B6/97.

Kaack, Heino, *Geschichte und Struktur des deutschen Parteiensystems*. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1971 (p.402).

Kaes. Abg., *Rede in der Sitzung des Landtages Nordrhein-Westfalen am 14. December 1949 zum Entwurf des Grundgesetzes für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 1949*.

Kaff, Brigitte, "Robert Lehr", in: Buchstab, Günter, Gotto, Klaus (Hrsg), *Die Gründung der Union. Traditionen, Entstehung und Representanten*. Geschichte und Staat Band 254/255, Olzog Verlag, München 1990 (p.IX).

Kaff, Brigitte, *Die Unionsparteien, 1946-1950. Protokolle der Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU Deutschlands und der Konferenzen der Landesvorsitzende*, Forschungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte Band 17, Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1991.

Kaiser, Jakob, *Der Volkspolitische und nationale Wille der christlichen Gewerkschaften*. Vortrag gehalten auf dem 13. Kongress der christlichen Gewerkschaften Deutschlands in Düsseldorf am 19. September 1932. Christlicher Gewerkschaftsverlag, Berlin-Wilmersdorf 1932.

Kaiser Jakob, "Rede in Düsseldorf, 29. März 1946" in; *Die Gegenwart* Jg 3, N. 3/6, February 1948 (p.2).

Kaiser, Jakob, "Der Kampf der Christlichen Demokraten in der Sowjetzone", in: Dörpinghaus, Bruno, Witt, Kurt, *Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU*, 1. Jg, K.G Lohse, Frankfurt am Main 1950 (p.198).

Kaiser, Jakob, *Freiheit und soziale Gerechtigkeit in einem wiedervereinten Deutschland*. Essener Kongress 1950 der christlichen demokratischen Arbeiternehmerschaft. Hrsg. Von den Sozialausschüssen der christlich-demokratischen Arbeitnehmerschaft CDU/CSU. Adam Stegerwald Haus, Königswinter 1950.

Kant, Emmanuel, "Zum ewigen Frieden, Anhang I", Werke in 6 Bände, Insel Verlag (v.703).

Karl, Holl, "Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte", Band 1, in: Wilfried Gottschalch, Friedrich Karrenberg, Stegmann, Franz Josef, (Hrsg) Helga Grebing, *Geschichte der sozialen Ideen in Deutschland. Deutsches Handbuch der Politik*. Günter Olzog Verlag, München-Wien 1969 (p.385, 564).

Keller, Ernst, *Der unpolitische Deutsche*, A. Francke Verlag, Bern 1965.

Ketteler, W. E von, *Die Katholiken im Deutschen Reiche, Entwurf zu einem politischen Programm, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe. Schriftliche Aufsätze und Reden 1871-1877*. Abteilung 1, Band 4. Hrsg. Erwin Iserloh, V. Hase & Koehler Verlag, Mainz 1977, (p.186-258).

Kirchliche Bruderschaft in Württemberg, "Das Wort 'Christlich' im Namen der CDU. Evangelische Verantwortung. Politische Briefe des Evangelischen Arbeitskreises der Christlich-Demokratischen/Christliche-Sozialen Union", in: *Deutsches Monatsblatt*, 5 Jg N.8, , Bonn 1957.

Kirsch, Ludwig, "Kompromisse?", in: *Südwestdeutsche Union*, Nr. 19, Jg 2, Halbmonatszeitschrift der Christlichen-Demokratischen Union Badens, Karlsruhe (p.4).

Kitschert, Herbert, *The Logics of Party Formation*. Cornell University Press, London 1989.

Klaus, Gotto, *Christliche Demokratie in Deutschland, Analysen und Dokumente zur Geschichte und Programmatik der Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands und der Jungen Union Deutschlands*. Konzeption Dr Holher Asmussen. Mit Beiträgen. Ernst Knoth, Melle 1978 (p.24).

Klaus, Gotto, *Das Ahlener Programm und die Düsseldorfer Leitsätze, Christliche Demokratie in Deutschland. Handbuch der Politischen Akademie Eichholz*. Ernst Knoth GmbH, Melle 1978.

Klaus, Gotto, (et al.), *Konrad Adenauer. Seine Deutschland und Aussenpolitik 1945-1963, mit einem Vorwort von Hans Maier*. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, München 1975.

Kleinmann, Hans Otto, *Kleine Geschichte der CDU*, DVA, Stuttgart 1993 (p.35-47, 74).

Norbert Kloten, Wilhelm Krelle, Heinz Müller, Fritz Neumark (Hrsg), *Systeme und Methoden in den Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Erwin v. Beckerath zum 75. Geburtstag*, Mohr, Tübingen 1964, p.56-60.

Klotzbach, Kurt, *Der Weg zur Staatspartei. Programmatik, praktische Politik und Organisation der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1945-1965*, J.H.W Dietz, Berlin, Bonn 1982 (p.21).

Klug, Oskar, *Katholizismus und Protestantismus zur Eigentumsfrage. Eine gesellschaftspolitische Analyse*. Rowohlt Taschenbuch, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1966.

Knoblich, Axel, *Die Vorstellungen der Sozialausschüsse und des Wirtschaftsrates der CDU e.V vom Sozialstaat*, Hausarbeit zur Erlangung eines Magister Artium. Johannes Gutenberg Universität zu Mainz, 1989.

Koch, H.G, Bamberg, H.D, *CDU/CSU Verhinderte Staatspartei*, W. Raith, Starnberg 1974.

Koch, Manfred, "Blockpolitik und Parteiensystem in der SBZ/DDR 1945-50", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 37/84 15 September, 1984, (p. 3-14).

Kocka, Jürgen, "Restauration oder Neubeginn? Deutschland 1945-1949", in: Heinrich Böll, Günter Grass, Carola Stern (Hrsg), *L' 76 Demokratie und Sozialismus*, 1. Vierteljahr 11, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Köln, Frankfurt am Main 1979.

Koerfer, Daniel, *Kampf ums Kanzleramt. Erhard und Adenauer*. DVA, Stuttgart 1987 (p.32).

Kogon, Eugen, Die Restaurative Politik. Zur Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Band 3 der Gesammelten Schriften, Michael Kogon und Gottfried Erb (Hrsg), Quadriga, Weinheim, Berlin 1996, p.23-48.

Kogon, Eugen, "Demokratie und Föderalismus", in: *Frankfurter Hefte*, No.6, Jg 1, 1946.

Kogon, Eugen, "Gericht und Gewissen. Ob man ein Programm machen darf?", in: *Frankfurter Hefte*, Heft 1. Jg 1, 1946.

Kogon, Eugen, "Das Recht auf den politischen Irrtum", in: *Frankfurter Hefte*, Jg. 2, 1947.

Kogon, Eugen, "Das Jahr der Entscheidungen", in: *Frankfurter Hefte*, Heft 1. 3 Jg, 1948.

Kogon, Eugen, *Ideologie und Praxis der Unmenschlichkeit. Erfahrungen mit dem Nationalsozialismus*, Quadriga, Weinheim/Berlin 1995.

Kogon, Eugen, Dirks Walter, "Der Kampf um Europa", in: *Frankfurter Hefte*, 3 Jg, Heft 1, p.1, 1948.

Kogon, Michael und Gottfried, Erb, *Die Restaurative Politik. Zur Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Band 3 der Gesammelten Schriften, (Hrsg), Quadriga, Weinheim/Berlin 1996, (p.23-48).

Kohl, Helmut, *Die politische Entwicklung in der Pfalz und das Wiedererstehen der Parteien nach 1945*. Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der philosophischen Fakultät der Ruprecht-Karls Universität zu Heidelberg, Heidelberg 1958.

Köhler, Erich, *Ohne Illusionen - Politik der Realität. Reden*. Walther Gericke, Wiesbaden 1949 (p.36).

Kondylis, Panajotis, *Konservatismus - Geschichtlicher Gehalt und Untergang*, Kett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1986.

Koss, Siegfried, "Vorstellungen der Alliierten von Nachkriegs-Deutschland. Planungen zwischen 1943 und 1945", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B42-43/72, 14. Oktober, 1972.

Krahe, Brigitte, Seibel Michaela, *Bibliographie zur Geschichte der CDU und CSU 1981-1986. Mit Nachträgen 1945-1980*. Forschungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte. Im Auftrag der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Buchstab, Günter, Gotto, Klaus, Hockerts, Hans-Günter, Rudolf Morsey und Hans-Peter Schwarz (Hrsg), Bd 15, Droste, Düsseldorf 1990.

"Kulturpolitik der Ost-CDU", in: *Deutschland Union Dienst*, Nr. 131, Jg 3, Ausgabe C, 1949.

Kraiker, G & Welteke, M., "Die Politische Reorganisation des Bürgertums", in: Huster, Kraiker, Scherer, Schlotmann, Welteke, *Determinanten der westdeutschen Restauration 1945-1949*. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1975 (p.214-260).

Kramer, Gertrud, Kramer, Johannes, "Der Einfluss der Sozialausschüsse der Christlich-Demokratischen Arbeiternehmerschaft auf die CDU. Ein Beitrag zur Parteientheorie", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B46-47, 1976.

Kratz, Th., "Die Soziale Programmatik der CDU", in: *Internationale Jahrbuch der Politik*, Lieferung 5/6, 1956/57.

Kreikamp, Hans Dieter, "Die Amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik im Herbst 1946 und die Byrnes-Rede in Stuttgart", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Heft 2. Jg 29, 1981.

Kremendahl, Hans, *Parteiprogramme. Grundsatzprogrammatik und aktuelle politische Ziele von SPD, CDU, CSU, FDP, DKP, NPD*. Hergt, Siegfried (Hrsg), Heggen Verlag, Leverkusen 1977.

Krippendorff, Ekkehart, "Die Gründung der Liberal-Demokratischen Partei in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone 1945", in: *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 8, 1960 (p.290-299).

Kröger, Klaus, *Einführung in die Verfassungsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vorgeschichte, Grundstrukturen, und Entwicklungstendenzen des Grundgesetzes*. C.H Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Schriftenreihe der Juristischen Schulung, München 1993.

Kroll, Gerhard, *Christliche Union! Bamberger Denkschrift zur Schaffung einer politischen Einheitsfront aller Christen Deutschlands*, Rems Druckerie, Schwaebisch Gmuend 1946.

Krubke, Erwin, *Wirtschaftspolitik zwischen Gestern und Morgen. Die Stellungnahme der CDU zur Herausbildung der sozialistischen Planwirtschaft in der DDR in Gestalt des Zweijahresplanes 1949/50 und des ersten Fünfjahrplanes 1951/1955*. Hrsg vom Sekretariat des Hauptvorstandes der CDU, Berlin 1977.

Kuckuck, Horst Albert, "Etappen im Ringen um eine Wirtschaftskonzeption der CDU 1945-1949", in: Lothar, Albertin, Werner, Link (Hrsg), *Politische Parteien auf dem Weg zur parlamentarischen Demokratie in Deutschland. Entwicklungslinien bis zur Gegenwart*, Droste, Düsseldorf 1981 (p.255).

"Kulturprogramm der christlich demokratischen Union", in: *Union teilt mit*. Nachrichten der christlich demokratischen Union, Nr. 7 July Jg 3, 1949.

Kunz, Rainer, "Parteien und Parlamentarismus in den deutschen Ländern 1945 bis zur Gründung der Bundesrepublik", in: Becker J., Stammen T., Waldmann P., (Hrsg), *Vorgeschichte der Bundesrepublik zwischen Kapitulation und Grundgesetz*. Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München 1979 (p.33).

Kunz, Rainer, Maier, Herbert, Stammen, Theo, *Programme der politischen Parteien in der Bundesrepublik*, Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, München 1975.

Lademacher, Horst, "Grundfragen, Britischer Sozialisierungspolitik", in: Först, Walter, *Land und Bund*, Kohlhammer-Grote, Köln, Stuttgart, Berlin, Mainz 1981.

Laitenberger, Volkhard, *Ludwig Erhard. Der Nationalökonom als Politiker*. Mit einem Vorwort von Helmut Kohl. Muster Schmidt, Göttingen/Zürich 1986 (p.77f).

Laitenberger, Volkhard, "Auf dem Weg zur Währungs- und Wirtschaftsreform. Ludwig Erhards Wirtschaftspolitik im Frühjahr 1948," in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B23/88, 1988 (p.34).

Lange, Erhard, H.M, "Bestimmungsfaktoren der Föderalismusdiskussion vor Gründung der Bundesrepublik. Zur geistig-politischen Vorformung des Grundgesetzes", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 2/3 (s.9-29), 1974.

Lange, Erhard, H.M, *Wahlrecht und Innenpolitik. Entstehung und Analyse der Wahlgesetzgebung und Wahlrechtsdiskussion im westlichen Nachkriegsdeutschland 1945-1956*. Anton Hain, Meisenheim am Glan 1975.

Lange, Max Gustav, Schulz, Gerhard, Schütz, Klaus. Mit einer Einleitung von Siegmund Neumann, *Parteien in der Bundesrepublik. Studien zur Entwicklung der deutschen Parteien bis zur Bundestagswahl 1953*, Ring Verlag, Stuttgart und Düsseldorf 1955.

Latour, Conrad F, Vogelsang, Thilo, *Okkupation und Wiederaufbau. Die Tätigkeit der Militärregierung in der Amerikanischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1944-47*. DVA, Stuttgart 1973 (p.163).

Lauterbach, Herbert, "Die Adenauer CDU - Instrument der reaktionärsten Gruppen des deutschen Monopolkapitals", in: *Einheit. Zeitschrift für Theorie und Praxis des wissenschaftlichen Sozialismus*, Hrsg. Von dem Zentralkomitee der sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Heft 2 Jg 15, 1960.

Lengemann, J., *Richtlinien der CDU Kassel*", (Hrsg), *25 Jahre Christlich Demokratische Union in Kassel 1945-1970*, Kassel 1970.

Lepsius, M. Rainer, "Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur. Zum Problem der Demokratisierung der deutschen Gesellschaft" in; Gerhard A. Ritter (Hrsg.), *Die Deutschen Parteien vor 1918*, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Köln 1973 (p.67).

Ley, Richard, "Die Mitglieder des Parlamentarischen Rates. Ihre Wahl, Zugehörigkeit zu Parlamenten und Regierungen. Eine Bilanz nach 25 Jahren", in: *Parlamentsfragen* 4, 1973.

Ley, Richard, "Organisation und Geschäftsordnung des Parlamentarischen Rates", in: *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, Jg 6, 1975.

Godehard Lindgens, "Die politischen Implikationen der katholischen Soziallehre" in; Iring Fetscher und Herfried Münkler (Hrsg.), *Pipers Handbuch der politischen Ideen, Neuzeit: Vom Zeitalter des Imperialismus bis zu den neuen sozialen Bewegungen*, Band 5, Piper, München/Zürich 1993 (p.84-87).

Lipgens, Walter, *A History of European Integration*. Vol. 1 1945 -1947, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1982.

Lösche, Peter, *Kleine Geschichte der deutschen Parteien*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1993 (p.66).

Löwenstein, Karl, "Über das Verhältnis von Politischen Ideologien und Politischen Institutionen", in: *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Jg 2 Heft 3, 1955.

Löwenstein, Karl, "Über die Verbreitung der politischen Ideologien", in: *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Jg 3, Heft 3, 1956.

Lützeler, Paul Michael, (Hrsg), Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), "Die Christenheit oder Europa." Ein Fragment. *Hoffnung Europa. Deutsche Essays von Novalis bis Enzensberger*, S. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 1994.

Mahler, Karl, *Die Programme der Politischen Parteien im neuen Deutschland*, Druckerei und Vertriebsgesellschaft m.b.H, Berlin, 1945.

Mai, Gunther, "Der Alliierte Kontrollrat in Deutschland 1945-1948. Von der geteilten Kontrolle zur kontrollierten Teilung", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 23/88, 1988.

Maier, Hans, "Politischer Katholizismus, sozialer Katholizismus, christliche Demokratie", in: *CIVITAS*, Jahrbuch für christliche Gesellschaftsordnung, Band I, Pesch-Haus Verlag, München 1962 (p.11).

Maier, Hans, *Revolution und Kirche*, 2. Aufl., Rombach & Co, Freiburg i. Br. 1965.

Maluschke, Günter, "Wie Sozial ist der klassische Liberalismus?", in Gauger, Jörg-Dieter, Weigelt Klaus, *Soziales Denken in Deutschland. Zwischen Tradition und Innovation*. Bouvier, Bonn 1990 (p.9-29).

Mannheim, Karl, *Ideology and Utopia*, Harvest Books, Harcourt Brace & Co., New York 1936.

Manteuffel, Anselm-Doering, "Die Frommen und die Linken vor der Wiederherstellung des bürgerlichen Staats. Integrationsprobleme und Interkonfessionalismus in der frühen CDU", in: Kaiser, Jochen C, Manteuffel, A.D (Hrsg), *Christentum und Politische Verantwortung. Kirchen in Nachkriegsdeutschland*. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1990 (p.88-108).

Marshall, Gordon, *In Search of the Spirit of Capitalism. An essay on Max Weber's Protestant Ethic thesis*. Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, London 1982 (p.29, 44).

Martin, Albrecht, "Union und Ökumene", in: *Die Politische Meinung*, Jg 40, Nr. 308 Juli, Hrsg. Bernhard Vogel 1995.

Martin, Anne, "Der französische Besatzungspolitik und die Gründung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz", in: *Historische Politische Mitteilungen*, Archiv für Christlich Demokratische Politik, 2 Jg, Hrsg. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Böhlau Verlag, Köln, Weimar, Wien 1995 (p.131).

Martin, Anne, *Die Entstehung der CDU in Rheinland-Pfalz*, V. Hase & Koehler, Mainz 1995 (p.68-79, 134).

Mattedi, Norbert, "Gründung und Entwicklung der Parteien in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1945-1949", in: *Bonner Berichte aus Mittel- und Ostdeutschland*, Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen. Deutsche Bundesverlag, Bonn & Berlin 1966 (p.9, 55, 78, 103).

Mayer, J.P, *Max Weber and German Politics. A Study in Political Sociology*. Faber & Faber, London 1955.

McCauley, Martin, "The Rebirth of Democracy. Political Parties in Germany 1945-49", in: Doering, Herbert & Smith, Gordon (Ed.), *Party Government and Political Culture in Western Germany*. Macmillan, London 1982.

Meier, Hans, "Der deutsche Katholizismus seit 1945", in: *Herder Korrespondenz. Monatsheft für Gesellschaft und Religion*, Heft 10, Jg 30, 1976.

Meinicke, Wolfgang, "Die Entnazifizierung in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone 1945 bis 1948", in: *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 32. No. 2, 1984.

Mende, Werner, "Zur Neuordnung des Wirtschaftslebens", in: *Stimmen der Zeit, Monatsschrift für das Geistesleben der Gegenwart*, Band 144, 1948-49, Herder, Freiburg 1948/49.

Merkel, Peter H., *The Origin of the West German Republic*. Oxford University Press, New York 1963.

Merschmann, H., "Schule und Elternrecht in Bund und Ländern", in: *Die Neue Ordnung*, Jg 3, Heft 4, Kerle Verlag, Heidelberg 1949.

Merschmann, H., "Bonn als Paradigma deutscher Politik", in: *Die neue Ordnung*, Jg 3, Heft 6, Kerle Verlag, Heidelberg 1949.

Mey, Harald, "Marktwirtschaft und Demokratie. Betrachtungen zur Grundlegung der Bundesrepublik", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 19 Jg, 2 Heft, April, 1971.

Michels, Robert, *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie. Untersuchungen über die oligarchischen Tendenzen des Gruppenlebens*, 4. Auflage (1. Auflage 1910). Mit einer Einführung versehen von Frank R. Pfetsch, Kröner, Stuttgart 1989.

Midgley, E.B.F, *The Ideology of Max Weber. A Thomist Critique*, Gower, Aldershot 1983 (p.95).

Mintzel, Alf, *Der akzeptierte Parteienstaat, Broszat Martin (Hrsg), Zäsuren nach 1945. Essays zur Periodisierung der deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte*, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Oldenbourg, München 1990.

Mintzel, Alf, "CDU/CSU 1945-1950 Forerunners, Establishment and Regional Development until the emergence of the CDU National Party", in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*. Vol. 29 Nr. 4, 1988, (s.668-673).

Mitchell, Maria, "Materialism and Secularism. CDU politicians and National Socialism 1945-49", in: *The Journal of Modern History*, June, No. 67, The University of Chicago, 1995.

Moetteli, Carlo, "Ludwig Erhard und der Liberalismus, Ludwig Erhard", in: *Beiträge zu seiner politischen Biographie. Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag*, Propylaen Verlag 1972, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Wien 1972.

Molt, Peter, "Wertvorstellungen in der Politik. Zur Frage der 'Entideologisierung' der deutschen Parteien", in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Jg 4, Heft 4, 1963.

Mommsen, Hans, "Die politische Vorstellungswelt des Kreisauer Kreises", in: Karpen, Ulrich, Schott, Andreas (Hrsg), *Der Kreisauer Kreis. Zu den verfassungspolitischen Vorstellungen von Männern des Widerstandes um Helmuth James Graf von Moltke*, C.F. Müller, Heidelberg 1996 (p. 173-212, 509-533).

Mommsen, Konrad, "Bonn - Ein Beamtenparlament. Kleine Analyse des parlamentarischen Rates", in: *Die Wandlung. Eine Monatsschrift*, 4 Jg, 3. Heft, March, Lutherstrasse 59, Heidelberg, 1949.

Mommsen, Wilhelm, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme. Deutsches Handbuch der Politik 1*, Olzog Verlag, München 1960.

Mommsen, Wilhelm, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme*, Lebendiges Wissen, Berlin, München 1961.

Mommsen, Wolfgang, *Der Lange Weg nach Europa. Historische Betrachtungen aus gegenwärtiger Sicht*, Edition European Community, Berlin 1992.

Mommsen, Wolfgang J., *Max Weber und die deutsche Politik 1890-1920*, Mohr, Tübingen 1959 (p.311-326, 417).

Morsey, Rudolf, *Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei 1917/23*, Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1966 (p.100).

Morsey, Rudolf, *Adenauer und der Nationalsozialismus*, in Stehkämper, Hugo (Hrsg) *Konrad Adenauer. Oberbürgermeister von Köln*. Rheinland Verlag, Köln 1976 (447-497).

Morsey, Rudolf, "Die Bildung der ersten Regierungskoalition 1949. Adenauer's Entscheidung von Frankfurt und Rhöndorf am 20. und 21. August 1949", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 34/78, 26 August, 1978.

Morsey, Rudolf, "Die Rhöndorfer Weichenstellung vom 21. August 1949. Neue Quellen zur Vorgeschichte der Koalitions- und Regierungsbildung nach der Wahl zum ersten Deutschen Bundestag" in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 28. Jg. 1980.

Morsey, Rudolf, Schwarz, Hans-Peter (Hrsg), Bearb. von Hans Peter Mansing, *Adenauer Rhöndorfer Ausgabe. Briefe 1945-1947*, Siedler, Berlin (West) 1983 (p.208f).

Müchler, Günter, "Zum frühen Verhältnis von CDU und CSU", in: *Politische Studien* Jg 23, Günter Olzog Verlag, München 1972.

Müller, Georg, *Die Grundlegung der westdeutschen Wirtschaftsordnung im Frankfurter Wirtschaftsrat 1947-1949*, Haag & Herchen, Frankfurt am Main 1987 (p.98, 111-113, 279-302).

Müller-Armack, Alfred, *Wirtschaftslenkung und Marktwirtschaft*, Verlag für Wirtschaft und Sozialpolitik, Hamburg 1948 (p.88).

Müller Armack, Alfred / Schmidt, Herbert B(Hrsg), *Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik im Zeichen der sozialen Marktwirtschaft. Festgabe für Franz Etzel*, Seelwald, Stuttgart-Degerloch 1967, (p.40)

Müller-Armack, Alfred, "Die Wirtschaftsordnung Sozial Gesehen", in: Eucken, Walter, Böhm Franz (Hrsg), *Ordo. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. Band 1, Küpper Bondi, Opladen 1948 (p.125-154).

Müller-Armack, Alfred, *Religion und Wirtschaft*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1959 (p.545).

Müller-Armack, Alfred, *Das Jahrhundert ohne Gott*, Regensberg'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, Münster 1948.

Müller-Armack, Alfred, *Wirtschaftsordnung und Wirtschaftspolitik. Studien und Konzepte zur Sozialen Marktwirtschaft und zur Europäischen Integration*. Rombach & Co., Freiburg im Breisgau 1966 (p.244).

Müller-Armack, Alfred, *Auf dem Weg nach Europa. Erinnerungen und Ausblicke*. Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, Tübingen 1971 (p.58).

Müller-Armack, Alfred, "Die Anfänge der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft - Zugleich eine Dokumentation ihrer Entwicklung in den Jahren 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948", in: *Die Zweite Republik 25 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland - eine Bilanz*. Hrsg. Von Richard Löwenthal & Hans Peter Schwarz, Seewaldverlag, Stuttgart-Degerloch 1974.

Müller-List, Gabriele, "Zwischen Konfrontation und Interessenausgleich. Zur Entwicklung und gesetzlichen Regelung der Mitbestimmung in der Frühzeit der Bundesrepublik", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 18/85, 1985.

Narr, Wolf-Dieter, *CDU/SPD Programm und Praxis seit 1945*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1966 (p.76-88, 297).

Narr, Wolf Dieter, "Social Factors Affecting the Making of Foreign Policy, Britain and West Germany", in: Kaiser, Karl, Morgan, Roger, *Changing Societies and the Future of Foreign Policy*. Oxford University Press, London 1971.

Nell Breuning, S.J Oswald von, "Wie sozial ist der Entwurf? Aus der Sicht der katholischen Soziallehre, Grundsatzprogramm der CDU. Diskussion des Entwurfs", in: *Soziale Ordnung*, 4/76, Dokumentation, Jakob Kaiser Stiftung (Hrsg), Köln 1976.

Nell Breuning, Oswald von, "Zur Programmatik politischer Parteien", in: Zeit- und Streitfragen, Heft 1, J.P Bachem, Köln 1946.

Nell Breuning, Oswald von, "Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft heute", in *Zeitfragen*, Band III, 1955-1959, Freiburg 1960.

Nell Breuning, Oswald von, "Die politische Verwirklichung der christlichen Soziallehre. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft heute", in: *Zeitfragen*, Band III, 1955-1959, Herder, Freiburg 1960.

Nell-Breuning, Oswald, "Kapitalismus und Sozialismus in katholischer Sicht", in: *Frankfurter Hefte*, Heft 7, Jg 2, 1947 (p.665-681).

Nell-Breuning, Oswald von "Christlicher Sozialismus", in: *Begegnung* 2, 1947 (p.145-149).

Nell Breuning, Oswald von, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Heute. Band III, Zeitfragen 1955-1959, Freiburg 1960, (p.15).

Nell-Breuning, Oswald, "Zum Streit um Markt- oder Plan-Wirtschaft", in: *Stimmen der Zeit. Monatsschrift für das Geistesleben der Gegenwart*, Band 155, 1954/55, 1954/55.

Nellis, John R, *A Theory of Ideology. The Tanzanien Examples*. Oxford University Press, London and New York 1972.

Neumann, Franz, *Handbuch politischer Theorien und Ideologien*. Rowohlt Taschenbuch, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1977.

Neumann, Sigmund, *Die Deutschen Parteien*. Junker and Dünhaupt, Berlin 1932 (p.15-40).

Neumann, Sigmund, *Modern Political Parties. Approaches to Comparative Politics*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1956 (p.358).

Neumann, Sigmund, *Die Parteien der Weimarer Republik*. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1977 (p.20-27).

Nicholls, A.J, "Ludwig Erhard and German Liberalism - An ambivalent relationship?" in Jarausch, Konrad H. and Jones Larry Eugene (Eds), *In Search of a Liberal Germany. Studies in the History of German Liberalism from 1789 to the Present*. Berg, New York, Oxford, Munich 1990 (p.390).

Nicholls, A.J, *Freedom with Responsibility*. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994.

Niclauss, Karlheinz, "Die Entstehung der Bundesrepublik als Demokratiegründung", *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, Jahr 22, H 1, Januar 1974.

Niclauss, Karlheinz, *Demokratiegründung in Westdeutschland. Die Entstehung der Bundesrepublik von 1945-1949*, R. Piper & Co., München 1974.

Niclauss, Karlheinz, *Restauration oder Renaissance der Demokratie? Die Entstehung der BRD 1945-49*, Colloquium Verlag, Berlin 1982.

Nipperdey, Thomas, "Max Weber, Protestantism and the Debate around 1900", in: Lehmann Harmut/Roth Günther (Ed), *Weber's Protestant Ethic. Origins, Evidence, Contexts*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1993 (p.80).

Nipperdey Thomas, *Deutsche Geschichte. 1866-1918. Band II. Machtstaat vor der Demokratie*, 3. Auflage, C.H Beck, München 1995 (p.312-318).

Nowak, Kurt, "Protestantismus und Weimarer Republik. Politische Wegmarken in der evangelischen Kirche 1918-1932", in: Bracher, Funke, Jacobsen (Hrsg), *Die Weimarer*

Republik. 1918-1933. Schriftenreihe Band 251, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn 1987 (p.218-238).

Nowak, Kurt, "Christentum in politischer Verantwortung. Zum Protestantismus in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone 1945-1949", in: Kaiser, Jochen C, Manteuffel A.D (Hrsg), *Christentum und Politische Verantwortung. Kirchen in Nachkriegsdeutschland.* Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1990.

Odenbach, Joachim, *Die Entwicklung der Ost-CDU in Sachsen nach 1945,* Magisterarbeit, Leipzig, 1993 (p.21).

Olzog, Günter, *Die Politischen Parteien,* Günter Olzog, München 1964.

Olzog, Günter & Liese, Hans J., *Die Politischen Parteien in Deutschland,* Günter Olzog, München, 1993.

Opitz, Günter, *Der christlich-soziale Volksdienst. Versuch einer protestantischen Partei in der Weimarer Republik,* Hrsg. von der Kommission für Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien, Droste, Düsseldorf 1969 (p.13).

O'Shanahan, William, *German Protestants face the Social Question. Vol. 1, The Conservative Phase 1815-1871.* University of Notre-Dame Press, Notre Dame Indiana 1954 (p.209-212, 283).

Ostrogorski, Moisey, *Democracy and the Organisation of Political Parties,* Band 2, Macmillan, New York, London 1922.

Owen Smith, Eric, *The German Economy,* Routledge, London 1994.

Padgett, Stephen, (Ed.), *Adenauer to Kohl. The Development of the German Chancellorship.* Hurst & Co., London 1994.

Parkin, Frank, *Max Weber*, Routledge, London, New York 1988.

“Parteien überflüssig?”, in: *Südwestdeutsche Union*, Nr 19 Jg 2, Halbmonatszeitschrift der Christlichen-Demokratischen Union Badens, Karlsruhe.

Peacock, Alan and Willgerodt, Hans (Editors), *German Neo-liberals and the Social Market Economy*, Macmillan, London 1989 (p.108).

Perels, Joachim, “Die Entstehung demokratischen Denkens im deutschen Protestantismus”, in: *Gegenwartskunde* 2/81, Jg 30, Leske, 1981 (p.153-163).

Pflaumer, Hans (Hrsg.) *Demokratische Traditionen im Protestantismus*, Hans Seidel Stiftung e.V, Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, Heft 2, Olzog Verlag, München 1969 (p.7-30)

Plessner, Helmut, *Die Verspätete Nation. Über die politische Verführbarkeit bürgerlichen Geistes*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main 1988.

Plum, Günter (Bearb.), *Akten zur Vorgeschichte der BRD 1945-1949*, Juni-Dezember 1947, Band III, Bundesarchiv und Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Hrsg), R. Oldenbourg, München, Wien 1982 (p.4)

Poppinga, Anneliese, *Konrad Adenauer. Geschichtsverständnis, Weltanschauung und politische Praxis*. DVA, Stuttgart 1975.

Potsdamer Abkommen und andere Dokumente. Kongress-Verlag, Berlin 1950.

Pribilla S.J, Max, “Das Verhalten der Unternehmer im Dritten Reich”, in: *Stimmen der Zeit*, Band 143. Monatsschrift für das Geistesleben der Gegenwart 1948-49, Herder, Freiburg 1948/49.

Pridham, Geoffrey, *Christian Democracy in Western Germany*. Croom Helm, London 1977 (p.24)

Pridham, Geoffrey, "Political Science and Contemporary History. Research trends and Documentary Sources on Postwar Germany", in: *Journal of Modern History* 59, September, No. 3, The University of Chicago, 1987(p.524-542).

"Primitiver Wahlkampf", in: *Die Gegenwart*, Nr.16, Jg 4, 1949.

Prittie, Terence, *Adenauer. A Study in Fortitude*. Tom Stacey Ltd., London 1972.

Pünder, Hermann, *Unsere wirtschaftliche Gesamtlage im Herbst 1949 beim Übergang der Amtsgeschäfte vom Verwaltungsrat zur Bundesregierung*, Industrie und Handelskammer zu M. Gladbach, 1949.

Pünder, Hermann, "Die Entstehung der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft während des 'bizonalen Interregnums. Aus der Amtszeit des Frankfurter Verwaltungsrates 1948/49", in: *Ludwig Erhard. Beiträge zu seiner politischen Biographie. Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag*. Propylaen, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Wien 1972 (p.186, 361)

Pünder, Tilman, *Das Bizonale Interregnum. Die Geschichte des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebiets 1946-1949*. Grote, Waiblingen 1966.

Pütz, Helmuth, *Die CDU. Entwicklung, Aufbau und Politik der christlich Demokratischen Union Deutschlands*, Droste, Düsseldorf 1978.

Pütz, Helmut. (Einleit. und Bearb), *Konrad Adenauer und die CDU der britischen Besatzungszone. Dokumente zur Gründungsgeschichte der CDU Deutschlands 1946-1949*, Hrsg. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. Vorwort Helmut Kohl und Bruno Heck, Eichholz Verlag, Bonn 1975 (p.330-351, 658, 854, 861).

Pulzer, Peter, "Responsible Party Government in the German Political System", in: Döring Herbert, Smith Gordon, *Party Government and Political Culture in Western Germany*. Macmillan, London 1982.

Raschke, Joachim, "Parteien, Programme und "Entideologisierung". Zur Analyse von Parteiprogrammen" in; *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B8/70, 21.2.1970, (p.3-23).

"Rechts von der SPD. Zur politischen Genealogie der CDU", in: *Die Gegenwart*, Nr. 11, Jg 4, 1949.

Reich, Simon, *The Fruits of Fascism. Postwar Prosperity in Historical Perspective*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London 1990.

Ribhegge, Wilhelm, *Konservative Politik in Deutschland. Von der französischen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart*. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1989.

Richert, Ernst, *Die Radikale Linke von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart*. Colloquium Verlag, Berlin 1969.

Richter, Michael, *Die Ost 1948-1952. Zwischen Widerstand und Gleichschaltung*, Droste, Düsseldorf 1991 (p.38-56).

Richter, Michael, "Die Teilung des CDU Landesverbandes Berlin 1948", in: *Deutschland Archiv*, Jahr 27, Nr. 7 July, 1994 (p.673-1344).

Richter, Michael, Rissmann, Martin, *Die Ost CDU. Beiträge zu ihrer Entstehung und Entwicklung*, Böhlau Verlag, Köln, Weimar, Wien 1995 (p.55).

Rissmann, Martin, "Von der politischen Bildung zur ideologischen Erziehung. Schulungsarbeit in der Ost-CDU 1945-1953", in: Fröhlich, Jürgen, *Bürgerliche Parteien*

in der SBZ/DDR. *Zur Geschichte von CDU, LDP(D), DBD und NDPD 1945-1953*, Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln, 1994.

Ritter, Gerhard A.(Hrsg.), *Die Deutschen Parteien vor 1918*, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Köln, 1973, (p.67).

Röpke, Wilhelm, *Civitas Humana. Grundfragen der Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsreform*. Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Erlenbach-Zürich 1944 (p.46).

Röpke, Wilhelm, *Das Kulturideal des Liberalismus*, Schulte-Bulmke, Frankfurt am Main 1947.

Röpke, Wilhelm, "Werden die Deutschen rückfällig?", in: *Erwacht Deutschland schon wieder?*, *Der Monat*, 1 Jg. Heft 8/9 1949.

Röpke, Wilhelm, "Die bedrohte Freiheit", in: *Der Monat*, 1 Jg Heft 5, 1949.

Rössler, Helmuth, *Grösse und Tragik des christlichen Europa*, Verlag Moritz Diesterweg, Frankfurt am Main 1955.

Rohe, Karl, *Elections, Parties and Political Traditions. Social Foundations of German Parties and Party Systems, 1867-1987*. Berg, Oxford, Providence 1990 (p.9, 53-81).

Rohe, Karl, "Entwicklungen der politischen Parteien und Parteiensysteme in Deutschland bis zum Jahre 1933," in: O.W Gabriel, O.Niedermayer, R. Stöss (Hrsg), *Parteiendemokratie in Deutschland*, Bonn 1997 (p.44-47).

Rosenbach, Regine, *Zur Vorgeschichte der BRD II. Die Wiederherstellung deutscher Staatlichkeit in den Westzonen von 1945-1949*, Wirtschaft und Politik verstehen. Didaktische Sachbuch zur Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der BRD. Erläuterungen,

Materialen, Arbeitsvorschläge, v. Bernewitz Ernst Heinrich (Hg), Rowohlt, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1978.

Rossmann, Erich, Deutsche Überlegungen zur Bildung der Bizone. "Erich Rossmanns Reise in die britische Zone im August 1946", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 22. 1 Heft Januar, DVA, Stuttgart 1974 (p.204-225).

Rothstein, Siegmund, Gab es eine Alternative? "Zur Vorgeschichte der Gründung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* B 20/69, 1969.

Rüschenschmidt, Heinrich, Die Entstehung der hessischen CDU 1945/46. Lokale Gründungsvorgänge und Willensbildung im Landesverband, Staatsexam, Philipps Universität, Marburg 1979. Published as Gründung und Anfänge der CDU in Hessen, Darmstadt, Selbstverlag der Hess. Hist. Kommission 1981, (p.22f).

Rüschenschmidt, Heinrich, "Gründung und erste Jahre. Mitgestaltung und Rückschlag. Die CDU Hessen unter Werner Hilpert 1945-1952" in; Werner Wolf (Hrsg), CDU Hessen 1945-1985. Politische Mitgestaltung und Kampf um die Mehrheit, Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von Nottbeck, Cologne 1986, (p.16).

Günther, Rüdiger, (Hrsg), *Geschichte der christlich-demokratischen und christlich-sozialen Bewegungen in Deutschland. Grundlagen, Quellen, Unterrichtsmodelle*. Günter Rüdiger, Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von Nottbeck, Köln 1986 (p.11-27).

Runciman, W.G, *Max Weber. Selections in Translation*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1978 (p.209).

Salzmann, Rainer, *Die CDU/CSU im Frankfurter Wirtschaftsrat. Protokolle der Unionsfraktion 1947-1949*, Forschungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte. Im Auftrag der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Klaus Gotto, Hans Günter Hockerts, Rudolf Morsey und Hans-Peter Schwarz (Hrsg), Band 13, Droste, Düsseldorf 1988.

Satori, Giovanni, *Parties and Party Systems, A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1976.

Schardt, Alois, *Theorie und Praxis einer christlichen Partei, Politik als Gedanke und Tat*, Richard Wisser (Hrsg), Hase & Köhler Verlag, Mainz 1967.

Scharmitzel, Theodor, *Christliche Demokratie im neuen Deutschland*, Schriftenreihe der christlich demokratischen Union, Landesverband Rheinland Heft 1, Köln 1946.

Scheer, Hermann, Die nachgeholte Parteibildung und die politische Säkularisierung der CDU. Kommentierte Materialien zur 'alten' und zur 'neuen' CDU", in: Narr, Wolf Dieter, *Auf dem Weg zum Einparteienstaat*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1977.

Schlange-Schöningen, Hans, *Am Tage Danach*, Hammerich & Lesser, Hamburg 1946.

Schlange-Schöningen, Hans, *Die Politik des Möglichen*, Publications Control Branch. Dept. Information Services Division, Frankfurt/Main 1948.

Schmid, Hans, *Neoliberalismus und Katholische Soziallehre. Eine Konfrontierung*. Mit einer Einführung von Prof Dr. Oswald v. Nell Breuning s.J, Bund Verlag, Köln-Deutz 1954 (p.25).

Schmid, Josef, *Landesverbände und Bundespartei der CDU. Organisationsstrukturen, Politiken und Funktionswesen einer Partei im Föderalismus*, Politikwissenschaftliche Dissertation an der Sozialwissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Konstanz, Konstanz 1988.

Schmidt, Eberhard, *Die Verhinderte Neuordnung 1945-1952*, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt am Main/Cologne 1975.

Schmidt, Ute, "Die Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands", in: Stöss, Richard, (Hrsg) *Parteien Handbuch. Die Parteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945-1980*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1983 (p.520-555).

Schmidt, Ute, Fichter, Tilman, *Der erzwungene Kapitalismus. Klassenkämpfe in den Westzonen 1945-1948*. Klaus Wagenbach, Berlin 1971.

Schmidt, Otto, "von der Demokratie als Form zu der Demokratie als gestaltende Gemeinschaft". Minister für Wiederaufbau Düsseldorf. Rede auf dem Landesparteitag der CDU des Rheinlandes in Duisburg am 3.Dezember 1950, in: Heft 12, Schriftenreihe der CDU des Rheinlandes.

Schmitt, Karl, "Die CDU im Landesbezirk Nordwürttemberg", in: Weinacht, Paul Ludwig (Hrsg), *Die CDU in Baden-Württemberg und ihre Geschichte*, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz 1978 (p.139).

Schockenhoff, Volker, *Wirtschaftsverfassung und Grundgesetz. Die Auseinandersetzungen in den Verfassungsberatungen 1945-1949*, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt/Main 1986.

Schönbohm, Wulf, *Christliche Demokratie in Deutschland*, Handbuch der Politischen Akademie Eichholz. Ernst Knoth GmbH, Melle 1978.

Schönbohm, Wulf, "Funktion, Entstehung und Sprache von Parteiprogrammen", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 34/35, Nr. 27-52, 1974 (s.17-37).

Schönbohm, Wulf, *CDU Porträt einer Partei*, Günter Olzog Verlag, München 1979.

Schönbohm, Wulf, Braun, Günter E., (Hrsg), *CDU Programmatik. Grundlagen und Herausforderungen*, Günter Olzog Verlag, München 1981.

Schnabel, Franz, *Deutsche Geschichte im 19. Jahrhundert*. Band 4, Herder, Freiburg in Br. 1951 (p.440).

Schröder, Hans Jürgen, "Die Anfangsjahre der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Eine amerikanische Bilanz 1954", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 37, 1989.

Schröder, Wolfgang, *Katholizismus und Einheitsgewerkschaften. Der Streit um den DGB und der Niedergang des Sozialkatholizismus in der Bundesrepublik bis 1960*. J.H.W Dietz Nachf., Bonn 1992 (p.40).

Schröder, Wolfgang, *Die gewerkschaftspolitische Diskussion in der evangelischen Kirche zwischen 1945 und 1955. Soziale Protestantismus und Gewerkschaftsbewegung. Kaiserreich, Weimar Republik, Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Bund Verlag, Köln 1994.

Schröder, Wolfgang, "Die CDU im Spiegel neuer Studien und alter Quellen", in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Band 36, Nr.1, 1995, (s.121-130).

Schröter, Marie Elise Foelz, "Föderalistische Politik und nationale Repräsentation 1945-1947. Westdeutsche Länderregierungen, zonale Bürokratien und politische Parteien im Widerstreit", in: *Studien zur Zeitgeschichte*, Hrsg.vom Institut fuer Zeitgeschichte, DVA, Stuttgart 1974.

Schütze, Leo, "Parteiprogramme und politische Praxis. Die Bedeutung der geistigen Orientierung für die Politik," in: *Gesellschaftspolitische Kommentare*. Sonderdruck, September 1977.

Schulz, Gerhard "Die 'Christliche Union' und die kirchliche Tradition" in; M.G Lange/G. Schulz, K. Schütz. Mit einer Einleitung von Sigmund Neumann, *Parteien in der Bundesrepublik. Studien zur Entwicklung der deutschen Parteien bis zur Bundestagswahl 1953*, Ring Verlag, Stuttgart/Düsseldorf 1955, (p.26-40, 60-89).

Schulze, Lauda, "Theologische Bedenken gegen die CDU?", in: *Südwestdeutsche Union*, Nr 19, Jg 2, Halbmonatszeitschrift der Christlichen-Demokratischen Union Badens, Karlsruhe.

Schummer, Uwe, *Im Mittelpunkt steht der Mensch. Die Alternativen der christlich-sozialen Arbeitnehmer*. Bund Verlag, Köln 1995.

Schumpeter, Joseph, "Der Demokratische Kurs", in: *Der Monat*, 1 Jg Heft 5, 1949.

Schwan, Alexander, "Deutscher Liberalismus und nationale Frage im 19. Jahrhundert", in: ", M. Funke/H.A Jacobsen, H.H Knütter, H.P Schwarz (Hrsg), *Demokratie und Diktatur. Geist und Gestalt politischer Herrschaft in Deutschland und Europa. Festschrift für Karl Dietrich Bracher*, Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf 1987 (p. 46-59).

Schwan Anton, "Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung", in: *Südwestdeutsche Union*, Nr 1, Jg 2, Karlsruhe.

Schwarz, Hans Peter, *Vom Reich zur Bundesrepublik*, Luchterhand, Neuwied/Berlin 1966 (p. 81, 299-336).

Schwarz, Hans-Peter, "Adenauer und Europa", in: *Vierteljahresschrift für Zeitgeschichte*, Jahr 27, 1979.

Schwarz, Hans-Peter, "Konrad Adenauer: Erinnerungen 1945-1953", in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Jg 6, 1965.

Schwarz, Hans-Peter, *Konrad Adenauer. Reden 1917-1967. Eine Auswahl*. DVA, Stuttgart 1975 (p. 82-106).

Schwarz, Hans-Peter, Konrad Adenauer. *Seine Deutschland und Aussenpolitik 1944-63*, DTV, München 1975 (p.102).

Schwarz, Hans-Peter, *Konrad Adenauer. A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction*, Berghahn, Providence 1995 (p.339-353).

Schwarz, Hans-Peter, *Adenauer. Der Aufstieg 1876-1952*. DVA, Stuttgart 1986 (p.110).

Schwarzkopf, Dietrich, "Was ist heute eigentlich konservativ?", in: *Der Monat*, Heft 166, Jg 14, 1962.

Schwering, Leo, *Vorgeschichte und Entstehung der CDU*, Deutsche Glocke, Köln 1952 (p.3, 21, 35-53).

Seidel, Hans, *Weltanschauung und Politik*, Bayern Kurier, München 1960.

Sering, Paul, "Drei Wege deutscher Aussenpolitik", in: *Erwacht Deutschland schon wieder. Der Monat*, 1 Jg, Heft 8/9, 1949.

Sevenich, Maria, *Die Union als Gottesarbeit*, Godesberg 14-16 Dezember 1945, Schriftenreihe der CDU des Rheinlandes 4, Dienst am Kreuz, Köln 1946, (p.6).

Sevenich, Maria, *Unser Gesicht*. Vortrag auf dem 1.Reichstreffen der Christlich-Demokratischen Union in Bad Godesberg. Abhandlung über christlichen und marxistischen Sozialismus, Bitter & Co., Recklinghausen 1946.

Siemer, Laurentius, *Aufzeichnungen und Briefe*, Knecht, Frankfurt 1957 (p.125).

Smith, Gordon, "The German Volkspartei and the Career of the Catch-All concept", in: Döring, Herbert, Smith, Gordon, *Party Government and Political Culture in Western Germany*, Macmillan, London 1982.

Sörgel, Werner, *Konsensus und Interessen. Eine Studie zur Entstehung des Grundgesetzes für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Leske Verlag & Budrich GmbH, Opladen 1985.

Sonthheimer, Kurt, "Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik", in: *Historische Zeitschrift* 197, 1968.

Sperber, Jonathan, *Popular Catholicism in 19th century Germany*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey 1984, (p.211).

Spieker, Manfred, "Katholische Soziallehre und Soziale Marktwirtschaft", in: *Ordo. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Band 45, Gustav Fischer, Stuttgart 1994.

Spranger, Eduard, "Wesen und Wert politischer Ideologien", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 2, 1954 (p.119-123).

Staedtke, Joachim, "Demokratische Traditionen im westlichen Protestantismus", in: Pflaumer, Hans (Hrsg), *Demokratische Traditionen im Protestantismus*, Olzog Verlag, München 1969, (p.7-30).

Stammen, Theo, Maier, Gerold, "Der Prozess der Verfassungsgebung", in: Becker J, Stammen T, Waldmann P, (Hrsg), *Vorgeschichte der Bundesrepublik zwischen Kapitulation und Grundgesetz*, Wilhelm Fink, München 1979.

Stankowski, Martin, *Linkskatholizismus nach 1945. Die Presse oppositioneller Katholiker in der Auseinandersetzung für eine demokratische und sozialistische Gesellschaft*. Paul Rugenstein Verlag, Köln 1974 (p.67-76).

Staritz, Dietrich, "Parteien für ganz Deutschland? Zu den Kontroversen über ein Parteiengesetz im Alliierten Kontrollrat 1946/47", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 32, 1984.

Staudinger, Hugo, "Entideologisierung der CDU? Gedanken zum Tode Konrad Adenauers", in: *Politische Soziale Korrespondenz*, Nr.11, Jg 18.(9-11).

Stegerwald, Adam, *Wo stehen wir?*, Fränkische Gesellschaftsdruckerei, Würzburg 1945.

Stegmann, Franz Josef, "Geschichte der sozialen Ideen im Deutschen Katholizismus", in: Gottschalch, Wilfried, Karrenberg, Friedrich, Stegmann, Franz Josef. Hrsg. Helga Grebing. *Geschichte der sozialen Ideen in Deutschland. Deutsches Handbuch der Politik*, Günter Olzog Verlag, München-Wien 1969.

Steininger, Rolf, "Reform und Realität. Ruhrfrage und Sozialisierung in der Anglo-Amerikanischen Deutschlandpolitik 1947/48", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 27. Jg, Heft 2, 1979.

Steltzer, Theodor, *Von deutscher Politik. Dokumente, Aufsätze und Vorträge*. Josef Knecht, Frankfurt am Main 1949.

Steltzer, Theodor, *Reden Ansprachen Gedanken 1945-1947*. Mit einer Einführung von Jürgensen, Kurt, Karl Wacholtz, Neumünster 1986.

Steltzer, Theodor, "Denkschrift vom 15. Juli 1944. Die Deutsche Opposition gegen den Nationalsozialismus", in Steltzer, Theodor, *Reden Ansprachen Gedanken 1945-1947*, Karl Wacholtz Verlag, Neumünster 1986.

Stern, Fritz, *The Failure of Illiberalism. Essays on the Political Culture of Modern Germany*. Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1972.

Stern, Fritz, *The Politics of Cultural Despair. A study in the rise of the Germanic Ideology*. University of California Press, London, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1974.

Sternberger, Dolf, "Arten der Rechtsmässigkeit", in: *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Heft 1. Jg 3, 1962, (s.2).

Sternberger, Dolf, Theodor Heuss, "Ein Streitgespräch", in: *Die Wandlung. Eine Monatsschrift*, Unter Mitwirkung von Karl Jaspers Werner Kraus und Alfred Weber Hrsg von Dolf Sternberger, Lutherstrasse 59, Heidelberg, 1949, Jg 4, Heft 3.

Stoltenberg, Gerhard, *Wendepunkte - Stationen deutscher Politik 1947-1990*, Siedler, Berlin 1997 (p.19, 209).

Stöss, Richard, Niedermayer, Oskar, *Stand und Perspektiven der Parteienforschung in Deutschland*, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1993, (p.9, 44-45).

Strauss, Franz Josef, "Das Verhältnis von Programm und Pragmatismus in der politischen Praxis", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 32/33, Nr. 27-52, 1976, (s.28-38).

Strauss, Franz-Josef, *Die Neuordnung von 1948 und die Verantwortung für die Zukunft. Reden zum vierzigsten Jahrestag der Währungs- und Wirtschaftsreform am 12. Juni 1988*. Ludwig Erhard Stiftung, Bonn 1988.

Stromberg, Roland N., *An intellectual History of Modern Europe*, 2nd ed., Prentice Hall Incl., New Jersey 1975.

Stubbe-da Luz, Helmut *Von der Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Grossstadtpartei – 40 Jahre Christlich Demokratische Union in Hamburg. (1945-1985)*, Staatspolitische Gesellschaft Hamburg e.v, Hamburg 1985 (p.9,31-38).

Stützel, Wolfgang, "Soziale Marktwirtschaft", in: Greiffenhagen, Martin, *Kampf um Wörter? Politische Begriffe im Meinungsstreit*, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Bonn 1980.

Suckut, Siegfried, "Zum Wandel von Rolle und Funktion der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands (CDUD) im Parteiensystem der SBZ/DDR (1945-1952)", in: Weber, Hermann, *Parteiensystem zwischen Demokratie und Volksdemokratie. Dokumente und Material zum Funktionswandel der Parteien und Massenorganisationen in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1950*, Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln 1982, (p.135f, 518).

Suckut, Siegfried, "Die CDU in der DDR. Zu Funktion und Funktionswandel einer christlichen Partei im Sozialismus", in: *DDR Report*, Jg 15, Heft 11, 1982, (p.703).

Suckut, Siegfried, "Zu Krise und Funktionswandel der Blockpolitik in der sowjetisch besetzten Zone Deutschlands um die Mitte des Jahres 1948", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 31, 1983 (p.674f).

Suckut, Siegfried, *Blockpolitik in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1949. Die Sitzungsprotokolle des Zentralen Einheitsfront-Ausschusses*. Wissenschaft und Politik, Berend von Nottbeck, Köln 1986, (p.106).

Suckut, Siegfried, "Christliche Demokratische Union Deutschlands CDU(D)", in: Broszat, Martin, Weber, Hermann, *SBZ Handbuch. Staatliche Verwaltungen, Parteien, gesellschaftliche Organisationen und ihre Führungskräfte in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1945-1949*. Oldenbourg, München 1990, (p.521).

Süsterhenn, Adolf, *Mitgestalter des Grundgesetzes. In Memoriam Wilhelm Boehler. Erinnerungen und Begegnungen*, Verlag J.P Bachem, Köln 1965.

Sywottek, Arnold, *Deutsche Volksdemokratie. Studien zur politischen Konzeption der KPD 1935-1946*. Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag, Düsseldorf 1971, (p.74).

Thielicke, Helmut, *In der Stunde Null. Die Denkschrift des Freiburger 'Bonhoeffer Kreises'*, J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1979.

Thielicke, Helmut, *Theologische Ethik* II/2, (p.689-698).

Tiburtius, Joachim, *Christliche Wirtschaftsordnung: ihre Wurzeln und ihr Inhalt*. Union Verlag, Berlin 1947 (p.29ff).

Tillich, Ernst, "Die öffentliche Intelligenz", in: *Der Monat*, Jg 1, Heft 5, 1949.

Treue, Wolfgang, *Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1954*. Musterschmidt Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Göttingen 1954 (p.16-32, 140-180).

Treue, Wolfgang *Die Deutschen Parteien. Vom 19. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart*, Walther Hubatsch (Hrsg), Ullstein, Frankfurt, 1975 (p.19,72,133).

Tribe, Keith, *Strategies of Economic Order. German Economic Discourse 1750-1950*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995.

Trittel, Günter J., "Hans Schlange-Schöningen. Ein vergessener Politiker der ersten Stunde", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 35, Heft 1, 1987 (p.25-63).

Troeltsch, Ernst, "Die deutsche Demokratie," translated into the English, in: Kaes, Anton, Jay, Martin, Dimendberg Edward (Ed.), *The Weimar Republic Sourcebook*, University of California Press, Berkeley, California, Los Angeles California, London 1994.

Troeltsch, Ernst, "Die deutsche Demokratie," December 29, 1918, in: Hans Baron, *Spektatorbriefe. Aufsätze über die deutsche Revolution und die Weltpolitik 1918-1922*. J.C.B Mohr, Tübingen 1924, (p.301-313).

Troeltsch, Ernst *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches, Vol 1. 1911*. First published in English, Allen & Unwin, London 1931, (p.310).

Troeltsch, Ernst *Protestantism and Progress. A historical study of the relation of Protestantism to the Modern World*. Williams & Northgate, London 1912, (p.54, 129-133).

Uertz, Rudolf, "Verpflichtendes Erbe? Ursprung und Programmentwicklung der CDU", in: *Die neue Ordnung*, 39, 1985, (p.84-93).

Uertz, Rudolf, "Die Christliche Demokratie in der historischen und sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung. Eine Problemskizze", in: *Historische Politische Mitteilungen*. Archiv für Christlich Demokratische Politik, Jg 2, Hrsg. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Böhlau Verlag, Köln, Weimar, Wien 1995.

Uertz, Rudolf, *Christentum und Sozialismus in der frühen CDU. Grundlagen und Wirkungen der christlichen Sozialen Ideen in der Union 1945-1949*. Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte Nr. 43, DVA, Stuttgart 1981, (p.18-90).

Uffelman, Uwe, "Der Frankfurter Wirtschaftsrat 1947-1949", *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B37/84 15 Sep 1984 (p.37-46).

Uffelman, Uwe, *Der Weg zur Bundesrepublik. Wirtschaftliche, gesellschaftliche und staatliche Weichenstellungen 1945-1949*, Schwann, Düsseldorf 1988, (p.79-81).

Uhl, Bernd, *Die Idee des Christlichen Sozialismus in Deutschland*, Hrsg. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, V. Hase & Koehler Verlag, Mainz 1975, (p.22-37, 70-150).

"Um die CDU in der Ostzone", in: *Die Gegenwart*, Jg 3, Nr. 3/4, 1948.

"Um was es geht", in: *Neue Zeit*, August 11, 1946.

v. Hassel, Kai Uwe, "Die Idee der christlich-Demokratischen Union", in: *Deutsches Monatblatt. Evangelische Verantwortung. Politische Briefe des Evangelischen Arbeitskreises der Christlich-Demokratischen, Christliche-Sozialen Union*, Jg 5, Nr 5, Bonn 1957.

Vincent, Andrew, *Modern Political Ideologies*. Blackwell, Oxford UK & Cambridge USA 1992.

Vögelin, Eric, "Der Liberalismus und seine Geschichte", in: Forster, Karl (Hrsg), *Christentum und Liberalismus*, Karl Zink Verlag, München 1960.

Vogel, Hans Jochen, *Die Neuordnung von 1948 und die Verantwortung für die Zukunft. Reden zum vierzigsten Jahrestag der Währungs- und Wirtschaftsreform am 12 Juni 1988*. Ludwig Erhard Stiftung, Bonn 1988.

Vogel, Walter, Weisz Christoph (Bearb), *Akten zur Vorgeschichte der BRD 1945-1949*, Band I, September 1945-Dezember 1946, Bundesarchiv und Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Hrsg), Oldenbourg, München, Wien 1976, (p.27f, 84-130ff, 871ff).

Vogelsang, Thilo, "Die Bemühungen um eine Deutsche Zentralverwaltung 1945/6", in: *Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 18, Heft 4, DVA, Stuttgart 1970.

Vogelsang, Thilo, "Westdeutschland zwischen 1945 und 1949 - Faktoren, Entwicklungen, Entscheidungen. Einführung in die Problematik", in: *Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 21, Heft 2, DVA, Stuttgart 1973.

Vollnhals, Clemens, *Die Evangelische Kirche nach dem Zusammenbruch. Berichte Ausländischer Beobachter aus dem Jahre 1945*. Vandenhoeck & Ruprechte, Göttingen 1988.

von Oertzen, Dietrich, "Adolf Stoecker. Lebensbild und Zeitgeschichte", Vaterländischen Verlags- und Kunstanstalt, Berlin 1910.

Wagner, Wolfgang, "Besatzungszonen und Spaltung Deutschlands. Zur Vorgeschichte der Teilung", in: *Aussenpolitik*, Heft 12, December, Jg 5, DVA, Stuttgart 1954.

Wahl, Adalbertin, "Beiträge zur deutschen Parteiengeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert", in: *Historische Zeitschrift*, Band 104, Oldenbourg, München, Berlin 1910 (p.537-594).

Ware, Alan, *Political Parties and Party Systems*, Oxford University Press, New York 1996, (p.20).

Weber, Alfred, "Zur Belebung der deutschen Wirtschaft", in: *Die Wandlung. Eine Monatsschrift*, Jg 1, Heft 2, 24 Januar. Unter Mitwirkung von Jaspers, Karl, Kraus, Werner und Weber, Alfred, Hrsg. von Dolf Sternberger, Lutherstrasse 59, Heidelberg, 1945/6.

Weber, Hermann, *Von der SBZ zu DDR*, Band 1, 1945-1955, Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, Hannover 1966, (p.10ff).

Weber, Hermann, "Die Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland und das Parteiensystem der SBZ/DDR", in: *Deutschland Archiv*, 15, 2 Heft 10, 1982, (p.1067).

Weber, Hermann, (Hrsg) *Parteiensystem zwischen Demokratie und Volksdemokratie. Dokumente und Materielen zum Funktionswandel der Parteien und Massenorganisationen in der SBZ/DDR 1945-1950*, Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln 1982, (p.132, 518).

Weber, Max, *Die protestantische Ethik I. Eine Aufsatzsammlung*, Hrsg. von Johannes Winckelmann, Siebenstern Taschenbuch Verlag, Hamburg 1975, (p.28-44, 76).

Weber, Max *Politik als Beruf*. Nachwort von Ralf Dahrendorf, . Philipp Reclam jun., Stuttgart 1992.

Weber, Max *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie*, Hrsg. Johannes Winckelmann, 4. Auflage, Band 2, Mohr, Tübingen 1956.

Weede, Erich, "Ideen, Ideologie und politische Kultur des Westens", *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Organ der Hochschule für Politik, Heft 1, Nr. 36, München 1989.

Weidenfeld, Werner, Konrad Adenauer und Europa, *Die Geistigen Grundlagen der Westeuropäischen Integrationspolitik des ersten deutschen Kanzlers*, Europa Union Verlag, Bonn 1976.

Weinacht, Paul -Ludwig, "BCSV and CDU in Baden", in: Weinacht, Paul Ludwig (Hrsg.), *Die CDU Baden-Württemberg und ihre Geschichte*, W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz 1978, (p.83).

Weisz, Christoph / Woller, Hans(Bearb.), *Wörtliche Berichte und Drucksachen des Wirtschaftsrates des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes 1947-1949*, Institut für Zeitgeschichte u.d. Dt. Bundestag (Hrsg.), Wissenschaftliche Dienste, München/Wien/Oldenbourg 1977, Band I.

Weisz, Christoph, "Organisation und Ideologie der Landwirtschaft 1945-1949", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 21, Heft 2, 1973.

Weisz, Christoph, "Deutsche Überlegungen zur Bildung der Bizone. Erich Rossmanns Reise in die britische Zone im August 1946", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 22, Heft 1, Januar 1974, (p.204-225).

Weisz, Christoph/Woller, Hans(Bearb.), *Wörtliche Berichte und Drucksachen des Wirtschaftsrates des Vereinigten Wirtschaftsgebietes 1947-1949*, Institut für

Zeitgeschichte u.d. Dt. Bundestag (Hrsg.), Wissenschaftliche Dienste,
München/Wien/Oldenbourg 1977, Band I.

Weitzel, Kurt, *Von der CSVP zur CDU. Die Gründung der CDU in Rheinhessen 1945-1947*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main 1982, (p.37-45, 70-190).

Weitzel, Kurt, *Vom Chaos zur Demokratie. Die Entstehung der Parteien in Rheinland-Pfalz 1945-1947*, LZ für politische Bildung Rheinland-Pfalz, Mainz 1989.

Welty, Eberhard *Was nun? Grundsätze und Hinweise zur Neuordnung im deutschen Lebensraum*, Albertus-Magnus-Akad. d. Dominiker, Walberberg circa 1950.

Welty, Eberhard, *Die Entscheidung in die Zukunft. Grundsätze und Hinweise zur Neuordnung im deutschen Lebensraum*. Kerle, Heidelberg 1946 (p.288).

Welty, Eberhard, "Freiheit oder Bindung des wirtschaftenden Tuns?", in : *Die neue Ordnung*, Jg 1, 1946/47, Heft 4, Kerle, Heidelberg 1946/47.

Welty, Eberhard, "Christlicher Sozialismus", in: *Die neue Ordnung*, Jg 1, 1946/47, Heft 1, Kerle, Heidelberg 1946/47 (p.69,140).

Wengst, Udo, "Adenauers erste Koalitions- und Regierungsbildung im Spätsommer 1949", in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, B 18/85, 1985.

Wengst, Udo, "Die CDU/CSU im Bundestagswahlkampf 1949", in: *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 34, Heft 1, 1986.

Wengst, Udo, "Die Partei Adenauers. Neuerscheinungen zur Geschichte der Union. Rudolf Morsey zum 65. Geburtstag", in: *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte*, Band 32, (s.510-522), Hrsg. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, JHW. Dietz Nachf., Braunschweig, Bonn 1992.

Werner, Wolfram, (Bearb.), *Akten zur Vorgeschichte der BRD 1945-1949*, Band II, Januar - Juni 1947, Bundesarchiv und Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Hrsg), R. Oldenbourg, München, Wien 1979 (p.25, 86).

Westdeutschlands Weg zur Bundesrepublik 1945-1949, Beiträge von Mitarbeitern des Institutes für Zeitgeschichte, C.H Beck, München 1976.

Wege in die neue Zeit. Berliner Tagung der Union. Die Entschliessungen, N.5, Union Verlag, Berlin 1946.

Wichern, J. H *Die inner Mission der deutschen evangelischen Kirche. Eine Denkschrift an die deutsche Nation, im Auftrage des Centralausschusses für die innere Mission.* Martin Gerhardt (Hrsg), Agentur des Rauhen Hauses, Hamburg 1948.

Wickelmann, Johannes (Hrsg), *Max Weber. Die protestantische Ethik II. Kritiken und Antikritiken*, Güthersloher Verlagshaus, Gütersloh 1987.

Wieck, Hans G., *Die Entstehung der CDU und die Wiedergründung des Zentrums im Jahre 1945*, Droste, Düsseldorf 1953.

Wieck, Hans G., *Christliche und Freie Demokraten in Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden und Württemberg 1945/46*, Droste, Düsseldorf 1958 (p.35-52).

Wiesner, Joachim, "Weltanschauung und Entideologisierung in der Politik. Zur Grundsatz-Problematik politischer Parteien in der Bundesrepublik", in: *Die Neue Ordnung*, Jg 22, p.168-186, Verlag Bonifacius Druckerei, Paderborn 1968.

Wighton, Charles, *Adenauer. Democratic Dictator*, Frederick Muller Ltd., London 1963.

Winter, J. Alan, "Elective Affinities between Religious Beliefs and Ideologies of Management", in: *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 79, 1973/74, (p.1138).

Manfred Wilde, *Die SBZ-CDU 1945-1947. Zwischen Kriegsende und kaltem Krieg* (unpublished manuscript) München 1998 (p.126, 278-387).

Wirsching, Eugen, *Wirtschaftliches Ordnungsbild der christlich-demokratischen Arbeiterbewegung, Essener Kongress 1950 der christlichen demokratischen Arbeiternehmerschaft*. Hrsg. von den Sozialausschüssen der christlich-demokratischen Arbeitnehmerschaft CDU/CSU, Adam Stegerwald Haus, Königswinter 1950.

Wirth, Günther, "Zur Entwicklung der christlich-Demokratischen Union von 1945 bis 1950", in: *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, Heft 7, 1959.

Wirth, Günther, "Das Eigene oder das Fremde?" in: Fröhlich Jürgen, *Bürgerliche Parteien in der SBZ/DDR. Zur Geschichte von CDU, LDP(D), DBD und NDPD 1945-1953*, Wissenschaft und Politik, Köln 1994.

Wirth, Günter "Die Beteiligung der CDU and der Umgestaltung der DDR in den fünfziger Jahren" in; *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte*, Jg 3, Heft 1, Mai 1990, (p.125-151).

Witt, Kurt, "Wie die Union entstanden ist", in: Dörpinghaus, Bruno, Witt, Kurt, *Politisches Jahrbuch der CDU/CSU*, Jg 1, K.G Lohse, Frankfurt am Main 1950.

"Wo ist die deutsche Rechte?", in: *Die Gegenwart*, Nr.17 Jg 4, 1949.

Wolf, Erik, "Die Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland", in: *Frankfurter Hefte*, Jg 1, Heft 2, 1946 (p.83).

Woods, Roger, *The Conservative Revolution in the Weimar Republic*. Macmillan Press Ltd., London 1996 (p.62, 163ff).

Wucher, Albert, *Wie kam es zur Bundesrepublik? Politische Gespräche mit Männern der ersten Stunde*. Herder Bücherei, Band 324, Freiburg im Breisgau 1968.

Wünsche, Horst Friedrich, "Ludwig Erhards Soziale Marktwirtschaft. Ein Diskurs über Fehldeutungen und Entstellungen", in: *Ordo. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Band 45, Gustav Fischer, Stuttgart 1994.

Wulff, Manfred, "Die Geistigen Grundlagen und Quellen des Ordoliberalismus in den 30er und 40er Jahren", in: Gauger, Jörg-Dieter, Weigelt, Klaus, *Soziales Denken in Deutschland. Zwischen Tradition und Innovation*, Bouvier, Bonn 1990 (p. 156-170).

Wurm, Clemens, *Western Europe and Germany. The beginnings of European Integration 1945-1960*. Berg, Oxford 1995.

Zauzich, Maria Christine, *Parteien im Wandel. Von der Weltanschauungspartei zur Volkspartei*, Bayerische Landeszentrale für politische Bildungsarbeit, München 1976.

Ziebura, Gilbert, "Christliche Demokratie in Westeuropa. Reflexionen und Kommentar", in: *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Band V, Grobowsky, Adolf, Berlin, Carl, Heymann Verlag, Köln/Berlin 1958.

Hans Zillig, *In der Mitarbeit gewachsen und gereift. Zur Geschichte des Landesverbandes Sachsen der CDU 1945-1952*. CDUD, Berlin (Ost) 1978 (p. 14-17).

Zimdahl, Hans Heinrich, "Christlich Demokratische (Soziale) Union (CDU/CSU). Ihr Wirtschaftssystem 'Soziale Marktwirtschaft'", in: Lutzeyer, August, *Wirtschaftssysteme und Parteiprogramme. Programmatistische Wirtschaftspolitik*, Baden-Baden, Frankfurt am Main 1955.

Zimmermann, Karl, *Neues Wollen, Neue Ordnung*. Bericht über die Tagung der sozialen Ausschüsse der CDU Nordrhein-Westfalen in Herne 8/9. November 1946.

Zimmermann, Karl, *Erste Reichstagung der CDU in Godesberg*, Schriftenreihe der Christlichen Demokratischen Union des Rheinlandes, Heft 5, Köln, 14-16. Dezember 1945, (p. 13).

Zitelmann, Rainer, *Adenauers Gegner. Streiter für die Einheit*, Reihe Extremismus in der Demokratie, Straube GmbH, Erlangen, Bonn, Wien 1991 (p.36).

Zitelmann, Rainer, *Westbindung. Chancen und Risiken für Deutschland*. Ullstein, Frankfurt am Main 1993.

Zwoch, Gerhard, "Politik und Programme der demokratischen Parteien von 1919-1969, 1919-1969", in: *Parlamentarische Demokratie in Deutschland*, Schriftenreihe der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, Heft 86, Bonn 1970 (s.35-45).

"Zur Problematik deutscher Politik. Die Sprache des Wählers", in: *Die Gegenwart*, Jg 1, Nr. 22/23, 1946.

Archival Sources from the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung.

Landesverbände and Nachlässe.

Archive sources used for Part 2 of study: *Continuity and Change 1945-1947*

ACDP III-002-025/1.

Festschrift, August 1955, Dr Warsch, Landesverband Rhineland

Letter, Oct 1945, Bernhard Kaes to Dr. Hamacher, Landesverband Westfalen-Lippe.

ACDP I-009-007/1.

Interzonenausschuss meeting in Mingolsheim, Akte Zwischenzonenverbindungs-ausschuss, NL-Dörpinghaus.

ACDP, NL Dörpinghaus StA.

CDU Sozialausschuß of the British Zone, meeting 23/24 January 1947 in Cologne. NL Dörpinghaus StA.

ACDP III-010-039.

Minutes from the meeting 19, September in the home of Herr Schmidt, Oesfeldt, Hamburg.

ACDP I-178-001.

Report, 25th November 1946, NL-Lingens.

ACDP, I-090-015/1.

Comments made by Ernst Lemmer, Jakob Kaiser.

ACDP, I-090-016/2.

Minutes of meetings between 15-22 June.

ACDP, III -031/ 90.

Letter from CDU Landesvorstand Thuringia to LDP regional group in Schallenburg on 4.10.46.

ACDP, I-155-001/1.

Heinrich von der Gablentz, Gedanken zur Parteiarbeit, 8 August 1945.

Albert Grosse, 'Deutschland und die Union.'

ACDP, III-012-923.

Andreas Hermes' speech, CDU meeting in Bad Godesberg December 14th-16th, 1945.

Andreas Hermes' Speech at the founding conference of the CDUD on 22 July 1945 in Berlin.

Report of the dismissal of Kaiser and Lemmer, Telegraf newspaper, 21.12.1947.

ACDP I-090-018/4

Letter Hermes to Eisenhower, September 20th, 1945, p.194.

ACDP, I-090-016/4.

Protocols of the CDUD Economic Committee.

Fragen des Währungs-Banken – und Reichsschuldenwesens, lecture by Friedrich Ernst.

ACDP, III-012-1063.

Jakob Kaiser, Der soziale und staatspolitische Wille, February 13, 1946. Speech at the meeting of the CDU executive in Berlin. Landesverband Berlin.

Informationsbrief Nr.12 'Aus der Arbeit der Union' extracts from Albert Voss's speech from the executive board meeting 13th February 1946.

Von der Gablentz, Sondermaterial (economic policy). Party executive board meeting, Berlin 5/6 March 1946.

Tilman's speech, Sondermaterial (cultural policy). Party executive board meeting, Berlin 5/6 March 1946.

Report by Dertinger for the executive committee meeting, 17th September 1946, following communal elections in the Soviet Zone.

ACDP I-171-001/2.

Speeches from the Berlin party conference, 16th and 17th June, 1946.

ACDP I-294-012

Speech by Karl Arnold, 7. September 1947, Theater am Schiffbauerdamm, Berlin.

ACDP, III-035-041

Letter from Brandenburg CDU Landtagsfraktion to Saxony CDU Landtagsfraktion, 14th October 1947.

ACDP, VII-010-2037

Memo by Dertinger, General Secretary for the CDU in Berlin, 25.4.1947 on the meeting of the chairmen of the CDU *Landesverbände* in the Soviet Zone, Halle April 19 and 20, 1947.

ACDP, III-035

Ludwig Kirsch, Der Wille der Union.

ACDP, III-035-075

Pfarrer Bitter, 20th March 1946 at the CDUD's meeting in Annaberg-Buchholz, Saxony.

ACDP, III-036-082

Arbeitsberichte, Landesverband Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, July 1947.

Minutes of the Landesversammlung, 18th May 1947, Dr Siegfried Witte, Minister for economics.

ACDP, I-155-030/5

Suggestion of a programme of Democratic Federalism by Prof. Dr U. Noack Mecklenburg-Vorpommern to to v. d. Gablentz in Berlin in August 1945.

ACDP, III – 031-199.

12- point programme, Thuringia Landesverband,

ACDP, III-p. 31-227

CDU Landesverband Thüringen; 'Stoffsammlung zu den Redebeispielen.' The material which dates from 5th and 6th March 1946 following ratification at the executive meeting in Berlin, must originate with the CDUD programme discussions in Berlin and forwarded to Thuringia and other regions and Landesverbände for distribution and campaigns.

ACDP, III 031-61.

Pamphlet *Warum Christlich? Warum Union?*

ACDP, I-188-002/1

Aufruf der Christlichen Volkspartei, Kreis Chemnitz, 4 July 1945. NL Karl Buchheim.

ACDP, III-035-001

Niederschrift über die am 8.7 1945 im Hause Gottfried Kellerstr. 50 stattgefundene Besprechung zur Gründung der Christlich sozialen Volkspartei. LV-Sachsen.

ACDP, III-035-016

Letttter, 7th Sept 1945 Hugo Hickmann.

ACDP, III-035-061

Richtlinien für die Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands.

ACDP, NL I-188-002/2

Ernst Eichelbaum, Wie es in Leipzig begann. LV-Sachsen.

ACDP, I-201-001/7

Ernst Eichelbaum, CDU in Leipzig 1945-1948. Bericht über die Anfänge der CDU in der sowjetischen besetzten Zone Deutschlands, Leipzig, August 1982, in III-002-024/1 Landesverband Berlin 1945-.

ACDP I-188.

Leitsätze der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands, Unterbezirk Leipzig, 1945. NL-Karl Bucheim.

ACDP, III-031-147

This archive collection contains discussions that took place across the Soviet states over 'Sozialismus aus christlicher Verantwortung.'

**Archives sources used for part 3 of study: *Programmes, Power and Personality*
1947-1949**

ACDP, I-009-009/5

Paper by Fedor Reuscher, CDU member Fedor Reuscher of Lüdenscheid in Westphalia; NL Dörpinghaus.

ACDP, III- 155-001/1

A. H Berning report on the CDU meeting in Godesberg; 'Hessischer Nachrichten,' 22.12.1945.

ACDP, 009/003

Leitsätze der CDP Wetzlar, NL- Dörpinghaus.

ACDP III-028 -032/1

LV - Rhineland-Hesse-Nassau.

Herr Dr Zimmer/Frau Dr Mathilde Gantenberg, Die Gründungsgeschichte der CDU in Trierer Land
1945/6, 1955.

Appendices

Map 1 shows Germany after the Second World War divided into four allied occupation zones.

Map 2 shows Germany's regional states or *Länder*, towns and cities.

Pages removed for copyright restrictions.