

Some parts of this thesis may have been removed for copyright restrictions.

If you have discovered material in AURA which is unlawful e.g. breaches copyright, (either yours or that of a third party) or any other law, including but not limited to those relating to patent, trademark, confidentiality, data protection, obscenity, defamation, libel, then please read our [Takedown Policy](#) and [contact the service](#) immediately

APPROACHES TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION

Vol I

A study at Branch Level in a White Collar,
Public Sector Trade Union

DEREK JOHN ROLLINSON

Thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

THE UNIVERSITY OF ASTON IN BIRMINGHAM

June 1987

This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with its author and that no quotation from the thesis and no information derived from it may be published without the author's prior, written consent.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ASTON IN BIRMINGHAM

APPROACHES TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION:
A Study at Branch Level in a White Collar
Public Sector Trade Union

by

Derek John Rollinson

A thesis submitted for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Summary

This study examines the internal dynamics of white collar trade union branches in the public sector. The effects of a number of internal and external factors on branch patterns of action are evaluated. For the purposes of the study branch action is taken to be the approach to issues of job regulation, as expressed along the five dimensions of dependence on the outside trade union, focus in issues adopted, initiation of issues, intensity of action in issue pursuit and representativeness.

The setting chosen for the study is four branches drawn from the same geographical area of the National and Local Government Officers Association. Branches were selected to give a variety in industry settings while controlling for the potentially influential variables of branch size, density of trade union membership and possession of exclusive representational rights in the employing organisation. Identical methods of data collection were used for each branch.

The principal findings of the study are that the framework of national agreements and industry collective bargaining structures are strongly related to the industrial relations climate in the employing organisation and the structures of representation within the branch. Where agreements and collective bargaining structures formally restrict branch job regulation roles, there is a degree of devolution of bargaining authority from branch level negotiators to autonomous shop stewards at workplace level. In these circumstances industrial relations climate is characterised by a degree of informality in relationships between management and trade union activists. In turn, industrial relations climate and representative structures together with actor attitudes, have strong effects on all dimensions of approach to issues of job regulation.

Keywords

Industrial Relations, White Collar, Public Sector

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writer wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the help received from the following people:

My supervisor, Dr. R. Lumley, for his advice, discussion and valuable criticism at all stages throughout the research project.

The branch officials, members and managements of the organisations who kindly cooperated in fieldwork.

My wife, Victoria, for her support and the typing of the thesis.

CONTENTS

VOLUME I

	<u>Page No.</u>
CHAPTER 1 THE STUDY OF WHITE COLLAR UNIONS	1
Introduction	1
The Need for Further Study of White Collar Trade Unions	2
The Study of the Character of White Collar Trade Unions	3
Public vs Private Sector Trade Unions	6
Level of Study of White Collar Unions	11
Prior Studies at Branch or Workplace Level	14
Outline Research Strategy	18
CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: APPROACHES TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION AS DIMENSIONS OF BRANCH ACTION	20
Introduction	20
Job Regulation and Approaches to Issues	20
The Five Dimensions of Approaches to Issues of Job Regulation	24
Dependence on Outside Trade Union	24
Focus in Issues	26
Initiation of Issues	28
Intensity of Action	30
Representativeness	34
Interrelation of Dimensions	39
CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: FACTORS AFFECTING APPROACHES TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION	40
Introduction	40
General	40
Group 1: Factors External to the Trade Union Branch	41
The Employer: Policies and Actions	41
Industry Collective Bargaining Structures	44
Other Workplace Trade Unions	46
The Outside Trade Union	46
Group 2: Issues Factors	47
Group 3: Structural Factors in the Union Branch	50
Size of Branch	50
Trade Union Density	51
The Representative System	52
Membership Dispersion	54

	<u>Page No.</u>
Group 4: Factors Associated with Actors	55
Actor Attitudes	55
General Attitude Patterns of White Collar Workers	55
Differences Between Members within White Collar Unions	60
Biographic Factors: Age and Sex	65
Education	66
Occupational Factors	66
Processes of Intra-organisational Bargaining and Decision Making	68
Interrelationships between Factors: An Overview	71
CHAPTER 4 THE SETTING FOR THE STUDY	73
Introduction	73
NALGO as a Trade Union	73
Suitability for the Study	73
History and Development	74
The Role of the Branch within NALGO	76
Relation of Branches to the Parent	78
The Branches Studied	79
General Selection Criteria	79
The Branches Selected	81
The Gas Industry Branch	81
Electricity Industry Branch	84
Local Authority Branch 1	88
Local Authority Branch 2	91
CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS	95
Introduction	95
Methodological Approach	95
Data Specification and Collection Methods	97
General Considerations	97
Dimensions of Approach to Issues of Job Regulation	98
Dependence on Outside Trade Union	98
Focus in Issues	99
Initiation of Issues	101
Intensity of Action	101
Representativeness	102

Factors Influencing Approaches to Issues of Job Regulation	104
Employer Policy and Action -	
Industrial Relations Climate	104
Industry Collective Bargaining Structures	105
The Outside Trade Union	106
Issues	107
The Representative System	107
Membership Dispersion	108
Actor Attitudes	109
Processes of Intra-organisational	
Bargaining and Decision Making	110
Data Collection	112
Data Analysis Techniques: An Overview	115
CHAPTER 6 DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS: THE FIVE DIMENSIONS	
OF APPROACHES TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION	117
Introduction	117
Description of Findings on the Dimensions	117
Dependence On Outside Trade Union	117
Focus in Issues	121
Initiation of Issues	125
Intensity of Action	132
Representativeness	136
An Overview of the Five Dimensions	139
CHAPTER 7 ISSUES FACTORS: THE DOMINANT ISSUES	142
Introduction	142
General	142
The Gas Branch	143
The Meter Readers Dispute	143
The Issue of Accountability of Regional	
Negotiators	146
Electricity Branch	149
The Issue of Support for Other Trade Unions	149
Amalgamation of North and South Divisions	151
Local Authority Branch 1	155
The Issue of Accountability of Branch Officers	
and Delegates	155
Local Unemployment Initiatives	156
Transfer of Assets from New Town Development	
Corporation	157

	<u>Page No.</u>
The Issue of Privatisation	159
Local Authority Branch 2	161
Transfer of Assets from New Town Development Corporation	161
The Issue of Local Holiday Entitlement	162
CHAPTER 8 ISSUES FACTORS: GENERAL MEASURES AND OVERVIEW	166
Introduction	166
General Measures	166
Issue Salience	166
Perceived Importance of Rank and File Involvement in Issue Shaping	168
Perceptions of Appropriate Methods for Rank and File Involvement in Issue Shaping	170
Recent Issues	173
Salience of Recent Issues	173
Perceived Influence of Rank and File Members in Recent Issues	175
Accuracy of Recall and Mode of Pursuit of Recent Issues	178
Perceived Need for Branch Involvement in Issues of Job Regulation	179
Issues Requiring Branch Involvement	179
Activist Perspectives on Branch Involvement in Issues	181
Factors Effecting Issue Salience	182
General Issue Salience and Salience of Recent Issues	182
Recent Issue Salience	183
Issues Factors as Partial Explanations of Approaches to Job Regulation	186
Issues Factors and Intensity of Action	186
Issues Factors and Initiation	189
Issues Factors and Focus	192
Issues Factors and Representativeness	195
Issues Factors and Dependence on Outside Trade Union	200

	<u>Page No.</u>
CHAPTER 9 DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS: ACTOR ATTITUDES	201
Introduction	201
Attitudes to Work	201
Expectations of Work	201
Experience of Work	202
Interaction of Expectations and Experiences of Work	204
Gas Branch	205
Electricity Branch	206
Local Authority Branch 1	208
Local Authority Branch 2	210
Trade Unions in General	212
Gas Branch	213
Electricity Branch	214
Local Authority Branch 1	215
Local Authority Branch 2	216
Trade Unions at Work: Non-activists	217
Similarities Between Branches	219
Differences Between Branches	220
Gas Branch	220
Electricity Branch	221
Local Authority Branch 1	222
Local Authority Branch 2	223
Trade Union at Work: Activists	225
Similarities Between Branches	227
Differences Between Branches	228
Gas Branch	228
Electricity Branch	230
Local Authority Branch 1	232
Local Authority Branch 2	235
Attitudes as Partial Explanations of Approaches to Job Regulation	237
Gas Branch	237
Electricity Branch	239
Local Authority Branch 1	241
Local Authority Branch 2	243
CHAPTER 10 STRUCTURAL FACTORS	245
Introduction	245
The Representative System	245
Shop Steward Constituencies	245

	<u>Page No.</u>
Formal Provision to Inform and Sense	246
Members' Opinions	247
Centralisation of Authority within Branch	248
Perceived Opportunity for Steward Autonomy	254
Effectiveness of Recent Sensing and Informing Processes in Issues Affecting Total Branch Memberships	255
The Representative System: An Overview	256
Membership Dispersion	259
Internal Structural Factors as Partial Explanations of Approach to Job Regulation	261
Dependence on Outside Trade Union	262
Focus in Issues	263
Initiation of Issues	264
Intensity of Action	265
Representativeness	267
CHAPTER 11 FACTORS EXTERNAL TO THE BRANCH	267
Introduction	267
Employer Policy and Action	268
Formality in Industrial Relations	269
Perceptions of Management	269
Classification of Perceived Climate	271
Activist Endorsement of Formality	272
Formality and Attitudes	275
Employer Policy and Action: An Overview	277
Industry Collective Bargaining Structure	277
The Prescribed Situation	281
The Outside Trade Union	285
Factors External to the Branch as Partial Explanations of Approaches to Job Regulation	285
Gas Branch	287
Electricity Branch	288
Local Authority Branch 1	289
Local Authority Branch 2	291
CHAPTER 12 PROCESSES OF INTRA-ORGANISATIONAL BARGAINING AND DECISION MAKING	291
Introduction	291
General Considerations	292
Data and Measures for Executive Committee Meetings	292

	<u>Page No.</u>
Allocation of Time	292
Interactions between Executive Members	294
Proposals and Decisions	296
Themes Emerging in Issue Discussion	298
Meeting Processes and Partial Explanations of Approaches to Job Regulation	300
Gas Branch	300
Electricity Branch	305
Local Authority Branch 1	308
Local Authority Branch 2	312
CHAPTER 13 INTEGRATION OF RESULTS AND EXPLANATION	317
Introduction	317
General Observations on Factors Influencing Job Regulation	317
The Effects of Industry Collective Bargaining Structures and the Framework of Existing Agreements	317
Multiple Causality	318
Generalisations from Explanations	319
Dimensions of Approach to Job Regulation and Integrated Explanations	320
Dependence on Outside Trade Union	320
Focus in Issues	324
Initiation of Issues	329
Intensity of Action	335
Representativeness	342
Overview	351
Dependence on Outside Trade Union and Focus in Issues	351
Focus in Issues and Initiation of Issues	353
Initiation of Issues and Intensity of Action	353
Representativeness and Other Dimensions	354
CHAPTER 14 CONCLUSIONS	356
Introduction	356
A Simplified Model of Factors Influencing Approaches to Issues of Job Regulation	356
Generalised Conclusions	358
Industrial Relations Climate and Structures of Representation	358

	<u>Page No.</u>
Dependence on Outside Trade Union	363
Focus in Issues	366
Initiation of Issues	370
Intensity of Action	374
Representativeness	379
Generalisations from Findings	382
Areas for Further Research	383
Implications of Findings for Management and Trade Unions	386
Postscript: Results Feedback and Organisational Development in Branches	391
LITERATURE REFERENCES	394

VOLUME 1

INDEX TO FIGURES AND TABLES

	<u>Page No.</u>
Fig. 3.1 A Qualitative Conceptual Model of Factors Influencing a Branch's Approach to Issues of Job Regulation	72
Fig. 4.1 Nalgo Structures	80
Fig. 4.2 Gas Branch: Internal Structure	85
Fig. 4.3 Electricity Branch: Internal Structure	87
Fig. 4.4 Local Authority Branch 1: Internal Structure	90
Fig. 4.5 Local Authority Branch 2: Internal Structure	93
Fig. 4.6 Vital Statistics of the Four Branches Investigated	94
Table 6.1 Summary Dependence Index Scores	120
Table 6.2 Summary Focus Index Scores	124
Fig. 6.1 Proportions of Branch Activity in Action Modes	130
Table 6.3 Summary Initiation Index Scores	131
Table 6.4 Summary Intensity Index Scores	134
Table 6.5 Summary Representativeness Scores	137
Table 6.6 Branch Scores and Rank Order Positions on the Five Dimensions of Approaches to Issues of Job Regulation	139
Table 8.1 Rank Order of Salience by Issue Type	167
Table 8.2 Summary Indices of Perceived Importance of Rank and File Involvement in Issue Shaping	169
Table 8.3 Degree of Consensus between Non-activists and Activists on Best Method of Rank and File Involvement	172
Table 8.4 Recent Issues: Mean Salience and Menu Frequency of Issues Recalled	174

	<u>Page No.</u>
Table 8.5 Summary Indices of Perceived Influence of Rank and File in Recent Issues	177
Table 8.6 Summary Scores Recent Issues: Accuracy of Recall of Issue Details and Perceived Mode of Issue Pursuit	179
Table 8.7 Summary Frequencies (Issues per Respondent) of Issues Requiring Branch Involvement	180
Table 8.8 Summary Indices of Activist Desire for Increased Issue Involvement	182
Table 8.9 Rank Order Correlation Coefficients (Spearman) Intensity of Action with Issue Salience x Proportions Affected	187
Table 8.10 Proportions of Management Initiated and Branch Initiated Action Weighted for Salience of Action to Trade Union Members.	191
Table 8.11 Mean Percentage (Activists and Non-activists) of Pecuniary Issues Mentioned as Perceived Desirable for Branch Involvement	194
Table 8.12 Indicators used to Provide Explanations of Relationships between Issue Factors and Representativeness	196
Table 10.1 Summary Scores: Design for Shop Steward Constituencies	246
Table 10.2 Summary Scores: Index of Formal Provision to Inform and Sense Rank and File Opinion	247
Table 10.3 Summary Index Scores: Centralisation of Authority within Branch	248
Table 10.4 Summary Scores: Index of Perceived Opportunity for Steward Autonomy	249
Table 10.5 Index of Effectiveness of Recent Sensing and Informing Processes in Issues Affecting Total Branch Memberships	255
Table 10.6 Summary Scores: Index of Effects of Membership Dispersion	258
Table 11.1 Summary Scores: Index of Industrial Relations Formality in Employing Organisation	268

Fig. 11.1	Classification of Branch Perceptions of Industrial Relations Climate in Employing Organisation	270
Table 11.2	Index of Perceived Legitimacy of Preclusion from Involvement by Provisions of Existing Agreements and Collective Structures	279
Table 11.3	Index of Manifest Effects of Collective Bargaining Structures on Restriction of Branch Roles	280
Table 11.4	Index of Outside Trade Union Influence	284
Table 13.1	Summary Table of Factors Explaining Dependence on Outside Trade Union	321
Fig. 13.1	Diagram of Major Influences on Branch Dependence on Outside Trade Union	325
Table 13.2	Summary Table of Factors Explaining Focus in Issues	326
Fig. 13.2	Diagram of Major Influences on Branch Focus in Issues	330
Table 13.3	Summary Table of Factors Explaining Initiation of Issues	331
Fig. 13.3	Diagram of Major Influences on Branch Initiation of Issues	336
Table 13.4	Summary Table of Factors Influencing Intensity in Action	337
Fig. 13.4	Diagram of Major Influences on Branch Intensity in Action	343
Table 13.5	Summary Table of Factors Explaining Representativeness	345
Fig. 13.5	Diagram of Major Influences on Branch Representativeness	352
Fig. 14.1	Simplified Model of Factors Influencing Branch Approaches to Issues of Job Regulation	357

VOLUME II

INDEX TO APPENDICES

METHODOLOGICAL

Page No.

Appendices		
M1.1 and M1.2	Requirements, Sources and Collection Methods for Data	1
Appendix M2	Sampling Considerations	7
Table 2.1a	Gas Branch: Target Sampling Frame	10
Table 2.1b	Electricity Branch: Target Sampling Frame	13
Table 2.1c	Local Authority Branch 1: Target Sampling Frame	15
Table 2.1d	Local Authority Branch 2: Target Sampling Frame	16
Appendix M3	Attitude Theory and Development of Self Administered Questionnaire	17
	Attitude Theory Utilised	17
	Development of Data Collection Instrument	21
Table 3.1	Constructs to Work and Trade Union Derived from Repertory Grid Techniques	25
Table 3.2	Sub-Scales and Items on Pilot Questionnaire	29
Table 3.3	Internal Consistency of Questionnaire Items	32
Table 3.4a	Attitudes to Work: Principal Factor Loadings	35
Table 3.4b	Attitudes to Trade Unions in General: Principal Factor Loadings	36
Table 3.4c	Non-activists Attitudes to Trade Unions at Work: Principal Factor Loadings	37
Table 3.4d	Activist Attitudes to Trade Unions at Work: Principal Factor Loadings	38
Appendix M3.1	Attitude Questionnaire	41
Appendix M3.2	Validity of Attitude Questionnaire	55
Table M3.2a	Variation of Extrinsic and Mobility Expectations with Salary Level	57
Table M3.2b	Variation in Work Expectations with Level of Educational Qualifications	58
Table M3.2c	Variation in Intrinsic Satisfaction and Attitudes to Management and Supervision with Tenure	58
Appendix M4	Interview Schedule Considerations and Piloting	59

		<u>Page No.</u>
Appendix M4.1	Interview Schedule	61
Appendix M5	Selection of Data Recording Scheme for Meeting Observations	70
Appendix M6	The Use of Multivariate Analysis Methods for Attitude Data	74

STATISTICAL

Appendices S1.1 to S1.4	Cases and Issues Adopted During Eighteen Month Period	79-82
Appendices S2.1 to S2.4	Procedural and Substantive Agreements Affecting Branches	83-86
Appendices S3.1 to S3.4	Dependence on Outside Trade Union: Derivation of Dependence Indices	87-94
Appendix S4	Focus in Issues: Derivation of Branch Indices	95-96
Appendices S5.1 to S5.4	Initiation of Issues: Derivation of Branch Indices	97-100
Appendices S6.1 to S6.4	Intensity in Action: Derivation of Branch Indices	101-104
Appendices S7.1 to S7.6	Scores to Questionnaire Item C7	105-110
Appendices S8.1 to S8.6	General Issue Salience Scores	111-118
Appendices S9.1 to S9.6	Scores to Questionnaire Items C2b, C3b, C4b, C5b, C6b	119-126
Appendices S10.1 to S10.6	Responses to Questionnaire Items C2c, C3c, C4c, C5c, C6c	127-134
Appendices S11.1 to S11.6	Recent Issue Saliences	135-140
Appendices S12.1 to S12.6	Perceived Influence of Rank and File Members in Recent Issues	141-146
Appendices S13.1 to S13.6	Accuracy of Recall of Recent Issue Details	147-152
Appendices S14.1 to S14.2	Perceived Mode of Pursuit of Recent Issues	153-154

		<u>Page No.</u>
Appendices S15.1 to S15.6	Expressed Desire for Branch Involvement by Issue Type	155-160
Appendices S16.1 to S16.4	Summary of Responses to Interview Items 45-47: Activists	161-164
Appendix S17	Association: Rank Order of General Salience and Recent Issue Salience by Type	165
Appendices S18.1 to S18.4	Path Models: Relationship Between Recent Issues Measures	166-169
Appendices S19.1a to S19.4b	Derivation of Salience Weighted Proportions of Branch Action	170-177
Appendices S20.1 to S20.6	Expectations of Work Scores	178-183
Appendices S21.1 to S21.6	Attitudes to Work Experience	184-189
Appendices S22.1 to S22.16	Path Models Analysing Work Expectations and Work Experience Attitudes	190-205
Appendices S23.1 to S23.6	Attitudes to Trade Unions in General	206-211
Appendices S23.7 to S23.14	Path Models Analysing Attitudes to Trade Unions in General	212-219
Appendix S24.1	Non-activists: Attitudes to Trade Union at Work	220
Appendices S24.2 to S24.13	Path Models Analysing Attitudes to Trade Union at Work, Management and Activists and Trade Union and Management: Non-activists	221-232
Appendix S25.1	Activists: Attitudes to Trade Union at Work	233
Appendices S25.2 to S25.17	Path Models Analysing Attitudes to Trade Union at Work, Rank and File Members, Trade Union and Management and Management and Rank and File Members: Activists	234-249
Appendix S26	Design for Shop Steward Constituencies Derivation of Branch Indices	250

		<u>Page No.</u>
Appendix S27	Formal Provision to Sense and Inform Rank and File: Derivation of Branch Indices	251
Appendix S28	Centralisation of Authority: Derivation of Branch Indices	252
Appendix S29	Perceived Opportunity for Steward Autonomy	253
Appendices S29.1 to S29.8	Path Models Analysing Perceived Opportunity for Stewardship, Opinions of Rank and File and Expectations of Work: Activists	254-261
Appendix S30	Effectiveness of Recent Sensing and Informing Processes: Derivation of Branch Indices	262
Appendices S31.1 to S31.4	Effects of Membership Dispersion: Derivation of Branch Indices	263-266
Appendix S32	Formality of Industrial Relations: Derivation of Branch Indices	267
Appendix S33	Endorsement of Formality in Industrial Relations	268
Appendices S34.1 to S34.8	Path Models Analysing Stewardship Opportunity, Formality, Activist Role, Opinions of Rank and File and Management: Activists	269-276
Appendix S35	Perceived Legitimacy of Preclusion from Involvement by Existing Agreements and Collective Bargaining Structure	277
Appendix S36	Effects of Collective Bargaining Structures: Derivation of Branch Indices	278
Appendix S37	Outside Trade Union as Source of Internal Support: Derivation of Branch Sub-indices	279
Appendix S38	Influence of Outside Trade Union: Derivation of Branch Indices	280
Appendix S39	Summary Details of Meetings Observed: all Branches	281

Appendix S40	Executive Committee Meetings: Mean Numbers of Issues Discussed and Proportions of Time by Issue Type	282
Appendices S41.1 to S41.4	Executive Committee Meetings: Summary Statistics of Participant Interactions	283-286
Appendices S42.1 to S42.4	Branch Executive Committee Meetings: Analysis of Interaction Patterns	287-291
Appendices S43.1 to S43.2	Branch Executive Committee Meetings: Proposals Made, Outcomes of Discussion and Analysis of Results	292-293
Appendices S44.1 to S44.2	Branch Executive Committee Meetings: Themes Arising in Discussion of Issues of Job Regulation and Analysis of Results	294-296

CHAPTER 1

THE STUDY OF WHITE COLLAR TRADE UNIONS

INTRODUCTION

This thesis "Approaches to Issues of Job Regulation" has two principal aims. The first is to provide information on the role of the trade union branch in the public sector white collar situation. The second is to make a substantive contribution to the understanding of the internal dynamics of workplace trade unionism in this setting. As such the investigation addresses itself to the basic research question of

"how can different patterns of action in white collar trade union branches in the public sector be accounted for in terms of interactions between environmental influences on branches and their internal structures, processes and actor characteristics?"

The approach adopted to answering this question is that of integrating a variety of prior research evidence into a model of factors which could shape patterns of action. The model is then subjected to the rigours of empirical investigation.

This opening chapter commences with a brief statement of why further research in the area of white collar trade unions is felt to be necessary. Past themes and concerns in the study of the character of white collar unions are then examined and the conclusion drawn that there is a requirement for greater understanding of their internal dynamics. A distinction is made between public and private sectors, as two situations where the role and actions of white collar trade unions could be different.

Following this, the level at which white collar unions have been studied is examined and an argument developed that a study focussed at branch level in the public sector would be worthwhile. Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of some major studies which have shed light on the internal dynamics of workplace trade unions are examined and an outline research strategy established.

THE NEED FOR FURTHER STUDY OF WHITE COLLAR TRADE UNIONS

The need for further research into the collective organisation of white collar workers arises for two main reasons.

The first of these is the increasing prominence of white collar trade unions. In 1948 white collar workers comprised 31% of the total U.K. labour force and 26% of the total trade union membership. By 1979 the white collar labour force had risen to 49% of the total and trade union density had risen from 33% to 44%, so that white collar union members comprised 40% of the total U.K. union membership (Bain and Price 1972b, Price and Bain 1976 and 1983). Clearly the growing number of white collar workers and their increasing tendency to unionise makes further knowledge of their collective organisations vital to the body of knowledge of industrial relations.

Secondly, the claims in much prior work that collective organisations of white collar workers are in some way fundamentally different from those of manual workers needs examination. For the present, it can be noted that arguments range between two poles.

At one extreme is the assertion that white collar collective organisations do not possess the necessary characteristics to enable them to be labelled trade unions (i.e. Blackburn and Prandy 1965, Blackburn 1967). At the other extreme is the argument that white collar workers will become the new driving force in trade unionism (Mallet 1975, Gallie 1978, Low-Beer 1978). Further knowledge of white collar trade unions can help inform the debate on these contrasting theories.

THE STUDY OF THE CHARACTER OF WHITE COLLAR TRADE UNIONS

For two decades theory and empirical research on white collar trade unions has taken character as one of its principal themes. Character has been used in two separate but nevertheless connected ways, both of which are problematic if used for descriptive purposes.

First, character has been used to refer to aspects of visible action of the part of whole trade unions. The most prominent example of this is Blackburn's concept of "Unionateness" consisting of seven behavioural characteristics (Blackburn and Prandy 1965, Blackburn 1967. Even with later refinements (Prandy Stewart and Blackburn 1974) the term has been shown to lack conceptual clarity and is not really usable as a descriptive measure. For example it is unclear how the seven dimensions relate to each other to produce distinct trade union types (Bain, Coates and Ellis 1973).

Secondly, character has been used at workgroup and individual level to denote attitudes and actions of trade union members. In this sense, whilst it could be applied to any union, it has been used most often in the white-collar situation (Bain et al 1973). The reason for this is probably that although union growth and character can be conceptually and empirically separated, the two are often linked. Indeed, although there are theories of white collar union growth which largely ignore personal psychological characteristics of members (i.e. Bain 1970, Bain and Elsheikh 1976); many more seek to relate growth to attitudes and beliefs (i.e. Roberts, Loveridge and Gennard 1972; Lockwood 1958; Crompton 1976, 1979a, 1979b, 1980; Bellaby and Oribabor 1977)

Two strong underlying assumptions in these theories which link character and growth are that:

- i. Joining a trade union is a voluntary act for most white-collar workers.
- ii. Certain attitudes and orientations (which will have subsequent links with action in the trade union) characterise this group.

Ultimately, and here is where the two uses of the word character connect, it is assumed that the actions of these workers will affect the essential nature of the trade union in a way that makes it acceptable to increasing numbers of white collar workers. These two assumptions are, however, open to criticism.

The assumption that joining is purely voluntary can be criticised on the grounds that over two-thirds of white collar union members are employed in the public sector, where closed shop agreements are commonplace (Price 1983). The assumption that there are attitudes and orientations unique to white collar workers has led to the word character being used largely to distinguish between blue and white collar unions. Indeed an implicit theme in much of the literature is that the blue collar situation constitutes a model of "proper" trade union against which the white collar should be compared (Price 1983). This may well have hampered rather than aided the study of these unions.

This not to deny that differences between trade unions do exist; not the least of which could be the aims, attitudes and actions of their members. To assume, however, that member attitudes and orientations alone produce differences which distinguish between blue and white collar unions may well be a gross oversimplification. Moreover it can be argued that trade unions are such complex organisations that their differences arise not only from member characteristics and aims, but also the structures and the channels evolved to advance those aims (Undy, Ellis, McCarthy and Halmos 1981). It is doubtful therefore, whether differences in the actions of trade unions can be solely linked to the occupational category of their memberships.

It must be concluded therefore that the word character is imprecise when used to describe trade unions and needs to be viewed

with some caution. As an accurate descriptive dimension character it is lacking in precision. There are huge problems in its use either independently to catalogue behavioural attributes or comparatively to draw distinctions between trade unions. The evidence of Undy et al. suggests that it makes more sense to regard each trade union as potentially unique in some respects. Each is an instrument of collective representation, operating in its own environment. Each has its own particular set of interests to advance and evolves its own structures and actions to do so.

Adopting this approach frees the study of trade unions from the blue vs white collar distinction with its attendant problems of identifying which (if any) are suitable dimensions of comparison. It makes any trade union a potentially interesting object of study in its own right.

White collar unions, because of their growing numerical strength will continue to be of interest. Conceptually the distinctions between different white collar unions become just as important as those between blue collar and white collar unions. Moreover, the internal dynamics which could produce similarities and/or differences become a vital object of investigation.

PUBLIC Vs PRIVATE SECTOR TRADE UNIONS

The white vs blue collar distinction referred to above is only one way to distinguish between trade unions. Traditionally the craft, general and industrial distinction was commonly used; a somewhat

arbitrary system into which it would be hard to fit many white collar unions. An alternative typology (Turner 1962) distinguishes between open and closed unions and a later elaboration of this (Hughes 1968) adds categories of sectoral and sectoral-general. Sectoral unions are those organising specific groups of workers in several industries across a given economic sector e.g. The National and Local Government Officers Association, which is open only to non-manual workers in certain public services. Sectoral-general are open to all workers within a given sector e.g. The National Union of Public Employees which is open to all workers in public sector employment.

Hughes's elaboration is useful in focusing attention on the division between public and private sectors of an economy. In the U.K., this distinction has traditionally received little emphasis. In the U.S.A. however, where the legal right to organise and engage in collective bargaining in the public sector is of a comparatively recent origin, the difference is regarded as important and a volume of literature and empirical work has been generated in the area (Carlson and Robinson 1969, Wellington and Winter 1971, Annable 1974, Kochan 1974, Kochan 1975, Kochan and Wheeler 1975, Methe and Perry 1980, Martin 1980, Herrick 1980, Anderson 1979b).

More recently this has been taken up in regard to the U.K. It has been argued for example, that as a whole, public sector unions can be distinguished from their private sector counterparts in having relatively more bargaining power and willingness to engage in

overtly political behaviour (Thomson and Beaumont 1978). Moreover, it is probable that it is with respect to white collar unions that the great differences between unions in the public and private sectors exist. Six reasons can be advanced for this.

1. The Range of Issues of Concern to Trade Unions

There are several large white collar trade unions exclusive to the public sector. Some such as the Civil and Public Services Association and Society of Civil and Public Servants, are confined to single employer. Arguably this gives a more restricted range of issues with which the union concerns itself. Private sector trade unions typically organise across a more diverse range of industrial situations.

2. Numbers and Trade Union Densities

Over two-thirds of white collar trade unionists are located in the public sector. In many situations joining is not voluntary. Closed shop agreements exist which has given very high density levels; an average of 79.1% in gas, electricity and local government against 43.7% in private manufacturing (Bain and Price 1980, Price and Bain 1983). It is from these density levels that the higher bargaining strength of these unions is said to be derived (Thompson and Beaumont 1978). However this can be a double edged sword for high density levels are also argued to lead to a far greater diversity of membership attitudes and expectations (Rallings 1983).

3. Maturity of Trade Union Organisation

Historical developments in the two sectors are somewhat different. In the private sector a fairly recent increase in numbers has resulted in an enhanced but still comparatively low density of union membership. In the public sector, a much larger increase in absolute numbers has only marginally increased density in what had for many years been highly unionised environments. Arguably public sector unions possess a greater maturity and experience of the problems of collective organisation.

4. Multi Unionism

Multi-unionism is far less frequent in the public sector. By and large white collar workers in a particular employing organisation are represented exclusively (or at least overwhelmingly) by a single union. This too can contribute to the potential bargaining strength of the union.

5. Levels of Bargaining

The prevalence of centralised national bargaining in the public sector makes certain aspects of job regulation (e.g. pay) remote from rank and file influence. This has been argued to create large discrepancies between leaders and rank and file in terms of orientations and attitudes (Rallings 1983). In the private sector bargaining over these highly visible and important matters more commonly occurs at plant or establishment

level (Boraston, Clegg and Rimmer 1975, Daniel and Millward 1983).

6. Structure and Organisation of Domestic Trade Unions

In most cases in the public sector, the trade union branch is employer based i.e. one branch per employer or large workplace (Clegg 1979, p 38). In British trade unionism, the branch has an undeniable sovereignty (within limits laid down by the constitution of the parent union) to make and ratify its own agreements and has the important right to discipline its members (Boraston et al. 1983). The branch can to some extent develop its own approach and policies to job regulation, which gives workplace industrial relations in the public sector an important element of autonomy. In the private sector, smaller numbers and densities mean that the branch is less frequently employer based. Negotiation is either by outside trade union officials on major issues, or by steward committees on other matters, in which custom and practice arrangements play a larger part (Clegg 1979, Brown 1972).

Notwithstanding these points, it is important to note that the public sector is not a homogeneous whole. A useful distinction can be made between Market (nationalised industries and public corporations) and non-Market (local/central government and National Health Service) segments. Here it has been powerfully argued that different management decision-making structures and economic considerations, produce different issues of concern for trade

unions together with different industrial relations systems to deal with them (Thomson and Beaumont 1978).

In summary the characteristics distinguishing public and private sector white collar trade union situations are such that the basic nature of trade unionism in the two sectors could be quite different; particularly with respect to issues and methods of job regulation. Public sector white collar unions probably need to be regarded as a special situation which, because of the numbers of members involved, is an important area of study in its own right. Since differences exist between segments of the public sector, another dimension of interest is added; comparisons of trade union activity in different public sector situations.

LEVEL OF STUDY OF WHITE COLLAR UNIONS

In addition to largely ignoring potential differences between public and private sectors, there is another way in which prior work is limited in terms of providing knowledge of white collar trade unions. A great deal of this work has been conducted in terms of macro-level studies and its results generalised to all white collar workers.

It has, for example, been noted that these trade unions have shown an increasingly undifferentiated identity with the wider union movement and a greater willingness to espouse militant action (Thomson and Beaumont 1978 , Undy et al. 1981, Kelly 1981, Fryer, Manson and Fairclough 1978, Schatt 1982). Unfortunately,

explanations of this are couched in extremely general terms. Members of a particular trade union or even white collar workers as a whole are treated as a homogeneous mass.

One explanation given is that a move to higher density levels is inevitably accompanied by more militant behaviour (Blackburn and Prandy 1965). Another explanation has been that both the act of joining white collar unions and changes in behaviour of these unions are linked to changed class perceptions of white collar workers (Lockwood 1958; Lucas 1971, Crompton 1976, 1979a, 1979b, 1980; Bellaby and Oribabor 1977, Kelly 1984). Still other commentators have explained joining and subsequent behaviour as defensive reactions to lowered income and status differentials (Allen 1964, Routh 1966, Banks 1978, Jenkins and Sherman 1979, Stewart, Prandy and Blackburn 1980, Childs 1985). Finally, both joining and behaviour have been explained in terms of protective steps to counter perceived threats of insecurity of employment (Greenwald 1978, Jones 1981).

Although very useful for theory building which could then be subjected to empirical test these macro level explanations are problematic.

For example the inference that behavioural changes of national trade unions occur because the motivations of their whole memberships have changed is clearly appealing on democratic grounds but may fly in the face of the reality of decision making. Union

policy and action are determined by comparatively small numbers of activists whose motivations may be quite different from rank and file members (Moran 1974, Carter 1979). Moreover these trade unions are not monolithic entities but are made up of smaller sub-units of members whose perceptions, motivations and aspirations can vary widely. Here it can be noted that the type of grievance generated, has been shown to vary considerably with the attributes and aspirations of workers concerned (Ronan 1963). In the public sector, different situational variables generate different job regulation issues and industrial relations systems for their resolution (Thomson and Beaumont 1978). Thus within a national trade union which organises workers in different segments of the public sector, pronounced variations could well occur in its sub-units. To quote

"the very wide variations that occur within the white collar category in terms of work, market and class situations makes it imperative to consider the attitudes and structures of each group in the context of its particular circumstances no easy equation can be made between union membership and adoption of collective philosophies. It will be important to assess issues on which a collective strategy is held to be appropriate."

(Price 1983, p 173)

From the above it follows that a wider understanding of white collar unions, can only occur if knowledge of action and objectives at national level is supplemented with a knowledge of their internal dynamics at the workplace. At this level the particular sets of contextual variables, member characteristics and the internal structures and processes which can affect patterns of action are important considerations. Of particular interest is the

way in which these variables could result in different patterns of action in different circumstances. For reasons outlined previously, the trade union branch in different parts of the public sector is a highly appropriate vehicle for this later type of study. It remains to consider what evidence is available from prior empirical work which sheds light on these matters. This is the subject of the next section.

PRIOR STUDIES AT BRANCH OR WORKPLACE LEVEL

Although there is a considerable volume of general evidence on attitudes, motivations and orientations of white collar workers, few detailed studies have been undertaken which explore the internal dynamics of their unions at workplace level. There are four noteworthy studies which consider certain aspects of internal dynamics and therefore have great value for theory building.

The first of these is an empirical study of blue and white collar shop stewards in the same private manufacturing company (Batstone, Boraston and Frenkel 1977). The results contrast the two activist groups and give extremely useful pointers as to how internal dynamics can shape approaches to job regulation. In addition, since actions of the two groups are compared within the same contextual environment, the results give vital clues regarding the way in which other blue collar studies may be used for theory building in the white collar situation. The study however, focuses almost exclusively on shop steward groups. It gives little detailed information on a potentially important aspect of internal

dynamics; the influence of non-activists and activists on each other.

A second empirical study which contains more precise information on non-activists, is another comparison of blue and white collar workers in the same nationalised industry - Steel (Bowen 1976). Here, very useful information is given about potential issues of job regulation in a particular context and how these arise through the attitudes and motivations of rank and file members. Although a clear picture of non-activist aspirations is given, there is little evidence on how their attitudes and motivations get translated into action. Additionally, it can be argued that too heavy an emphasis on attitudes and motivations diverts attention away from structural and contextual variables which can also affect approaches to issues of job regulation.

A third investigation which remedies this lack of structural emphasis is one comparing twenty three workplace trade union organisations through individual case studies (Boraston, Clegg and Rimmer 1975). The focus here was on collective bargaining in the workplace and how it is influenced by two main groups of factors; the external trade union with its full-time officers and external agreements at industry or company level.

Despite some extremely interesting and pertinent clues as to the effects of structure, there are problems in generalising from the results. The study once again deals exclusively with the activist

group in workplace organisations. Whilst external union and prior agreements clearly do constrain the job regulation activity of this group, probably the most significant source of issues for bargaining is the rest of the workplace trade union. There is little information in the study to show how issues themselves are generated, shaped and defined. Since a wide variety of situations were covered in the study (white and blue collar in public and private sectors) this is extremely important. The issues that arose could have varied widely; a factor that could have affected the way they were handled.

Another criticism (accepted by the authors themselves) is that the actual workplace organisations studied were nominated by outside trade unions. As such the authors may well have only encountered the ones perceived by the trade union as the most effective.

A final limitation is that although in some cases the study was pitched at branch level, this only occurred by coincidence when the workplace organisation was an employer based branch. In many other cases the work place organisation was a shop steward negotiating committee. This is highly problematic when using, as the authors did, "dependence on outside trade union" as a major dimension of comparison. As has been previously mentioned, in almost all British trade unions the branch has a degree of constitutional sovereignty not accorded to any group of shop stewards. Dependence can be an extremely crucial dimension and probably affects not

only collective bargaining itself, but the general approach to job regulation in terms of who shapes and defines issues.

In summary whilst the study is valuable in drawing attention to the effects of structural influences on workplace bargaining, other potentially influential factors are not covered. Its results, therefore, must be interpreted with some caution.

A fourth and extremely comprehensive investigation of the internal dynamics of white collar unionism at workplace level, is that of Nicholson, Ursell and Blyton 1981. This took place at branch level in the public sector and had a major focus on the way in which attitudes of activists and non-activists together with interactions between the two groups can shape action. Again there are problems in generalising from the study. In two important respects (size and structures of representation) the branch studied was atypical of white collar trade unionism in the public sector.

In terms of size (8000 members) the branch studied was one of the largest in the National and Local Government Officers Association (NALGO). In NALGO mean branch size is approximately 600 and 75% of branches have less than 2500 members (NALGO 1980). A similar but more dramatic case could be made for it being atypical in respect to other unions; for example the Society of Public and Civil Servants where 97% of branches contain less than 1000 members (Drake, Fairbrother, Fryer and Murphy 1980). It can be noted that size of branch has been demonstrated to have very significant

effects on action patterns (Brown, Ebsworth and Terry 1978; Boraston, Clegg and Rimmer 1975; Poole 1976, Anderson 1977).

In terms of its representative structures the branch was also atypical. It was one of the very few branches in NALGO to have implemented the recommendations of the national trade union by introducing a shop steward system of workplace representation based on the manual trade union model (NALGO 1976). Again evidence suggests that type of representative system has a strong effect on branch behaviour (Anderson 1977, Poole 1976, Allen 1971).

Another problem which limits generalisations from the findings of this study is one which applies to all single situation case studies; it could only investigate the effects of variables found in that specific situation. As such it is impossible to do more than speculate on the relative effects of the many other potentially influential variables that have affected branch action.

OUTLINE RESEARCH STRATEGY

To overcome the above problems is no easy matter. There are a whole host of structural and situational variables, as well as member characteristics that can affect action. Theoretically, to tease-out the relative effect of the many variables affecting job regulation at branch level, an experimental approach would be the most useful i.e. only by manipulating variables can causality be established. However, even in the highly unlikely event of such an approach being permissible, it could be so divorced from the

everyday reality of trade unionism as to add little to the body of knowledge.

An alternative approach is that of comparing naturally occurring systems which are carefully selected to contain the variables of interest. Even here there are obvious limitations. It would take a study of considerable magnitude to encompass every possible variable; a task well beyond the resource capabilities of a doctoral investigation. Nevertheless, even though a small scale investigation cannot provide definitive answers to all aspects of branch dynamics, it can make some positive contribution to the body of knowledge. For example, by carefully selecting branches, it can control some variables and investigate others to highlight their relative effects on action.

This, in general terms is the outline strategy adopted for this investigation. A large number of prior studies are used for theory building to construct a tentative model of branch action. The model is then tested in four carefully selected situations to compare the relative effects of influencing factors on approaches to issues of job regulation adopted by the branches investigated.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: APPROACHES TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION AS DIMENSIONS OF BRANCH ACTION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter begins by discussing job regulation as an important activity of trade unions. A definition of approaches to issues of job regulation is developed and criteria laid down for the selection of suitable sub-dimensions of action along which approaches of trade union branches can be compared.

The five sub-dimensions selected for use in this investigation are described in detail, together with their definitions and the empirical rationale for their use. Finally, a short note is given on the possible integration of the dimensions into dominant styles of action for branches.

JOB REGULATION AND APPROACHES TO ISSUES

The centrality of job regulation as a trade union activity is probably most strongly reflected in the statement that:

"the basic social purpose of trade unions is job regulation and control".

(Flanders 1970, p 46)

Flanders' statement with regard to the basic social purpose of trade unions reflects a particular (pluralist) school of thought which has been hotly contested by Marxist and Radical theorists alike (Hyman 1975, Wood and Elliot 1977, Fox 1974). Nevertheless, whilst this difference of opinion exists on social purpose, there

is little if any dispute that within the workplace, job regulation is a primary activity of trade unions and thus provides a fundamental measure in which their activities can be compared.

Although a well used phrase, job regulation is seldom explicitly defined; the most comprehensive attempt perhaps being

"...the making and administration of rules which regulate employment relationships; regardless of whether these are seen as formal or informal, structured or unstructured."

(Bain and Clegg 1974, p 95)

Viewed this way, the study of job regulation is essentially the study of rules; an argument also advanced by other authors (Flanders 1965; Goodman, Armstrong, Wagner, Davis and Wood 1975).

A different emphasis is to look behind the rules of job regulation, to the purposes that rule making has for the actors involved. Indeed it has been powerfully argued that to concentrate on rules alone without taking full cognizance of these factors, is to obscure the most pertinent aspect of job regulation (Hyman 1975, Margerison 1969, Shimmin and Singh 1973). In the case of trade unions, suggested purposes have been control over work activity (Mann 1977) or limitation of power and authority of employers and to lessen dependence of employees on market fluctuations and the arbitrary will of management (Flanders 1970).

A crucial step in looking behind the rules of job regulation is to recognise that approaches adopted by actors are dependent on their

motives and goals together with the resources they are able to deploy in attaining them.

As a way of comparing workplace trade unions, this somewhat wider concept of approaches to issues of job regulation is potentially a richer way of explaining action. Using the Bain and Clegg definition as a basis "approaches to issues of job regulation" may be described as

"The objectives, policies and actions of the workplace trade union towards those issues which concern the making and administration of rules that govern employment relationships; regardless of whether these are formal or informal, structured or unstructured."

For empirical purposes this definition must be refined. An initial step is to recognise that job regulation takes place within a context. The issues of job regulation and the objectives, policies and actions evolved towards them are all likely to vary somewhat in time and location (Clegg 1979, Sykes 1967). A host of historic, social and economic forces including complex customs of who has the right to regulate and the limits to which they can regulate, all combine to make job regulation an activity which in different contexts has different meanings to those involved. Indeed, the whole history of industrial relations includes constantly changing definitions of what are issues of job regulation (Clegg 1979, pp 163 - 186). Thus the approaches actors adopt to issues of job

regulation are likely to have some measure of contextual dependency.

A second important refinement is the difficult task of specifying suitable common dimensions along which approaches to issues of job regulation can be described in different contexts. Because meanings and interpretations of actors are important, dimensions which have been used to compare whole trade unions (i.e. Undy et al. 1981) are likely to be of limited applicability to the trade unionism of the workplace. The most appropriate way forwards is to refer to prior empirical studies to see what dimensions have been used and compare these with criteria which must be satisfied for a dimension to be acceptable. For this study three criteria of acceptability were chosen:-

1. Conceptually it should be possible to treat the dimension as discrete from other dimensions of action.
2. The dimension should be able to distinguish between branches and be capable of being operationalised in a way that highlighted differences. There should in addition, be some empirical rationale for suggesting that identifiable differences exist between workplace trade unions in terms of the dimension.
3. There should be a rationale, preferably supported by empirical evidence, for expecting specifiable antecedant conditions to affect positionings along the dimension.

The next section gives an account of the five sub-dimensions selected. For each one, the rationale for its selection is given,

together with the conceptual definition adopted for the dimension. Details of operationalised measures are deferred to chapters 5 and 6.

THE FIVE DIMENSIONS OF APPROACHES TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION

The five dimensions selected to compare branches in terms of their approaches to issues of job regulation were:-

1. The Dependence of the branch on the Outside Trade Union.
2. The Issue Focus of the Branch.
3. The extent to which the branch was an Initiator of Issues.
4. The Intensity of Action of the branch in issue pursuit.
5. The extent to which the branch was perceived as Representative of its Members Interests.

Dependence on Outside Trade Union

This fundamental and important sub-dimension concerns the extent to which the branch shapes, defines and pursues its own issues of job regulation, or is dependent on others to do so in its stead. Its importance lies in the fact that in most British trade unions, the branch has some constitutional autonomy in these matters. In NALGO (the trade union studied here) very strong sovereign rights are constitutionally guaranteed (NALGO 1983a), together with a specific obligation on branches to undertake job regulation activities on behalf of their members (NALGO 1983b).

The most obvious focus of any dependence is the parent trade union; in particular the full-time officer who services the branch. Here,

almost all accounts of workplace trade unionism show that dependence can, and does, exist but can vary widely (Batstone et al. 1977, Brown et al. 1978, Brown and Sisson 1975, Terry 1982). However, some care is needed in evaluating dependence. Its sources and visible signs can vary considerably. In particular three factors need to be considered.

First, whilst the confidence, ability and experience of lay activists could clearly have an effect, these persons also have work roles within the employing organisation. Unless they have unlimited time off for union activities some degree of dependence may be inevitable in that the role of the full-time officer may be very necessary to pursue certain member interests (Terry 1982, Fryer, Fairclough and Manson 1975). Additionally, full-time officers may well be the most readily available link with the wider labour movement. This could also create a degree of dependence and also give full-time officers a potentially powerful role as definers of issues (Volker 1966, Brown and Sisson 1975).

Secondly, industry negotiating structures have an influence. These might in certain cases, specify full-time officer involvement. Moreover the extent to which negotiation of highly salient issues is removed from the workplace trade union can crucially affect dependence. It has, for example, been demonstrated that local negotiations on highly visible issues (such as pay) brings rank and file support for lay activists which in turn loosens dependence (Brown et al. 1978, Boraston et al. 1975).

Third, the rise in workplace bargaining in the 1960's and 1970's is said to have resulted in a decline in importance of full time officers. This is usually associated with heightened confidence of lay activists and increasing numbers of managers who prefer to deal with them. However, the effect may not be universal. A degree of accommodation between trade union and personnel professionals is a widely acknowledge phenomenon and some collusion could well heighten dependence (Walton and McKersie 1965, Boraston et al. 1975).

In view of these factors allowances need to be made for structural and behavioural antecedants of any dependence, together with different ways in which it can manifest itself. It is, therefore, unlikely that it can be expressed in any absolute way. For the purposes of comparing branches a conceptual definition of dependence is adopted as follows:-

"The extent to which the branch either exceeds its entitlement to shape, define and pursue issues of job regulation as laid down by trade union constitution, industry negotiating structures and the framework of existing agreements or alternatively adopts patterns of action less than its entitlement."

Focus in Issues

Although essentially concerned with issues in its own workplace, the branch is to some extent part of a wider trade union movement, from which other issues can emanate. The extent to which it incorporates these into its own policy and action is a dimension on

which there is some evidence to suggest that workplace trade unions can vary (Miller, Zeller and Miller 1965, Storey 1976).

Clearly the parent trade union is potentially the most influential source of issues concerning matters beyond the immediate work environment (Scase 1974). Moreover the parent union may well have sound strategic reasons for attempting to focus the attention of branches on such issues i.e. to mobilise support for itself (Brown and Sisson 1978) or as a means of trying to obtain cohesion where it represents very diverse industrial groups (Undy et al. 1981). However, the evidence suggests that trade unions are frequently unsuccessful in their attempts to induce rank and file members to focus on issues beyond the immediate work context (Gartrell 1982). Indeed, considered as a whole, British workplace trade unionism has been noted to be almost exclusively orientated towards domestic wage-work bargaining issues (Hyman and Brough 1975, Mann 1977, Scase 1974, Childs 1985).

In the public sector it is possible that matters may be somewhat different. It is an area of heavy government intervention. Its trade unions are acutely aware of the identity of the real paymaster and often complain that decisions affecting the ultimate outcomes of collective bargaining are made outside negotiating councils (Thomson and Beaumont 1978, Chester 1954). Thus they sometimes have an interest in government policy and action beyond their own immediate spheres of negotiation (Volker 1966, Jones 1978, Kelly 1981, Undy et al. 1981). At branch level there is some

evidence which suggests that activists see the necessity for this and try to incorporate such issues into their own policies (Nicholson, Ursell and Blyton 1980).

For this investigation, the conceptual definition adopted for Focus in Issues is:

"The extent to which the branch adopts into its approach to job regulation, issues concerned with matters beyond the employing organisation".

Initiation of Issues

One of the most pronounced changes in national trade unions across the last two decades has been the way in which they have sought to assert their influence in job regulation (Undy et al. 1981). Here there have been some parallels at workplace level including the readiness of trade unions to take the initiative in promoting an issue as one in which they should have some involvement in setting the rules of job regulation (Storey 1976).

Inevitably this has been bound up to some extent with definitions of both trade unionists and managements as to what are bargainable issues. Here a useful distinction can be made between two types of issue; Job Territory and Job Control (Storey 1976, Perlman 1949). The former is normally taken to mean defence of jobs and preservation of employment opportunities, whilst the latter concerns regulation of conditions under which jobs are carried out.

This distinction has some value in focusing attention on the difference between negotiable and reserved issues. Here evidence suggests that many trade unionists draw a line (albeit a subjective one) and regard certain aspects of Job Control as an area largely reserved for management discretion (Derber, Chalmers and Stanger 1958, Perline 1971). In addition, procedural agreements which can limit the scope of bargaining are often framed to reinforce this line (Boraston et al. 1975). Nevertheless despite perceptual and procedural limitations, the demarcation line between negotiable and reserved issues is somewhat moveable over time. With the rise of workplace bargaining it has been noted that there has been an increase in the range of issues that trade unionists feel should be bargainable (Parker 1973, Fairhurst and Bean 1976, Marchington and Armstrong 1981a). The expansionary tendency however, is neither inevitable nor universal. Significant differences have been noted in the extent to which workplace trade unions attempt either to increase the range of bargainable issues or even mildly challenge management prerogatives (Boraston et al. 1975, Brown and Sisson 1975).

With white collar unions there is some limited evidence to suggest a concern to extend bargaining beyond reward - effort issues, into areas of power distribution between employers and employees (Walker and Lawler 1979, Robinson 1976). The tactics of this can be quite varied and subtle. For example, existing agreements can be used to open up new areas (Walsh 1974) and non-bargaining forums such as joint consultation can be used to get hitherto reserved issues onto

the bargaining table (Dyer, Lipsky and Kochan 1977). This latter tactic is of some relevance to this study since in the public sector, joint consultation often exists in parallel with collective bargaining and is available for expansionist purposes.

For the purposes of this investigation Initiation is conceptually defined as a continuum; the extremes of which are:-

Reactive - a branch which defends the status quo within the limits of historic definitions of job territory and control and only engages in job regulation after some proposed or imposed management change.

Proactive - a branch whose workload consists entirely of issues initiated in an attempt to expand its job territory and control into areas hitherto considered as those of management discretion.

Intensity of Action

A dimension of strong practical significance is the militancy with which the workplace trade union pursues its job regulation issues. This is an aspect of action along which workplace trade unionism has been shown to vary considerably; even in response to very similar issues (Thompson and Borglum 1973, Britt and Galle 1972 and 1974, Brown and Sisson 1975, Poole 1976, Shirom 1977). The dimension is therefore, a valuable one along which to express differences between branches.

Traditionally, white collar trade unions have been characterised in the literature as totally unwilling to adopt militant tactics. This view is perhaps most most amply expressed in the statement that they are:

".....an army which shows up well on the parade ground, but about whose willingness or ability to shoot there is much doubt."

(Routh 1966, p 201)

However since evidence exists to the contrary (Roy 1964, Adams 1975, Schatt 1982) the statement is almost certainly an oversimplification. .

The causes and correlates of militancy are extremely difficult to pin down. One explanation given is in the existence of occupational communities which are seen to have a social predisposition towards militant action (Kerr and Seigal 1954, Gurr 1970). This explanation is however problematic. Even where apparently militant occupational communities do exist, evidence suggests that any militancy arises in the workplace not the community (Nelson and Grams 1978). With white collar workers where residential and occupational heterogeneity is high the explanation is even more improbable. Thus it is in the workplace that more credible explanations of militant behaviour must be sought.

Here a number of explanations have been given. For example a past history of the successful use of militant tactics has been shown to have some relationship to their continued use (Fairhurst and Bean 1976, McLean 1979). Additionally, styles of activist leadership have been demonstrated to be crucial in mobilising support for militant action (Pack 1963). More interestingly however, evidence suggests that leadership is not a one way activity. Rank and file

militancy has been shown to have a huge influence on the stance that activists adopt (Shirom 1977, Bowen, Elsy and Shaw 1974, Undy et al. 1981).

Another factor affecting militancy is the issue itself. Any issue prompting militant action must be both highly visible and salient (Brown and Sisson 1975, Schatt 1982, Walker and Lawler 1979). Additionally, there is some suggestion that the fewer the number of bargainable issues, the more salient is each one; giving a higher probability of its militant pursuit (Dubin 1973).

Yet another factor of which some account needs to be taken, is the necessity for militant action. Clearly in some cases militancy will be a power resource which needs to be mobilised to pursue an issue. It is, however, necessary to draw a distinction between latent and manifest power (Marchington 1975). Of particular importance here is the recognition that some groups of workers occupy such strategic organisational positions that they do not need overt displays of militancy to achieve success (Cohen 1971, Purcell et al. 1977, Schwab and Thompson 1974).

Overall the question of militant action, particularly in terms of its antecedant conditions, is clearly a complex one. Matters are made more complex when it comes to defining the manifest signs of militancy.

Traditionally, a conceptual distinction has been drawn between type of action (political processes, collective bargaining, unilateral action) and how aggressively the type of action is pursued (Turner 1962). This distinction was originally derived in regard to national trade unions and at branch level it is probably more apparent than real. A movement from political processes to unilateral action at this level would almost certainly coincide with an increase in aggressiveness.

Nevertheless Turner's distinction is a useful one and directs attention to the notion that any evaluation of action needs to be more sophisticated than simply classifying it as militant or non-militant. Conceptually this can be particularly important with respect to the public sector situation for two primary reasons.

1. Militancy is likely to be issue specific. Seldom if ever are groups of workers militant about everything (Shirom 1977, Terry 1982, Britt and Galle 1974).

In the public sector where many of the most salient issues are removed to national level for bargaining, it is possible that militant pursuit of workplace issues could be comparatively rare.

2. The notion of strategic importance of workers can be particularly relevant in certain public sector situations (Bell 1975, Kochan 1974). It has been argued that in these situations unions have a far greater range of disruptive tactics at their disposal than in private industry. Some of

these tactics, although quite mild by most standards can be far more unpalatable to managements than all-out strikes

(Thompson and Beaumont 1978).

For these reasons Intensity of Action which expresses both depth (militancy) and breadth (numbers involved) is used to compare branch action in issue pursuit. Conceptually, it can be regarded as a continuum, the extremes of which are:

Intense in Issue Pursuit - use of militant tactics on all issues and involving all members of the workplace trade union.

Non-intense in Issue Pursuit - eschews anything but the most non-militant methods of pursuit on all matters ranging from individual issues to those affecting the whole workplace trade union.

Representativeness

A final dimension is representation of members interests, the importance of which is cogently expressed in the statement

"....their principal task is one of representation. If it fails in this the trade union no longer serves its purpose."

(Flanders 1970, p 48)

An additional importance of this dimension stems from the tendency of representativeness (or lack of) to affect other dimensions. For example, perceived unrepresentativeness can lead the rank and file to become dissident and alienated. This, in turn, can lead activists to fail to pursue issues for fear of lack of support (Nicholson et al. 1980, Glick, Mirvis and Harder 1977).

Representativeness, although strongly connected with the democratic function of trade unions is a more useful concept for this study than democracy itself. Trade union democracy is plagued with definitional problems and tends to be described in terms of an outcome or property of the whole trade union, which either does or does not exist according to the presence of certain processes. It has, for example, variously been described in terms of responsiveness to rank and file opinion (Allen 1964); survival of a faction (Martin 1968); competition for top union office and closeness of elections (Edelstein 1967, Edelstein and Warner 1975, Edelstein, Warner and Cook 1970) and the extent to which members have the opportunity to influence decisions which affect them (Nicholson 1978).

A definition of representativeness on the other hand may be somewhat more simply derived from the transitive verb to represent. Namely "to serve as a specimen or to exemplify" (Oxford Dictionary 1975). In this context, representativeness may be taken to mean the extent to which trade union action exemplifies the interests of its membership. As will be seen later, this has its own definitional problems. However, it has the value of reflecting dynamic behavioural processes, rather than implying some static property, and is conceptually applicable to all levels of a trade union.

It is not, however, totally divorced from the democratic concept. Most theorists would agree that representativeness is the very

essence of democracy. Martin, for example, agrees that survival of a faction cannot exist without it. Similarly, Edelstein and Warner consider that competition for top office and close elections can only flourish if the trade union has structures and processes permitting representation of member interests (Edelstein and Warner 1971 and 1977). To put matters more succinctly

*"democracy is not simply about who is in power
but a whole range of trade union policies and
arguments, amongst which is the active consent
of the membership to those policies."*

(Fryer et al. 1975).

Within this broad conceptualisation, there is substantial evidence to suggest that representativeness varies widely (Nicholson 1976, Nicholson et al. 1980, Volker 1966, Blyton and Ursell 1982).

Problematically it can be argued that some degree of unrepresentativeness is inevitable. There is almost certainly some degree of psychological differentiation between activists and non-activists in terms of motivations and perceptions (Anderson 1977, Walton and McKersie 1965, Hemingway 1978, Nicholson et al. 1981). Moreover collective bargaining creates a decision making situation where leaders and led are physically separated (Child, Loveridge and Warner 1976, Cuthbert and Whitaker 1977).

Far from counteracting these tendencies, it has been postulated that workplace bargaining might merely have created a new level of trade union bureaucracy equally as removed from the rank and file as are national officials (Hyman 1979). Even were this not so,

activists are often poor at communicating with those they represent (Schuller and Robertson 1983) and can have very unrealistic perceptions of their members' wants (Howells and Woodfield 1970, Brosnan 1973). In some cases it is not unknown for them to be seduced into taking a management perspective on issues (Parker and Bynner 1970).

In addition to attitudinal factors, situational variables have also been shown to be associated with variations in representativeness. Uncertainty or conflict with the employer tends to act as a centralising influence in decision making, as does the existence of factions with different goals (Anderson 1977, Walton and McKersie 1965). Clearly both could tend to make members feel that the trade union did not exemplify their interests.

Notwithstanding its conceptual simplicity, representativeness can therefore, be a complex dimension. Two vitally important considerations are necessary for any definition.

First, it is essentially perceptual. Regardless of whether or not a trade union branch really is representative, it is their perceptions of its representativeness which can have the major effect on its members' actions. As has been cogently argued

".....action arises out of meanings which define social reality. It follows that explanations of human actions must take account of the meanings which those concerned assign to their actions."

(Silverman 1970, p 127)

Secondly, a conceptual distinction is necessary between representativeness itself and methods of achieving it; particularly active participation of the rank and file in decision making (Perline and Lorenz 1970, Spinrad 1960). In the main, it is activists who most frequently desire to be involved in decision making (Anderson 1979a, Glick et al. 1977). The rank and file may not want to participate in anything other than (to them) the most vital issues (Ursell, Nicholson and Blyton 1981, Tannenbaum 1965). Moreover they could well lack the knowledge to do so even where they have a desire (Anderson 1977, Schuller and Robertson 1983). Thus although opportunity to participate must obviously figure in any definition of democracy or representativeness (Ramswamy 1977), the level of participation alone is itself a poor indicator. Indeed, it has been noted that increased participation can arise because the rank and file perceive their leaders to be unrepresentative of their interests, rather than the reverse (Glick et al. 1977, Anderson 1979a, Ursell et al. 1981, Tannenbaum 1965, Neill 1979).

With these considerations in mind, the conceptual definition of representativeness adopted for this investigation is:

"The extent to which rank and file members perceive that they have the opportunity to influence the policy and actions of their branch so that it reflects their interests in its approaches to issues of job regulation."

INTERRELATION OF DIMENSIONS

A word of caution is necessary with respect to the way these dimensions are interpreted. As presented above, they are described discretely. In practice it is unlikely that any of these dimensions would exist in isolation. Indeed there is a small amount of evidence to suggest that some combinations of positionings on dimensions could well hang together to give distinct patterns of branch action (Poole 1969, 1976). Exploration of this possibility is one of the major aims of the study.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: FACTORS AFFECTING APPROACHES TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is concerned with examining factors which can influence a branch's approach to issues of job regulation. It commences by establishing criteria for the inclusion of factors as part of the subject material of the investigation. Those factors selected are discussed in detail, together with theoretical and empirical rationales for their inclusion. Finally, an initial model is developed which outlines the expected interrelationships between dimensions developed in the previous chapter and the factors described in this chapter.

GENERAL

The factors which could influence a branch's approach to issues of job regulation are potentially endless, but practical evaluative and analytical considerations in an empirical study dictate that only the most influential are dealt with. To identify these, recourse can be made to the literature in the subject area to identify those to be included. The criteria used for inclusion of a factor in this study were:

1. There should be a sound rationale, preferably supported by empirical evidence, to suggest that the factor has effects on the job regulation activity of workplace trade unions.

- ii. Its existence as an affecting factor should be acknowledged by the actors involved; even though they might not specifically recognise it as an influence on their actions.
- iii. It should be capable of being operationalised in a way that distinguishes between workplace trade unions and highlights the effects of any differences in its strength.

For ease of discussion the factors selected can be considered in four major groups.

GROUP 1 - FACTORS EXTERNAL TO THE TRADE UNION BRANCH

The Employer: Policies and Actions.

There are a number of ways in which the employer can shape trade union approaches to job regulation.

At a general level, mention has been made earlier of the political sensitivity of public sector managements which, if recognised by the trade union, can become a source of bargaining strength. Thus employer action (albeit unwitting action) can shape trade union approaches to job regulation (Kochan and Wheeler 1975, Kessler 1986).

The effectiveness of the trade union is also partly influenced by employer policies. For example the extent to which its activities are considered by management to be legitimate and facilities given for its operation (Hesmondhalgh 1978). In the public sector, there is a long tradition of legitimisation of white collar trade unions but even here, managerial prerogatives are jealously guarded (Poole

et al. 1982). In the recent past, external financial pressures on the public sector have been noted to lead to an increased degree of managerialism which has, in turn, hastened the development of effective shop steward systems as a means of countering pressures on the membership (Terry 1982, Fryer et al. 1978).

The most pronounced employer effect is, perhaps, the contribution to the relationship which exists between trade union and management. This is a highly important set of circumstances which can probably best be encapsulated in the term "Industrial Relations Climate" (Parker and Scott 1971).

Problematically whilst real enough to those who have to live with it, climate is probably more an experienced phenomenon than a set of hard, quantifiable attributes. Evidence suggests that it arises in the perceptions that union and management have of each other (Rim and Marnheim 1964) and once formed these perceptions can become self-fulfilling prophecies (Biasatti and Martin 1979).

Despite this high perceptual element, attempts have been made to identify a practical typology of industrial relations climates. For the purposes of empirical work, the most useful of these is a system using two orthogonal factors of Trust and Formalism to give four ideal types. Namely:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|--|
| Adaptive Co-operation | - high trust between parties with low formalism. |
| Co-operative Constitutionalism | - high trust and high formalism |
| Antagonistic Constitutionalism | - low trust and high formalism. |

Uninhibited Antagonism

- low trust and low formalism.

(Purcell 1979)

Despite the usefulness of this typology, there must be some doubt as to whether the two dimensions of trust and formalism, are truly independent. For example, some degree of formality in terms of procedural agreements which allow issues to surface and be resolved, has been shown to promote trust (Marsh and Pedler 1979, Nicholson 1979). Conversely excessive formalism throughout the whole employing organisation, has been shown to be associated with work alienation and low trust (Aiken and Hage 1966). Indeed Purcell hints at a non-orthogonal relationship in that lack of trust can bring a desire for increased formalism (Purcell 1979).

A further problem with the use of the concept of climate is that its antecedents may well be lost in some past circular process. Issues could have affected relationships and relationships in turn have affected outcomes with the outcomes themselves having reinforced climates or in turn thrown-up more issues (Nicholson 1979, Martin 1976 and 1980).

Nevertheless climate is a useful notion to encapsulate relationships between trade union and management. Moreover Purcell's scheme for classifying climates has several potential uses in empirical work, not the least of which is to categorise different climate and their effects on approaches to job regulation issues. In addition other work provides some evidence on the effects of climate e.g. whether or not a trade union is likely to

adopt a co-operative or oppositional stance on most issues has been shown to be climate related (Dyer et al. 1977, Beaumont 1981). Thus intensity of action and to some extent initiation of issues can be expected to be two of the dimensions affected.

In this investigation management policy and action is taken as reflected in the industrial relations climate in which each branch perceives it operates. Climate itself is classified according to Purcell's typology.

Industry Collective Bargaining Structures

Collective bargaining structures, by limiting issues bargainable at local level can have a pronounced effect on job regulation by workplace trade unions (Boraston et al. 1975, Brown et al. 1978, Storey 1976).

In the public sector situations with which this investigation is concerned, Whitley type structures are normal. Whitleyism has been argued to have the great advantage of giving a stable bargaining forum which virtually forces the employer to treat the union as an equal. To the trade union however, Whitleyism can be a double-edged sword. One disadvantage is that it discourages local managements from negotiating about virtually anything, and removes from rank and file view negotiations about many of the most salient issues (Farnham 1978, Jones 1978). Therefore, branch job regulation can be expected to be shaped in some degree, by the extent to which industry bargaining structures allow important (to branch memberships) issues to be negotiated locally.

It is important to note that restriction of bargainable issues can have other pronounced effects. Evidence suggests that trade unions have a low tolerance to restriction of their bargaining scope and may attempt to widen it by using non-bargaining forums such as joint consultation to get issues onto the table (Beaumont 1980, Cuthbert and Whitaker 1977, Marchington and Armstrong 1981b and 1983). Where restrictiveness still persists, it has been argued that it raises the salience of those issues that remain and leads to their militant pursuit (Dubin 1973). Here it is worth noting that in the industries studied in this investigation, the restrictive effects of Whitleyism vary considerably (NALGO 1978). Moreover, joint consultation is legally enshrined in the charters of British Nationalised Industries (Chester 1954) and is also common in other parts of the public sector (Terry 1982).

Another feature of public sector Whitleyism is that it has been noted to spawn extremely comprehensive and complex procedural agreements. These are difficult for line managers to interpret and thus bargaining is removed into the hands of personnel specialists (Burton 1972). As a corollary, it is possible that there could be a similar swing on the trade union side, making issue pursuit the prerogative of full-time officers and thus creating a tendency for dependence of the branch on their services.

For the purposes of this investigation the characteristic of interest with respect to industry collective bargaining structures

is the extent to which they curtail branch roles and the effects which this has on approaches to issues of job regulation.

Other Workplace Trade Unions

The sharing of negotiating rights for a particular group of workers with another workplace union has potentially strong effects on approaches to job regulation. If, for example, trade unions have different national policies towards an issue, these can pervade downwards and affect action at workplace level (Fairhurst and Bean 1976). Conversely where negotiating rights are shared there is probably a need for the unions to act in concert. This has been argued to lead to higher levels of formality in their workplace organisations and more developed representational systems (Brown et al. 1978, Terry 1982, Clegg 1979, p 48).

In this investigation, the presence of other trade unions is controlled for in the sample. Branches selected for study have either exclusive or overwhelming representational rights in their employing organisations.

The Outside Trade-Union

The outside trade union can affect branch action in two important ways. First, the policies of the outside union acted out via full-time officers, can promote either dependence or independence by the branch (Boraston et al. 1975). Here it can be noted that centralised bargaining by its very nature retains much of the decision making power at the centre (Child et al. 1976). However, where well developed methods exist to allow the centre to be called to account for its actions, high levels of local autonomy often

exist (Roomkin 1976). Nevertheless, the centre is still likely to have great influence on branches and it has been noted that where constraints are put on outside trade-union leaders, this frequently results in renewed attempts by the leaders to shape rank and file attitudes (Scase 1974).

Second, and allied to the first point, the outside trade union is the most potent source of support, power and sympathy for a branch (Poole 1969 and 1976). If the constitution allows it can in addition, regulate local militancy by retaining for itself the sole authority to initiate industrial action (Roomkin 1976).

For the purposes of this investigation, the major concern with respect to the outside trade union is the extent to which it influences branches in definition, shaping and pursuit of issues of job regulation.

GROUP 2 - ISSUE FACTORS

Issues which confront a branch can vary from those affecting the whole industry, to those impinging solely on one individual. They can also vary in their impact on those whom they affect (Lewin and Peterson 1982). Clearly, it is unlikely that all will be approached in the same way and several considerations with respect to issues themselves could be influential in shaping branch action.

In white collar situations, there is evidence to suggest that as well as conventional monetary issues, many non-wage matters can be of great importance (Kassalow 1977). Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that the major impact of white collar unionisation has been on non-wage rather than monetary benefits (Hamermesh 1971, Antos 1983). Many of these non-monetary issues impinge on traditional managerial prerogatives (Robinson 1976, Nicholson et al. 1980) and initiation of issues could, therefore, be an affected dimension.

Interestingly there is some evidence to suggest that attitudes, values and attachments to work are different enough between employees in public and private sectors to give rise to potentially different issues (Herrick 1980, Blank 1985). Clearly however, it would be too sweeping a generalisation to regard the public sector as completely homogeneous in this respect. There are

"different industrial relations traditions and workplace practices and conditions that pre-date and have often survived nationalisation that make generalisations based solely on state ownership or government control of limited validity."

(Winchester 1983, p 157)

Nevertheless the importance of an issue to the membership can have strong implications for the approach that is adopted towards it. For example, the more salient the issue, the greater the tendency for rank and file members to wish to influence decision making processes (Ursell et al. 1981). Clearly this has implications for representativeness.

Even where issues have similar importance, the different patterns of trade union histories can result in different patterns of action in issue pursuit. For example, two public sector unions NALGO and TSSA (originally the Railway Clerks' Association) arose in totally different circumstances which could well have some effect today. The Railway Clerks' Association, faced from the outset with extremely hostile and autocratic employers adopted many of the action patterns of traditionally more militant manual unions and within two years of its formation it was a T.U.C. affiliate. NALGO, on the other hand, was formed with goals of enhanced professional standing for its members, uniformity of service conditions and friendly benefits; all of which were seen as attainable through a non-antagonistic stance (Price 1983, pp 156-62, Blackburn 1967, pp 155-59 and pp 184-94). Clearly, these past relationships could effect the intensity of issue pursuit.

In addition to salience and histories, certain issues can be perceived by the membership to be best handled in certain ways and this can affect approaches to job regulation. Some issues can be perceived as essentially concerned with distribution of rewards and best handled by adversarial bargaining. Others are considered to be best removed to consultative forums (Dyer et al. 1977, Ponak and Fraser 1979) and some are considered to be within management's legitimate decision sphere which should not be challenged (Perline 1971).

For these reasons the major concern with respect to issues themselves is to evaluate their salience to the actors concerned and then relate this to approaches adopted to the issues. A complicating factor is that the researcher can only take what is found i.e. only those issues that occur can be evaluated.

GROUP 3 - STRUCTURAL FACTORS IN THE UNION BRANCH

Size of Branch

There are several ways in which this factor is likely to have a bearing on approaches to job regulation.

Size potentially gives certain organisational advantages. For example, the reservoir of skills and abilities available to a branch is to some extent dependent on the continuity and stability of its internal organisation. Below a minimum size (approximately 500) workplace organisations have been argued to tend towards instability and above this level, there is a progressive trend towards role differentiation, together with more sharpened skills and expertise in activists (Brown, Ebsworth and Terry 1978). Not the least important of these skills are those of mobilising rank and file support and if necessary, militant action (Shirom 1977). In addition size brings a larger influence in the outside trade union and thus tends to lower dependence (Boraston et al. 1975).

There are however, certain potential dysfunctions of size. It increases the likelihood of heterogeneity of member expectations and gives the concomitant difficulty of trying to satisfy them all

(Child et al. 1976). Moreover, the tendency for a more elaborate internal structure brings with it the risk of lowered sensitivity of the leadership to membership expectations and a reduced influence of the rank and file in decision making (Anderson 1977).

It is important to note that in the employing organisations with which this study is concerned, trade union densities are high. Size of the workplace organisation is therefore to some extent synonymous with size of the employer or that part of it covered by the branch. Here it can be noted that size of employing organisation has been shown to have some connection with the characteristics of its industrial relations. Small organisations for example, tend towards more co-operative, joint problem-solving union-management relationships. Larger ones tend to exhibit more formalised and possibly antagonistic relations (Dyer et al. 1977, Ingham 1969, Allen and Stephenson 1983). For this last reason, size is treated in this study as a controlled variable. Branches selected for investigation are all close to the NALGO mean of 610 members (NALGO 1983c).

Trade Union Density

High density gives to the trade union a greater potential ability to disrupt the functioning of the employer (Britt and Gallie 1972). Thus its negotiating power is enhanced (Blackburn 1967, Blackburn and Prandy 1965, Poole 1976).

Within the employing organisations with which this investigation is concerned, trade union density is generally very high. It is

regarded as a controlled variable and branches selected are all situated in employing organisations where white collar union density is at or above the mean for all NALGO organised services of 74%.

The Representative System

As used here, the term representative system refers to a structural system of roles through which rank and file members are linked to branch decision making processes.

It has been noted that an inherent feature of trade unions is what has been referred to as a conflict of two rationalities. The first of these is that of administrative rationality, which is concerned with goal attainment and which, for effectiveness, requires a unified, co-ordinated system of control. The second is that of representative rationality, concerned with goal formulation and in trade unions, implies a dispersion of authority to the rank and file (Child et al. 1976). A vital influence on a branch's approaches to job regulation is the extent to which the representative system is keyed to top down (branch officer dominated) or bottom up (steward dominated) processes for shaping, defining and adoption of issues.

In public sector trade unions, shop steward representation has hitherto been relatively undeveloped and branch domination has been the norm (Fryer et al. 1975, Terry 1982). In the union investigated in this study, stringent attempts have as a matter of national policy been made to try to reverse this pattern. The

rationale for this is that even though many issues need to be dealt with at branch level or above, accurate formulation and shaping of policies can only adequately take place through an effective steward system (NALGO 1976). Interestingly, there is quite strong evidence to demonstrate the efficacy of the structural characteristics embraced by NALGO; namely, a low ratio of rank and file to stewards and minimal number of levels in the branch hierarchy (Anderson 1977) day-to-day proximity of stewards to their constituents (Lawler and Levin 1968, Howells and Woodfield 1970) and some autonomy in the stewards' workplace role (Storey 1976).

Clearly the dimension of job regulation most likely to be affected by the above is representativeness. However, since it is through the representative system that support for an adopted issue is most likely to be mobilised, there are other dimensions which could also be influenced (Poole 1976). This duty of mobilisation can create some conflict of loyalties in representatives i.e. between loyalty to their constituents and loyalty to the union (Kuhn 1961). Indeed, the structural features of the representative system can strongly exacerbate or alternatively ameliorate these conflicts. For example, where representatives are excluded from issue shaping at branch level, they can become extremely reluctant to promote them (Schuller and Robertson 1983). Thus the type of representative system has implications for the branch's ability to both initiate issues and/or pursue them with intense action.

For this investigation, the major consideration with respect to branch representative systems is the extent to which they facilitate either branch or steward domination in issue definition, shaping and adoption.

Membership Dispersion

Clearly the more dispersed is the membership of a branch, either in time (i.e. shiftworkers) or location, the more difficult it is to maintain contact with them. It is thus hardly surprising that dispersion has been noted to result in a tendency for factions to form (Beynon and Blackburn 1972, Brown et al. 1978).

To some extent, the effects of dispersion can be ameliorated by certain factors. Mobility and freedom of key lay officials to visit dispersed memberships can help. This can however result in the emergence of a small number of influential roles and a branch dominated decision structure (Terry 1982). Where no such mobility and freedom exists, the workplace trade union probably has two alternatives. Either it can become dependent on the mobility and freedom of outside trade union officials (Terry 1982) or it can develop a representative system with characteristics that enable it to undertake the crucial role of sensing member expectations and relaying information to the rank and file (Roy 1964). The two dimensions most likely to be affected by dispersion are therefore representativeness and dependence.

For this study the major consideration with respect to dispersion of the membership, is to evaluate its experienced effects in terms of

the branch's ability to inform and sense its rank and file members and pursue the issues of job regulation of salience to them.

GROUP 4 - FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH ACTORS

The term actor factors is used to deal with those pressures emanating from both activists and non-activists which influence approaches of the branch to issues of job regulation.

Actor Attitudes

Here the focus of interest is on the attitudes to the social milieu which is work and the trade union as part of that milieu. In particular, the interest is in attitudes which influence the shaping and defining of issues and promote patterns of action for their pursuit. (Appendix M3 gives a description and discussion of the concept of attitude as used in this investigation).

General Attitude Patterns of White Collar Workers

Both theory and empirical research suggest that individuals have underlying orientations which predispose them to choose certain occupations (Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechofer and Platt 1968, Blackburn and Mann 1979). More precisely, they have orderings of wants and expectations relating to work (Brown 1973) and have preconceived notions that the occupation entered, will fulfil their wants and expectations (Stewart et al. 1980). Whilst some readjustment of expectations does occur in the light of work experiences (Dubin, Champoux and Porter 1975) there is no definitive evidence that orientations lose their stability altogether (Whelan 1976). A complex interaction of underlying orientations and the necessity to readjust them in the light of

work experiences can result in the formation of attitudes (Silverman 1968, Hill 1974, Brown 1973, Whelan 1976).

With respect to this process of attitude formation, empirical evidence suggests four very strong general themes in the orientations to work of white-collar personnel. Namely;

- i. A very strong attachment to work itself (Bowen and Shaw 1972, Mercer and Weir 1972).
- ii. Strong legitimisation of stratification within the employing organisation, on the basis of occupational hierarchies of authority and rewards (Mercer and Weir 1972, Giddens 1977).
- iii. An acceptance of the principle of deferred gratification in the rewards from work, coupled with a belief in their prospects of upwards mobility through occupational hierarchies (Cook, Clark, Roberts and Semenov 1978, Stewart et al. 1980, Mercer and Weir 1972, Giddens 1977).
- iv. A strong espousal of individualism as a route to advancement i.e. advancement of the individual via career rather than collectively in a group (Thompson and Weinstock 1967, Margerison and Elliot 1970, Mercer and Weir 1972, Cook et al. 1978).

Since most employing organisations are structured into occupational hierarchies and by and large white collar workers have in the past enjoyed superior upwards mobility prospects (Stewart et al. 1980) these orientations suggest little in the way of predispositions towards collective organisation. Indeed, early literature stresses

this view of white collar workers (Routh 1966, Blackburn and Prandy 1965). However, this view is now no longer universal and a recurrent theme has been the need to consider the specific circumstances of groups of workers (Mills 1951, Roy 1964, Martin 1965, Adams 1975). It is desirable therefore, to compare these orientations with conditions that can and do exist in the white collar work situation to explain attitude patterns.

The attachment to work orientation could, in certain circumstances, become a potent source of espousal of trade unionism. Attachment to work itself and attachment to the employing organisation are not the same thing (Carrel and Dittrich 1976). In many organisations white collar work has become progressively deskilled, more impersonal and offers less opportunity for individual control (Glen and Feldburg 1977). Increased bureaucratisation has weakened the intrinsic satisfactions derived from employment (Aiken and Hage 1966, Long 1975a, Mottaz 1981) and views of the work provided by the organisation have moved towards the instrumental, where it becomes merely a means to an end (Blauner 1964, Kirsch and Longerman 1972). Nevertheless, the Western individualistic ethos in work, rising educational levels and the ability of pay levels to satisfy basic needs, have all combined to give a desire for more to be obtainable from work than money alone (Kassalow 1977). Clearly the situation could be ripe to produce attitudes of dissatisfaction with the specific employment situation. The interaction of work expectations with an environment which gives little cause for attachment to work, could result in the emotional

energy to redress the situation (Hamner and Smith 1978, Walker and Tausky 1982). In these circumstances far from being the cause of dissatisfactions, trade unions can become a focus for action (Thomson and Borglum 1973, Schriesheim 1979). Indeed, strong evidence exists to show that attachment to work itself (but dissatisfaction with the specific employment context) goes hand in hand with attachment to trade union (Beynon and Blackburn 1972, Bowen and Shaw 1972, Bowen 1976).

The legitimisation of occupational hierarchies of rewards and authority can also be a source of influential attitudes. Groups of employees have occupational stereotypes of themselves, together with subjective notions of their relative worth (Cohen and Derrick 1970, Bass and Mitchell 1976). Changes in the pattern of occupational rewards and prestige in groups whose positioning has declined can trigger feelings of a disturbance in the proper normative order (Maitland 1980, Bowen and Shaw 1972, Bowen 1976). In these circumstances, attitudes to the trade union can become more favourable since it is seen as a potential means of pursuing sectional interests (Cook et al. 1978, Brosnan 1973, Scase 1974, Carrell and Dittrich 1976, Loveridge 1972, Sturmthal 1966, Mills 1951, Sykes 1965).

Thwarted upwards mobility expectations, can also become a source of pro-trade union attitudes. Here, evidence suggests that the individual goals are probably not abandoned completely. Rather individual effort is no longer seen to be paying-off and

collective effort becomes a route to rewards that were hitherto expected from individualism (Cook et al. 1978, Marsh and Pedler 1979, Greenwald 1978, Silverman 1968). It must however be noted that the positive attitude is still tempered with individual goals and likely to be somewhat fragile. One of the main drawbacks of trade unionism may still be seen as that of swamping the individual (Cook et al. 1978).

The generalised picture of white collar workers that emerges is one in which attitudes to the trade union are interrelated with attitudes to, and experience of, work itself. Collectivity, when it occurs, is prompted by instrumental rather than ideological considerations. Instrumentality can lie in the direction of desire for satisfaction of both intrinsic and extrinsic wants and the trade union is judged in terms of its ability to both remove dissatisfactions and satisfy expectations (Gordon et al. 1980). In short, collective effort is seen, for a number of reasons, to have a potential payoff.

Here it must be noted that reasons other than the instrumental have been advanced for white collar espousal of trade unionism. The more positive attitudes are seen to arise from a recognition by these workers that their class position has changed; the proletarianisation hypothesis (Crompton 1976, 1979a, 1979b, 1980, Bellaby and Oribabor 1977, Kelly 1985). Class position as a sole reason for positive attitudes towards trade unions is however an implausible explanation for two reasons.

First, it is unlikely that any occupational stratum would hold a single homogenised view of its class position (Lockwood 1960 and 1966). This would seem to be particularly true of white collar workers who form an extremely heterogeneous section of the population (Sturmthal 1966). There is moreover, no evidence to suggest that they have embraced political philosophies which would lead to collectivisation because of class positioning (Nicholson et al. 1980, Rallings 1983, Greenwald 1978). Indeed a leftwing political stance by the union has been shown to result in members wishing to disassociate themselves from its policies (Jones 1978, Childs 1985).

Secondly, evidence suggests that most attitudes and behaviour at work must be related to the work situation itself (Brown 1973). It is thus extremely doubtful that social background alone is the major influence on behaviour in organisations (Welan 1976). For white collar workers, evidence suggests that attitudes and perspectives are particularly strongly directed inwards towards positionings in occupational hierarchies (Banks 1978, Scase 1974) not outwards to positions in wider society (Nicholson et al. 1980, Giddens 1977, Heritage 1980).

Differences between Members within White Collar Trade Unions

Although the generalised picture referred to above could in a very broad way shape the nature of white collar unionism, differential patterns are likely to exist in specific employment situations. To compare branches, attention must be directed to differences within and between their memberships.

A potentially fundamental difference, insofar as attitudes are concerned, is that between active and non-active members of the branch. Active members here are restrictively defined as stewards/representatives and branch officers.

Evidence suggests that at what is probably a subconscious level, activists have different drives, beliefs and values to non-activists; all of which can manifest themselves as attitudes. Activism for example, can become a route to fulfilment of certain personal needs. Amongst these needs are security (Cangemi et al. 1981), decision making and influence (Anderson 1979b, Glick et al. 1977), achievement and autonomy (Dalton and Todor 1979), stimulation and excitement gained via negotiation (Nicholson 1976, Dickson 1981) and responsibility towards and serving others (Moore 1980, Parker and Bynner 1970).

Work can be a more central part of the activist's life (Spinrad 1960, Tannenbaum 1965). Following from this, there can be a stronger concern to shape the working experience to their satisfaction (Moore 1980, Gordon et al. 1980) and the trade union comes to be seen as the most appropriate (if not only) way of achieving this end (Bowen et al. 1974, Glick et al. 1977). In addition, the risk of erosion of gains already made, is seen by this group to be more constantly present (Jones 1981) and the concept of organised labour as a force to prevent this, as more important (Gordon et al. 1980).

For activists, industrial egalitarianism is more likely to be seen as a desirable goal (Ursell 1979, Dickson 1981) and concomitant with this, a far wider conception of what issues should be bargainable (Marchington and Armstrong 1981a). Clearly these differences provide a potential for polarisation in opinions between activist and non-activist groups. To compound this, not only are activist and non-activist attitudes likely to be different, the two groups are likely to perceive differences between each other.

Activists have been noted to develop unfavourable, stereotyped views of the rank and file as being uninterested, apathetic, possessing rather ignoble motives and thankless of efforts on their behalf (Schuller and Robertson 1983, Howells and Brosnan 1972). Thus an element of elitism can appear in activist attitudes and any gains can be seen as attributable to themselves alone (Ponack and Fraser 1979, Ursell 1979, Marchington and Armstrong 1981b). Activists can therefore spend more time communicating with each other, than with those who they represent (Partridge 1977, Schuller and Robertson 1983, Batstone et al. 1977). They can become not only poor predictors of rank and file wants (Lawler and Levin 1968, Howells and Woodfield 1970, Howells and Brosnan 1972, Brosnan 1973), but also come to see the rank and file as far less competent to define for themselves (let alone pursue) issues that affect them (Dickson 1981, Ursell 1979, Park 1963, Fosh 1981). Therefore, irrespective of rank and file wants, activists own attitudes and

values can come to influence what issues they are prepared to take-up and pursue (Poole 1976).

For their part, non-activists can develop correspondingly unfavourable views of activists and the union. Since non-activists may only be members because benefits of membership are seen to outweigh costs (Lansbury 1975, Jones 1981) they can become disloyal, highly critical but nonetheless highly demanding in their expectations (Glick et al. 1977, Wilders and Parker 1975). A major source of criticism can become the goals and actions of activists (Walker and Lawler 1979). Problematically, although they may be dissatisfied, with their union they can also feel poorly equipped to participate and shape events (Glick et al. 1977, Schuller and Robertson 1983). Paradoxically, their workplace representatives can be seen as those who should defend their interests against the trade union as much as against management (Schuller and Robertson 1983).

There are implications in terms of action arising from these differences between non-activist and activist attitudes. Non-activists, for example, can see organisation and management as sources of psychological and material satisfactions, whilst activists can transfer these feelings to the union (Cangemi et al. 1976, Gordon et al. 1980). Militancy is more common in activists (Parker and Bynner 1970) and there is some evidence to suggest commitment to trade union is concomitant with beliefs that confrontation is the most effective of conflict resolution

strategies (London and Howatt 1978). Similarly, whilst non-activists can see co-operation with management in joint problem solving as appropriate, activists prefer distributive bargaining relationships (Tracy and Peterson 1977). In addition activist actions are more likely to be shaped by their perceptions of management's attitudes towards themselves (Fairhurst and Bean 1976, Beaumont 1980b).

However, it would for a number of reasons be inaccurate to portray activist and non-activist attitude differences as the only ones influential in shaping action. Although both groups are to some extent probably aware of their attitudinal differences activists are also aware of the need for member support. Thus, although activists may be the spur to action (Routh 1966) they also need to take their tone from the rank and file (Shirom 1977). Which set of attitudes come to dominate will be taken-up later when discussing intra-organisational bargaining and decision making.

In addition to differences between activist and non-activist groups, attitude variations have been shown to be concomitant with a number of other characteristics. The distribution of these characteristics can be a very important factor to be taken into account when using attitudes to explain differences between branches. Given below are some of the characteristics which empirical evidence suggests can affect attitudes.

Biographic Factors - Age and Sex

For males, evidence suggests that as age and length of service advance, there is a reduction in work aspirations (Margerison and Elliot 1970, Hinrichs 1969, Long 1975a). Concomitant with this can be an increased satisfaction or contentment with what rewards work provides (Hunt and Saul 1975) and lowered willingness to utilise the trade union if grievances arise (Kissler 1977). Thus for the male members of a branch, the distribution of age and tenure can be crucial factors to be taken into consideration in evaluating attitudinal effects.

With women, although evidence indicates that there is also a lowering of attachments with age (Long 1975a), attachments are themselves lower than for males in any age group. Even where they comprise a substantial proportion (or even majority) of the workforce, they are unlikely to be proportionately represented in the ranks of activists (Wall and Virtue 1976, Egan 1982) for which a number of arguments have been advanced. For example, lower work related aspirations and attachments to work (Hinrichs 1969, Bowen et al. 1974), pragmatic acceptance of their lower organisational roles (Lovelace 1982) and lower commitment to the trade union as a collective means of improving their lot (Glick et al. 1977).

The above arguments are however, controversial and have been hotly disputed. There is, for example, some evidence to suggest that women have a strong desire to participate in trade unions, but lack the knowledge and experience to do so (Wertheimer and Nelson 1974).

Even more basically, the argument has been advanced that although unions publically espouse the cause of feminine equality, the truth is somewhat different. In effect they are vehicles of male domination (Baker and Robeson 1981) in which feminine participation is discouraged because trade unionism is defined as men's business (Lockwood 1980, Kozira and Peterson 1981, Beynon and Blackburn 1972). Notwithstanding these arguments, the evidence suggests that women's attitudes to work and union could well be different to those of men. The sex composition of a workforce is, therefore, a factor to be taken into account in evaluating the effects of attitudes.

Education

In terms of attitudes to work and trade union, higher education has been shown to raise work related aspirations (Hinrichs 1969). Additionally, there is a small amount of evidence to show that higher education is concomitant with a predisposition to eschew collective advancement in favour of individual bargaining (Blum 1971, Thompson and Weinstock 1967).

Occupational Factors

Here, two dimensions along which occupations can be differentiated have been shown to affect attitudes.

1. Functional Differentiation into Occupational Types

Groups of workers, particularly where they undertake tasks which distinguish them from other groups, are prone to develop self-generated images which include evaluations of their own worth (Cohen and Derrick 1970, Bass and Mitchell 1976). Comparisons with other groups in terms of levels of reward and

organisational prestige, can lead to group cohesiveness (Sayles 1958), feelings of relative deprivation and evaluation of the union in terms of its efficacy in resolving these (Scase 1974, Blum 1971, Bowen 1976 et al. 1974, Bowen and Shaw 1972, Roberts et al. 1972, Brosnan 1978).

It is also worth noting that some groups have high latent power (Marchington 1975). They perform such crucial organisational roles that they experience relatively little trouble in getting their desires granted (Bell 1975, Walsh 1981, Cohen 1971). Such groups have been noted to have a tendency to be isolationist and extremely reluctant to use their muscle on behalf of others (Purcell et al. 1977). The capability of such a group to get its own way in a relatively easy fashion can, of course, heighten relative deprivation feelings in other groups.

Clearly the greater the number of distinct occupational groups, the greater is the potential for a heterogeneity of separate interests. A diversity of interest groups all with their own needs to be advanced, can lead to factionalism. Ultimately this can itself lead to domination of one occupational group over others, with all its attendant attitudinal and behavioural problems (Hemingway 1978).

2. Vertical Differentiation - Status Differences

Here evidence here suggests that patterns of attachment, readiness to utilise the services of the union and motivations

for involvement in its activities, can vary with positioning in the occupational hierarchy (Blyton 1981a and 1981b). It has been noted for example, that in public sector white collar unions, high occupational status members participate quite readily. Their occupational roles give competences, skills and freedoms, which can carry benefits to the union. This ensures that they often come to occupy dominant branch roles (Nicholson et al. 1980, Blyton 1981a, Blyton et al. 1981). Their participation can however be prompted by a desire to avoid having their interests swamped by lower levels and is often accompanied by feelings of conflicts of loyalties (Blyton 1981b). Where this occurs there can clearly be implications for what issues the branch adopts and its methods of pursuit.

Where high status groups cannot (or do not want to) dominate, another phenomenon can manifest itself; managerial unionism or desire for separate status based representation (Bamber 1976, Weir 1976, Mant 1977, Price 1977, Poole, Mansfield, Frost and Blyton 1983). In NALGO in particular, there have long been pressures in this direction. Where separate representation is not allowed it can result in factionalism within the branch (Neill 1979).

Processes of Intra-Organisational Bargaining and Decision Making

Although attitude variations are likely to be influential, attitudes alone provide an incomplete explanation of actor influences.

A branch draws its members from an occupational structure. Groups of members are likely to have different perceptions, motivations and emotional forces which shape their attitudes (Walton and McKersie 1965, p 298). Thus conflict (at least latently so) within the branch becomes an everyday fact of life (Hemingway 1978). With conflict comes the need to shape and reconcile conflicting interests into a mutually acceptable approach (Kuhn 1961, pp 77). The end product of approach formulation is what has been described as attainment (through internal adjustment) of a zone of acceptable preferences (Gottschalk 1973). The processes involved in this have been distinguished as intra-organisational bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1961).

In intra-organisational bargaining, a conceptual distinction can be made between reconciliation of conflicts over objectives and over means. In terms of objectives, there can clearly be differences between occupational groups. In addition differences can also exist between the rank and file and activist negotiators. The former can have an idealised picture of what they want, and believe it to be completely attainable. Activists on the other hand, can be more pragmatic and exert pressures on each other to adopt a united front irrespective of rank and file wants (Nicholson 1976). Thus there is potential conflict between the aspirational optimism of the non-negotiators and the aspirational rigidity of those who negotiate (Anthony and Crichton 1969).

Negotiators need some room for manoeuvre (Peterson and Tracy 1977) and yielding to rank and file demands beforehand can force them into a stance with management where negotiation is not possible and only fight will win the day (Mastenbroek 1980). Activists, therefore, have a vested interest in shaping rank and file aspirations before any negotiation commences.

Some internal adjustment may also be necessary about means. Activists may need the support of the rank and file to attain objectives (Ursell et al. 1981) but can be acutely aware of either widespread lack of support (Nicholson et al. 1980) or variations between groups of members (Nicholson 1976). Unless they can convert the latent power of non-activists into realisable power (Marchington 1975) by mobilising bias (Batstone et al. 1977) they will be forced to take their tone completely from the rank and file.

This investigation is concerned with processes of intra-organisational bargaining and decision making at two levels:-.

1. As a crucial part of the explanation with respect to approaches adopted towards issues of job regulation.
2. As visible signs of the existence of and interaction between many of the other factors discussed in this and the previous chapter.

INTER-RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FACTORS: AN OVERVIEW

The discussion in this and the previous chapter has covered dimensions along which approaches to issues of job regulation may be portrayed together with factors which are likely to affect positioning along those dimensions. However, the discussion could give rise to the misconception that the dimensions characterising approaches to job regulation and the affecting factors are all discrete variables. This would clearly be a gross oversimplification.

Many of the variables are considered likely to be reciprocally or even multi-dimensionally related. A somewhat more accurate, but purely qualitative representation of relationships, can be given in the form of a simple model such as that shown in Fig. 3.1.

It is an important aim of this investigation to uncover some of these relationships and more specifically highlight combinations which affect branch action i.e. put some quantitative flesh on the bones of the purely qualitative model shown in fig. 3.1. Of necessity this involves careful selection of data to highlight variable interactions, situations in which interaction of the variables occur, together with the devising of methods for their analysis. These topics are covered in the following two chapters.

A QUALITATIVE CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF FACTORS INFLUENCING A BRANCH'S APPROACH TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION



CHAPTER 4

THE SETTING FOR THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

This chapter commences by explaining the suitability of NALGO for the purposes of this study. It then briefly reviews NALGO's history and notes recent significant developments in its behaviour. The importance of the branch in NALGO is examined and a description given of the relationship to the parent trade union. The general criteria used to select the branches for the study are stated and finally a brief description is given of each branch selected, together with specific reasons for its inclusion.

NALGO AS A TRADE UNION

Suitability for the Study

NALGO is exclusively a non-manual trade union, organising in both market and non-market segments of the public sector. Its members are to be found in eight major public sector groupings: Universities, Local Government, New Towns, National Health Service and the nationalised industries of Electricity, Gas, Water and Transport. With the exception of Universities and the National Health Service it is for negotiating purposes the dominant white-collar union wherever it has members.

In structural terms, NALGO is also of interest. The branch is its fundamental unit of organisation and in the majority of cases,

there is only one for each employing organisation. Indeed, even where this is not the case, branch organisation commonly follows management structure to cover sub-units of the employer.

Thus within a single trade union are to be found branches which organise in a variety of industrial contexts and an organisation that lends itself to an active role for the branch in job regulation. For a study of the relative effects of variables shaping job regulation behaviour at branch level in the public sector, NALGO is therefore, an extremely suitable vehicle amongst British white-collar trade unions.

History and Development

The origins of NALGO lie in municipal officers guilds; separate, in-house employee collective organisations formed in local authorities in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. In 1906, after a short period as a loose federation, a number of guilds combined to form the National Association of Local Government Officers with a membership of approximately 10,000 (Spoor 1967 p.11). For almost forty years, growth continued by the incorporation of hitherto independent guilds to reach a figure of approximately 140,000 in 1945 (Lockwood 1958, p.140).

Up to this point, NALGO was exclusively an association for local government employees, for although recruitment outside local government was advocated as early as 1923, it was consistently rejected (Spoor 1967, Chapter 21). Eventually a change in policy was prompted by the postwar tide of nationalisation. Here, newly

formed public utilities took over several activities previously performed by local government. Faced with either losing members or following them into the newly formed organisations, NALGO took the latter step. It also changed its title to that of National and Local Government Officers Association.

A significant period of growth occurred between 1960 and 1980, when membership grew from under 300,000 to just short of 800,000. Although probably due in some measure to expansion in the public sector, the majority of this increase came from those already in NALGO organised services but who had hitherto remained outside trade unions (Spoor 1967, p 491).

The years 1960 to 1980 also witnessed very significant changes in the behaviour of the trade-union. Its early days had been characterised by avoidance of an image of trade unionism. To quote its first General Secretary, L.C. Hill:

"Anything savouring of trade unionism is nausea to the local government officer and his association"

(Spoor 1967, p 47)

This philosophy prevailed for many years. For example, successive annual conferences consistently rejected the strike weapon, the principle of the closed shop, or affiliation to the Trades Union Congress.

In 1961 however, a strike clause was inserted in the constitution. The first official strike occurred in 1965 and, having adopted the

weapon, its use increased; the number of requests by branches for official sanctioning of action rising from 6 in 1968 to 146 in 1978 (Newman 1982, p 445). The closed shop was adopted in principle, as a long term aim in 1959. By 1981, 30% of branches were operating Union-Management Agreements (NALGO 1981). After a long fought battle by a minority within the union, NALGO affiliated to the T.U.C. in 1964 (Volker 1966). It has since then, played an increasingly prominent part in T.U.C. activities (Spoor 1967, pp 533-57, Newman 1982, pp 69-97).

The Role of the Branch within NALGO

In some measure, the importance of the branch as a unit of organisation is a legacy of NALGO's origins and development. To encourage independent municipal officer guilds to affiliate, the newly formed NALGO guaranteed them much autonomy (Spoor 1967). Coupled with this for the first forty years, the reality of local authority bargaining gave branches autonomous roles. Primarily this was due to the fact that national bargaining machinery in the form of Local Government Whitley Councils was not established until 1946 (Spoor 1967, Chapter 12). Branches had little alternative but to pursue separate negotiations about everything with their respective employing organisations. In a more limited way, the practice continues and is respected by the constitution to the present day.

Clearly there can be no form of second class citizenship amongst branches. Thus, as other services came within the NALGO organising

sphere, their branches had the same constitutional rights as those in local government.

Evidence of this semi-autonomous role can be seen in model rules which broadly specify the objects of branches as "organisation, advancement and protection of the interests of their members by engaging in bona-fide trade union activities on their behalf" (NALGO 1984). Indeed, given observance of national policy, branches can and do make agreements with employers without the necessity for outside trade union ratification. Only in their right to initiate official industrial action (the prerogative of the National Executive Committee) is autonomous job regulation seriously curtailed. There can, of course, be no curtailment on unofficial action.

A further significant sign of autonomy is the financial independence of NALGO branches. Each branch after collecting members subscriptions, retains as a right, a proportion at its own disposal. The proportion varies according to a complex formula, but is upwards of 21%. Even for medium sized branches studied here, this can given an income of £700 per month. For large branches it can and does sometimes result in full-time clerical help employed directly by the branch. This, coupled with virtual full-time secondment to trade-union duties of some branch officers, facilitates a semi-autonomous branch role.

Financial independence is of course not all one-sided. Branches are expected to do something with the monies they retain, i.e. internal publicity, steward training, welfare etc. However, delegation of these activities to the branch, reinforces a degree of autonomy.

Relation of Branches to the Parent

All branches relate to the parent through one or other of the twelve regional sub-divisions (District Councils) of NALGO. Within a District, all branches are entitled to seats on the District Council. From District Council representatives of a particular service, a number are chosen to form a District Service Conditions Committee; one for each service. Within national policy, this committee sets its own objectives, policies and strategies for pursuance at district level. It also elects one of its number to a National Service Conditions Committee.

District Service Conditions Committees also select from their members a number who form the trade union side of Provincial Whitley Councils; the practical importance of which varies somewhat in different services. In local government for example, where a single branch per local authority is normal, provincial Whitley councils tend to be of less importance as a negotiating forum than the lower tier Whitley machinery of the employing organisation's own Joint Consultative or Local Joint Committee. In nationalised industries whilst there is also a lower tier Whitley structure, regional machinery (usually called Regional Joint Councils) is the

level at which the whole employing organisation is represented and is of greater significance than the lower tier.

In addition to service conditions machinery, District Councils also maintain standing committees i.e. Finance and General Purposes, Publicity, Education etc. The role of these is broadly to implement district policies in their respective functions and to be an aid and resource to branches in organising activities beyond their scope. Each district also elects annually, a number of its members to serve on the National Executive Council of the union.

At national level a structure of service and standing committees exists which, with some additions, mirrors that at district level. District and national structures are portrayed diagrammatically in Fig 4.1.

THE BRANCHES STUDIED

General Selection Criteria


In line with evidence cited in the previous three chapters on factors influential in affecting approaches to job regulation, general criteria used to select branches were applied as follows:

1. Contextual Effects of Employing Organisation

Four branches were selected: two each from the market and non-market segments of the public sector; all being drawn from the West Midlands District of NALGO.

Figure 4.1

NALGO STRUCTURES



2. Size

By selecting branches all of the same approximate size (the NALGO mean of 610 members) it was initially hoped to control this variable. This was not possible, and a measure of control was established by pairing branches; one member of each size pair being drawn from the market and non-market segments.

3. Trade Union Density

In each case branches were selected which had approximately the same high proportion of eligible employees in membership.

4. Member Dispersion

In each of the two segments, one branch was selected which had its members dispersed over a number of different sites, whilst the other had a relatively more concentrated membership.

5. Presence of Other Workplace Trade Unions

All branches selected had sole or overwhelming negotiating rights for eligible non-manual employees in their organising spheres. As will be explained, due to variations in industry negotiating structures, this does not of necessity mean negotiating rights for all non-manual employees.

THE BRANCHES SELECTED

The Gas Industry Branch

This was the largest branch studied. It is one of seven NALGO branches, each representing members in geographical sub-divisions of the employing organisation.

When the study commenced, the branch had existed for eighteen months; having been formed from a merger of two previous branches. Of these, one had serviced the majority of the geographical subdivision covered by the new branch. The other had historically restricted membership to the top three salary grades (Senior Officers) now represented. Its existence dated from an era when these grades had been covered by separate negotiating machinery which ceased to exist in 1974 with the formation of a National Joint Council for Gas Staffs and Senior Officers. It is however worth noting that there were still two negotiating machineries for the industry. One of these was for Gas Staffs and Senior Officers and this covered the branch studied.

For formal negotiations the branch had majority representation on two Local Joint Committees; the lowest organ of the Gas Industry three-tier Whitley machinery. Constitutionally, only accredited representatives, nominated directly by branches may sit on the trade-union sides of these committees.

The next level above in the negotiating machinery, is the Regional Joint Council; which operates at the level of the whole employing organisation. When the study commenced, the branch had two members on the trade union side of the Regional Joint Council; both of whom subsequently resigned their seats shortly after being re-elected to serve for a further three-year term. Details of the issue prompting these resignations will be discussed in a later chapter. For the present, it is sufficient to note that it also

resulted in the branch virtually declaring itself unilaterally independent of the decisions of its District Service Conditions Committee and the trade union side of the Regional Joint Council. Irrespective of this, it still maintained connections with NALGO at district level and to the wider trade union movement through its affiliation to the Local Trades Council.

The particular reasons prompting the choice of this branch were threefold:

1. The author was an active NALGO member in another branch within the same employing organisation. As such there was a strong familiarity with trade union organisation, industrial relations practices and the framework of agreements. In a study of this type, variables are such that their strength and effects can probably only be rank ordered. An intimate knowledge of one set of circumstances provided a valuable datum line against which comparisons could be made.
2. In terms of both organisation and structure the branch was interesting. When formed, a conscious decision had been taken to adopt a shop steward system of organisation; partly to deal with the problem of a dispersed membership. This system, which is not yet widespread throughout NALGO, uses strictly delimited workplace constituencies following management structures. Accredited stewards are given, within the limits of branch policy, full authority to conduct negotiations with managers in their constituencies.

In addition to the steward system, the branch had adopted a policy of having a full complement of branch officers to perform specialist functions. All of these officerships were working roles, and were allocated annual budgets with full authority to spend in performance of their respective functions.

3. As well as having a dispersed membership, the size of the branch at approximately 660 members made it ideal for the study. Details of internal structures, relation to employer based negotiating machinery and NALGO at district level are given in Fig. 4.2.

Electricity Industry Branch

Of the four branches studied, this was the oldest; having been in existence for twenty-eight years. It represented administrative, professional and clerical employees in two divisions of the employing organisation; both of which came under a single general manager. Here it should be noted that in the Electricity Supply industry a fundamental distinction is drawn for negotiating purposes, between engineering and non-engineering staffs. Each has separate Whitley machinery. In the two divisions represented by this branch, eligible non-engineering staffs constituted 77% of all the divisional employees.

Formal negotiating channels for the branch were two staff committees; one for each division. Once again these are the lower tier of the industry Whitley machinery. Constitutionally, staff

G A S B R A N C H

INTERNAL STRUCTURE AND RELATION TO NALGO WEST MIDLANDS AND EMPLOYER BASED NEGOTIATING MACHINERY




Figure 4.2

committee representatives must be trade union members; not appointed by the branch, but elected annually by the whole workforce. Theoretically, they need not be trade union activists; invariably however, they are. In addition the branch was represented on NALGO's District Service Conditions Committee and via this on the Regional negotiating machinery (District Joint Council)


Three reasons prompted selection of this branch:

1. In both Electricity and Gas industries, at the level studied here, a similar range of activities were undertaken by the employing organisations. From an industrial relations viewpoint however, they had national and local agreements differing in many important respects. This allowed some comparison of the effects of agreements on approaches to job regulation.
2. Both management organisations covered approximately the same geographical area. Moreover employees were largely drawn from the same urban population. Thus a degree of control was introduced for the possible influence of location as an extraneous variable that could affect attitudinal measures.
3. Compared to its Gas counterpart, the branch had a relatively concentrated membership; some 60% being located in one or other of two large divisional offices.

Details of internal structures, relation to employer based negotiating machinery and NALGO at district level are given in fig 4.3.

ELECTRICITY BRANCH

INTERNAL STRUCTURE AND RELATION TO NALGO WEST MIDLANDS AND EMPLOYER BASED NEGOTIATING MACHINERY



Local Authority Branch 1

This branch represented members in a District Council covering a mixed urban and rural area in the North West Midlands. It was formed in 1974, at the time of local government reorganisation when the District Council itself came into existence. Like most local authority branches, it officially represented all non-manual grades within the employing organisation with the exception of the Chief Executive and Deputy.

For negotiating purposes, the primary formal mechanism was the employing authority's Joint Consultative Council; the lower tier of the industry Whitley machinery. At the time of the study there were, however, two additional Joint Consultative Councils in the Authority. One of these (the Transfer J.C.C.) had been formed specifically to handle negotiations concerning the impending transfer of assets and responsibilities of the New Town Development Corporation lying within the District Council boundaries. The second J.C.C. concerned itself with matters associated with any potential privatisation of the District Council's activities. Although neither of these two J.C.C.'s were official Whitley bodies, each one in the eyes of both trade union and management had the status of an official negotiating channel in respect of its special subject area. In addition to J.C.C.'s a system of bi-monthly departmental liaison meetings occurred. At these workplace representatives from within a department together with two senior branch officers, met formally with departmental management.

The branch was represented on the Service Conditions Committee of NALGO and via this on the Provincial Whitley Council and was affiliated to its local Trades Council. It also played an active part in an association of all local authority NALGO branches in the country (The County Forum).

The reasons for selection of this branch were as follows:-

1. At 640 members (including Y.T.S. trainees) its size was near to the NALGO mean and it provided an almost exact size match to one of the nationalised industry branches.
2. Like the Gas Branch it had a highly structured system of workplace representatives and branch officer roles; not however a shop steward system i.e. it retained traditional departmental representative roles.
3. With approximately 60% of its members located in the main office complex of the employing authority, it had a more concentrated membership than either of the Nationalised Industry branches. Nevertheless its membership was more highly dispersed than the second local authority branch.

Details of internal structures, relation to employer based negotiating machinery and NALGO at district level are given in fig. 4.4.

LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 1

INTERNAL STRUCTURE AND RELATION TO NALGO WEST MIDLANDS AND EMPLOYER BASED NEGOTIATING MACHINERY




Figure 4.4

Local Authority Branch 2

This branch represented members in a District Council covering a largely urban area in the central West Midlands. Like the other local authority branch, it was formed in 1974 when the District Council came into existence and took under its wing a number of smaller adjacent town councils. More recently the New Town Development Corporation located within the District Council boundaries had been wound-up on central government instructions. This resulted in a transfer of assets and responsibilities to the District Council. For the branch studied, it resulted in an increase in membership when staffs employed by the Development Corporation transferred to newly created posts within the District Council.

For negotiating purposes, the sole formal mechanism was the authority's Joint Consultative Council; the lower tier of the industry Whitley machinery. The branch was represented on the Service Conditions Committee of NALGO in West Midlands but not on the Provincial Whitley Council.

Reasons for selection of this branch were as follows:

1. At 410 members its size was very near to that of one of the nationalised industry branches.
2. With 96 per cent of its members located in the main office complex of the employing authority, it was an extremely suitable candidate for comparison with the other local authority branch which had a more highly dispersed membership.

3. Like the other local authority branch, the geographical area covered by the employing authority had historically been designated a New Town. As such there had been comparatively rapid urban expansion promoted by a New Town Development Corporation. With the central government directive to wind-up New Town Development Corporations, both authorities were faced with similar circumstances of absorbing transferred employees which brought like problems to both branches. At the time of the study this branch had already encountered the problems, whilst for local authority branch 1, they were just commencing.

Details of internal structures, relation to employer based negotiating machinery and NALGO at district level are given in fig. 4.5. A comparison of the vital statistics of the four branches is given in fig. 4.6.

LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 2

INTERNAL STRUCTURE AND RELATION TO NALGO WEST MIDLANDS AND EMPLOYER BASED NEGOTIATING MACHINERY

EMPLOYER BASED NEGOTIATING MACHINERY

NALGO WEST MIDLANDS

DISTRICT SERVICE
CONDITIONS COMMITTEE
57 PERSONS

1 Branch Representative

DISTRICT COUNCIL

5 Representatives

TRADE UNION SIDE OF JOINT CONSULTATIVE
COUNCIL
6 SEATS

6 Branch Representatives




Figure 4.5

VITAL STATISTICS OF THE FOUR BRANCHES INVESTIGATED

		GAS BRANCH	ELECTRICITY BRANCH	LOCAL GOVERNMENT BRANCH 1	LOCAL GOVERNMENT BRANCH 2
Membership	Number male	440	140	350	245
	Percentage male	66%	31%	57%	60%
	Number female	220	310	290	165
	Percentage female	33%	69%	45%	40%
	TOTAL	660	450	640	410
Salary Levels	Mean salary of members to nearest £100 per annum	£9000	£9100	£6800	£8100
	Standard deviation	£3000	£2900	£2900	£2400
Representation	Number of workplace representative roles - filled	17	N/A	25	14
	Number of workplace representative roles - unfilled	10		0	0
	TOTAL	27		25	14
	Number of separate workplace sites	28	16	12	2
Branch Executive Committee	Mean constituency size	24	}	26	29
	Standard Deviation	9		N/A	11
	Branch Officers not also representatives	1	0	5	6
	Branch Officers also representatives	8	13	4	0
	TOTAL	9	13	9	6
	Trade Union Density	91%	98%	100%	99%
	Union-Management Agreement	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
	Number of Local Whitley Councils Covered	2	2	1	1

CHAPTER 5

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter commences with a short discussion identifying the general methodological approach of the investigation. Following this, all variables are considered and for each one an explanation given for the choice of data collected and the collection methods used. A short description of the fieldwork is given and the chapter concludes with a brief overview of data analysis.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

At the end of chapter 3, the primary aim of the study was given as quantitative elaboration of the qualitative model developed therein. To do this required empirical investigation, but before describing methods, it is appropriate to state the overall methodological approach.

Any eventual explanation of branch action would need to consist of propositions which specified relationships between the concepts and variables used. The way in which the explanatory propositions were derived could have varied between two methodological extremes of Classical and Grounded Theory approaches; each of which has its own inherent advantages and disadvantages. (Bailey 1978).

The Classical Approach is characterised by the a-priori definition of concepts, variables and relationships followed by the

development of empirical measures and testable hypotheses. Its main advantage lies in the use of deductive reasoning which encourages a rigorous and thorough theoretical consideration of concepts and analysis methods before data itself is collected (Bailey 1978). However the approach has the attendant risk of potential overemphasis on deduction and hypothesis formulation prior to fieldwork. This can result in the use of measures which in their own way may be valid, but ignore the richness and complexity of the social situation studied (Glasser and Strauss 1968, Silverman 1970.)

At the other extreme is the Grounded Theory Approach. Here the theory itself is developed by entering fieldwork without prior hypotheses. Explanations are formulated on the basis of what is found. Clearly, since the explanations are generated by the situation, there is less risk of errors arising from choice of variables and methods of measurement. However, reliance on data specific to the study's location makes generalisations difficult and there is the additional risk of ignoring potentially valuable prior work in the area.

This study does not fit easily into either approach. It uses a wide variety of empirical evidence to construct the model given in chapter 3 and there is some specification of data to be collected together with its methods of analysis. Nevertheless, even though a model of interacting variables is developed, there are no formal hypotheses established for testing. Moreover, data

collection methods are purposely chosen which are flexible enough to allow information to emerge on the basis of what is found. In addition the way data is used acknowledges that complex patterns of interaction between variables can only be adequately explained on the basis of what data emerges from fieldwork. For example, at the level of each case study, standard data collection techniques applied to large population samples permit the use of extensive analysis to describe interaction of variables but in the final stage of inter-branch comparison, different methods must be used. Here, the number of separate case studies is too small to rely on anything more than rudimentary statistical comparisons. Instead, the final theory hinges on iterative methods in which the evidence from each branch is re-examined to construct explanations of how variables could have different relative effects in differing circumstances.

DATA SPECIFICATIONS AND COLLECTION METHODS

General Considerations

1. The very nature of some information specified its collection method. Data on decision making in action would have been impossible to collect other than by observation. Similarly, certain historic evidence together with that on trade union constitution and agreements, required document search. In addition, sampling considerations (see Appendix M2) dictated the use of large samples in each branch. This requirement, coupled with practical limitations on the investigators available time, dictated the use of self-completed questionnaires for some data.

2. Notwithstanding these points it was acknowledged that all data collection methods have their weaknesses and sources of bias (Cook and Selltiz 1964). This is particularly so in the case of interviews and questionnaires where

"the principal objection to their use is that they are so frequently used alone."

(Webb et al. 1966, p 1)

It was therefore decided that wherever possible an attempt would be made to collect data using more than one method; a multiple indicator approach.

DIMENSIONS OF APPROACH TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION

Dependence on Outside Trade Union

The conceptual definition of this variable (see Chapter 2) anticipated the possibility of a restricted branch role, arising from constraints imposed by trade union constitution and industry negotiating structures. A first requirement was to gather information on constitutions and agreements to establish the formal procedural freedom of the branch. For this data, document search was chosen.

The second requirement was to gather information on the approaches adopted in pursuit of recent issues. For those where the branch had a formally unrestricted role, data on branch and any outside trade union involvement was specified as necessary. Additionally, evidence of any extra-procedural influences exerted by the outside trade union to exclude branches from involvement was regarded as

potentially useful. Since all data was considered to be potentially sensitive, it was decided to use interview methods. These would permit the atmosphere to be varied to suit respondents and enable the use of follow up questions to check truthfulness and explore complex topics (Selltiz et al. 1976, Kerlinger 1969). Open-ended questions which allowed injection of a broad orientation by the interviewer and a free-form response by the subject were specified as most appropriate (Dohnewed and Richardson 1963, Lemon 1973).

With issues where the branch had a formally restricted role, it was felt necessary to search for any evidence that might indicate circumvention of restrictions. Open-ended interview questions were again specified as the most appropriate collection method. Direct observation of meetings at which decisions were made on methods of issue pursuit was also used as a source of data uncontaminated by post-hoc distortions (Bailey 1978).

Finally, for both restricted and unrestricted issues, some indication of actor perceptions of the legitimacy of procedural constraints was considered necessary. Again open-ended interview techniques were specified as the collection method.

Focus in Issues

Although the definition in chapter 2, implies a simple dichotomy between internal or external issues; focus was felt to be a more complex phenomenon. For example, apparently external issues could

be adopted because they were perceived as having a present or future impact internally. It was therefore considered necessary to gather data not only on issues adopted, but also on the reasons for their adoption. In addition it was realised that there could be varying degrees of adoption ranging from mere rhetoric to active pursuit. Thus, for each issue adopted details on its method of pursuit were noted.

Finally data was gathered on issues to which branches had been exposed. Of particular interest were any steps taken by branches to expose themselves to external sources of issues. For this information, document search was specified as one appropriate method, but it was recognised that the accuracy of this information was subject to the twin problems of selective deposit in records and selective survival of the records themselves (Webb et al. 1966). To supplement documented information, additional data was collected by using interview techniques. Here the information required was considered to be relatively unsensitive and uncomplex but to avoid bias, structured interview techniques using carefully piloted questions were specified (Merton et al. 1956, Cicorel 1964).

To be able to assess what people do rather than what they say they do (Selltitz et al. 1976) a third method of data collection was used. Namely direct observation of meetings where decisions on issue adoption took place.

Initiation of Issues

The conceptual definition of this dimension in Chapter 2 links initiation to two sub-dimensions; actor definitions of job territory and the party (trade union or management) that initiated issues.

An initial step in evaluating branches was to determine actor definitions of job territory, including any formal specification of negotiable and reserved issues as laid down in formal agreements. Within this framework, data was collected on recent issues adopted and the initiating party. For this information document search, structured interview questions and direct observation of meetings were used. As an aid to explaining the amounts of initiation and to locate branch action within the context of any changing organisational definitions of legitimate job territory, historic trends in issues arising in each employing organisation were also examined. For this document search and structured interview questions were specified as appropriate techniques.

Finally, it was felt desirable to gather data on actor perceptions of the legitimacy of current definitions of job territory and the most appropriate actions to be taken by the branch to affect any desired changes in the range of negotiable issues. Structured interview techniques were used for this data.

Intensity of Action

Intensity, as defined in Chapter 2 related action in issue pursuit to numbers of actors involved. Both were largely a matter of

historic record and comparatively simple data to collect by document search.

As additional explanatory information, data was collected on the relative importance of issues in progress throughout, and shortly before the period of study, together with actor perceptions of what made issues more or less important. For this structured interview questions were used.

Finally, because the range of issues encountered by the branch across the time period could be somewhat restrictive, data was also gathered on the relative salience of a somewhat wider range of issues hypothesised as those to which actors could possibly be exposed. Here, in-depth probing for answers was not considered necessary and the convenience and economy of effort of rigorously pre-tested questionnaire items was utilised (Kerlinger 1969, Selltiz et al. 1976, Bailey 1978, Lemon 1973).

Representativeness

The conceptual definition of this dimension in Chapter 2 expresses representativeness in perceptual terms. This required adoption of an action frame of reference in which

"Shared orientations become institutionalised and expressed as social factsit follows that explanations of human actions must take account of the meanings which those concerned assign to the acts."

(Silverman 1970, p 127)

A first data requirement was defined as actor perceptions of their opportunity to influence branch policy and action; both in a

general way and in relation to specific issues that had arisen. For the information on recent issues, structured interview questions were used. The more general picture of opportunity to influence policy and action was obtained by questionnaire items. The reason for using this technique was that it was felt that an element of criticism of the branch could emerge in answers. Thus the anonymity of self-completed questionnaire items would permit more frankness in responses (Knudson et al. 1967, Lemon 1973).

A second data requirement was concerned with examining the extent to which representativeness was facilitated in branches in terms of structural and operational provisions to communicate with members and to sense their needs and wants. It was recognised that existence of these provisions would not in itself guarantee either their use or efficacy. Thus in addition to gathering information on communication methods, data on members perceptions of these steps was also collected using structured interview techniques.

Finally for explanatory purposes, it was considered desirable to obtain information on branch decision making. Here the aim was to learn whose interests came to the fore in processes of issue definition, shaping and adoption. For this data, a mixture of document search, interview questions and direct observation of meetings was used.

As a first step towards fieldwork the above data requirements, collection methods and sources of information for the five

dimensions of approaches to job regulation were assembled into a list. This became part of the outline specification for data collection instruments and is shown in Appendix M1.1

FACTORS INFLUENCING APPROACHES TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION

Employer Policy and Action - Industrial Relations Climate

This factor is described conceptually in Chapter 3. It used Purcell's typology of orthogonally related sub-dimensions of trust and formality to categorise industrial relations climate in the employing organisation (Purcell 1979). An action frame of reference was utilised in which climate was used as a shorthand way of expressing what branch actors perceived management policy and action to be.

For the sub-dimension of trust, actor perceptions of the trustworthiness and/or fairness of management were specified as the required data. In addition, it was felt that useful explanatory information could be derived from Purcell's observation that low trust is frequently concomitant with desires for high formality. Hence information on actor perceptions of the desirability of formality in industrial relations, were also specified as data to be collected. Both of these items were classified as attitudinal and of a potentially sensitive nature. Self-administered questionnaire items giving anonymity to respondents were therefore specified.

As measures for the sub-dimension of formality, one indication that could be used was the comprehensiveness (tightness or looseness) of agreements. It was realised that tightness could exist in industry agreements, but not of necessity be observed in organisational practices. The main indicator of formality was therefore specified as the existence, frequency of use and reliance on the employing organisation's formal bargaining forums. Here there was considered to be some potential complexity in the nature of information required and open-ended interview questions were specified.

Finally, it was felt desirable to tap actor perceptions of the efficacy of these forums, together with information on whether or not other channels were found more useful for certain issues. Actors were defined as industrial relations specialists in the employing organisation as well as trade union activists. Again responses were considered to be potentially complex and open-ended interview items were specified.

Industry Collective Bargaining Structures

As explained in chapter 3, it was considered possible that industry collective bargaining structures could limit branch independence. A survey using document search of the restrictiveness of existing procedural and substantive agreements was the first step in evaluating this.

Notwithstanding the above point, restrictiveness exists to some extent in the eyes of the beholder and can probably be

circumvented to some degree. It was therefore felt useful to tap actor perceptions of the legitimacy of limitations of branch roles as defined in existing agreements, together with any measures taken in circumvention. Here a mixture of structured and open-ended interview questions was specified.

The Outside Trade Union

Discussion of this factor in chapter 3 anticipates two main aspects of its influence.

First, and allied to the factor above, procedural and substantive agreements could prescribe limits to branch autonomy. Initiatives could at some point in the development of an issue become the prerogative of the outside trade union. In addition, the trade union constitution could have a similar effect. As a first step information on these constitutional limitations was collected using document search.

Secondly, and somewhat less tangible forces and counter forces could be at work to modify the effects of any constitutional limitations. For example, the extent to which branches felt bound by outside trade union policies and/or the roles played by representatives of the parent body in branch decision making processes. Here useful information was felt to be actor recollections of past issues, their origins and details of how defined and shaped. This data was considered to be both potentially sensitive and complex. Thus flexible, open-ended interview methods were specified. Additionally, valuable

information was felt to be accessible by observation of branch decision making processes in action.

Finally (as with the previous factor) it was recognised that steps to circumvent outside influences and limitations could be taken by branch actors. Data on perceptions of the legitimacy of these influences was gathered, together with any avoidance measures adopted. Open-ended interview questions and direct observation of meetings were specified as suitable collection methods for this data.

Issues

The major information requirement on issues as factors influencing branch action was their relative salience to memberships. Data requirements for this are discussed above under Intensity of Action.

The Representative System

The discussion in chapter 3 indicates that certain characteristics of a branch's representative system, were anticipated to have some effect on issue definition and shaping processes. The major distinction made is the extent to which characteristics of the representative system facilitate highly influential roles for either workplace representatives or alternatively give rise to a more centralised group of branch decision makers. Here it was felt that there was a need for information on both structural and perceptual aspects of the situation.

In terms of structure, it was considered important to know the relationship between definitions of representative roles, boundaries of groups represented and the decision making structure of the branch. The information required was considered sufficiently sensitive and complex as to require extremely flexible interview questions.

Notwithstanding any structural provisions found to exist, it was also considered important to tap actor perceptions of the situation which could give indications of their willingness to conform to role requirements. Again potential sensitivity and complexity dictated the use of flexible interviewing techniques. Finally, it was considered that observation of decision making processes in action would enable assessment of whose viewpoints came to dominate when issues were brought forward.

Membership Dispersion

Since the characteristics of the representative system could have effects on the ability to cope with dispersed memberships, there was felt to be a connection between this factor and the previous one. Here it was important to recognise that the experienced effects of dispersion do not simply arise from geography itself. They could also be influenced by the extent to which the effects of dispersion could be more or less ameliorated. Several sets of data were specified as necessary:

1. The extent to which branch memberships were dispersed over discrete sites. This was collected by document search.
2. The likelihood of problems requiring trade union involvement

arising at each location and the necessity (in terms of a competent local steward) for branch officials to provide this involvement. Here the data requirement was for information that allowed strict comparisons between branches and fixed format interview items were specified.

3. The freedom and mobility of branch officials to travel to sites when required. For this fixed format interview items were also specified.

Actor Attitudes

The use of attitudes as an explanatory variable in this investigation prompted two major considerations:-

1. That of specifying attitudes which were potentially most influential in shaping branch action. The discussion in Chapter 3 indicates that those with the most explanatory potential were attitudes to work and trade union. Here it can be noted that work and trade union are perhaps most realistically conceived of as attitude objects endowed with multiple attributes; each one capable of being evaluated either positively or negatively. Thus attitude holders could simultaneously experience both positive and negative feelings towards different attributes of the same object.
2. The methods to be used to evaluate actor attitudes. Here it was considered important to recognise that if actor attitudes were to be used to explain action at branch level, sample populations would need to be large, thoroughly representative and attitudes themselves evaluated in a standardised way.

These two considerations were quite strongly connected. The second dictated the use of standardised attitude measuring techniques and the first made it unlikely that any readily available published attitude scales would be suitable for use. The decision was therefore taken to develop new scales particular to the study. This posed certain choices as to the particular attitude scaling techniques to be used which involved a number of technical considerations. Since elaboration of these would complicate this chapter to an unnecessary extent, full details are given in Appendix M3. For the present it can be noted that Likert type scales were used.

To satisfy the requirement to explore certain attitudes in greater depth actors in each branch were interviewed as well as completing the standard collection instrument.

Processes of Intra-Organisational Bargaining and Decision Making

From the discussion in chapter 3, it is clear that these processes could provide indications of the effects of many other factors. A major consideration was that of method.

Total reliance on post-hoc recollections of past bargaining and decision-making situations contained obvious drawbacks. It would risk incorporating perceptual distortions of extremely dynamic and sometimes emotional events. Nevertheless, if issues prior to the time of study were to be included, there could be little alternative and interview and document search techniques were specified for the data.

It was also considered important to incorporate an evaluation somewhat less subject to actors perceptual distortions. Desirably, there should be direct observation of these processes as they occurred. In these observations, there would be a need to collect data on:-

1. Inputs to the process - actor concerns and aspirations
2. The process itself - information, arguments and influences brought to bear on the inputs.
3. The outcomes - the approaches to issues of job regulation adopted.

The most likely forums to yield useful information were defined as open meetings of branches, branch executive committee meetings and any pre-meetings of branch bargaining teams prior to actual negotiation. The aim of these observations was specified as providing information which could illustrate the influence of almost all other factors. Therefore a restricted recording method keyed to gathering specific information was felt to be the most appropriate. The selection of this method is elaborated in methodological Appendix M5.

As the first step towards fieldwork, the above data requirements, collection methods and sources of information on factors influencing approaches to issues of job regulation were assembled into a list. This became part of the outline specification for data collection instruments and is shown in Appendix M1.2

Using information from Appendices M1.1 and M1.2 content specifications were derived to be used in development and piloting of data collection instruments. Development of collection instruments is described in methodological appendices M3 to M5 where examples of the instruments themselves are given.

DATA COLLECTION

Branches were studied sequentially in the following order:-

Gas Branch

Electricity Branch

Local Authority Branch 1

Local Authority Branch 2

Within each branch, the sequence of events was keyed to gaining increasing familiarity with both the situation and respondents, to ensure their co-operation.

A first step before data collection actually commenced, was to attend a meeting of each branch executive committee. At this the aims of the study were explained, questions answered and guarantees on anonymity and results feedback given. Following this, arrangements were made to see senior management of the organization (usually the Industrial Relations Manager) to carry out a similar process. Anonymity was a requirement of all organisational managements. Thus branches are not named directly in the study.

In retrospect, the decision to consult managements prior to fieldwork was a prudent one. It ensured co-operation and in two

cases resulted in some access to organisational records, provision of interview facilities and willing assent for all respondents to be allowed absence from work to attend interviews.

The first data collection step in each branch was to obtain from its treasurer, copies of branch records to enable construction of target sampling frames. Following this, all branch officers who were not also workplace representatives were interviewed. Each interview lasted approximately 40 minutes, at the end of which questionnaires for self completion were handed to respondents.

Workplace representatives were then interviewed and self administered questionnaires were handed out. These activists were also requested to bring to the interview their constituency membership rolls. Using these and the target sampling frame, non-activist respondents were selected for subsequent interview and questionnaire application. This was accomplished by random selection using salary numbers to achieve the required sample composition according to sex and pay level criteria.

By using this method, the workplace representative alone knew the actual identity of respondents, whilst both investigator and steward were able to identify subjects by reference numbers. This gave subjects a high degree of anonymity, whilst at the same time enabling a sufficient degree of identification to allow progressing (via the steward) of respondents who were slow in returning questionnaires.

Programmes of interviews with non-activists were then completed; each interview lasting for approximately 30 minutes. At the end of each one, the questionnaire was handed to respondents and its method of completion explained. There were no refusals for either interview or questionnaire completion. Approximately 95% of questionnaires were returned within one week; no doubt due to the co-operative urging of stewards. A 100% return was achieved within two weeks.

Permission to attend both open and branch executive meetings was freely given. To allow erosion of any intrusive effects (Riley 1963, Detusch 1949) data collected in the first two executive meetings in each branch was largely ignored. Pre-meetings of negotiating committees were found not to occur; branch executive meetings being used for this purpose. Within each branch all meetings held over an eight-month period were observed.

When the fieldwork in each branch was almost completed, its senior officials were interviewed again in depth. In addition, free access to branch records was obtained at this stage and any necessary copies of minutes, correspondence and agreements taken.

The final stage for each branch was to interview the full-time trade union officer charged with its servicing, plus at least one senior member of the employing organisation's Industrial Relations staff. With respect to this last person, an exception was made in the case of the Electricity branch. Here, at a very early stage

in the investigation, it was revealed that the branch had virtually no contact with industrial relations staff; all local negotiation being with line management. In lieu of this, a senior line manager with whom the branch had the vast majority of its negotiating contact was interviewed.

DATA ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES: AN OVERVIEW

As an overall scheme, the analysis of data was undertaken in two distinct stages, in which the requirements of the second stage set a specification for the first. It is helpful to discuss the two stages in reverse order.

Inter Branch Analysis

At this level of analysis, the essential task was one of comparing the results from the four case studies to describe and explain differences between branches and draw general conclusions on relative effects of factors on approaches to issues of job regulation. With only four branches to compare sophisticated statistical analysis for comparison was precluded. Clearly the quality of any final conclusions at this stage would depend crucially on the results of the first (intra-branch) stage of analysis.

Intra-Branch Analysis

Here the task was to describe and measure the position of each branch in terms of its approaches to issues of job regulation and model its internal dynamics in terms of the effects of influencing factors.

Essentially, the task was one of searching for evidence to support causal inferences for which rigorous statistical analysis and well developed modelling techniques were used to imply causality (Blalock 1964, Heise 1975). These are described in greater detail in Appendix M6.

CHAPTER 6

DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS: THE FIVE DIMENSIONS OF APPROACHES TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes the positioning of branches along the five dimensions used to characterise approaches to issues of job regulation. For each dimension, a description is given of the data collected and its operationalisations through the derivation of indices, together with a summary table of results and brief discussion. Finally values and rank orders for all dimensions are brought together in a short discussion comparing the branches studied.

DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS ON THE DIMENSIONS

Dependence on Outside Trade Union

For this dimension two sets of data were used, each involving separate considerations. For convenience these are discussed separately.

The first set of data dealt with specified entitlements of branches to define, shape and pursue issues of job regulation. Here it was felt necessary to recognise that the trade union constitution together with existing agreements could prescribe differences in roles for branches. Accordingly, national and local procedural and substantive agreements were surveyed. In each case, these were

classified on a five-category scale reflecting varying degrees of prescribed involvement of the outside trade union:-

<u>Specified Handling Category</u>	<u>Score</u>
Locally Precluded: no allotted role for local trade union. Cases and issues to be pursued via higher echelons of trade union.	5
Locally Permitted but must be handled by full-time official from first stage.	4
Locally Permitted but must be handled by full-time official after first stage.	3
Locally Permitted but must be handled by full-time official after second stage.	2
Locally Permitted and can be handled by lay officials or handling not specified.	1

From the results of the surveys (see Appendices S2.1 to S2.4) it can be noted that there was a wider allotted role for lay officials in Local Authorities than Nationalised Industries. In the latter, whilst the degree of restriction was much the same in both cases, it was more explicit for the Electricity Branch; many agreements specified full-time officer involvement. For the Gas Branch, many agreements specified referral of an issue at its second stage to the Regional Joint Council. Since the constitution of the trade union makes it virtually inevitable that the secretary of the trade union side will be a full-time officer, referral was effectively passing the case to the outside trade union.

The second set of data used was that concerning cases and issues handled by branches. For this, details of issues and their methods of handling were obtained from branch records. In each one this covered an eighteen month period. Although all branches had in varying degrees embraced some wider social issues, these were excluded; the count being confined to matters concerning organisation or industry service conditions. Details from branch records were supplemented by data gathered from senior branch officials, full-time officers and personnel specialists using questions 58-60 and 67-70 from the interview schedule (Appendix 4.1). For reference purposes, details of all cases and issues handled by each branch are listed in Appendices S1.1 to S1.4.

Each case or issue was scored on a nominal five point scale reflecting the degree of autonomy exercised by the branch in its mode of handling. The criteria were as follows:

<u>Actual Handling Mode</u>	<u>Score</u>
Handled Nationally via Outside Trade Union.	5
Handled locally by full-time officer from first stage.	4
Handled locally by full-time officer from second stage.	3
Handled locally by full-time officer from third stage.	2
Handled throughout by lay officials of branches	1

Using the twin classifications of specified handling category and actual handling mode, a sub-index of dependence for each specified handling category was derived using the formula:-

$$\sum \frac{\text{Number of Issues in Actual Handling Mode}}{\text{Total Issues in Specified Handling Category}} \times \frac{\text{Actual Handling Mode Score}}{\text{Specified Handling Category Score}}$$

The overall index of dependence for each branch was derived by calculating the mean of sub-indices for all specified handling categories. The index gave a summary comparison of actual issue handling with specified methods in all categories. Its theoretical extremes were 100 and 1 which respectively represented the ultimate degrees of dependence or autonomy. A branch exercising just that degree of autonomy allowed in agreements and trade union constitution would score 23.625.

Derivation of indices is shown in full in Appendices S3.1 to S3.4 and summary results are given in table 6.1 below:-

	<i>Dependence Index</i>
Gas Branch	10.292
Electricity Branch	22.958
Local Authority Branch 1	19.000
Local Authority Branch 2	19.458

Table 6.1 Summary Dependence Index Scores

At this stage a number of points emerge from the results. None of the branches could be said to be dependent; rather they exhibited

varying degrees of autonomy. Overall the Electricity and both Local Authority branches showed little autonomy beyond that allowed by trade union constitution and agreements. This however, was not the case with the Gas Branch.

Looking at the more detailed picture in Appendices S3.1 to S3.4 it can be seen that both Local Authority branches displayed similar patterns of action across all specified handling categories. Moreover, their overall dependence indices were the closest of any two branches. The Electricity Branch had no consistent pattern. It displayed autonomy in some categories and dependence in others. Conversely the Gas Branch showed a consistent trend towards autonomy in all categories.

Focus in Issues

For this dimension two sets of data were used; details of issues to which branches were exposed and those cases and issues which had been adopted.

Sources of data on cases and issues adopted has already been described for the previous dimension. However, it should be noted that in this case, details of those which were of a wider social nature and involving matters beyond the employing organisation or industry were also included in the count.

Details of cases and issues to which branches had been exposed were obtained from branch minutes and an extensive survey of circulars

sent out by national and district offices of the trade union. Exposure was defined as a case, issue or cause which had been drawn to the attention of the branch, either through correspondence or personal reference. In the case of matters arising from participation of branch representatives in outside bodies such as trades councils, only those issues presented to branch executive committees for their consideration were included in the count.

In using the data to evaluate focus, it was felt that simply dichotomising issues as internal or external could be misleading. However, in all branches studied it was discovered at an early stage that each one invariably adopted for pursuit all cases and issues arising from its own membership. In addition each branch had consistently displayed solidarity with other trade unions or branches internal to the employing organisation, by providing, where required, backing for their issues. Accordingly a six category system of classifying and scoring issues was developed to measure the degree of external focus. This took internally arising issues as the datum line and was as follows:-

<u>Issue Category</u>	<u>Category Score</u>
<u>Internal Self</u> Involves only branch members and within employing organisation	0
<u>Internal Allied</u> Internal to the employing organisation but of immediate impact on employees not represented by branch i.e. manual workers or members of other branches	0
<u>External Allied</u> External to employing organisation but in same industry and involving parallel groups to those represented by branch.	0.025

<u>External Solidaristic</u> Involving other trade unions at national level or other industries in same trade union.	0.500
<u>Macro Social 1</u> Wider social issues but of significance in United Kingdom only i.e. Trade Union Legislation	7.575
<u>Macro Social 2</u> Wider social issues of significance to international trade union movement.	91.900

The scoring framework was selected with two purposes. First (for uniformity of results presentation) to produce an index with a maximum value of 100. Second (after a consideration of the numbers of issues falling into each category) to ensure that a high score truly represented an external focus i.e. it should not be possible as a result of differing numbers of issues for a less external category to score the same or higher than one representing a more external focus. (For further details see notes to Appendix S4).

For each branch an index of focus was calculated as follows:

1. Issues to which branches had been exposed and those adopted were categorised using the method given above.

2. For each category a sub-index was calculated using the formula:

$$\frac{\text{Number of Issues Adopted}}{\text{Number of Issues to Which Exposed}} \times \text{Category Score}$$

3. Category sub-indices were summed to give an overall index of focus.

Theoretically scores on this index could be anywhere between 0 and 100. The former would be attained by a branch adopting only those issues internal to the employing organisation and the latter by one which also adopted those of varying degrees of external focus. In approximate terms a score of 0.034 or below would indicate a focus predominantly concerned with the branch's own industry. For practical purposes, branches very seldom reject any internal issues and usually showed a concern for their own industry's problems. Effectively scores of above 0.034 represent some degree of additional external focus.

Derivation of indices is given in detail in Appendix S4 and summary results in table 6.2 below:

	<i>Index of Focus in Issues</i>
Gas Branch	0.644
Electricity Branch	1.290
Local Authority Branch 1	18.936
Local Authority Branch 2	1.599

Table 6.2 Summary Focus Index Scores

As can be seen none of the branches could be said to have a predominantly external focus. Only Local Authority Branch 1 had a score indicating a tendency in this direction. Conversely, the Gas Branch had a focus more severely restricted to workplace and industry issues than all others.

Turning now to the more detailed analysis given in Appendix S4 the reason for the score of Local Authority Branch 1 becomes apparent; it had adopted a fairly high number of macro-social issues. It can also be noted that compared to the other branches, the Electricity Branch showed a fairly high concern with external solidarity.

Initiation of Issues

The definition of initiation given in Chapter 2 prompted a number of considerations with respect to the measure used to compare branches.

1. Branches were felt unlikely to be proactive or reactive about every issue. Therefore, as well as providing a single index of comparison, it was considered desirable to be able to profile total issue handling into a number of different modes of action.
2. Cases and issues could vary in the numbers of members affected. Theoretically two branches could initiate the same numbers of issues, but in one case the total activity could affect only a small proportion of its members and in the other, its whole membership many times over. Clearly for a branch level measure the second instance should be rated higher in terms of initiation.

3. Existing agreements with the employer could facilitate or inhibit a branch's ability to initiate. These gave a convenient reference point against which to evaluate branch action. However, as each employing organisation had different agreements the reference point would need to be different for each branch.

To measure initiation, two major groups of data were used; details of issues handled across an eighteen month period and details of agreements relating to each employing organisation.

Sources of data on issues handled has been described for the previous two dimensions. In this instance, since the object was to evaluate branch level initiation, issues prompted by national and district trade union initiatives were excluded from the count. Conversely, branch action to pursue an issue via national or district levels was included.

To provide the reference point for evaluation of action, national agreements, local written agreements and custom and practice arrangements were surveyed to establish their frontier of control provisions. These were classified as falling into one of the following five types which were then divided into two categories; management "reserved" issues and "negotiable" issues, as follows:-

Frontier of Control Provisions

Type Category

Agreement gave employer unilateral decision making rights over some aspect of job regulation with no specified process of consultation.

Reserved Issues

OR

Agreement obliged employer to consult over some aspect of job regulation but had no built-in right of appeal against management decisions.

Reserved Issues

Agreement required employer to consult over some aspect of job regulation and had built-in appeal provisions to be used in the event of disagreement.

Negotiable Issues

OR

Agreement required any employer proposal with respect to some aspect of job regulation to be subject to agreement for each specific case.

Negotiable Issues

OR

Agreement gave trade union an explicit frontier of control over some aspect of job regulation where rights existed to be claimed.

Negotiable Issues

For each branch a profile of action was derived as follows:-

- i. Issues handled over the eighteen month period were classified as falling into either the reserved or negotiable categories

- ii. In both categories, cases and issues were sub-divided into those initiated by either the branch or management. This gave four modes of action representing increasing degrees of branch proaction. Namely:-

<u>Action Mode</u>	<u>Issue Area</u>	<u>Initiating Party</u>	<u>Characteristics</u>
A	Reserved	Management	Branch listening (on behalf of members) to management decision.
B	Negotiable	Management	Branch negotiating (on behalf of members) a management proposal.
C	Negotiable	Branch	Branch attempting to enhance members interests in area where management's unilateral decision making already eroded by prior agreements.
D	Reserved	Branch	Branch attempting to advance members interests by alteration to management's boundaries of unilateral decision making.

- iii. Proportions of branch memberships covered by cases handled in each action mode were summed to give mode totals. Mode totals added together represented the sum of all branch job regulation activity for the time period. From this a profile of action was obtained by calculating the percentage of the whole, represented by each action mode. These are shown graphically in Fig. 6.1
- iv. Overall indices of initiation were derived by multiplying mode percentages by the following mode scores.


<u>Action Mode</u>	<u>Score</u>
A	1
B	33
C	66
D	100

The scoring framework was selected to produce an index having theoretical extremes of 100 and 1. The former representing a branch proactive about all issues and the latter one which only reacted to management proposals.

Derivation of these indices is shown in full in appendices S5.1 to S.5.4 and summary results are given in table 6.3 below.

PROPORTIONS OF BRANCH ACTIVITY IN ACTION MODES

Fig. 6.1



	<i>Index of Initiation</i>
Gas Branch	44.938
Electricity Branch	47.921
Local Authority Branch 1	71.056
Local Authority Branch 2	54.420

Table 6.3 Summary Initiation Index Scores

As can be seen from the summary table the most proactive branch was Local Authority 1 and the least Gas. However, the profile of differences shown in fig. 6.1 gives a more revealing picture.

In the Local Authorities, management were the initiating party only in reserved areas. Moreover in each one, their initiations accounted for very nearly the same proportions of total activity. Thus branches were not forced to devote their efforts to defence of their frontiers of control. With respect to the other modes of action, the two Local Authority branches were quite different. Branch number one had a very high level of initiation in hitherto reserved areas. The other branch tended to initiate mainly in those which were negotiable areas.

In both Nationalised Industries branches were largely reactive to management initiatives. The distinguishing feature between the two was management's higher level of initiation in negotiable areas in Gas.

It can also be noted that the areas in which the two branches did initiate were different. With the Gas Branch it was in hitherto reserved areas. In the case of Electricity it was totally in regard to negotiable issues, but the proportions of membership affected indicate that initiation was frequently in an attempt to expand the provisions of an existing agreement seen by the branch as unsatisfactory in its present state.

Intensity of Action

Two major considerations influenced the way in which the measure for this dimension was operationalised:

- i. For evaluation of intensity at branch level, proportions of members affected by issues and cases would need to be incorporated into the measure. Two issues involving the same action patterns but with different numbers of members should not be rated the same in terms of intensity.
- ii. To simply dichotomise actions into militant and non-militant would be both arbitrary and misleading. A more finely graduated classification, enabling expression of a wide range of actions would need to be used.

To provide data for the measure, details of all cases and issues adopted and pursued over an eighteen month period were used. Sources of this data have been described above.

Indices of branch intensity were derived as follows:

1. Cases and issues adopted were classified into types according to the most intense action used in their pursuit. Each type was allocated a nominal score reflecting increasing degrees of intensity with the scoring framework being selected to produce an index having a maximum value of 100.

2. Each case or issue was also classified as falling into one of five categories roughly approximating to the breadth of its impact on memberships of branches, trade union or beyond; i.e. Individual Issues, Group/Departmental Issues, Organisational Issues, Industry Issues, Wider Social Issues. This sub-division was adopted for descriptive purposes and to highlight any differences in action patterns associated with the level of trade union from which issues emanated.

3. For cases and issues in each category the proportion of branch membership involved was multiplied by its intensity nominal score. This produced a case index which reflected the proportion of the branch involved in a pattern of action at a level of intensity.

4. These case indices were summed and the resulting figure divided by the total number of cases and issues. This gave an overall index reflecting the mean level of intensity for all cases and issues throughout the time period.

Scores on this index could theoretically fall between 1 and 100; a high figure representing greater intensity of action. It is important to note however, that the index represents not only different actions but the breadth of their adoption. Very high scores could only be obtained by relatively militant action involving all members on all issues; a fairly untypical situation.

Derivation of indices together with the action type scores used is shown in detail in Appendices S6.1 to S6.4 and summary results given in table 6.4 below

	<i>Index of Intensity of Action</i>
Gas Branch	2.235
Electricity Branch	3.456
Local Authority Branch 1	1.406
Local Authority Branch 2	1.390

Table 6.4 Summary of Intensity Index Scores

The summary results demonstrated that the highest level of intensity was displayed by the Electricity Branch and the second highest by Gas. When taken across all cases and issues the scores of these two branches indicated an average action pattern of Informal Negotiation. This however, was a greater intensity of action than the local authority branches, where the average intensity of action was below joint consultation.

Although indices portray average patterns of action, there are differences shown in Appendices S6.1 to S6.4 which give a somewhat richer picture. Here it can be seen that so far as individual issues are concerned, all four branches were very similar.

At group/departmental level it was the Gas branch which scored highest; a score largely derived from a single occurrence of strike action involving the whole membership. The difference between the gas branch and others in the relative volumes of activity at this level is an important distinguishing feature. The Electricity branch, whilst still having large numbers of members involved at this level attained a lower score because matters were handled largely by negotiation. Both local authority branches had low scores reflecting issues involving relatively small membership proportions.

At organisational level there were also wide differences in both numbers of issues and action patterns. Here the interesting feature is the gas branch which became involved in only one issue, but this was pursued by relatively militant action. Other branches were involved in greater numbers of issues at this level and pursued them by a wider variety of actions.

Turning now to industry level issues, all branches had identical scores derived from similar patterns of adoption and pursuit of nationally initiated issues.

At the Wider Social level all branches but one had scores reflecting totally passive patterns of issue adoption. The exception here was Local Authority Branch 1, which actively pursued an issue of this type into a negotiating forum.

Representativeness

A single measure was used for this dimension; namely, non-activist perceptions of potential representativeness on a broad range of issues to which they could be exposed. Although the measure of representativeness was concerned with rank and file evaluations, it was also considered useful to obtain a similar measure for activists. This was concerned with the influence activists perceived themselves to have in influencing branch policy and was obtained because it was felt that any differences between the two groups was a potentially useful feature that might aid explanations of scores on this and other dimensions.

Data for the measure was obtained from responses to item C7 on self administered questionnaires (Appendix M3.1). This asked subjects to indicate their perceived opportunity to influence branch policy on five categories of issues: Individual, Group/Departmental, Organisational, Industry and Wider Social.

For each category mean scores were calculated, and from these the mean score for all categories was obtained. Scores on this measure could theoretically range between 100 and 1 - the former reflecting perceptions of very high representativeness.

Detailed results are presented in appendices S7.1 and S7.2 for non-activists and activists respectively and summary scores in table 6.5 below. Appendices S7.3 to S7.6 give comparisons between activist and non-activist samples within each branch.

	<i>Mean Sample Score Non-Activists</i>	<i>Mean Sample Score Activists (comparison only)</i>
Gas Branch	45.739	65.833
Electricity Branch	43.499	71.352
Local Authority Branch 1	58.354	64.288
Local Authority Branch 2	40.444	61.335

Table 6.5 Summary Representativeness Scores

In only one branch (Local Authority 1) did the non-activist scores reach the half-scale value of 50. Conversely activists saw themselves as having much higher opportunities to influence policy.

Although reflecting the overall position in branches, summary scores mask several interesting features in the way scores varied by issue category. Here it can be seen in Appendix S7.1 that differences between non-activists scores were only statistically significant at the minimum level for two issue categories; organisational and wider social.

For wider social issues, significant differences arose from the lower scores for two branches in the issue category where representativeness was most poorly evaluated.

With organisational issues the picture is somewhat different. Here Local Authority 1 branch members saw their opportunity to shape policy as highest at group/departmental and organisational levels. For other branches, there was a progressive decline in perceived representativeness as issue levels moved from individual to wider social.

For activists, differences in scores were not statistically significant in any issue category (Appendix S7.2). An important feature was that they perceived their opportunity to influence policy to be at its highest at either group/departmental or organisational levels.

Appendices S7.3 to S7.6 show that each branch had its own pattern of differences between activist and non-activist scores. For the Gas branch differences were small and nowhere statistically significant. Similarly in Local Authority branch 1, although differences were statistically significant in four categories, mean scores were (with the exception of wider social issues) quite close. Conversely, in Electricity and Local Authority 2 branches differences were much larger and statistically significant in several categories.

As a preliminary finding it can be observed that the two branches where rank and file evaluations of representativeness were the highest, differences between activist and non-activist scores were the smallest. Conversely, where rank and file evaluations were

lowest, differences in perceptions were highest. This, as will be seen in later chapters, has some connection with differences in branch decision making processes.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE FIVE DIMENSIONS

As described above, the five dimensions used to characterise approaches to issues of job regulation have been treated discretely. It remains therefore, to illustrate a number of features with respect to patterns of positionings which are germane to subsequent explanations. Table 6.6 below gives summary scores for all five dimensions together with rank order positions for each branch:-

Dimension	Gas Branch		Electricity Branch		Local Authority Branch 1		Local Authority Branch 2	
	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank
Dependence on Outside Trade Union	10.292	4	22.958	1	19.000	3	19.458	2
Focus in Issues	0.644	4	1.290	3	18.936	1	1.599	2
Initiation of Action	44.938	4	47.921	3	71.056	1	54.420	2
Intensity in Action	2.235	2	3.456	1	1.406	3	1.390	4
Representativeness for Non-Activists	45.739	2	43.499	3	58.354	1	40.444	4
Activists Perceptions of their Influence (for comparison only)	65.833	2	71.352	1	64.288	3	61.335	4

Table 6.6 Branch Scores and Rank Order Positions on the Five Dimensions of Approaches to Issues of Job Regulation

The most convenient way to illustrate potential interconnections in positioning is to compare and contrast branches on a number of dimensions.

A noticeable feature was the relationship between focus and initiation of issues i.e. the more externally focused the branch the higher its level of initiation of issues. A weaker negative relationship was apparent between initiation and intensity of action. The two branches with the most intense action patterns (Gas and Electricity) were those with the lowest levels of initiation. Conversely the two local authority branches which initiated more issues had patterns of pursuit which were less intense.

It is also noticeable that the two branches evaluated highest by their members in terms of representativeness (Gas and Local Authority 1) were also those with least dependence on the outside trade union.

Finally, although not a dimension used here to compare differences between branches, the direct relationship between intensity of action and activist evaluations of their opportunity to influence policy and action is worthy of mention. As activist evaluations of their influence rose, so did the intensity level with which issues were pursued.

Thus tentative evidence emerged that some dimensions could be connected. The following chapters explore in depth a number of factors which provide some explanations of these features.

CHAPTER 7

ISSUES FACTORS: THE DOMINANT ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter and the next, both deal with issues as factors which can in themselves shape branch patterns of action. The following chapter deals with the topic in a more generalised way, whilst this one concerns itself with a number of dominant issues each of which had a detectable influence on one or more aspects of a branch's approach to job regulation.

Issues are described, together with a brief note on their more pronounced effects. The drawing of overall conclusions on the effects of issues is deferred until the end of the following chapter where data from both chapters is drawn into an integrated picture for each branch.

GENERAL

The primary activity of all branches studied was involvement in issues, each branch having its own particular workload which constituted an imperative to respond with particular patterns of action. However within overall workloads it was possible to identify in each branch a small number of dominant issues, the existence of which had a more visible effect in shaping action.

Data to describe and explain these features was obtained from responses to questions 36 to 44 on the interview schedule (Appendix M4.1). Details obtained from responses were checked against branch records and correspondence. For those issues current whilst fieldwork was in progress, interview data was supplemented by observation of branch meetings where issues were discussed.

THE GAS BRANCH

For this branch the bulk of case workload was departmental reorganisations. These were of either a purely structural nature or involved introduction of new technology and working methods.

Some two years prior to the study there had been a number of major reorganisations and the branch's workload can be seen as part of the legacy of previous events. At the time of the study a process of adjustment to new structures and technologies at departmental level had prompted the high number of reorganisations. As a consequence the focus of negotiating activity had shifted to workplace level and for the branch concerned, the period was one of high activity. Arising from these reorganisations was an almost inevitable volume of individual cases concerning regradings, redeployments etc.

Within this milieu two prominent issues occurred which had a highly visible effect on the branch's approach to job regulation.

The Meter Readers Dispute

This issue occurred some twelve months prior to the commencement of fieldwork. It centred around management's proposals to institute

major changes in working practices for a group of employees, some of whom were branch members.

After prolonged negotiations, senior management refused to modify their proposals and threatened to impose the changes without agreement. In retaliation, the trade union side of the Regional Joint Council (R.J.C.) threatened all out strike action.

In the branch investigated, a special executive meeting decided that stewards should sense member opinion to the retaliatory strike and report back to branch officers who would then vote at a meeting of representatives of all branches. In essence the rank and file view that emerged was that whilst they did not wish to take strike action, they would do so if instructed. This view however, came only from the small number of stewards who had been able to extract any answer from their constituents.

Faced with this somewhat ambiguous situation, branch officers felt unable to vote one way or the other at a reconvened meeting of branches. However, they agreed to instruct branch members according to the majority view of the meeting. This was for strike action and both management and the branch membership were informed that unless the proposed imposition of changes was withdrawn, indefinite strike action would commence two days later. Within twenty four hours of the instruction being given, members called a mass meeting of the branch and summoned branch officers to attend and account for their actions.

The meeting resulted in an emotive and heated exchange of views. Activists stressed the need for solidarity and criticized the rank and file for failing to give a clear indication of their will until after the event. In return, the rank and file criticized their officers for not balloting before deciding on strike action and for being (as they saw matters) at the beck and call of the district trade union and other branches.

Since a compromise accommodation was reached with management the strike lasted less than one day. However, for some time there was an uneasy relationship between activists and the rank and file. The whole matter reached a climax some two months later at the branch annual general meeting. Here stewards and officers refused to take office for the following year unless in future, rank and file members were prepared to take a greater interest in events and make their will known to the executive.

The rank and file virtually had to plead with activists to take office but nevertheless stressed that from that time they would require the executive committee to attend to the affairs of the branch and put the interests of its members before those of other parts of the trade union. As a result an uneasy truce was concocted which clearly laid down for activists the matters with which they were expected to concern themselves. In return, within the confines of their brief, activists had obtained for themselves a more focal and influential role in issue definition and shaping.

The Issue of Accountability of Regional Negotiators

This issue occurred almost immediately after the one above.

For twelve month's prior to its occurrence there had been persistent rumours that a major reorganisation of service depots represented by the branch would reduce their number from five to four. Despite requests for information on this matter, the existence of reorganisation plans was denied by management.

Eventually, information in the form of a map outlining the proposed changes came into the possession of the branch secretary who tackled management on the matter. Management repeated their denial of reorganisation plans and the branch then decided to push matters into the regional negotiating forum (R.J.C.).

Accordingly branch representatives reported the matter at the next meeting of the District Service Conditions Committee. They successfully proposed a motion binding the trade union side of the Regional Joint Council to convene a special meeting to pursue the matter which, if not resolved, could then be forced to National level. However, at a pre-meeting of the trade-union side, the full-time officer argued against pursuit of the issue. Despite efforts of the two branch members who were at that time part of the trade union side, the full time officers advice was followed.

A special meeting of the branch executive committee (where these events were reported) took the line that the trade union side of the

Regional Joint Council was appointed by the District Service Conditions Committee and had no right to refuse to negotiate an issue when so instructed. Accordingly, branch representatives on the District Service Conditions Committee were instructed to move a vote of censure on the trade union side of the Regional Joint Council and the full-time officer. This was done but the motion was defeated and both branch members of the trade union side immediately resigned their seats.

When matters were reported back, the branch executive took the view that events had virtually removed from the trade union side of the Regional Joint Council any accountability to the membership on whose part it negotiated. As such, it was felt to have little relevance as a channel through which the branch could pursue issues on behalf of its members. It was decided therefore to take the issue before an open meeting of the branch, after first reporting matters more widely via stewards.

At the open meeting two resolutions of particular significance received extensive debate and were passed unanimously. The first was a motion that the branch would no longer hold itself bound by decisions and policies of either the District Service Conditions Committee or the trade union side of the Regional Joint Council. Moreover it would, in future, deal independently with all cases and issues of concern to its own members alone.

The second motion was a recognition that the first would require a stronger and more effective shop steward system to deal with workplace matters in order to free branch officers to negotiate on issues hitherto handled by or with the full-time officer. The motion made it a branch rule that all cases and issues be channelled via stewards and remain their property until adopted by the branch at an executive meeting. A corollary, of course, was that a constituency without a steward would be unable to be represented by the branch without first pleading the case before an open meeting. Following the meeting management were informed of the branch's new policy and from then on the full-time officer was excluded from all involvement in its cases and issues.

The effects of this and the previous issue on branch action were to some extent mutually reinforcing. Both issues served to firmly delineate the boundaries of branch involvement in issues. In addition both strengthened the role and influence of steward organisation and placed a measure of responsibility firmly onto the shoulders of rank and file members for achieving success in the pursuit of issues. The second issue on its own determined that the branch would be highly independent from the outside trade union.

Two subsequent events will perhaps illustrate the manifestations of the policy. In the first, instead of pursuing a group grievance about shift-pay entitlement via Regional and National procedures, the branch mobilized support via its strengthened steward system to force management (contrary to national agreements) to pay the allowances.

In the second, the branch held its own internal ballot and accepted management proposals on local holiday timing contrary to the stance then being taken by the trade union side of the Regional Joint Council that the proposals were unacceptable.

ELECTRICITY BRANCH

This branch also had a substantial workload arising from organisational change. As with the Gas Branch, the then current reorganisation arose as a consequence of earlier changes. In this case however, the number of reorganisations to be dealt with was much smaller. These were concerned solely with organisation structures but affected all branch members.

Traditionally job regulation activity by the branch had largely been at individual level; existing national agreements together with custom and practice making almost anything above this a matter for full-time officer involvement. However, for some time, organisational change in the form of new structures and technologies had induced a more prominent role for the branch in representation of groups of members. Within this pattern, two very prominent issues occurred, both of which had a detectable influence on the branch's approach to job regulation.

The Issue of Support for Other Trade Unions

This issue had its roots in the decision of NALGO at national level to donate several thousand pounds to the National Union of Mineworkers during its long dispute with the National Coal Board in 1984/85. Whilst the dispute was in progress, all NALGO branches were asked by

the parent union to consider making donations to a hardship fund for miners families. The executive committee of the branch decided to accede to one of these appeals and a donation was made.

Knowledge of the branch donation become widespread shortly before an open meeting was held on another topic; at which point a number of rank and file members tabled it as an agenda item. Despite protestations that they were merely responding to what had become national trade union policy, many branch members saw the actions of their executive committee as overtly political. Rank and file members could not (or would not) distinguish between a contribution to another union's strike fund and a donation to a hardship fund for striker's families. As a result the executive committee were severely censured and instructed to make no further donations of a like nature without specific permission. In addition there were a number of resignations from the union.

Arising from this issue was a somewhat reluctant realisation by activists that matters beyond those strictly concerned with service conditions could be anathema to the membership. In so far as the rank and file were concerned it may well be that the issue prompted a degree of watchfulness over, or even interest in, branch activities. For example attendance at open meetings was much higher after the event and hitherto unrepresented groups nominated representatives to sit on the branch executive committee.

Amalgamation of North and South Divisions

This issue arose shortly before the commencement of fieldwork. It had its origins some years previously when the employing authority had implemented a major structural reorganisation.

Prior to the earlier reorganisation, organisational structure was that of a fairly large number of divisions each covering a small geographic area. In the reorganisation the number of divisions was reduced, each new one consisting of two or more of the previous units. For the branch studied this had resulted in the amalgamation of three small divisions, each one retaining its own site with parallel functions and structures - a situation ripe for further rationalisation.

In the year prior to the study, rationalisation had commenced with the transfer of the bulk of work and duties from the smallest site to the remaining two. A small number of employees remained on the small site which was retained as a depot and stores. Shortly after fieldwork commenced, management announced their intention of closing one of the remaining sites which would effectively bring the bulk of personnel under one roof. It was not specified which office was to close, merely that the decision would rest on the commercial consideration of which site could most easily be sold.

In the absence of any definite information the situation was highly ambiguous for all branch members. Moreover, an inherent part of the proposal was a rationalisation of parallel structures into a single

chain of command. Consequently there were real fears of loss of position, career prospects and even security of employment.

Existing agreements made it inevitable that the proposal was first aired at regional negotiating level. Indeed, under what had hitherto been negotiating practice, it is at this level that the matter would normally have remained to be handled by the full-time trade union side secretary. However, the branch executive took the decision to handle matters itself. Accordingly it asserted the constitutional right of the lower tier Whitley body (the Staff Committee) to handle the issue; a step which caused some consternation at District Level.

A well attended open meeting was held by the branch at which the executive committee put forward its proposals for negotiating objectives. However, a degree of factionalism based on existing geography appeared amongst branch members. There were assumptions (subsequently supported by events) as to which site would be closed. Those already located at the one which it was assumed would remain open, attempted to make a case for protection of sitting tenancies for existing postholders, thus ensuring for themselves a somewhat unequal opportunity of promotion, or at least avoidance of demotion. This was resisted by activists and members from the other site who had their own concerns with respect to relocation.

Eventually a compromise set of negotiating objectives was agreed which, apart from a few minor points, was that originally proposed by the executive committee. The most important point (designed to remove some of the nagging ambiguity) was reflected in the motion that "there be no cooperation whatsoever with management's proposals until full structures (including numbers and grading of posts) were published together with a decision on which site was to remain open".

This ploy put matters firmly back in management's hands and gave branch negotiators a breathing space to construct more detailed plans. Subsequent events made action to implement the spirit of the motion unnecessary. Management quickly took the decision to close one of the sites without finding a buyer and produced proposed structures. These were discussed with the membership by representatives who fed comments back to the executive committee.

At this point the branch executive took the initiative. Taking cognizance of members comments and apprehensions, it produced its own plan specifying how the reorganisation should be implemented. This included a no compulsory redundancy clause and a system of counselling interviews for all members before decisions were made on redeployment to specific posts. The right to be accompanied by a trade union representative at the counselling interview was included. It was proposed that the existing sub-depot remain open to accommodate those whose domicile made a move to the new location impossible and a scale of relocation and travelling allowances was

suggested for those who moved. These proposals were quickly presented to management and (after some bargaining) accepted virtually unaltered.

The whole matter, including branch initiatives, was reported to the membership at the annual general meeting some six weeks later. The full proposals were debated and unanimously accepted by the membership who were highly congratulatory of efforts and initiatives on their behalf.

As with the Gas Branch there was an element of mutual reinforcement in the effects of the two issues. The first served to delineate legitimate branch activity and assert member demands to be involved in matters that affected them. The second focused attention on domestic matters in a service where nationally negotiated issues traditionally dominated union activity. Moreover in the way it was handled, this second issue both established a strong representational role for the branch and gave the rank and file higher involvement in decisions.

This may well have had an adverse effect on overall rank and file evaluations of branch representativeness. It could have raised expectations about control of all issues; an expectation which in practical terms could not be satisfied. For example, a short while later branch activists were engaged in attempting to mobilise a yes vote for a national ballot on minor industrial action in pursuit of a claim for reduced working hours. Here the rank and file seemed

unable to comprehend that they alone could not determine for national negotiators how the issue should be pursued.

LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 1

Although this branch also dealt with a number of departmental level reorganisations, these generally involved quite small numbers of members. The vast majority of its job regulation activity was conducted at organisational level in the negotiation and re-negotiation of formal agreements. Indeed, almost all departmental and individual cases and issues arose from structural adjustments prompted by organisational agreements. Within this milieu, four issues stand out as visibly affecting approaches to job regulation.

The Issue of Accountability of Branch Officers and Delegates

This matter was also connected with donations made by the parent trade union in the National Union of Mineworkers' strike. However, the point at issue was not local donations to a hardship fund, but NALGO's national contribution. Here the membership of the branch was highly incensed, with much talk of mass resignations from the union.

Eventually a number of other branches requisitioned a special one-day national conference to debate the issue. The executive committee of the branch, knowing that feelings were running high, called a special open meeting to mandate its delegate. At the meeting activists argued that the delegate should have an unencumbered vote after hearing the arguments. However, rank and file members firmly instructed that he vote to censure the National

Executive Committee for donations already made and against further contributions.

At the conference itself, after listening to the arguments the delegate voted contrary to the branch mandate. When this became known in the branch, a furore erupted but no open meeting was held to allow the members to voice their feelings. The consequence was the creation amongst active and non-active members of suspicion that there existed within the branch an inner cabal of senior officers who would act (irrespective of how instructed) as they saw fit.

Local Unemployment Initiatives

In accordance with NALGO's national policy of attempting to combat unemployment, the branch had for some time prior to the study maintained pressure on the employer to give employment to the maximum numbers possible. The area served by the authority was one which had an unemployment level well above the national average and at a branch executive meeting it was proposed and carried that the branch itself should do something more positive.

The idea was floated that the membership be voluntarily levied and the proceeds used to fund additional new jobs in the organisation jointly with the employer. Support for this was canvassed and willing consent of the membership obtained. Therefore negotiations were opened with the employer which resulted in an agreement to do as proposed.

At an open meeting where the result of the negotiations was reported, it became clear that rank and file members as well as activists had some desire for involvement of the branch in wider social issues; but of this type only. From henceforth an unwritten, informal but nevertheless consistently followed policy, was a degree of participation in the affairs of the local community. In some cases this was passive and took the form of donations and grants. In others, a more active role was played in promoting local festivals and events. All of this took place with the consent and sometimes active involvement of rank and file members. Almost inevitably, once the branch's horizons had been extended beyond the boundaries of the employing authority, donations and support for many other issues of a wider social nature was forthcoming. A legacy of the issue was therefore a degree of external focus totally untypical of other branches studied.

Transfer of Assets of New Town Development Corporation

This matter had been live for sometime before fieldwork in the branch. It had its roots in the 1980 decision of central government to wind-up New Town Development Corporations and accelerate the process of asset transfer to local authorities.

It was part of national NALGO policy that New Town's staff should effectively be given first priority for employment in the expanded local authorities which resulted from transfer of assets. Accordingly the branch successfully negotiated an agreement with the employer which embodied this principle together with protected

salaries and service conditions for those who transferred. Problematically, staff in New Town development corporations (to compensate for the finite nature of employment) enjoyed somewhat better salaries and service conditions than equivalent posts in local authorities. Therefore in concluding the agreement, the branch came into conflict with some of its own members; many of whom felt that too much effort had been devoted to protection of what they saw as privileged outsiders. At one point rank and file members refused to sanction the signing of the agreement until some of its clauses had been drastically modified.

It also became clear that some groups of members would be more affected than others. For example with the transfer of substantial housing stock and public works responsibility, it was obvious that these two functions would need to absorb the bulk of staff from the Development Corporation. Consequently there was some apprehension in the department's concerned that the transferred employees would be an imported strata that blocked career prospects. Indeed, a degree of factionalism arose in which those most affected tried to pursue sectional interests and others to promote wider trade union policy. Tensions were heightened by negotiating practices in the organisation. The process of bargaining was frequently conducted between a small number (usually two) branch officers and the same number of personnel specialists. Coincidentally one of the branch's two chief negotiators worked in a department most affected. Inevitably

therefore, old wounds were opened in regard to accountability of branch officers.

Since transfer was not finalised by the start of the study, the issue (together with the one following) came to dominate branch thoughts throughout the investigation. Its primary effect was to bring workplace representatives and their constituents into an increased level of interaction. Representatives were consistently used by the rank and file as information sources and sometimes to vociferously pursue factional interests at executive meetings.

The Issue of Privatisation

This issue like the previous one, was an ongoing matter for the branch. It had its origins in the steps taken by central government to encourage the subcontracting out to private tender of various functions performed by local authorities.

Faced with future scrutiny of the authority's activities, it had been realised by a number of elected councillors that pressures to privatise might grow stronger and be extremely hard to resist. An approach was therefore made to all trade unions within the organisation to form an ad-hoc consultative committee to discuss how this situation might be dealt with. Accordingly the branch secretary and chairman were nominated to sit on this committee.

From the outset, the committee operated in a fairly unconventional way. It very quickly emerged that all parties had the common aim of resisting privatisation. From then on the bulk of discussion

concerned the relative merits of different proposals to attain this objective. Bargaining therefore had a distinctly integrative framework (Walton and McKersie 1965).

At the time of the study, the most significant conclusion reached was that certain departments were more susceptible to privatisation than others. Consequently for these departments, it would be necessary to demonstrate to any external scrutineers a picture of extremely high efficiency and economy; particularly in the use of labour. Short of redundancies, relocation of employees away from these departments into other, less sensitive areas was agreed as the most appropriate step. As a party to the bargain, trade unions were expected to play a positive role in encouraging members to make these moves.

This issue had perhaps a greater effect on approaches to job regulation than all others. The establishment of a pattern of integrative bargaining for this issue tended to result in a more integrative approach to many others. Since for almost all major issues the same two senior branch officers were the bargaining agents, this did little to dispel lightly veiled accusations of an inner cabal or, indeed, that the branch was being politicised.

An even more noteworthy feature was that the potential wholesale movement of employees spawned a number of proposals by the branch for new agreements to formally protect members service conditions and career opportunities if seconded or relocated. Thus the branch

tended to become the initiating party in a high proportion of new issues of job regulation.

LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 2

Like the other local authority branch, most job regulation activity was conducted at the level of the employing authority. However, this branch had already dealt with transfer of assets from a New Town Development Corporation. The employing organisation, rather than being faced with an impending upheaval was in the process of settling down after a major change. For this branch, job regulation mainly consisted of an ongoing routine of attempting to gain small increments of improvement for its members - either as individuals, or as a whole, through new agreements. Two prominent issues stand out as having an effect in shaping its approach.

Transfer of Assets from New Town Development Corporation

This event, prompted by the same central government directive as for the previous branch, had occurred some twelve months prior to fieldwork. It had an indirect but nevertheless significant impact on approaches to job regulation.

Negotiations for the transfer itself had proceeded smoothly and the branch achieved much in terms of protected salaries and service conditions for those who took up employment with the local authority. Unfortunately several of those who did transfer exploited loopholes in the agreements by first taking redundancy from the Development Corporation, then employment with the local authority on protected conditions.

Inevitably this resulted in a degree of animosity and factionalism in the branch. This still persisted in some degree nine months later when fieldwork commenced. It provided a legacy of feeling which was to materially influence the most important issue which is described next.

The Issue of Local Holiday Entitlement

The origins of this issue lie well before the 1974 local government reorganisation. At that time the employing authority, had been a small town council with a somewhat paternal approach to employees. A decision had been taken by the elected body to grant all employees an additional Tuesday as a local supplement to every national bank holiday. Although never ratified as a formal agreement between trade union and employer, this was recorded in council minutes and honoured as a custom and practice arrangement.

Throughout the next two decades as the number of public bank holidays progressively increased, the employer experienced increasing difficulty in making its services accessible to the public on these supplementary Tuesdays. Eventually some four years before the study, the decision was taken in council that the arrangements would be honoured for all existing employees but new appointments would only be granted the basic nationally agreed holiday entitlement.

Although new employees all joined with this provision reflected in their contracts of employment, the decision remained unimplemented for some years. The number of new employees was comparatively

small and the council would have found it virtually impossible to open its offices on bank holiday Tuesdays. An additional complicating factor was that in the meantime, a fairly large number of employees from the now defunct Development Corporation had joined the local authority, all of whom enjoyed the additional day as part of their protected conditions.

After four years however, the employer realised that there were now sufficient new employees with only the basic holiday entitlement to make possible the opening of offices on Tuesdays following bank holidays. Accordingly, it was announced that from henceforth this would happen with manning by those on the basic contract.

The announcement raised an immediate howl of protest from those affected. An open meeting was requisitioned by these members to press their case. Here it was explained to the affected members that under employment law, their contracts were individual and binding. However, branch officers did agree to take the issue on board and open negotiations which, if necessary, would be pursued under dispute procedures to negotiating forums outside the authority.

Not content with this, the aggrieved faction proposed and had passed, an all embracing motion. This specified that the branch obtain (not, it will be noted, try to obtain) for all its members the same holiday entitlement as that enjoyed by long serving employees.

The effect of this on branch negotiators and subsequent action was extremely significant. Whilst they felt the cause was a just and worthy one, it was something of an albatross around their necks. Short of the whole branch being prepared to back-up the demand with industrial action, they felt the objective unattainable. Notwithstanding the enthusiasm for the motion at the meeting, they also felt that those already enjoying enhanced holidays were unlikely to strike to obtain the entitlement for those who were not. Indeed they felt that if this were put to the test it would be likely to promote rampant factionalism in the branch.

The dilemma this posed was complicated by a number of other claims for local enhancement of service conditions; most of which were either in the early stages of negotiation or due for submission. Inevitably if the common leave entitlement objective was to be achieved then other negotiating goals might need to be surrendered as a trade-off.

In effect this is just what happened. Other claims were either not pressed or were actually withdrawn. Thus what had been planned as an extremely proactive period of branch activity, became one of almost complete reactivity to employer initiatives.

These then were the dominant issues in each branch. The following chapter examines total workloads of issues for each branch and

integrates findings from this chapter into overall conclusions on issues as factors shaping approaches to job regulation.

CHAPTER 8

ISSUES FACTORS: GENERAL MEASURES AND OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

This chapter commences with the examination of a number of general measures which tap attitudes of branch members to a range of issues and participation in issue shaping. Member recollections of issues which occurred in the recent past of the branch histories are then examined, together with their perceptions of the range of issues in which branch involvement was desired.

The relationships between measures is explored and data from this and the previous chapter are brought together in an examination of the way in which issues factors give partial explanations of branch approaches to job regulation.

GENERAL MEASURES

Issue Salience

For this measure, data was used from self-administered questionnaire items C1, C2a, C3a, C4a, C5a and C6a (Appendices M3.1). Question C1 asked respondents to indicate the rank order of importance for branch involvement in five issue types: Individual Issues, Group/Departmental Issues, Organisational Issues, Industry Issues and Wider Social Issues. The remaining questions asked respondents to rank order specific examples within each type.

This data was treated as follows:-

1. For each respondent, issue type ranks and ranks of issues within each type, were transformed into a rank ordered list for the fifteen issue examples. From these, mean rank orders were calculated for non-activist and activist samples of each branch.
 - ii. Mean rank orders were ranked from one to fifteen to give overall salience rankings for branch samples; a rank of 1 being the highest salience.
- Details of salience rankings obtained are given in Appendices S8.1 to 8.6 and summary details for issue types in table S8.1 below.

	<i>Individual Issues</i>	<i>Group/Departmental Issues</i>	<i>Organisational Issues</i>	<i>Industry Issues</i>	<i>Wider Social Issues</i>
Gas Branch:					
Non Activists	2	4	1	3	5
Activists	3	1	2	4	5
Electricity Branch:					
Non Activists	2	4	1	3	5
Activists	4	1	3	2	5
Local Authority Branch 1:					
Non Activists	2	4	1	3	5
Activists	2	3	1	4	5
Local Authority Branch 2:					
Non Activists	2	4	1	3	5
Activists	1	3	2	4	5

Table 8.1 Rank Order of Salience by Issue Type

Non-Activists in all branches had the same relative order of type salience. For the fifteen issue examples, very few of the differences between branches were statistically significant (Appendix S8.1).

For activists there was a noticeable difference by type between local authority and nationalised industry branches. In the latter group/departmental issues were amongst the most salient whilst in local authorities their importance was much lower. There was also a difference in type salience between the nationalised industry branches. In Gas, the three most salient issue types all lay within the employing organisation whilst for Electricity, industry issues were highly salient.

Perceived Importance of Rank and File Involvement in Issue Shaping

For this measure, data from self-administered questionnaire items C2b, C3b, C4b, C5b and C6b was used. For each of the fifteen issue examples, respondents were asked to indicate on a five point scale the importance of rank and file involvement in deciding policy or action. Data obtained was treated as follows:

- i. Responses were scored 100, 75, 50, 25 or 1 according to the cell ticked; the higher score representing Very Important.
- ii. Mean scores for issue examples were computed for Non-activist and Activist samples of each branch. From these, mean scores for issue types were calculated.
- iii. Means for the fifteen issues were rank ordered to provide an indication of the relative importance of rank and file involvement in each one.

iv. For summary comparison purposes, an overall index was obtained by calculating the mean score for all fifteen issues. Scores on this index could theoretically fall between 1 and 100, the latter representing the highest perceived importance for rank and file involvement.

Details of scores obtained are given in Appendices S9.1 to S9.6 and summary results using indices in table 8.2 below:

	<i>Non-Activists</i>	<i>Activists</i>
Gas Branch:	80.133	75.062
Electricity Branch:	78.785	73.168
Local Authority Branch 1:	78.677	79.962
Local Authority Branch 2:	81.038	75.869

Table 8.2 Summary Indices of Perceived Importance of Rank and File Involvement in Issue Shaping.

Summary scores revealed a very important difference between Local Authority 1 and other branches. Here, activists scored higher than non-activists. Elsewhere activists perceived a lower importance for rank and file involvement than did non-activists.

Turning now to the more detailed comparisons given in Appendices S9.1 to S9.6. For non-activists a noticeable difference was the higher importance given in the Electricity branch, to group/departmental issues. For activists there was a noticeable

difference between local authority and nationalised industry branches. In the latter, involvement in organisational level issues was seen of lower importance.

A comparison of activist and non-activist samples in each branch also highlighted some noteworthy features. For Local Authority Branch 1, activists scored higher than non-activists on roughly half the issues and lower on the remainder, but on no issue were differences statistically significant. In all other branches, the number of issues on which non-activists scored higher than activists was much greater and on some issues differences in scores were statistically significant.

Perceptions of Appropriate Methods
for Rank and File Involvement in Issue Shaping

For this measure, responses to questionnaire items C2c, C3c, C4c, C5c and C6c were used. For each of the fifteen issue examples, respondent were asked to indicate which of four methods they considered best for expression of member opinions. The four alternatives being:

1. Interested members seeking out representatives and communicating their opinions.
2. Representatives canvassing member's opinions.
3. Open branch meetings.
4. Secret ballots.

These four methods can be viewed as representing a trade-off between certainty and effort. A progression from method one to four gave a higher probability that rank and file opinion was

incorporated into decisions; but at the price of increasing activist effort to organise opinion gathering. For non-activists, methods one and three were those requiring most effort to ensure their voice was heard.

For the fifteen issue examples, proportions of non-activist and activist indicating each method were calculated. From these figures, mean proportions were derived for each of the five issue types. Detailed results are given in Appendices S10.1 to S10.6.

The results indicated some variation between branches in the degree of consensus between activists and non-activists. This can be illustrated by simplifying the data and comparing the number of issues on which over 50% of activists and non-activist samples either:-

- i. Agree/disagree methods one or three are best.
- ii. Agree/disagree methods two or four are best.

This is shown in Table 8.3 overleaf:-

<i>Consensus Categories</i>	<i>Number of Issues in Consensus Category</i>			
	<i>Gas Branch</i>	<i>Electricity Branch</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 1</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 2</i>
Over 50% of both Non-activist and Activist Samples indicated methods 2/4 best	7	6	12	7
Over 50% of both Non-activist and Activist Samples indicated methods 1/3 best	2	2	0	5
Over 50% Non-activists opted for methods 2/4 and over 50% Activists for methods 1/3	2	2	2	1
Over 50% Non-activists opted for methods 1/3 and over 50% Activists for methods 2/4	4	5	1	2

Differences between branches χ^2 (df 6) = 4.99 Not significant at $P < .05$

Table 8.3 Degree of Consensus between Non-activists and Activists on Best Method of Rank and File Involvement

Although the difference between branches was not statistically significant, the table illustrates some important features. In both local authority branches there was consensus between a majority of non-activists and activists about method for twelve of the fifteen issues. Moreover in Local Authority Branch 1, both groups accepted that the onus should be on activists to seek-out rank and file opinion.

For the nationalised industry branches, the most interesting feature was the fairly high proportions of issues in the bottom line of the table. Here activists had underestimated issues in which rank and file members were themselves prepared to take pains to become involved. Both branches were those of the lowest external focus (Chapter 6) and the issues themselves were of the wider social type and of very low salience. Thus there are implications that to rank and file willingness to participate could have been to prevent branch involvement.

RECENT ISSUES

Four measures were used in respect of recent issues, all of which were developed from responses to questions 36 to 38 on the interview schedule (Appendix M4.1).

Salience of Recent Issues

For this measure, responses to questions 36 to 38 were used. Question 36 asked respondents to name important issues having occurred in the previous twelve months. In question 37 they were asked to indicate the importance of named issues on a five-point rating scale with extremes identified as "extremely important" and "negligible importance." These responses were scored from two to ten; the latter representing extremely important.

Question 38 asked respondents to rank the order of importance of the named issues; a precaution introduced to deal with tied scores to question 37. In no case did any respondent evaluate more than two issues of the same degree of importance for question 37.

Therefore rank orders were allocated to scores as shown in Appendix M4.1.

Saliency for each issue mentioned was obtained by multiplying scores to questions 37 and 38. This gave a score for the issue which could theoretically fall between 2 and 100; the latter being maximum saliency. Respondent scores for this and all other measures for the named issue, were classified by type and retained for analysis which is described later.

For non-activists and activists in each branch, mean scores were calculated for specific named issues e.g. Grading Claim, Departmental Reorganisation. Specific named issues were then grouped according to the typology used throughout this investigation and mean type scores calculated. Finally, overall indices of saliency were obtained by computing the weighted average saliency for all issue types. These are shown in full in Appendices S11.1 to S11.6 and summary scores for overall saliency indices and frequencies of recall are given in table 8.4 below:-

	<i>Mean Saliency of Recent Issues</i>		<i>Frequency of Recall: Mean Issues per Respondent</i>	
	<i>Non-activists</i>	<i>Activists</i>	<i>Non-activists</i>	<i>Activists</i>
Gas Branch	47,713	56,380	2,901	3,614
Electricity Branch	59,825	56,452	2,333	2,321
Local Authority Branch 1	65,862	62,174	2,304	3,440
Local Authority Branch 2	69,513	59,149	2,500	3,350

Table 8.4 Recent Issues: Mean Saliency and Mean Frequency of Issues Recalled

Taken as a whole, in all branches except Gas (where the position was reversed) recent issues were more salient to non-activists than activists. The general indices however, mask some of the more prominent differences revealed in appendices S11.1 to S11.6. Within every branch there were differences between non-activists and activists in the relative order of type saliences. Moreover, these differences in relative salience were stronger in some branches than others; a feature which relates to some of the prominent issues described in the previous chapter.

Perceived Influence of Rank and File Members in Recent Issues

For this measure, data from interview schedule items 40 to 44 was used.

For each issue mentioned, Question 40 asked respondents to recall methods used to both inform and sense rank and file opinion. Responses were classified into four methods, each with a nominal score as shown in Appendix M4.1.

Questions 41 and 43 asked of non-activists and activists respectively, the perceived extent of rank and file communication of opinion on the issue. Responses were given as locations on a five-point rating scale with extremes of "a great deal" and "almost none" and scored as shown in Appendix M4.1. Using the same five point rating scale, question 42 asked of non-activists, the extent to which they felt activists had noted and acted on communicated opinions. For activists, question 44 asked the extent

to which they felt their own views and actions had been influenced by non-activist opinion. The scoring framework used for these is also shown in Appendix M4.1. Measures were developed as follows:-

1. For each issue mentioned a quotient of activist sensitivity was calculated by:

$$\frac{\text{Non Activists Question 42 Score}}{\text{Question 41 Score}} \quad \times \quad \frac{\text{Activists Question 44 Score}}{\text{Question 43 Score}}$$

This quotient could theoretically fall between 1 (5/5) and 25 (25/1), representing respectively high opinion communication with low activist cognizance and low communication and high notice.

2. The two scores for question 40 were averaged to give a mean method of informing/sensing members; a score which could theoretically fall between one and four.

3. For each issue mentioned, an index score which could fall between 1 and 100 and reflected perceived influence was calculated by:-

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{Score for mean method} \\ \text{of informing and} \\ \text{sensing rank and file} \\ \text{(minimum 1, maximum 4)} \end{array} \quad \times \quad \begin{array}{l} \text{quotient of activist sensitivity} \\ \text{(minimum 1, maximum 25)} \end{array}$$

4. Mean scores were calculated for specific named issues i.e. Grading Claim etc., these were grouped according to the typology used in the investigation and mean type scores calculated. Finally, summary indices of perceived influence were obtained by computing the weighted average of type scores. Details

by issue type are given in Appendices S12.1 to S12.6 and summary scores in table 8.5 below:

	<i>Non-activists</i>	<i>Activists</i>
Gas Branch	13.283	10.798
Electricity Branch	11.596	10.350
Local Authority Branch 1	26.680	14.254
Local Authority Branch 2	22.141	12.776

Table 8.5 Summary Indices of Perceived Influence of Rank and File in Recent Issues.

In terms of summary scores, activists in all branches perceived rank and file influence to be lower than did non-activists themselves and the rank order of branch scores was the same for both. However, the more detailed results given in appendices S12.1 to S12.6 reveal differences by issue type both between and within branches.

For non-activists, perceived influence in industry issues was much higher in Local Authority Branch 1 than elsewhere and for wider social issues perceived influence was higher in Local Authority Branch 2. In both cases differences between branches were statistically significant. For activists the only statistically significant difference was for industry issues where Local Authority Branch 2 scored highest.

Accuracy of Recall and Perceived Mode of Pursuit of Recent Issues

For these measures responses to interview item 39 were used. This asked respondents to describe how issues mentioned had been pursued.

For perceived mode of pursuit, descriptions were scored according to the framework shown in Appendix M4.1. From respondent scores, mean scores for specific issues, issue types and overall pursuit of issues were derived, as for other measures.

For accuracy of recall, responses were compared with histories of issue pursuit in correspondence, minutes etc. and scored as shown in Appendix M4.1.

As for other measures, respondent scores were used to compute mean scores for specific issues, type scores and overall indices of accuracy.

Details of results obtained are shown in Appendices S13.1 to S13.6 and S14.1 and S14.2 for Accuracy and Perceived Mode of Pursuit respectively, with summary indices in table 8.6 below. These measures were developed mainly for analytical purposes and are used later in the chapter.

	<i>Accuracy of Recall</i>		<i>Perceived Mode of Issues Pursuit</i>	
	<i>Non-activists</i>	<i>Activists</i>	<i>Non-activists</i>	<i>Activists</i>
Gas Branch	62,274	91,123	12,305	15,831
Electricity Branch	57,221	68,667	22,332	16,690
Local Authority Branch 1	60,211	74,128	10,894	13,244
Local Authority Branch 2	44,354	75,284	6,701	7,881

Table 8.6 Summary Scores Recent Issues: Accuracy of Recall of Issue Details and Perceived Mode of Issue Pursuit.

PERCEIVED NEED FOR BRANCH INVOLVEMENT IN ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION

Two measures were developed here; the first for non-activists and activists, the second for activists only.

Issues Requiring Branch Involvement

For this measure, responses to interview schedule item 45 were used. This asked respondents to specify as an ideal situation, those issues in which it was felt the branch should be involved.

For both activists and non-activists, responses were grouped into specific prominent issues (i.e. Grading Claim, Departmental Reorganisations etc.) and the frequencies of mention calculated. Specific issues were then grouped into types and frequencies calculated for these. Finally a weighted average for all types was computed to give an index of mean frequency of issue mentions.

Results are shown in Appendices S15.1 to S15.6 and overall frequencies in table 8.7 below:-

	<i>Non-activists</i>	<i>Activists</i>
Gas Branch	1.802	2.891
Electricity Branch	3.572	3.619
Local Authority Branch 1	3.050	3.120
Local Authority Branch 2	3.332	2.700

Table 8.7 Summary Frequencies (Issues per Respondent) of Issues Requiring Branch Involvement

As the summary results demonstrate, there were overall differences between branches. In both Electricity and Local Authority Branch 1, activists and non-activists had similar overall frequencies of issue mentions. For Gas, non-activists had a lower frequency than activists and in Local Authority Branch 2 the position was reversed.

Turning now to the more detailed results in Appendices S15.1 to S15.6. For both non-activists and activists differences between branches were statistically significant. For non-activists in all branches the majority of issues mentioned were those within the employing organisation. Nonetheless, the difference between branches was statistically significant. For the Gas Branch proportions at group/departmental and individual levels were higher than elsewhere. Local Authority branches had the higher proportions at organisational level and the Electricity Branch at industry level. In the case of activists, the difference between branches was also statistically significant and patterns broadly mirrored those of non-activists.

Within branches, differences between non-activists and activists were in all cases statistically significant. For Gas, departmental level issues were those most frequently mentioned by both groups but non-activists attached far more prominence to individual issues. In the Electricity branch, the prominent features were the higher frequency of organisational issues for activists and of those at industry level for non-activists. For both Local Authority branches, activists and non-activists were closer in type frequencies than in either nationalised industry branch.

Activist Perspectives on Branch Involvement in Issues

This measure was derived from activist responses to interview items 45 to 48. Question 46 asked (for each issue mentioned in response to Question 45) whether some branch involvement was possible. Responses were categorized as either yes or no. In question 47 respondents were asked to give reasons for degree of involvement; answers being classified as shown in Appendix M4.1.

Question 48 then asked what respondents felt should be the branch approach to the issue. Responses fell into four approach modes, each of which were allocated a nominal score as shown in Appendix M4.1.

Indices of activist desire for increased issue involvement were then calculated. Scores for these could theoretically fall between 1 and 100; the latter figure representing maximum desire for increased involvement.

Derivation of indices is shown in Appendices S16.1 to S16.4 and summary results in table 8.8 below:-

	<u>Score</u>
Gas Branch	80.508
Electricity Branch	16.590
Local Authority Branch 1	15.658
Local Authority Branch 2	9.399

Table 8.8 Summary Indices of Activist Desire for Increased Issue Involvement

In three of the branches the desire for any increase in involvement beyond current levels was comparatively low. Here the Gas branch was outstandingly different from others. As can be seen from Appendix S16.1, in this branch activists saw the level of involvement currently possible on many issues as much lower than they desired. Noticeably their preferred approach to this situation was erosion of any impediment to involvement. Indeed, even on those issues where they perceived that they could become fully involved at present, they felt that their scope for involvement should be even greater.

FACTORS AFFECTING ISSUE SALIENCE

Here two sets of interactions were examined:-

General Issue Salience and Salience of Recent Issues

To explore this relationship, respondent scores for general salience by type and recent issue salience by type were rank order correlated. This operation was performed separately for non-activist and activist samples of each branch. Results are shown in Appendix S17 where it will be seen that for non-activists, the strength of association between salience of recent issues and general issue salience was universally weak. For activists, a small number of

stronger associations were found but these lacked statistical significance. It was therefore concluded that the salience of events in the recent past contributed very little to general salience. For the present therefore, it is necessary to treat General Salience as given and turn to salience of recent issues.

Recent Issue Salience

The four separate measures of Salience, Perceived Influence of Rank and File, Accuracy of Recall and Perceived Intensity of Pursuit of Recent Issues all varied strongly between branches and to some extent between activists and non-activists within each branch (Tables 8.4 to 8.6 above). To examine relationships between these measures two methods were used.

1. Using all issues mentioned, zero order correlation coefficients were computed for activist and non-activist samples in each branch.

11. For Salience, Perceived Influence of Rank and File and Perceived Intensity of Pursuit, relationships were examined using partial correlation and path analytic methods. The former was to establish the presence of any indirect links between measures and therefore which variable could be treated as a dependent variable. The latter technique was used to provide values for links between measures in combination. For Accuracy scores, the number of categories of response was less than the minimum necessary for use in these methods (Appendix M6). They were therefore omitted from partial correlation and path analytic steps.

In all branches, salience was found to be capable of being regarded as the dependent variable. Path models developed, together with associated measures are shown in Appendices S18.1 to S18.4.

For non-activists, in only two branches were sizeable proportions of variance in salience associated with Perceived Influence and Intensity of Issue Pursuit; 51.5% and 52.2% for Gas and Local Authority 2 respectively. In both branches, Intensity had the major influence; almost all correlation between Opportunity to Shape and Salience occurring as an indirect link via Intensity. Here however the similarity ends.

In Gas the analysis indicated that the most salient issues were those whose details were most accurately recalled and what made the issues salient was their intensity of pursuit. Perhaps more importantly the rank and file saw their opportunity to exert influence as the highest where intensity was the highest.

For Local Authority Branch 2, the analysis indicated that whilst the most intensely pursued issues were the most salient, the rank and file did not see their opportunity to influence rising with salience; if anything it fell a little.

In the Electricity branch, salience for non-activists was also the highest where Intensity was the highest. However, as Intensity rose the rank and file saw a declining opportunity to influence events,

which has implications for perceived representativeness in the branch.

For Local Authority Branch 1 there was an indication that although the rank and file saw opportunity to influence events rising with intensity, the most intensely pursued issues were not those which were most salient.

For activists in all branches only negligible proportions of variance in Saliency were explained by either Intensity of Pursuit or Perceived Opportunity of the rank and file to influence issues. However, sample sizes were much smaller than for non-activists and complex patterns of interaction were correspondingly more difficult to demonstrate

Overall two main inferences may be drawn in respect of non-activists:-

1. Perceptions of how recent issues were handled probably had as much influence on their saliency as the issues themselves. This is not to say that past events had no bearing on general saliency. It would however seem more likely that what had occurred in the past could have had a greater connection with how the rank and file viewed their branches in terms of representativeness. A representative branch was not necessarily one where intensity had been low. Rather it was one where the rank and file perceived themselves to have had some opportunity to influence the level of intensity.

ii. The weak connection between general and recent issue salience coupled with the stronger one between issue handling and salience was not totally unexpected. Branches did not have complete freedom about what issues arose. Those initiated by the employer may not have been those of the highest salience to the rank and file. Here it can be noted that the two local authority branches where overall issues had the highest salience, were also the branches with the highest levels of initiation; a feature which is referred to below.

ISSUES FACTORS AS PARTIAL EXPLANATIONS OF APPROACHES TO JOB REGULATION

Using the measures described above, a number of tests were performed and the results integrated with information from Chapter 7 to give partial explanations of positions along the dimensions used to characterise branch approaches to issues of job regulation.

Issues Factors and Intensity of Action

To identify any relationship here, the following procedure was adopted.

Within each branch an index number was developed which for every issue adopted, reflected its general salience and proportion of branch affected. These were obtained by multiplying proportions of the branch affected (extracted from Appendices S6.1 to S6.4) by a nominal score reflecting rank order of salience of the issue type. Nominal scores used were:-

<i>Salience Rank</i>	<i>Nominal Score</i>
(from Appendices S8.1 or S8.2)	
1	100
2	75
3	50
4	25
5	1

The higher the index number, the greater the proportion of the branch affected and/or the more salient the issue.

Issue index scores were rank order correlated with intensity of handling scores given in Appendices S6.1 to S6.4; the resulting coefficient indicating the degree of association between a change in intensity and a change in salience. Results are shown in table 8.9 below:-

	<i>Non-Activists</i>	<i>Activists</i>
Gas Branch	0.314 xx	0.415 xxx
Electricity Branch	0.351 x	0.449 xx
Local Authority Branch 1	0.236 N/S	0.165 N/S
Local Authority Branch 2	0.210 N/S	0.157 N/S

Table 8.9 Rank Order Correlation Coefficients (Spearman): Intensity of Action with Issue Salience X Proportion Affected.

N/S Not statistically significant at P <.05 level
 x Statistically significant at P <.05 level
 xx Statistically significant at P <.01 level
 xxx Statistically significant at P <.001 level

For both non-activists and activists there was a difference between nationalised industry and local authority branches. In the former

for non-activists 10% to 12% of the variance in intensity was associated with a change in salience, for activists 17% to 19%. Since neither of the local authority branches had a wide range of different levels of intensity of action, associations were weaker and lacked statistical significance.

With respect to the small amounts of explained variance, general salience was of course unlikely to be the only factor affecting intensity of action. Attitudes to intense action were likely to have had a bearing; a point which will be covered in the next chapter. Nevertheless taken across all four branches, strength of association between salience and intensity was strongest where the branch was most intense in action and weakest for the least intense branch. The results show a weak but positive relationship indicating the ability to act more intensely as salience rose. In terms of causality, it can be noted that general salience was shown earlier to be relatively unconnected with saliences of recent issues and thus likely to be a more enduring feature of attitudes and orientations of branch members. It may therefore, be reasoned that similar patterns of general salience were present both before and when the issues arose: the inevitable causal inference being that salience influenced intensity of action.

In one branch (Gas), specific issues and activist attitudes can also be seen to have had some effect. Here, both prominent issues described in Chapter 7 reinforced the influence of activists and threw onto non-activists, a measure of responsibility for achieving

results at branch level. Coupled with this was the activist viewpoint that most, if not all, issues should be handled locally. In the face of national and local agreements which formally precluded the degree of desired involvement, it is possible that increased intensity arose as a consequence; an explanation in keeping with the hypothesis that the smaller the range of issues on which involvement is possible, the more militantly will these be pursued (Dubin R 1973). Conversely in Local Authority branch 1 the prominent issue of privatisation had created a situation where management and branch moved towards a more integrative style of bargaining; bringing about a set of relationships where differences could be resolved without recourse to intense action.

Issues Factors and Initiation

Two considerations were felt necessary in examining this relationship:-

- i. Whilst a branch may have little option but to become involved in management initiated issues, it is not inevitable that it will initiate in return. It was therefore felt that a measure should be developed which related the salience of issues to the initiating party, trade union or management.
- ii. For this measure it was felt necessary to use the average salience of non-activists and activists. To use only non-activist or activist saliences would be to assume either perfect representativeness or no interaction between the two groups.

The measure was derived as follows:-

1. Data giving proportion of memberships involved in each of the four modes of issue initiation (negotiable and management initiated, negotiable and branch initiated, reserved and management initiated, reserved and branch initiated) was extracted from Appendices S5.1 to S5.4. Issue proportions were multiplied by the same nominal scores for salience of type used above in examining Intensity. This was performed separately for activists and non-activists and gave an index for issues in each initiating mode which reflected breadth of effect weighted for mean salience.
2. Indices in each initiating mode were summed to give mode totals. From these were derived salience weighted proportions of total workload in each mode.
3. Proportions for the two trade union initiating modes were summed, as were those for management initiation. The mean of activist and non-activist proportions was then calculated to give an overall measure for each branch. This measure gave an indication of which types of issues (those initiated by the trade union or those initiated by management) were most salient to branch memberships e.g. the higher the percentage the more salient the type. Derivation of figures is shown in detail in Appendices S19.1a and b to S19.4a and b and mean summary proportions for activists and non-activists in table 8.10 below:

	<i>Gas Branch</i>	<i>Electricity Branch</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 1</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 2</i>
<i>Management Initiated:</i>				
- Mean	47.70	40.50	23.15	28.40
<i>Branch Initiated:</i>				
- Mean	52.30	59.50	76.85	71.60

Table 8.10 Percentages of Management Initiated and Branch Initiated Action Weighted for Saliency of Action to Trade Union Members

The rank order of branches was the same as for the initiation of issues (Chapter 6). It may be inferred that there was some connection between overall saliency and tendency to initiate.

It is worth noting, however, that whilst trade union initiated issues were the most salient for non-activists in all branches, the situation for activists varied strongly between branches. In the two local authority branches, activist figures were much the same as for non-activists. In the nationalised industry branches, branch initiated workloads were of lower saliency to activists. With respect to the Gas Branch, the low activist score here provides a potential link with Intensity of Action which is described above.

Within this general explanatory framework, prominent issues described in Chapter 7 can also be seen to have had effects. For the most initiating branch (Local Authority 1) involvement in the privatisation issue led to a high degree of subsequent initiation of other issues and may well have contributed to a negotiating climate that made management more receptive to trade union initiated issues. Conversely in Local Authority Branch 2, a single prominent issue induced the sacrifice of initiation of other issues as a trade-off.

With both nationalised industry branches, management were in the process of introducing changes and were the initiating party on most issues. Thus trade union action had a tendency to be more defensive. Moreover in both branches prominent issues had played a part in directing attention of activists to this largely defensive concern with internal matters. For example in Electricity there was a single issue that posed a potential threat to all branch members.

Issues Factors and Focus

Two main sets of data were examined here; General Issue Saliences and Perceived Need for Branch Involvement in Issues. In all branches the primary focus was internal and the inference may be drawn that any focus on external issues was something additional to domestic job regulation.

Appendix 8.1 shows that for non-activists in all branches the three most important issue types were Organisational Issues, Individual

Issues, Industry Issues. For activists (Appendix 8.2) the position was somewhat different. In three branches (Gas, Local Authority 1 and Local Authority 2) the three most important issue types were Individual, Group/Departmental and Organisational but with the order different in each one. For the Electricity Branch the three most important issue types were the same as for non-activists.

Turning now to perceived need for branch involvement (Appendices S16.1 to S16.6), here there was a major difference between Gas and other branches. In Gas (the least externally focused branch) 84.4% and 67.4% of all issues mentioned by non-activists and activists respectively were at organisational level or below. Even at group/departmental level and below, the percentages were still high at 71.6% for non-activists and 59.6% for activists. In addition, percentages for wider social issues were the lowest of all branches at 1.4% (non-activists) and 5.7% (activists). In all other branches there was a far higher emphasis on industry issues and a stronger tolerance to branch involvement in some issues of a wider social nature.

Issues concerned with pecuniary rewards were the largest single category of those mentioned in all branches. An examination of these revealed a difference that in some measure explained the high internal focus of the Gas Branch. A summary analysis of this is given in table 8.11 below. Here it can be seen that in the Gas Branch, pecuniary advancement issues at local level were mentioned more frequently than nationally negotiated salary increases;

indicating a higher perception of the possibility of obtaining improvements locally. For all other branches pecuniary advancement was seen mainly as a matter for national negotiation.

	<i>Gas Branch</i>	<i>Electricity Branch</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 1</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 2</i>
Total all Pecuniary Issues Mentioned	29.05%	15.90%	17.65%	14.05%
<u>External Issues</u> (Salary Claim)	11.70%	12.55%	17.00%	12.05%
<u>Internal Issues</u> Grading Claims Local Allowances Car Allowances Commission Rates	17.35%	3.35%	0.65%	2.00%

Table B.11 Mean Percentage (Activists and Non-activists) of Pecuniary Issues Mentioned as Perceived Desirable for Branch Involvement

In addition it should be noted that in the Gas Branch, activists tended to see almost every issue as one where the branch should play a large role in job regulation (Appendix S16.4). Moreover, as has been described in Chapter 7, because of one highly prominent issue they had been explicitly instructed by the rank and file to devote their efforts to the branch membership alone. A second issue had resulted in what amounted to a unilateral declaration of independence from the outside trade union. As such the branch was hardly likely to be receptive to calls to adopt external issues.

With respect to other branches, the effects of both general attitudes and prominent issues can also be seen to have resulted in

patterns of action. Chapter 7 has described how activists in Electricity had also been subjected to rank and file recall. They had been instructed to adopt an internal focus. Moreover they were confronted with an issue which largely made this inevitable. The same chapter describes how, in the case of Local Authority Branch 1, a single issue enabled horizons of action to be gradually widened and progressively more external issues adopted.

Issues Factors and Representativeness

A number of indicators were used here. Some consisted of measures shown earlier; others were zero order correlation coefficients computed between measures. For convenience these are numbered and are shown in Table 8.12. The explanation for each branch is given separately using indicator numbers in parenthesis.

In the most representative branch, Local Authority 1 (7) relative salience of issues to activists and non-activists was closest (1) and both groups had similar opinions of the relative importance of rank and file involvement (2). Overall, activists evaluated the importance of involvement higher than did non-activists themselves (3). There was also a high degree of concordance between activists and non-activists about appropriate methods of involvement (4). In most cases this put the onus on activists to ensure involvement occurred. Finally, importance of involvement for non-activists was not linked in with their relative salience of issues (5). More importantly, activist views on the importance of involvement was not linked to activist salience (5).

INDICATORS USED TO PROVIDE EXPLANATIONS OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ISSUE FACTORS AND REPRESENTATIVENESS

Indicator Number	Indicator	Gas Branch	Electricity Branch	Local Authority Branch 1	Local Authority Branch 2
1	Rank Order Correlation Activist to Non-activist: Relative Salience of Issues (Appendices 8.3 to 8.6)	0.588 ^x	0.485 ^{N/S}	0.946 ^{xxx}	0.839 ^{xxx}
2	Rank Order Correlation Activist to Non-activists: Relative Importance of Rank and File Involvement in Issues (Appendices 9.3 to 9.6)	0.669 ^x	0.880 ^{xxx}	0.831 ^{xxx}	0.606 ^x
3	Index of Importance of Rank and File Involvement in Issues (Table 8.2) Difference (Activists minus Non-activists)	75.062 80.133 - 5.071	73.168 78.795 - 5.617	79.962 78.677 + 1.285	75.869 81.038 - 5.169
4	Concordance: Activists to Non-activists on methods of Rank and File Involvement (Table 8.3) Number of Issues on which concordant Issues on which not concordant	9 6	8 7	12 3	12 3
5	Rank Order Correlation Relative Salience (Appendices 8.3 to 8.6) to Perceived Need for Rank and File Involvement (Appendices 9.3 to 9.6) Non-activists Activists	+ 0.570 ^x - 0.026 ^{N/S}	+ 0.586 ^x + 0.768 ^{xx}	+ 0.325 ^{N/S} - 0.021 ^{N/S}	+ 0.567 ^x - 0.175 ^{N/S}
6	Recent Issues: Non-activists Perceived Opportunity to Influence (Table 8.5) Accuracy of Recall (Table 8.6)	13.283 62.274	11.596 57.221	26.680 60.211	22.141 44.354
7	FOR COMPARISON Perceived Representativeness Non-activists (Table 6.7, Chapter 6) Score Rank	45.739 2	43.499 3	58.354 1	40.444 4

N/S Not statistically significant at P < .05 level

x Statistically significant at P < .05 level

xx Statistically significant at P < .01 level

xxx Statistically significant at P < .001 level

Here the branch could be described as having an ethos attitudinally geared to representativeness; a picture reinforced by non-activist perceptions of their influence in recent issues and their high accuracy of recall of details (6).

It is in addition important to note the contribution of prominent issues (see Chapter 7) to this ethos. One issue had raised suspicions amongst activists with respect to accountability of branch officers. Two further issues promoted a degree of factionalism, which led to increased contact between activists and workplace representatives. Thus rank and file involvement became a continuous process.

For Gas, the second most representative branch (7), activist and non-activist issue saliences were also positively associated (1); as was the weak relationship between the two groups on relative order of importance of involvement (2). Overall, activists saw slightly less need for rank and file involvement than did non-activists (3). Concordance between activist and non-activists on the most appropriate methods for involvement was fairly low (4) and for non-activists, importance of involvement was linked to their salience (5). However, for activists, the importance of rank and file involvement was not linked to activist saliences (5).

The picture here is of rank and file perceptions of representativeness shaped by their own reluctance to participate in decision making in anything other than the most highly salient

issues. To some extent this is borne out by non-activist evaluations that opportunity to influence recent issues rose with salience as did their accuracy of recall of issue details. Here it is also possible that one of the prominent issues described in Chapter 7 had an effect on rank and file perceptions. In this issue the branch, whose members already had a highly internal focus, had made it a matter of policy and practice for activists to concern themselves solely with domestic matters in a manner which excluded dismissing the wishes of the wider trade union.

In the least representative branch, Local Authority 2 (7), activist and non-activist saliences were strongly associated (1). However, relative order of importance of involvement had the weakest association of all branches (2). Overall, activists saw a lower need for rank and file involvement than non-activists (3). There was a high degree of concordance between activist and non-activists about appropriate methods of involvement (4) but here the onus was placed more heavily on non-activists to physically participate. Importance of involvement was linked with salience for non-activists but not for activists.

Again the picture is of a high potential for representativeness. The low non-activist evaluation could have been more a matter of perceptual distortions than anything else. This impression was supported by high non-activist evaluations of opportunity to influence recent issues, but the lowest accuracy of recall of issue details of all branches.

For the Electricity Branch, which was also low on representativeness (7) relative issue saliences of activists and non-activists were the most weakly associated (1). Activist perceptions of the need for rank and file involvement (3) and concordance about methods (4) were the lowest of all branches but with a strong association between activist and non-activist views on the relative importance of rank and file involvement (2). For non-activists, importance of involvement was linked to their relative salience (5). More importantly, activist views on the relative importance of rank and file involvement was strongly associated with activist salience (5).

Here the picture is of low representativeness arising from differences in salience. Non-activists only had a desire to participate in what were to them important issues and these had little or no correspondence with activist saliences. For their part activists perceived rank and file involvement to be most important where the issue was to them (the activists) most salient. This picture is supported to some extent by non-activist evaluations of opportunity to influence recent issues (6); the lowest of all branches studied. Once again one of the prominent issues (donating to Miners Welfare Fund) described in Chapter 7 provides supporting evidence. Here activist priorities had resulted in an executive committee decision which brought activists and the rank and file into conflict; a matter about which non-activists still had strong feelings at the time of the study.

Issues Factors and Dependence on Outside Trade Union

In so far as dependence on outside trade union is explainable by issues factors, dependence (or rather its absence) can be traced in the Gas Branch to a single prominent issue plus strong activist views that almost all matters should be locally determined. This does not explain varying degrees of dependence in other branches. In a subsequent chapter it will be shown that this was more highly connected with collective bargaining structures and outside trade union influence.

CHAPTER 9

DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS: ACTOR ATTITUDES

INTRODUCTION

This chapter deals with the greater part of the attitude measurement undertaken in the investigation. It commences by examining expectations of work and experience of work and from this draws some conclusions with respect to the salience of issues in each branch.

Attitudes to trade unions in general are then examined and conclusions drawn. Following this attitudes to the trade union at work are examined separately for non-activists and activists and their relationship with selected attitudes to work explored. Finally attitudes of both non-activists and activists in each branch are reviewed as partial explanations of approaches to issues of job regulation.

ATTITUDES TO WORK

Expectations of Work

For these measures, a scale consisting of eight items from section 'A' of the questionnaire was used. The scale was divisible into four sub-scales, each reflecting a separate expectation of work (see Appendix M3, table 3.3). For non-activist and activist samples in each branch mean scores for total and sub-scales were computed. These are shown in Appendices S20.1 to S20.6.

For non-activists, several scores were higher in Gas and Local Authority 1 branches; particularly expectations of extrinsic satisfactions and freedom from supervision, where differences between branches were statistically significant. In the case of activists, the only statistically significant difference was for expectations of intrinsic satisfactions where the Gas branch had a conspicuously low score.

Within all branches except Gas higher expectations of work by activists gave a number of differences between activist and non-activist scores that were statistically significant, i.e. in Electricity and Local Authority branch 1 where activist expectations of intrinsic satisfactions were higher and Local Authority branch 2 where expectations of extrinsic satisfactions and freedom from supervision were higher.

Experience of Work

For these measures a scale (divisible into six sub-scales) consisting of twenty items from section 'A' of the questionnaire was used - see Appendix M3, Table 3.3. Mean scores for non-activist and activist samples in each branch were computed and are shown in Appendices S21.1 to 21.6.

For non-activists differences in total scale scores were not statistically significant, but there were significant differences on a number of sub-scales, namely:

1. Perceptions of mobility prospects where Local Authority 1 scored high.

- ii. Receipt of intrinsic satisfactions where Electricity and Local Authority branch 2 scored much lower than the other two branches.
- iii. Receipt of extrinsic satisfactions where local authority branch 1 scored much lower than others.
- iv. Perceived trustworthiness of management where Electricity and Local Authority branch 2 scored lower than the other two branches.

For activists, differences on the total scale were statistically significant due to a much lower score for the Electricity branch. This was mirrored in all attitude dimensions having statistically significant differences.

In all branches there was at least one dimension on which non-activist and activist scores were significantly different. The most prominent branch, however, was Electricity. Here activists displayed a less favourable experience of work than non-activists on the total scale and three sub-scales - receipt of intrinsic satisfactions, commitment to remaining, and perceived fairness of management. Conversely, in the two local authority branches, where differences between activist and non-activist scores were statistically significant, this was because activists had more favourable experiences of work in terms of either intrinsic satisfactions (Local Authority branch 2) or extrinsic satisfactions (Local Authority branch 1).

The Interaction of Expectations and Experiences of Work

To examine these, two analyses were conducted for both activist and non-activists in each branch. These used partial correlation and path analytic methods and were:

Analysis 1

An examination of the interactions between the six sub-attitudes to experience of work i.e. mobility prospects, intrinsic satisfactions, extrinsic satisfactions, commitment to remaining with the employer, perceived fairness of management and management's perceived trustworthiness. This provided a detailed picture of interaction between sub-attitudes which made work an experience which was more or less favourably received. It also identified the sub-attitude which was the focus of all other work experiences.

Analysis 2

Here the four sub-dimensions of expectations of work i.e. upwards mobility, intrinsic satisfaction, extrinsic satisfaction and expectations of freedom from supervision, were compared with the overall score for experience of work. This enabled derivation of a picture from which conclusions could be drawn on the effect of expectations on experience, or vice versa.

The derived path models are shown in Appendices S22.1 to S22.16 and results discussed separately for each branch below:-

Gas Branch

For non-activists analysis 1 revealed that perceived receipt of intrinsic satisfactions was the focus of all other work experiences. This dimension had 57% of its variance explained by the other dimensions; over half of this arose positively from perceived trustworthiness and fairness of management.

Analysis 2 revealed that expectations of work focused on intrinsic satisfactions. Here the overall work experience variable had a determining effect on all expectations and it accounted for over half the explained variance in expectations of intrinsic satisfactions.

For non-activists it can be concluded that experience of work had given the expectation that it would be intrinsically satisfying; a major part of the satisfaction arising from the presence of a fair and trustworthy management who provided some degree of mobility prospects. This gave an indication of why individual and group issues, whilst not the most salient, were more important in this branch than elsewhere. The impact of management on work organisation and upwards mobility would be at its greatest and intrinsic satisfactions potentially most threatened by any changes.

For activists analysis 1 showed that intrinsic satisfactions were also the focus of other work experiences. Here, over three-quarters of the variance in perceived receipt of intrinsic satisfactions was explained (almost equally and positively) by

three other dimensions; trustworthiness of management, upwards mobility prospects and commitment to remaining with the employer.

From analysis 2 it can be seen that as with non-activists, expectations focused on intrinsic satisfactions and the 49% explained variance was associated mainly with expectations of upwards mobility. However, as expectations of mobility, extrinsic satisfactions and freedom from supervision rose, experience of work was less favourable.

Overall, these activists had relatively high expectations of work and the results suggest that work experience was a reminder that expectations were largely unfulfilled. This was coupled with a fairly high commitment to remaining with the employer; a combination likely to result in a desire for some voice in the government of their working lives. It is not surprising therefore, to find that individual, group and organisational level issues were the most salient.

Electricity Branch

In the case of non-activists analysis 1 showed that perceived fairness of management (60% explained variance) was the focus of other experiences of work. This was almost completely determined positively by three other dimensions; management trustworthiness, perceived mobility prospects and receipt of intrinsic satisfactions (35%, 14% and 9% explained variance respectively).

Analysis 2 revealed that upwards mobility was the focus of expectations of work with 40% explained variance. In this case both the overall work experience variable and expectations of intrinsic satisfactions were independent variables affecting all others and were the major determinants of mobility expectations (18% and 12% explained variance respectively).

For non-activists, management was seen as fair by those who evaluated it as trustworthy and provided intrinsically satisfying work together with prospects for upwards mobility. Experience of work exerted a strong influence on reinforcing the expectation that upwards mobility would occur. This dual attitudinal emphasis on mobility and management as provider of opportunities gives some explanation of why organisational and individual issues were the most salient to this group. Upwards mobility prospects (an individual matter) were perhaps most at risk from reorganisations; here an organisational rather than departmental level issue.

With activists, analysis 1 showed that perceived trustworthiness of management was the work experience dimension determined by all others. Approximately half of its 84% explained variance was determined positively by perceived receipt of extrinsic satisfactions.

In analysis 2 expectations centred on freedom from supervision (45% explained variance). This was determined positively by expectations of intrinsic satisfactions and the overall work

experience variable (10% and 15% variance respectively). The largest effect however, was negative. As expectations of extrinsic satisfactions rose, expectations of freedom from supervision fell (18% variance).

These activists evaluated work primarily in terms of management's perceived trustworthiness as determined largely by the provision of extrinsic satisfactions. As a whole, activists both expected and perceived themselves to be in receipt of these satisfactions, but this receipt was to some extent, seen as concomitant with increased supervision.

The high emphasis on extrinsic rewards in a situation where pay was nationally negotiated, provides some explanation of why national issues were highly salient. The most important issues were however, those at group/departmental level. Here it is possible that their importance had a connection with attitudes to management i.e. in providing some opportunity to exert a measure of freedom from supervision.

Local Authority Branch 1

For non-activists, analysis 1 revealed that receipt of intrinsic satisfactions was the focus of all other experiences of work. Over two thirds of the 64% explained variance in this variable was determined by perceptions of management.

In analysis 2, upwards mobility was the focus of work expectations but with only 17% of variance explained. This was positively

determined by expectations of intrinsic and extrinsic satisfactions (12% and 5% variance respectively). Here the overall work experience variable had no substantial connection to any of the work expectation dimensions.

These non-activists had relatively high expectations of work together with favourable experiences. Experience was primarily viewed in terms of intrinsic satisfactions for which a management perceived as fair and trustworthy was given some credit. Non-activist expectations were, however, relatively unconnected to these experiences and were focused on upwards mobility. It is possible therefore that intrinsic satisfactions were somewhat taken for granted.

For activists, analysis 1 showed that intrinsic satisfactions were also the focus of other work experiences, with 84% explained variance. Again perceptions of management played the major role in positively determining intrinsic scores, this time with trustworthiness and fairness together explaining 75% variance.

Analysis 2 demonstrated that expectations of work were focused on extrinsic satisfactions. Here the 33% explained variance was determined almost completely (positively) by the overall work experience variable.

As with non-activists, overall expectations of work were high and experiences favourable. Similarly, experience was evaluated in

terms of intrinsic satisfactions for which management were given some credit. Nonetheless activist expectations were primarily in terms of extrinsic satisfactions and these were determined by their overall experience of work. Once again it seems likely that intrinsic rewards were somewhat taken for granted.

For neither activists nor non-activists do these attitude patterns provide a strong explanation of issue salience. There is however a possibility that if intrinsic expectations (although relatively well satisfied) were taken for granted, organisational issues became the most salient i.e. as the level at which further gains were the most realisable.

Local Authority Branch 2

For non-activists, analysis 1 showed all other experiences of work focused on receipt of intrinsic satisfactions (60% explained variance). Over half of this was determined positively by perceptions of management fairness and trustworthiness, with additional effects from commitment to remaining with the employer (22% variance).

In analysis 2, all expectations of work (except freedom from supervision) had a noticeable positive determining effect on the overall work experience variable (25% explained variance) i.e. as expectations of mobility, extrinsic and intrinsic satisfactions rose, work was more highly evaluated.

Here evaluation of experience hinged on perceptions of management. More than in any other branch, experiences matched expectations. Those expecting the least perceived themselves to be in receipt of the lowest work satisfactions. Overall this group had the lowest expectations of work together with the lowest evaluation of experiences found in non-activists. It could be expected, therefore, that whilst any issue could be salient somewhere in the branch, salience of specific issues would vary widely. This was in fact the pattern which existed (see Appendix S8.1).

With activists, analysis 1 revealed that commitment to remaining with the employer was the focus of all other work experiences. Approximately two thirds of its 76% explained variance was determined negatively by perceived receipt of extrinsic satisfactions i.e. as extrinsic satisfactions rose, commitment to remaining fell. Other major determinants (positive) were perceptions of management fairness and trustworthiness, together explaining 35% variance.

In analysis 2, all work expectations focused on upwards mobility (44% explained variance). Here the major positive determinants were expectations of intrinsic and extrinsic satisfactions (20% and 16% variance respectively). The overall work experience variable was relatively unconnected to others.

These activists had the highest overall expectations of work found in any branch, but one of the lowest evaluations of work

experience. Their expectations focused on upward mobility driven by expectations of intrinsic and extrinsic rewards. Those perceiving themselves to be in receipt of the highest extrinsic satisfactions viewed management most favourably but had the lowest commitment to remaining with the employer. Thus for most of these activists, there was a strong note of careerism in their attitudes. In some measure, this explains why individual issues were the most salient; the only activist sample where they received this priority.

TRADE UNIONS IN GENERAL

For these measures a scale divisible into three sub-scales and consisting of ten items from section 'B' of the questionnaire was used. In addition, a small sub-scale on NALGO as a whole was used from the same section of the questionnaire; see Appendix M3, Table 3.3. Mean scores for non-activist and activist samples of each branch were calculated and are shown in Appendices S23.1 to S23.6.

For non-activists differences between branches were not statistically significant, either on total or sub-scale scores. However it can be noted that the Gas branch had the least favourable opinions of both trade unions in general and NALGO on every dimension and Local Authority Branch 1 the most favourable.

With activists, on only one sub-scale (political activities) were the differences between branches statistically significant. Here the Gas branch had very unfavourable attitudes and the Electricity

branch favourable opinions. Again there was a consistent rank ordering of scores on all dimensions, Electricity had the most favourable attitudes, then Local Authority 1, Local Authority 2 and Gas the least favourable.

Data was further analysed using partial correlation and path analytic methods. Path models are shown in Appendices S23.7 to S23.14 and results for each branch are as follows:-

Gas Branch

For both activists and non-activists, political involvement was the dimension along which trade unions in general were focally evaluated. With non-activists, the 57% explained variance in favourability towards political involvement was associated with the extent to which they also endorsed trade union involvement in wider social issues and their evaluation of trade unions as definers of appropriate issues for adoption. Evaluations of NALGO were determined by the same two variables.

For activists, the 84% explained variance in favourability towards political activities was determined almost completely by the extent to which they favoured trade union involvement in wider social issues. Evaluations of NALGO were relatively unconnected with those of wider trade unions.

Both activists and non-activists had the least favourable evaluations of trade unions in general (and NALGO in particular) found in any branch. Their attitude patterns were such that

involvement in wider social issues was strongly deprecated, which in turn led to low evaluation of trade unions as issue definers. Moreover to a large extent, any involvement in wider social issues was connected in their mind with the strongly eschewed notion of political activity. Low opinions of NALGO were more connected with the union's perceived involvement in wider social issues.

Electricity Branch

Non-activist evaluations of trade unions in general were focused upon the extent to which trade unions were viewed favourably as definers of appropriate issues for adoption. The 38% explained variance in this variable was determined by the extent to which political activity by trade unions was endorsed (20% variance), how favourably NALGO was viewed (13% variance) and the extent to which non-activists favoured trade union involvement in wider social issues (5% variance). Here, opinions of trade unions in general were little different from Gas non-activists. Similarly, opinions of NALGO were relatively unconnected with the extent to which political involvement by wider trade unions was favoured.

For activists, opinions of NALGO were the focus of all other evaluations of wider trade unions. Over three-quarters of the 81% explained variance in opinions of NALGO was determined by evaluations of wider trade unions as definers of suitable issues for adoption; the remainder by the extent to which their political activities were endorsed.

Here attitudes towards wider trade unions and NALGO were the most favourable encountered. It can therefore be concluded that NALGO was viewed favourably because it had been mentally compared (and not found wanting) with other trade unions in terms of issue definition and political activities.

Local Authority Branch 1

Non-activists focally evaluated wider trade unions in terms of their political activities. Almost three-quarters of the 50% explained variance in this variable was associated with the extent to which these non-activists also favoured involvement in wider social issues. Here, as with other non-activists, wider social and political involvement were largely seen as concomitant. However, their more favourable attitudes towards wider trade unions and NALGO suggest that this might not have been quite so unpalatable as elsewhere.

With activists trade unions in general were focally evaluated in terms of whether their involvement in wider social issues was favoured. The 69% explained variance in this variable was overwhelmingly associated with the extent to which political activity by trade unions was endorsed. Opinions of NALGO were mainly associated with how favourably wider trade unions were viewed as definers of appropriate issues for adoption.

For this group favourable attitudes towards wider trade unions and NALGO were second only to Electricity branch activists. The attitude pattern of these activists was one in which a favourable

disposition towards issues that wider trade unions marked out for involvement engendered equally favourable dispositions towards NALGO, political involvement and adoption of wider social issues.

Local Authority Branch 2

Both non-activist and activists evaluated trade unions in general in terms of the extent to which union involvement in wider social issues was favoured. For both groups, opinions of NALGO were largely associated with the extent to which wider trade unions were viewed favourably as definers of appropriate issues for adoption. Here however the similarity ends.

For non-activists, over 80% of the variance in favourability towards wider social involvement was associated with the extent to which political activity by trade unions was favoured. In their view, wider social and political were much the same thing; neither of which found much favour in their eyes. Moreover the extent to which wider trade unions were viewed favourably as definers of appropriate issues for adoption was also associated with the extent to which political activity was favoured.

With activists almost two-thirds of the 54% explained variance in endorsement of involvement in wider social issues was associated with how favourable trade unions were viewed as definers of appropriate issues. Only 18% of variance was determined by the extent to which political activity was endorsed. Thus trade union involvement in wider social issues was much more a question of

appropriate issue definition in the first place, rather than assumed political motivation.

TRADE UNION AT WORK: NON-ACTIVISTS

Data for these measures consisted of thirty items from section 'B' of the non-activist questionnaire. The total scale was divided into seven sub-scales, four of which dealt with the trade union branch and three with activists. (See Appendix M3, table 3.3). Mean scores for branch samples were calculated and are shown in Appendix 24.1.

For total scale scores and for a number of sub-attitudes differences between branches were statistically significant viz:

- i. Evaluation of the branch as a consulter of its members interests where Gas and Local Authority 1 scored much higher than the other two branches.
- ii. Endorsement of collective aspects of trade unionism where Gas scored much higher than other branches.
- iii. Endorsement of an aggressive approach to industrial relations where the two nationalised industry branches scored higher than either local authority branch.
- iv. Overall evaluation of (and in particular confidence in) activists which was much higher in Gas and Local Authority 1 than the other two branches.
- v. The total attitude to trade unions at work score where Gas and Local Authority 1 had more favourable attitudes.

To examine relationships between these and other sub-attitudes, three additional analyses were undertaken using partial correlation and path analytic methods:-

Analysis 1

All seven dimensions of the attitude to trade union at work scale were examined in conjunction to explore links between sub-attitudes.

Analysis 2

The two attitudes to management (perceived fairness and trustworthiness) were examined in conjunction with the four general sub-attitudes to the branch i.e. as a consulter of interests, as a source of security/succorance, as a vehicle for collective endeavour and endorsement of aggressiveness by the branch. This was to explore any connection between opinions of management and views of the branch.

Analysis 3

The three sub-attitudes of confidence in activists, evaluation of activists as consulters/informers, and endorsement of activist leadership were examined in conjunction with the two attitudes to management. Here the aim was to explore any connection between opinions of management and evaluation of activists.

The three analyses were then used to build-up a picture of rank and file attitudes in each branch. Path models are shown in appendices S24.2 to S24.13. Here the results can most conveniently be discussed by contrasting similarities and differences between branches.

Similarities Between Branches

From analysis 1, in all branches, the sub-attitude on which all others focused was the extent to which non-activists perceived that the branch consulted them about their will or interests. At least 85% of the explained variance in this variable arose from evaluations of activists; the major part of this being the level of expressed confidence in activists with the remainder from the extent to which they were seen to be good consulters/informers. It can therefore be concluded that in all branches, activists were viewed as the major factor influencing branch performance i.e. where confidence in activists was highest, the branch was viewed as better at consulting with its members.

With analyses 2 and 3, there were also common features in the connections between opinions of management and those of the branch and/or its activists. In all branches, either perceived fairness or trustworthiness of management was the attitude dimension on which all others focused and over 70% of its explained variance arose in the other perception of management. From this it could be concluded that to non-activists, management behaviour depended to a large extent on management, not the branch and its activists.

Notwithstanding this, there was a concomitant variation across all branches between perceptions of trade union and management i.e. where the trade union and its activists were evaluated most favourably, perceptions of management fairness and trustworthiness

were the highest. The differences between branches in terms of the interaction between variables pointed to corresponding differences in attitude patterns and can be best described by considering each branch in turn.

Differences Between Branches

Gas Branch

In analysis 1 higher evaluations of activists as consulters/informers, were associated with a raised sense of security from the trade union, higher endorsement of collectivism, higher aggressiveness by the branch and a willingness to accept leadership from activists. Moreover as endorsement of aggressiveness rose, so did a belief in collective aspects of trade unionism. There were in analysis 3, two small but noticeable effects. A rise in either evaluation of the branch as a consulter of its members or of a sense of security gained from union membership, positively affected perceived management trustworthiness. A fall in perceptions of management fairness was associated with a rise in endorsement of aggressive trade unionism.

This branch was viewed favourably because evaluations of its activists were correspondingly favourable. Above and beyond this, there was a small but definite association in the eyes of the rank and file between the presence of the trade union and management fairness. Moreover the trade union presence was associated with

some endorsement of collectivism and tolerance of a degree of aggressiveness by the branch.

Electricity Branch

In this branch, analysis 1 revealed that the more favourable were activists viewed as consulters/informers, the greater was the endorsement of aggressiveness. This in turn, increased the sense of security from the trade union. Conversely there was a note of wariness with respect to activists being allowed to exercise unrestrained leadership i.e. a fall in endorsement of leadership by activists was associated with a rise in the extent to which collective aspects of endeavour were endorsed. As with the Gas branch, analysis 3 revealed that there were small but noticeable effects in which higher evaluations of the branch as a consulter of its members and a sense of security gained from union membership were associated with more favourable perceptions of management fairness.

In this branch, evaluations of activists were amongst the most unfavourable encountered. From what has been said earlier, it follows that the branch was evaluated comparatively unfavourably because rank and file opinions of activists were correspondingly low.

As with the Gas branch there was a small but definite association in rank and file eyes between the presence of the branch and perceptions of management fairness. However, since opinions of management, the branch as a consulter of its members, and of

confidence in activists were all low, it must be concluded that the branch was regarded as somewhat less effective in ensuring fairness of management.

Finally, it is worth noting that rank and file endorsement of both collectivism and aggression was comparatively high. Their endorsement was, however, conditional on activists not taking the lead, but involving the membership before acting; a process in which they were viewed as somewhat less than effective.

Local Authority Branch 1

Here in analysis 1 there was a small negative effect in which a fall in endorsement of collective aspects of trade unionism was associated with a rise in opinions of the branch as a consulter of its members. In analysis 3, there was a weak negative relationship where lowered perceptions of management trustworthiness were associated with increased sense of security from the trade union. The most noticeable effect however, was a positive one. A rise in evaluations of management trustworthiness was associated with increased endorsement of an aggressive approach by the branch.

In this branch evaluations of both management and activists were highly favourable. However, although the branch was seen in a favourable light because its activists were viewed favourably, their perceived effect on management was evaluated lower than by any other group of non-activists.

The weak (but nevertheless noticeable) relationships between collectivism, membership consultation, aggressiveness and perceptions of management indicate that here aggression may have had a unique meaning. The more favourable were non-activist views of management, the higher was their endorsement of an aggressive approach to job regulation by the branch. However, the higher they endorsed aggression, the less they embraced collectivism. Thus in their eyes, aggressiveness of approach by the branch was definitely not synonymous with collective aggression. Moreover their evaluations of the branch and its activists rose as their embracement of collectivism fell; indicating that branch and activists were evaluated by the extent to which the rank and file were relieved of any necessity to engage in acts of collective aggression.

For these non-activists, collectivism was therefore probably limited to involvement in setting negotiating objectives for activists. Nevertheless, they saw management as responding to an aggressive approach to job regulation by the branch. In their eyes, therefore, this aggression was probably desirable in terms of producing results but at the same time something they expected activists to display on their behalf. As such it was probably not an attribute which they felt it was necessary to display themselves in collective acts.

Local Authority Branch 2

In this branch there was a weak but noticeable chain effect between attitude dimensions. In analysis 1, when activists were

evaluated more favourably, this in turn increased both endorsement of leadership by activists and opinions of the branch as a consulter of its members' interests. In analysis 3, evaluations of both the branch and its activists had somewhat stronger determining effects on perceptions of management than with any other group of non-activists. However, opinions of activists, management and the branch were amongst the least favourable encountered. Inevitably the unfavourable view of activists, led to a correspondingly unfavourable view of the branch in terms of consultation with its members. Moreover since opinions of management were more strongly associated here with the presence of the branch it seems likely that unfavourable views of both meant that the branch was viewed as somewhat ineffective in obtaining fairness.

Notwithstanding this, the positive link between non-activist endorsement of an aggressive stance by the branch and activist leadership can be noted. Had activists been viewed more favourably as consulters/informers, then an aggressive stance by the branch would, to some extent, have been underwritten together with a willingness to follow the activist lead. However it was as consulters/informers that activists were evaluated in a particularly unfavourable light. Their comparatively poor performance in this respect could well have been interpreted as a failure to provide the degree of aggressive approach and leadership that was desired.

TRADE UNION AT WORK: ACTIVISTS

For these measures data from section 'B' of the activist questionnaire was used. This consisted of a total scale of forty-two items divided into eleven sub-scales i.e. four sub-attitudes towards the branch, two sub-attitudes towards activist role and five sub-attitudes towards the rank and file. The two sub-attitudes towards activist role were combined into a minor scale as were the five sub-attitudes towards the rank and file (see Appendix M3, table 3.3). Mean scores for each branch sample were calculated for total scales, minor scales and sub-scales. These are shown in Appendix S25.1 where it can be noted that although there was some variation between branches, differences in scores were not statistically significant on either total scales, minor scales or sub-scales.

To examine relationships between these and other sub-attitudes, four additional analyses were undertaken using partial correlation and path analytic methods. These were:

Analysis 1

The four sub-attitudes to the branch (as a consulter of interests, as a source of security/succorance, collective aspects and endorsement of aggressiveness) were examined in conjunction with the minor scales of attitudes to activist role and attitudes to the rank and file. This was to explore links between the major dimensions of attitudes to the trade union at work.

Analysis 2

The five sub-attitudes to the rank and file were examined together i.e. perceptions of their loyalty to the trade union, their motives, their awareness, competence to fend for themselves and appreciation of trade union efforts on their behalf. This analysis was undertaken to complement information gained from the one above

Analysis 3

The two attitudes to management (perceived fairness and trustworthiness) were examined in conjunction with the four general attitudes towards the branch. This, as with the analysis performed on non-activist data, was to explore any connections between opinions of management and of the branch

Analysis 4

The minor scale of attitudes towards activist role was examined in conjunction with the five sub-attitudes towards the rank and file and the two sub-attitudes towards management. Here the aim was to determine which factors most influenced liking for (or dislike of) the activist role.

The four analyses were then used to build-up a picture of activist attitudes in each branch. Path models are shown in Appendices S25.2 to S25.17. Here as with non-activists, there were both similarities and differences between branches.

Similarities Between Branches

With respect to general attitudes to the branch (Analysis 1), in both Gas and Local Authority 1, the dimension on which all other variables focused was the degree of favourability towards adoption of an aggressive approach to job regulation. In both branches well over half the explained variance in this variable arose from positive effects of two sub-attitudes; sense of security gained from the trade union and the extent to which collective aspects of trade unionism were embraced. In these branches relatively high levels of endorsement of aggression stemmed from their correspondingly high beliefs in collectivism and sense of security gained from union membership.

With respect to attitudes to the rank and file (analysis 2) there was some similarity in opinions for three branches (Gas, Electricity and Local Authority branch 2). In each case perceived awareness of the rank and file was the focus of other opinions. Over three quarters of the explained variance in this variable arose in positive effects from evaluations of rank and file competence to protect their own interests and their perceived appreciation of trade union efforts on their behalf.

Competence to look after their own interests implies a degree of toughness or willingness to oppose management. In these branches, it could be inferred that whilst activists viewed the rank and file in terms of their awareness, they defined aware members as

those who appreciated trade union efforts on their behalf and were willing to support their branch when it opposed management.

With respect to the interaction between attitudes to branch and management (analysis 3) there were also similarities between Gas, Electricity and Local Authority branch 2. For all three, perceptions of management (either fairness or trustworthiness) was the focus of other attitudes, with approximately three quarters of its explained variance arising in the other opinion of management. This was a similar situation to that found for non-activists in all branches. With activists however, the trade union was seen to have a stronger effect on management, though these perceived effects differed.

Differences Between Branches

Gas Branch

Here analysis 4 revealed that liking for activist role was comparatively high and rose as perceived management trustworthiness fell. As liking for role rose, the rank and file were perceived as more appreciative of the trade union but their loyalty and motives more suspect. Liking for role had a fairly strong component of enjoyment of its power/oppositional aspects.

In addition, although analysis 1 showed that aggressiveness of approach to job regulation was the dimension on which all other evaluations of the trade union at work focused, it also demonstrated that as evaluations of the branch as a consulter and

as opinions of non-activists rose, endorsement of aggression fell. The inference here was that consultation of the rank and file might reveal their lack of support and thus preclude an aggressive approach to job regulation.

In analysis 3 although perceptions of management trustworthiness were largely determined by evaluations of their fairness there were other important interactions between variables. As perceived management fairness fell, the sense of security gained from union membership together with endorsement of an aggressive approach rose. As they did so, perceptions of management trustworthiness fell. The inference is that any perceived unfairness on the part of management would elevate the level of collective solidarity and prompt an aggressive approach to the issue.

The results together with those from analysis 2 given above permit the following inferences with respect to activist attitudes in this branch.

1. Because activists experienced the trade union as a strong source of security and succorance and believed fairly strongly in its collective aspects, they also endorsed the notion of an aggressive approach to job regulation by the branch.
- ii. This endorsement of aggression, together with the trade union as a source of security stemmed in part from a lack of faith in management fairness. This in turn affected views of management trustworthiness.

- iii. Low evaluations of trustworthiness were also linked to an increased liking for the activist role; in particular power/oppositional aspects. Activists were, therefore, somewhat inclined to see themselves as a counter force to any perceived unfairness, with collective aggressiveness by the branch as the best counter.
- iv. Activists were, however, somewhat wary of obtaining the backing of the rank and file for what they perceived to be an appropriate branch posture. Although there were no signs of actual dislike of non-activists, there were fairly clear indications that activists perceived the latter as being less than willing to take what action was necessary to protect their own interests.

Electricity Branch

On general attitudes to the branch, Analysis 1 revealed that opinions of rank and file were the focus of all other dimensions. Almost all the explained variance in this variable arose from negative relationships with two other variables; a strong belief in collectivism and liking for activist role. Liking for role was strongly affected (positively) by endorsement of an aggressive approach to job regulation. Here there was a distinct chain in which endorsement of an aggressive approach (the highest score of all activist groups) increased liking for role which together with a strong embracement of collectivism led to lowered evaluations of the rank and file.

In Analysis 3 although fairness of management was largely determined by perceptions of its trustworthiness, endorsement of an aggressive approach was an independent variable unaffected by perceptions of management. Here aggression (which was endorsed more highly than in any other branch) positively affected views of management fairness. The inference is that activists perceived that the more aggressive the approach to job regulation adopted by the branch, the more likely they were to be able to compel management to be fair.

When liking for role was examined together with evaluations of trade union and management (Analysis 4) it became the focus of all other attitude dimensions. There was a fairly strong relationship in which lowered evaluations of management trustworthiness increased activist liking for role. However, the strongest effects arose from opinions of the rank and file. Here lowered evaluations of both rank and file competence to fend for themselves and rank and file appreciation of trade union efforts, both increased liking for role. In addition, the higher was rank and file loyalty judged to be, the greater was the activist role liked. Thus these activists had somewhat elitist attitudes to the rank and file. They liked the activist role more when they perceived the rank and file as unable to fend for themselves and as loyal to the trade union, but cared little for whether or not non-activists appreciated efforts on their behalf.

These results together with those from Analysis 2 above, enable the following inferences to be made:-

1. An aggressive approach to job regulation was seen as a prerequisite to management fairness. This endorsement of aggression might however have led to some stereotyping of management as unfair and unjust. Evaluations on this factor were the lowest of any activist group.
- ii. Liking for activist role was strongly connected to endorsement of aggression, particularly its power/oppositional aspects. The major purpose of activism was therefore seen as opposition to management.
- iii. As with the Gas branch, the rank and file were viewed largely in terms of their willingness to support activists, about which there were grave doubts. It would probably be little exaggeration to suggest that non-activists were seen as a distinct impediment to activist aims of collective effort and aggressiveness of approach. Indeed there are implications that they were experienced as a factor somewhat tainting the otherwise valued involvement in branch trade unionism.

Local Authority Branch 1

With analysis 1, although endorsement of an aggressive approach to job regulation was the dimension on which all other opinions of the trade union at work focused there were other interactions between variables that were important. High evaluations of the rank and file together with opinions of the branch as a consulter, had the effect of increasing endorsement of an aggressive

approach. It can therefore, be inferred that activists felt that if the rank and file were consulted, there could be some confidence in their support.

With attitudes to non-activists (analysis 2) all other variables focused on perceptions of rank and file loyalty to the trade union. Over nine-tenths of the explained variance in this variable arose from a positive association with perceived motives of the rank and file. Here both motives and loyalty were evaluated higher than elsewhere. Thus it can be inferred that activists saw the rank and file as loyal because they had motives which were above suspicion and probably akin to those of activists themselves.

In relationships between attitudes to the branch and to management (analysis 3), endorsement of an aggressive approach to job regulation was the dimension on which all others focused. Here aggression was more highly endorsed as scores on three antecedant variables rose: namely the trade union as a source of security, endorsement of collectivism and evaluation of the branch as a consulter of its members interests. However as sense of security from trade union rose, collectivism was embraced less. In addition, as opinions of management fairness rose the branch was seen as a better consulter of its members.

Opinions of management fairness were the highest of any group of activists. The inference is that these activists felt that the presence of a fair management (presumably openness was considered

part of fairness) enabled the branch to better consult its members about matters which affected them. This in turn prompted endorsement of some degree of aggressiveness of approach to job regulation. It is therefore probable that aggressiveness of approach was an indication more of a proactive stance than a militant one. Additionally, whilst a feeling of security from the trade union also led to endorsement of aggression, it can be noted that security was not synonymous with collectivism. Aggressiveness may well have been a posture that activists felt should be adopted by themselves on behalf of the rank and file rather than a matter of collective action.

In this branch intrinsic satisfactions from the activist role slightly outweighed liking for its power/oppositional aspects. Analysis 4 revealed that the antecedents of liking for role were mainly opinions of the rank and file and that as evaluations of the rank and file rose, liking for role fell. Since opinions of the rank and file were comparatively favourable and the activist role was evaluated quite highly as a source of intrinsic satisfactions; it can be inferred that the positive feelings towards non-activists probably had the effect of reducing liking for power/oppositional aspects.

These three analyses enabled general conclusions to be drawn which can be summarised as follows:

1. Overall the rank and file were quite highly thought of by activists. In particular their motives and loyalty

were less suspect than in other branches.

- ii. Activists had far less apprehension in this branch than elsewhere about rank and file support.
- iii. Probably because they felt that rank and file support would be forthcoming, activists were quite strongly in favour of an aggressive approach to job regulation.
- iv. Aggressiveness however was not synonymous with collective action. To these activists aggressiveness meant proaction in initiation rather than militancy.

Local Authority Branch 2

With respect to the relationship between attitudes to the branch, the rank and file and activist role (analysis 1) the dimension on which all others focused was the extent to which these activists experienced the trade union as a source of security. Over half the explained variance in this variable arose from a negative relationship with opinions of the rank and file and a further quarter from a negative relationship with endorsement of collective aspects of trade unionism. Thus their relatively high sense of security arose from viewing the rank and file unfavourably and eschewing collectivism.

Although Analysis 3 revealed that opinions of management fairness were largely determined by perceptions of trustworthiness, endorsement of an aggressive approach had little effect on perceptions of management. Here, a rise in both sense of security from union membership and belief in collectivism, were associated with lowered evaluations of management fairness, but the lower the

belief in collectivism the greater the sense of security from trade union. The implication is that these activists gained their sense of security from the trade union in a personal sense i.e. the branch was available to counter any management unfairness towards them as individuals rather than being concerned with collective advancement of its whole membership.

In this branch the activist role was viewed more unfavourably than by any other group of activists. Analysis 4 revealed that the antecedents of any liking for role arose in a number of extremely weak negative relationships with sub-attitudes to non-activists. It can however, be noted that the less the activist role was liked, the more favourable was the view of management trustworthiness. However, these relationships were very weak, and views of the rank and file had very little influence on liking for role.

From these results and those given earlier, inferences with respect to attitudes of these activists can be made as follows:-

- i. These activists endorsed aggressiveness of approach to job regulation less than activists in any other branch. What desire for aggressiveness did exist was prompted by a fairly high sense of security gained from the trade union.
- ii. The sense of security was based on a low degree of support for collective aspects of trade unions. It might well have arisen in a desire not to act in concert with others but a feeling that help was available should they need it.
- iii. Their sense of security also had its roots in low opinions

of the rank and file. Non-activists were viewed no more favourably than in either of the nationalised industry branches and in much the same way i.e. there was a similar degree of wariness with respect to their support for the branch and its activists.

- iv. Overall the picture is of a group who gained some personal sense of security from involvement in the branch but who were reticent or even unwilling to attempt mobilisation of non-activists against management and content to follow rank and file instructions. Indeed the very low endorsement of collectivism might well have prompted a search for rationales to avoid mobilisation.

ATTITUDES AS PARTIAL EXPLANATIONS OF APPROACHES TO JOB REGULATION

Before using the above results to develop explanations, it is important to note the status of attitudes as explanatory variables. Attitudes are guides to action (Allport 1935) not infallible behavioural determinants. Therefore in comparing different social situations, they are most appropriately used as general factors predisposing actors to behave in certain ways. Indication of these predispositions clearly has value in enriching explanations, but requires that each situation be treated discretely. For this reason each branch is discussed separately below.

Gas Branch

For both non-activists and activists, expectations and experiences of work made internal issues at group/departmental level extremely important. This in part explains the highly internal focus of

the branch. There is however, another attitudinal factor which probably contributed to this focus. Both activists and non-activists had the least favourable attitudes towards wider trade unions found in any branch. Indeed, activists had attitudes which were only slightly more favourable than those of non-activists in other branches. In particular, wider trade unions were viewed unfavourably as definers of appropriate issues in which to become involved and this view coloured other evaluations. Activists were therefore unlikely to become a force which led the rank and file into involvement in external issues.

Some explanation of predispositions towards intense action were evident in both non-activist and activist attitudes. Both groups had a stronger belief in collective aspects of trade unionism than those in other branches. Activists had attitudes in which collective aggression was seen as a fairly natural response to any unfairness by management, and to some extent non-activists associated management fairness with the presence of the branch. Moreover this presence was itself associated with collectivism and a measure of aggression in approaches to job regulation. In addition, because the rank and file had a high degree of confidence in activists, non-activists viewed the branch favourably in terms of consulting their interests. As a consequence they were unlikely to feel they would be bulldozed into intense action against their will and were probably more inclined to willingly follow an activist lead.

In terms of the branch's low tendency to initiate issues, some explanation can be found in activist attitudes. Whilst they endorsed an oppositional role for themselves, it was essentially in terms of countering any perceived unfairness in management and was tempered with scepticism with respect to rank and file support. Rather than opening up new areas for negotiation, their attitudes supported mobilising non-activists to oppose some action on the part of management that could be demonstrated to be unfair.

The high rank and file evaluation of this branch's representativeness can in some measure be explained as the other side of the coin to many of the factors given above. Since activists were as internally focused as the rank and file, non-activists were probably not asked to involve themselves in matters which they would have considered irrelevant. Activist scepticism in regard to rank and file backing probably made them wary of calling for intense action without thoroughly selling the issue to non-activists. As a consequence, the rank and file felt themselves to have some say in shaping issues.

Electricity Branch

Here rank and file expectations and experience of work made issues within the employing organisation the most important. For activists extrinsic expectations were paramount and in this industry pay was a nationally negotiated issue. Thus dual emphasis on national and organisational matters gives some explanation of a focus in issues slightly more external than that of Gas. An additional explanation

arises in attitudes to wider trade unions, which for non-activists were slightly more favourable than those of the Gas branch.

The most important influence on focus was probably the activists, who had the most favourable attitudes to wider trade unions found in any branch. Indeed NALGO itself was evaluated in comparison with the macro-social and political activities of other trade unions. This also provides some explanation of why the branch was the most dependent of all on the outside trade union.

This branch was the most intense in action of all those studied and attitudes can be seen to have provided a potential trigger for intensity. Non-activists endorsed both aggression and collectivism, particularly with respect to any perceived management unfairness. To activists, an aggressive stance by the branch was a prerequisite to achieving fairness from management. Moreover, their liking for role, particularly its oppositional aspects, was largely driven by the use of aggression to oppose management's will.

Initiation of issues, which was slightly higher than that of the Gas branch, can also be explained in similar terms. Activists had attitudes predisposing them to see their role in terms of preventing the realisation of management initiatives, but they were sceptical about rank and file backing. In addition, their attitudes to the rank and file were rather elitist and predisposed them to consider non-activists as somewhat less than competent in

recognising their own best interests. Therefore, despite the fact that they were wary of rank and file backing, they would perhaps be inclined to act first and face the consequences later.

The low rank and file evaluations of representativeness of the branch can be seen as the opposite side of the coin to many of these attitude patterns. Here non-activists evaluated their branch comparatively unfavourably in terms of consulting its members' interests and in addition, their confidence in activists was low. Aggression and collectivism (which they endorsed to some extent) were crucially dependent on activists consulting them before embarking on a course of action, but the elitist attitudes of activists made it unlikely that this would always occur. Moreover activist attitudes, if communicated to the rank and file (and there was no evidence to suggest that they were not) would be almost bound to heighten any feeling of unrepresentativeness.

Local Authority Branch 1

For both activists and non activists, expectations and experiences of work made organisational level issues (where gains in improvements to service conditions were realisable) the most salient. However, the focus on issues was the most external of all branches studied and here attitudes to trade union in general can be seen to have played a part. Non-activists were more favourably disposed to the activities of wider trade unions than in any other branch. Moreover NALGO was viewed as part of wider trade unionism and evaluated in terms of involvement in macro social issues. Activists held very similar attitudes and thus there was a

high tolerance to external issues of a wider social (rather than political) nature; the very type in which the branch involved itself.

Intensity of action in this branch was one of the lowest and attitudes can be seen to have had an effect. Non-activists were unfavourably disposed towards acts of collective aggression by themselves and activists did not perceive their role as an oppositional one. Since both groups viewed management more favourably than in any other branch, attitude patterns were not conducive to militancy.

There was another side to this lack of intensity - namely the branch's proactive approach to job regulation. Here the more trustworthy and fair activists perceived management to be, the more strongly they endorsed an aggressive approach to job regulation. In addition since aggression was not equated with collectivism, and management was viewed favourably; aggression was probably channelled into initiation rather than opposition.

In the eyes of its rank and file members, this branch was the most representative studied and attitudes again give some explanation. Both activists and non-activists had very similar attitudes to almost every aspect of work and trade union; a clash of interests between the two was, therefore, unlikely. Aggression tended to be viewed by the rank and file as an attribute activists displayed on their behalf and activist attitudes were

conductive to accepting this role. Moreover, activist views of the rank and file loyalty and motives were more favourable than elsewhere; a view which would at the least predispose them to maintain a more consistent dialogue with their members. Given this it is hardly surprising that rank and file evaluations of the branch as a consulter of its members interests and confidence in activists were the highest encountered.

Local Authority Branch 2

Non-activists in this branch had the lowest expectations of work arising from the least favourable experiences. Activists on the other hand, had the highest expectations found in any branch. These focused on upward mobility and again experience determined expectations. On the whole it would be expected that the most salient issues would be those internal to the employing organisation.

Nevertheless, in attitudes to trade unions in general, there were among activists, signs of some degree of tolerance to externally focused issues. These however were not strong and, in view of other attitude patterns the emergence of a strong external focus was unlikely.

The branch was the least intense in action of all those investigated and some explanation can be found in attitudes. Both activist and non-activists were to a large extent receiving from work the satisfactions they expected. Nevertheless, in non-activists there were some signs of a potential for intense action

in that the presence of an aggressive trade union was seen to have an effect on management fairness and trustworthiness. Activists however eschewed aggression, collectivism and oppositional aspects of role more than any other activist group. In addition there was a distinct note of careerism in their attitudes to work i.e. those with the highest expectations perceived themselves to be receiving the most and had the lowest commitment to remaining. These attitudes were unlikely to predispose them to provide a lead in mobilising the rank and file towards any form of intense action.

Whilst the branch was the second highest in terms of initiation of issues, the level of initiation was still quite low. Activist attitudes to work, which predisposed them to obtain improvements for themselves by moving elsewhere, were unlikely to result in a high level of initiation with their current employer.

In the eyes of its rank and file, this branch was judged as the least representative. Non-activists showed some signs of wanting a more assertive style of trade unionism. Activist attitudes on the other hand were such that they were unlikely to provide much in the way of a lead or initiatives for the rank and file. It is possible that activists were considered unrepresentative because they were seen as unassertive. In contrast to the Electricity branch, where feelings of unrepresentativeness probably had their roots in activists being seen as one step ahead of the rank and file - here it might well have occurred because activists were perceived to be one step behind.

CHAPTER 10

STRUCTURAL FACTORS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines how internal structural factors of the branches studied affected approaches to job regulation. It commences by examining a number of different measures each of which characterises a separate aspect of the representative system within a branch. These are then brought together in a short overview. Membership dispersion as a second structural factor is then examined, with a concentration on its experienced effects. Finally structural characteristics of branches are used to develop partial explanations of approaches to job regulation.

THE REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM

Here a number of different measures were used, each of which characterised a different aspect of the system.

Shop Steward Constituencies

For this measure, an index was derived which reflected the extent to which the structural basis of the system of workplace representation could facilitate the emergence of stewards with some degree of autonomy in representation. The index was derived using responses to questions 1 and 2 on the interview schedule. Question 1 sought information with respect to the basis on which stewards were allocated groups of members to represent. The second question dealt with the structural basis on which constituencies

were selected. Responses were scored out of ten on the scheme given in Appendix M4.1 and the two scores multiplied to give an index which could vary between 1 and 100; the latter representing the maximum degree to which the design of constituencies facilitated stewardship. Derivation of indices is shown in detail in Appendix S26 and summary scores in table 10.1 below:

	<i>Gas Branch</i>	<i>Electricity Branch</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 1</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 2</i>
Score	70	35	25	15

Table 10.1 Summary Scores: Design for Shop Steward Constituencies

Formal Provision to Inform and Sense Member Opinions

Here an index was derived which reflected two main methods of informing and sensing members:

- i. through meetings
- ii. the use of newsletters or magazines within the branch.

It was derived using responses to questions 21 to 23 and 30 to 35 on the interview schedule; scored as shown in Appendix M4.1. Mean scores were used to calculate the index which could theoretically fall between 1 and 100; the higher figure representing maximum formal provision to sense and inform the rank and file. Derivation of indices are shown in detail in Appendix S27 and summary scores in table 10.2 below:-

:

	<i>Gas Branch</i>	<i>Electricity Branch</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 1</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 2</i>
Sub-Index Meetings	22.900	23.459	23.836	11.395
Sub-Index: Written Communication	20.649	5.935	8.496	17.334
Total Score	43.549	29.394	32.332	28.729

Table 10.2 Summary Scores: Index of Formal Provision to Inform and Sense Rank and File Opinion

Here it can be noted that as well as a variation in total scores, there were pronounced differences in the make-up of totals. Local Authority Branch 2 had a much lower score than others for the meetings sub-index; primarily because executive meetings were closed to the rank and file. However, the branch had a regularly issued newsletter which achieved some success in maintaining a flow of information between activists and rank and file. The other three branches all had very similar scores for the meetings sub-index. Of these, only the Gas branch made extensive additional use of a magazine/newsletter to inform and sense rank and file opinion.

Centralisation of Authority Within Branch

For this measure, responses to items 14 to 20 on the interview schedule were used. These were scored using the scheme given in Appendix M4.1 and used to construct three sub-indices; centralisation of authority in decision making, negotiating, and relationships with the wider trade union respectively. The sum of these gave a total index which could theoretically vary between 1 and 100; the higher figure representing maximum centralisation.

Derivation of indices is shown in detail in Appendix S28 and summary scores in table 10.3 below:

	<i>Gas Branch</i>	<i>Electricity Branch</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 1</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 2</i>
Decision Making	3	5	3	3
Negotiating	0	15	25	15
Relations with Wider Trade Union	9	9	9	25
Total Index	12	29	37	43

Table 10.3 Summary Index Scores: Centralisation of Authority within Branch

Overall the branch with the greatest degree of centralised authority was Local Authority 2 and that with the least was Gas. In decision making, Electricity had higher centralisation than others but this was still a low score. For negotiating, Local Authority branch 1 attained the highest score and Gas the minimum. In terms of relations with the wider trade union it was Local Authority branch 2 that scored the highest with all others low.

Perceived Opportunity for Steward Autonomy

For this measure responses to interview schedule items 7 to 11 were used. Items 7 to 9 asked respectively the extent to which representatives were allowed to take up issues on their own with management, the percentage of constituency issues they dealt with, and whether they had the branch's authority to reach a settlement. Question 10 established the type of issues about which

representatives were empowered to reach agreement without reference back to the branch and Question 11 those where reference back was mandatory. These were scored for each activist respondent on the scheme shown in Appendix M4.1 and an index computed as follows:

$$\begin{array}{cccccc} \text{Question 7} & \times & \text{Question 8} & \times & \text{Question 9} & + & \text{Question 10} & \times & \text{Question 11} \end{array}$$

Scores on this index could theoretically fall between 0 and 100, the latter figure representing the maximum level of perceived autonomy for stewards. Individual index scores were averaged to produce an overall index for the branch. This is shown in detail in Appendix S29 and for convenience summary scores are reproduced in table 10.4 below:

	Gas Branch	Electricity Branch	Local Authority Branch 1	Local Authority Branch 2
Mean Score				
Branch				
Activists	74.583	53.292	26.580	22.894

Table 10.4 Summary Scores:
Index of Perceived Opportunity for Steward Autonomy

As can be seen, there were large differences between mean scores for each branch. In view of these differences and those in attitudes both to work and to the rank and file highlighted in the previous chapter, two further analyses were conducted using partial correlation and path analytic methods.

Analysis 1

To examine relationships between perceived opportunity for steward autonomy and the five sub-attitudes to rank and file members i.e. their competence, loyalty, motives, awareness and appreciation.

Analysis 2

To examine relationships between perceived opportunity for steward autonomy and the four sub-dimensions of expectations of work i.e. extrinsic satisfactions, intrinsic satisfactions, upward mobility and freedom from supervision.

Path models obtained are shown in Appendices S29.1 to S29.8 and are interpreted as follows:

Gas Branch

For the first analysis the extent to which the rank and file were perceived as appreciative of efforts on their behalf was the sub-dimension on which all others focused. Perceived appreciation of the rank and file fell very slightly as stewards perceptions of their opportunity for autonomy rose. The main influences on perceived steward autonomy were opinions of rank and file competence and loyalty. Both of these had positive effects and together accounted for 10% of the variance in perceived autonomy.

In the second analysis, mobility expectations of stewards was the dimension on which all others focused. In addition the extent to which stewards perceived they had autonomy affected all other dimensions. As perceived autonomy rose, expectations of mobility

fell and this accounted for approximately one-fifth of the explained variance in the focal dimension.

In this branch stewards' perceptions of their autonomy were the highest of all branches studied. From the above analysis it can be inferred that autonomy was felt to be contingent in some degree on rank and file loyalty and competence. In addition acceptance of an autonomous steward role went hand in hand with low expectations of upward mobility.

Electricity Branch

In the first analysis, perceived awareness of the rank and file was the dimension on which all others focused. This was barely affected by steward's perceptions of their opportunity for autonomy. Perceptions of their autonomy were themselves determined by two other variables in opposite ways. As perceived appreciation of the rank and file rose, perceived autonomy also rose with approximately 13% variance explained. However, as perceived competence of non-activists fell, autonomy rose and explained 31% of variance.

For the second analysis, freedom from supervision was the focal dimension and stewardship opportunity explained (positively) about 10% of its variance. Moreover, as extrinsic expectations fell perceived stewardship opportunity rose. This explained about 10% variance.

In this branch stewards' perceptions of their autonomy were overall quite high. As the results indicate, acceptance of an autonomous steward role was to some extent linked with non-fulfilment of their extrinsic expectations. However, a note of elitism in activist attitudes was once again evident. Autonomy opportunities were seen to be highest where stewards felt their efforts were appreciated by the rank and file and where at the same time the rank and file were seen as least competent to fend for themselves.

Local Authority Branch 1

In the first analysis, perceived loyalty of the rank and file was the dimension on which all others focused. Stewards' perceptions of their autonomy had only a very small effect on explained variance. However, autonomy was itself positively determined by perceptions of motives of the rank and file (15% variance) and, to a lesser extent, their appreciation (2% variance).

For the second analysis, upward mobility expectations were the focal dimension and perceived autonomy had a determining effect on all expectations of work. The strongest of these effects was the focal dimension, where a rise in perceived autonomy opportunity gave a rise in mobility expectations. This explained 26% of variance.

In this branch perceived opportunity for stewardship was generally low. Moreover, as the results indicate, any rise in perceived autonomy was associated with expectations that upward mobility would occur i.e. activists perceived (in contrast to the Gas

branch) that activism was not an impediment to career progression. They also perceived the opportunity for autonomy to be higher where their evaluations of rank and file motives were highest.

Local Authority Branch 2

In the first analysis perceived awareness of the rank and file was the dimension on which all others focused. A fall in perceptions of the opportunity for autonomy was associated with a rise in opinions of rank and file awareness and explained 21% of its variance. Perceptions of the opportunity for autonomy rose with evaluations of rank and file appreciation and competence; 8% and 13% variance respectively.

For the second analysis, perceived opportunity for autonomy was the focal dimension affected by all others. As extrinsic expectations fell so did perceived autonomy, with 26% variance explained. However, a rise in either intrinsic satisfactions or expectations of or freedom from supervision was associated with a fall in perceived stewardship opportunity; explaining 22% and 9% of variance respectively.

In this branch stewards' perceptions of opportunity for autonomy were lower than in all other branches. Moreover, as the analyses show, it was those stewards who expected most in terms of work satisfaction who saw themselves as having least autonomy but at the same time were most likely to perceive the rank and file as being aware. It can be noted that in the previous chapter these activists were identified as having fairly strong careerist

attitudes to work. Their perceived lack of autonomy, which removed the necessity to bargain with management, might have been welcomed rather than deprecated. There could have been an element of wish fulfilment here.

Effectiveness of Recent Sensing and Informing Processes in Issues Affecting Total Branch Memberships

For this measure an index was derived using responses to questions 24 to 29 on the interview schedule. Questions 24 to 26 asked respectively how many extraordinary open meetings to discuss specific issues had been held in the year prior to the study, the issues covered and who had called the meeting (branch executive or rank and file). To these figures were added details of open meetings held throughout the period of fieldwork. This gave an eighteen month time span for each branch studied.

Questions 27 to 29 asked a similar series of questions with respect to any balloting of the membership across the same time period. Responses were scored according to the framework given in Appendix M4.1, and an index created on which scores could theoretically fall between 0 and 100; the maximum figure being attained by a branch where activists had always taken the lead to initiate these processes. The minimum score of zero could only be attained by a branch where in every instance the rank and file had felt it necessary to summon a meeting or call for a ballot to express their will. Derivation of indices is shown in detail in Appendix S30 and summary scores in table 10.5 below.

	Gas Branch	Electricity Branch	Local Authority Branch 1	Local Authority Branch 2
Score	83.333	66.667	75.000	0

Table 10.5 Index of Effectiveness of Recent Sensing and Informing Processes in Issues Affecting Total Branch Membership.

In every branch the rank and file had found it necessary to summon open meetings at least once. There were however strong differences in the extent to which branch executives had taken the initiative.

Clearly some caution is required in drawing conclusions from the index. The number of issues important enough to warrant open meetings or ballots varied between branches. Moreover events set in motion by activists could have occurred because representatives had fed information back in time for branch executives to take the initiative. Nevertheless, meetings and/or ballots pose organisational problems for activists and are unlikely to have been undertaken unless there was a perceived need. The perception of and response to the need is one way to measure the effectiveness of the representative system i.e. the burden of sensing must inevitably have fallen on workplace representatives who were in daily contact with the rank and file.

The Representative System: An Overview

The above measures all describe different, though complementary, aspects of branch representative systems about which a number of features can be observed:

1. The rank order of branches was the same for design of shop steward constituencies as for the extent to which stewards perceived they had autonomy in their role (Gas, Electricity, Local Authority 1 and Local Authority 2). Moreover, this rank order was the reverse of that for centralisation of authority in branches. Thus it can be inferred that the type of representative system was the result of a degree of conscious choice and to some extent reflected prevailing beliefs and attitudes with respect to the role of representatives within the branch.

2. The rank order of branches was also identical on the two measures of formal provision to inform and sense rank and file opinion, and effectiveness of recent endeavours to sense and inform branch memberships. Here it may be inferred that there was some connection between the two i.e. the higher the level of provision to sense rank and file opinion on a routine basis, the more likely was the use of widespread formal processes such as ballots and open meetings to involve the whole membership in decision making.

MEMBERSHIP DISPERSION

For this variable an index measure was derived using responses to questions 3, 4, 5 and 13 from the interview schedule. This index measured the effects of dispersion rather than simply how geographically dispersed was the membership. It was derived (with responses scored as indicated in Appendix M4.1) by multiplying

these scores to give a figure for each workplace. Summation of workplace indices gave a sub-index expressing the felt inconvenience for the branch arising from dispersion of its membership. This could theoretically fall between 36 and 125, the higher score representing maximum inconvenience.

A second sub-index was created using responses to questions 6 and 12. This reflected the extent to which the experienced inconvenience of dispersed memberships were ameliorated through the freedom granted (by the employer) to senior negotiators to pursue trade union duties, including mobility freedoms. Scores for the two questions were multiplied to produce a sub-index which could theoretically fall between 25 and 36; the latter figure representing the maximum degree of ameliorating effect.

Subtraction of the second sub-index score from the first gave an index for the branch reflecting both inconvenience of physical dispersion and ameliorating effects. This could theoretically fall between 0 and 100, i.e.

Maximum Inconvenience - Minimum Amelioration 125-25 = 100

Minimum Inconvenience - Maximum Amelioration 36-36 = 0

Derivation of branch indices are shown in detail in Appendices S31.1 to S31.4 and summary index scores in table 10.6 below:

	Gas Branch	Electricity Branch	Local Authority Branch 1	Local Authority Branch 2
Index Score	31.701	33.781	30.933	27.178

Table 10.6 Summary Scores: Index of Effects of Membership Dispersion

The branch experiencing most effects from dispersion was Electricity and the branch experiencing the least was Local Authority 2. However, it can be noted that the experienced effects did not strictly correspond to the relative degree of geographic dispersion in each one. Some indications of why this was the case can be obtained from comparison of the more detailed information in Appendices 31.1 to 31.4 where at the foot of each column the sum of multiplied constituency scores is given.

From the first column (headed P) it can be seen that in terms of geographical dispersion, the rank order of branches was Gas, Electricity, Local Authority 1 and Local Authority 2. The second column (P x T) expresses the effect of raw geographical effect compounded with travelling difficulty for senior branch negotiators. Here the rank order is the same as for simple geographic effect.

Turning to the next column (P x T x L), where the effects of the previous one are compounded with the likelihood of problems arising on each site; the rank order of Local Authority branches 1 and 2 are reversed. This was because Local Authority 1 branch, although

having more workplace sites had a comparatively lower probability of problems occurring at the vast majority of them.

At the foot of the last column (P x T x L x S) can be seen the effects of the perceived competence (or otherwise) of workplace representatives. Here it can be noted that the rank order of Electricity and Gas branches has reversed. The Gas Branch, although far more geographically dispersed than Electricity and having a somewhat higher number of potentially problematic sites, also had a higher proportion of local representatives evaluated as competent to handle any problems that arose.

Finally in subtracting ameliorating effects from dispersion, it can be noted that the freedom granted to branch negotiators was higher in both local authority branches than in both nationalised industry situations. With a similar degree of freedom for its negotiators, the Gas branch experienced lower problems from dispersion than did Electricity, because representatives in the former were evaluated as somewhat more competent.

INTERNAL STRUCTURAL FACTORS AS PARTIAL EXPLANATION OF APPROACHES TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION

As factors influencing branch action there is a critical difference between the two structural elements described above. The representative system has its characteristics chosen by the branch. Membership dispersion is largely an employer determined factor.

Nevertheless by selection of an appropriate representative system, it is possible for a branch to adjust itself to the potentially attendant problems of membership dispersion. Before developing explanations of branch action, it is pertinent to make a number of general observations with respect to structural factors in the branches studied.

1. In both local authority branches, memberships were less geographically dispersed than in either nationalised industry situation. In addition branch secretaries in local authorities enjoyed greater freedom (including mobility) to service members. Given these facilities, there was probably less imperative for a representative system of workplace-based negotiators to emerge. The other side of the story is that authority in local authority branches tended to remain centralised. Although the two local authority branches had very different degrees of membership dispersion, they had very similar patterns of centralised authority.
2. It is possible that in the two nationalised industry branches the lower levels of freedom and mobility enjoyed by branch secretaries, coupled with more dispersed memberships had played a part in promoting more autonomy on the part of workplace representatives. Here it can be noted that the Gas branch - whose reasons for formally adopting the steward system included that of coping with dispersion - was somewhat further along this road than the Electricity branch. As a corollary its centralisation of authority was the lowest of all

branches studied.

3. Unlike aspects described in the previous three chapters, neither of the two structural factors can be regarded as direct determinants of branch action. Both were more likely to be variables intervening between perceptions of the role of branches and actual role performance as reflected in approaches to issues of job regulation. As such, their influence in each branch was different both in magnitude and on the dimensions of approach to job regulation. Notwithstanding this there were effects which, as partial explanations, can enrich the pictures of branch action. These are given below.

Dependence on Outside Trade Union

With the Gas Branch, structural factors were more facilitators of independence than determinants. Even before the decision to divorce itself from the wider trade union (see chapter 7) its whole method of operation was in the direction of steward influence at workplace level. With the implementation of the decision, stewards became even more involved and through experience, grew more competent and confident to maintain an independent stance.

The Electricity branch also had a measure of autonomy in workplace representation; though not as high as in Gas. Neither did the Electricity branch experience similar events likely to accelerate the process. Stewards were not felt by the senior branch

negotiator (secretary) to be competent enough to be entrusted with the degree of autonomy accorded in the Gas Branch. Moreover, this branch secretary enjoyed only the same degree of freedom to pursue trade union duties as the secretary in Gas. Faced with a membership almost as highly dispersed, it is fairly easy to see why the Electricity branch had the strongest tendency to use the imported expertise of a full-time officer to pursue cases and issues.

In both local authority branches the degree of dependence on outside trade union was very similar, lower than that of Electricity but more than Gas. Both had a low state of development of workplace stewards as negotiators, but very high freedom for branch secretaries. For most domestic matters it was not necessary to call in a full-time officer since the branch secretary was allowed virtually unlimited time. Any dependence here arose from the necessity to pursue certain cases in appeal outside the organisation; a function of collective bargaining structures dealt with in the next chapter.

Focus in Issues

The two most internally focused branches (Gas and Electricity) were those with the most dispersed memberships. Dispersion is a factor likely to create a diversity of member needs or even factionalism (Beynon and Blackburn 1972, Brown et al. 1978). This is a situation where it can be difficult to obtain unity even for the more salient internal issues. Of the two branches, Gas was the most dispersed and with the most developed system of workplace

negotiators. With its more independent stance and higher caseload (Chapter 6) stewards would be more frequently involved in dealing with problems; a pattern likely to promote the somewhat higher activist levels of internal focus.

The most externally focused branches (Local Authority 1 and 2) had lower degrees of membership dispersion. Both had high centralisation of authority. It can be noted here that irrespective of rank and file feelings, activists in all branches had stronger leanings towards external issues than non-activists. Given a desire amongst influential figures in these branches to adopt externally focused issues, the high centralisation of authority would be a factor facilitating this step.

Initiation of Issues

In this investigation, initiation was a branch level measure (see Chapter 6). Both nationalised industry branches (the least initiating) had in some degree, representative systems geared to dealing with issues at workplace level by stewards. In contrast workplace issues in the two local authorities were more often dealt with at branch level.

In the nationalised industries it is possible that there was a measure of issue initiation and resolution which remained concealed, i.e. stewards did not register cases with the branch. Indeed, in the Gas branch it was a matter of standing orders that no case became the property of the branch (rather than the steward) until it had been moved for adoption at an executive committee

meeting. Other branches adopted similar processes in a less formalised way. In local authority branches, with their more centralised system of negotiations, branch officers had already become involved (and the case registered) by the time this occurred. Moreover, the case might well have been registered and resolved before the whole executive committee was confronted with its details. It is to be expected, therefore, that the two local authority branches would have higher levels of initiation.

With respect to the much higher level of initiation in Local Authority branch 1 than branch 2, some explanation can be found in its processes of informing and sensing rank and file opinion. The former branch was far more effective in terms of routine provision and in processes designed to test the feelings of the whole membership. As such it was probably somewhat better in touch with its membership's needs and wants. In addition, it was better equipped to influence members' perceptions of what their needs and wants should be and to mobilise support for activist initiated issues.

Intensity of Action

Initiatives for intense action are somewhat more likely to emanate from activists than the rank and file. In the two branches where militant action was more prevalent (Gas and Electricity) activists with the highest perceptions of stewardship opportunity were those who expected least in terms of work satisfactions and probably had little to lose personally by militancy. Conversely, in both local authority branches, the interaction between attitudes to

stewardship opportunity and career were such that activists were hardly likely to favour intense action.

Of the nationalised industry branches, Gas (the least intense of the two) with its lower centralisation of authority and higher provision to sense and inform, was more likely to have become aware of any lack of non-activist support. Conversely Electricity, with its rather more elitist activist attitudes, higher centralisation of authority and lower provision to sense rank and file opinion, was perhaps more inclined to act first and hold inquests after the event. Nevertheless, given an initiative for intense action, both branches had representative systems more likely to be effective in mobilising the rank and file than did either local authority branch.

Representativeness

The two branches judged most representative by their rank and file members were Local Authority 1 and Gas. Here it is likely that both representative systems and dispersion had some effect.

It can be noted that both branches had the highest routine provision to sense and inform their members and historically, were the most effective in consulting total memberships. Gas was somewhat more effective on both these measures, though evaluated as less representative by its members. However, despite its more active system of workplace representation the membership of the branch was far more dispersed than that in Local Authority 1. Thus sensing and informing the rank and file was a bigger problem.

Additionally in Gas, the potential heterogeneity of needs plus the greater autonomy of stewards was likely to promote a mild degree of factionalism. Some groups perhaps feeling less well serviced than others.

The branch considered least representative by its members (Local Authority 2) had the lowest routine provision to inform and sense their opinion. Moreover it was the least effective in taking issues affecting the whole membership before them for their consideration. Indeed, other than its annual general meeting, the only open meetings held by the branch had been summoned by the rank and file themselves.

CHAPTER 11

FACTORS EXTERNAL TO THE BRANCH

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the effects on approaches to job regulation of factors external to the branches investigated. It commences with an examination of employer policy and action as reflected in industrial relations climate. Following this the effects of industry collective bargaining structures and the outside trade union are considered. Finally, since all three factors were found to be complementary rather than discrete in their effects on trade union branches, their combined effects are examined to provide partial explanations of approaches to job regulation for each branch.

EMPLOYER POLICY AND ACTION

For this variable, a measure based on Purcell's typology was used (Purcell 1979). In its original form, this classifies industrial relations climate in an employing organisation into one of four types by using two orthogonally related dimensions of formality and trust between management and union.

The investigation here was essentially concerned with trade union action, so it was considered more relevant to evaluate trade union perceptions of climate, rather than climate itself. Thus whilst comparison of the four organisations in terms of formality broadly

followed Purcell's ideas, trust was defined as trade union perceptions of the trustworthiness of management. Measures were developed as follows:-

Formality in Industrial Relations

For this dimension an index was developed to portray the extent to which relations between the branch and management were confined to formal channels and forums. The index was constructed from responses by senior branch officers and personnel specialists to interview schedule items 62 to 67. These were scored according to the framework in Appendix M4.1 to produce three sub-indices, each portraying a different aspect of formality:

Scheduled Formality - standing arrangements for meetings of formal negotiating forums.

Reliance on Formal Forums - use of specially called meetings of formal forums to resolve cases and issues.

Stratification in Negotiations - the extent to which handling of different issues was restricted to levels of seniority in the branch hierarchy and their management counterparts.

Sub-index scores were summed to give a total on which scores could theoretically fall between 0 and 100; the latter representing maximum formality. Derivation of scores is shown in detail in Appendix S32 and total index scores in table 11.1 below:-

	<i>Gas Branch</i>	<i>Electricity Branch</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 1</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 2</i>
Index Score	14	24	52	70

Table 11.1 Summary Scores: Index of Industrial Relations Formality in Employing Organisation

Overall Local Authority 2 had the highest formality, and Gas the lowest. The more detailed picture in Appendix S32 also reveals several important features.

- i. Scheduled formality was much higher in local authority branches than nationalised industries. In Local Authority branch 1 it attained its maximum possible value.
- ii. Only Local Authority branch 2 had a high reliance on specially called formal meetings.
- iii. Hierarchical stratification in issue negotiation was lower in nationalised industries than local authorities.

Perceptions of Management

For this measure, mean activist scores for the attitudes to management scale were used (see chapter 9 and Appendix S21.2). Here it should be noted that although trustworthiness and fairness of management were measured as separate dimensions, they were found to strongly influence each other (see chapter 9) and were taken together as a single attitude to management measure.


Classification of Perceived Climate

For each dimension (formality and trust) the mid-point of the theoretical scale was taken as the neutral point i.e.

Formality	50
Attitude to Management	21

Scores for branches along each dimension were plotted to locate them into the types as used by Purcell. This is shown graphically in fig. 11.1.

CLASSIFICATION OF BRANCH PERCEPTIONS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CLIMATE
IN EMPLOYING ORGANISATION (After Purcell J. 1979)



The Purcell typology allows a number of behavioural predictions to be made resulting from the way activists viewed climate. However because the method used was not the Purcell typology in its original form, it was felt necessary to carry out additional analyses to provide supporting evidence and enrich the picture obtained. These are given below.

Activist Endorsement of Formality

It was recognised that irrespective of the degree of formality in each organisation as reflected in the above measure this could, to some extent, be a matter of practices whose origins lay in historical precedent rather than being a feature endorsed by trade union actors. To evaluate this, an additional measure of endorsement of formality was used. This consisted of an eight-item scale included in section B of the activist self-administered questionnaire (Appendix M2.1). Mean scores for activist samples in each branch are shown in Appendix S33.

Here it can be seen that activist endorsement of formality was in the same rank order as formality in the employing organisations. Moreover the statistically significant difference between branches on the endorsement index was due to the much higher mean score in Local Authority branch 2; a score paralleled by a degree of actual formality in the employing organisation. It can be concluded that the relative degree of formality in each organisation was a feature to which branches subscribed.

Formality and Attitudes

Since formality could be endorsed for a number of reasons, it was felt desirable to explore its interaction with other attitude dimensions. Here two separate analyses were conducted using partial correlation and path analytic methods.

Analysis 1

The relationships between activists' endorsement of formality, perceived opportunity for steward autonomy, attitudes to the rank and file, intrinsic satisfactions in activist role and endorsement of oppositional aspects of activism.

Analysis 2

The relationships between activist perceptions of the trustworthiness of management and the five separate evaluative dimensions of the rank and file; their perceived loyalty, appreciation, motives, competence and awareness.

Path models evolved are shown in Appendices S34.1 to S34.8 and are interpreted as follows:-

Gas Branch

From the first analysis it can be seen that endorsement of formality was mainly determined by evaluations of the rank and file (23% explained variance). A falling endorsement of formality had the effect of increasing intrinsic satisfactions from activist role (18% variance explained) which in turn raised endorsement of oppositional aspects of activist role (20% explained variance).

In the second analysis, neither of the evaluations of management had a noticeable determining effect on endorsement of formality. The primary determinants of this were perceptions of the competence of the rank and file and the perceived appreciation by the latter of trade union efforts on their behalf (45% and 12% explained variance respectively). Both variables positively affected endorsement of formality.

For this branch it can be concluded that the low endorsement of formality was connected more to perceived characteristics of the rank and file and to opportunities in the activist role than to any evaluations of management. Low formality was associated with a valued opportunity to autonomously manage industrial relations at workplace level. In addition low endorsement of formality had some origins in wariness of rank and file backing.

Electricity Branch

In the first analysis, formality affected all other attitude dimensions. Its most pronounced effect was one in which a lower endorsement of formality was associated with activists more strongly endorsing an oppositional role for themselves. This explained 34% variance. The second analysis demonstrated that as perceived appreciation of the rank and file rose so did formality endorsement (33% explained variance).

In this branch as in Gas, there was some connection between low endorsement of formality and low evaluations of the rank and file. Here, however, it was because the rank and file were evaluated as

unappreciative that formality was not highly endorsed. In addition the connection with endorsement of oppositional activist role must be noted. This suggests that irrespective of perceptions of management, formality was equated with a lowered opportunity to adopt an oppositional stance, a position unlikely to be favoured by these activists (see chapter 9).

Local Authority Branch 1

For the first analysis formality affected all other attitude dimensions. Its most prominent effect was on evaluations of the rank and file. Here as formality was more highly endorsed, non-activists were viewed more favourably (16% variance explained). The second analysis produced a rather more complex picture. Perceptions of management had a negligible determining effect on formality, but a rise in evaluations of rank and file awareness caused a rise in the endorsement of formality (16% variance explained).

Again it can be noted that formality was far more strongly determined by views of the rank and file than perceptions of management. Here, evaluations of the rank and file were more favourable than in other branches and thus formality was more highly endorsed.

Local Authority Branch 2

In the first analysis there was a weak relationship (3% explained variance) in which as evaluations of the rank and file fell, formality was more highly endorsed. This negative relationship was traced in the second analysis to evaluations of non-activist

loyalty and appreciation (8% and 14% explained variance respectively). Again views of management had a negligible effect on formality endorsement.

Unlike other branches where formality was eschewed if evaluations of the rank and file were low, here the reverse occurred. This suggests that activists, rather than seeing rank and file support as a prerequisite for adoption of formal negotiating stances with management, embraced formality for other reasons. For example by placing matters in a formal arena and merely reporting back management responses, activists could relieve themselves of the responsibility for success and place the onus to some extent on the rank and file.

Employer Policy and Action: an Overview

In the initial classification of climate it must be noted that scoring for both dimensions was specific to the investigation. Branch locations were relative rather than absolute i.e. the Electricity branch had a stronger tendency than others to regard itself as in a climate of uninhibited antagonism.

Nevertheless it can be noted from the additional analyses, that the degree of actual formality in each organisation was paralleled by trade union endorsement. In addition, formality endorsement was demonstrated to be connected with perceptions of the rank and file rather than of management. As in the original Purcell scheme, the two dimensions of trust and formality used here can be regarded as orthogonally related. The initial classification can be regarded

as a substantially accurate picture of how branches viewed their respective industrial relations climates and, as a corollary, the policy and action of management.

With respect to actual climates (rather than how they were perceived) the results of prior empirical studies can be noted. These have demonstrated that there is a strong correspondence between trade union and management views on the quality of relationships with each other (Rim and Mannheim 1964, Biasatti and Martin 1979). Moreover the correspondence is closest in organisational situations of the size with which this investigation deals (Allen and Stephenson 1983). It is likely, therefore, that actual climates bore a strong resemblance to those perceived as real by trade union actors. Since response to the world is inevitably in terms of what the world is perceived to be (Silverman 1970) it is pertinent to note the characteristics of each climatic type as given by Purcell. These have a strong resemblance to the four situations studied.

Adaptive Cooperation (Gas Branch)

".....there is high trust and cooperation but few, if any, formal written agreements, especially of a procedural nature. Meetings occur when required usually on an informal basis. There is a tendency for this type of industrial relations to rely on dominant personalities on either side."

(Purcell 1979, p 10)

Uninhibited Antagonism (Electricity Branch)

".....industrial relations is conducted in an ad-hoc conflict based manner.....mutual suspicion and distrust. The behaviour of one party is often seen by the other as irrational and unpredictable few agreed rules of conduct between the parties."

(Purcell 1979, p 10)

Cooperative Constitutionalism (Local Authority Branches)

".....high trust and cooperation within a framework of comprehensive agreements usually focused on Joint Negotiating Committee meetings. Particular effort is made to abide by the constitution which establishes mutual rights and obligations and should not be breached."

(Purcell 1979, p 10)

Antagonistic Constitutionalism (for reference only)

".....procedures and institutions used, as a means of expressing distrust and aggressioncomplaints of conduct or failure of other party to abide by its promisesmeetings found frustratingreference to (other party's) negative attitudes."

(Purcell 1979, p 10)

INDUSTRY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING STRUCTURE

The Prescribed Situation

This is described in more detail in chapter 6 and Appendices S2.1 to S2.4. Here it is sufficient to note that the rank order of restriction (from the highest degree of restriction to the lowest)

of job regulation role for branches as laid down in provisions of collective bargaining structures and agreements was as follows:-

Electricity

Gas

Local Authority Branch 2

Local Authority Branch 1

Within this formal position two additional measures were developed.

1 - Perceived Legitimacy of Preclusion of Involvement
from Job Regulation Activities

Here an index was developed using data extracted from appendices S16.1 to 16.4. This used responses to interview schedule items 47 to 49 details of which are given in Chapter 6.

For this sub-index, only those issues where existing agreements or bargaining structures either precluded or limited branch involvement were included in the count. These were sub-divided into two categories according to the response to question 49 viz:

Accept situation as is and pursue issue via outside trade union

or

Attempt to erode situation to obtain greater branch involvement.

An index was created by:-

$$\frac{\text{Accept situation and pursue via outside trade union}}{\text{Total number of issues where involvement limited/precluded}} \times 100$$

Derivation of indices is shown in detail in Appendix S35 and summary scores in table 11.2 below:-

Gas Branch	Electricity Branch	Local Authority Branch 1	Local Authority Branch 2
56.500	80.000	100.000	100.000

Table 11.2 Index of Perceived Legitimacy of Preclusion from Involvement by Provisions of Existing Agreements and Collective Bargaining Structure

Scores on this index could theoretically fall between 0 and 100; the higher figure representing the maximum degree of agreement with the situation as prescribed in existing arrangements. Whilst there was a small amount of dissatisfaction in the Electricity branch, only the Gas branch could be said to strongly question the legitimacy of existing arrangements. Both local authority branches had the maximum degree of satisfaction.

2 - Effects of Collective Bargaining Structure on Restriction of Branch Roles

Here an index was developed which evaluated (irrespective of the prescribed arrangements) the extent to which collective bargaining structures excluded branches from involvement in job regulation. This was derived using responses to interview schedule items 68 to 70 scored as per Appendix M4.1.

Question 68 obtained details of any issues for which it was normal for a lay officer to be excluded and Question 69 provided data on issues for which management normally insisted on full-time officer involvement. Question 70 obtained details of issues which were normally negotiated completely by lay officials.

The index was calculated by:

Question 68 x Question 69 x Question 70.

This produced an index where scores could fall between 0 and 100; the higher figure representing the highest degree of exclusion of the branch from job regulation.

Derivation of scores is shown in detail in Appendix S36 and summary indices in table 11.3 below:-

<i>Gas Branch</i>	<i>Electricity Branch</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 1</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 2</i>
0.400	12.800	1.600	1.600

Table 11.3 Index of Effects of Collective Bargaining Structure on Restriction of Branch Roles

For both local authority branches the index was identical. This was because the only exclusions were grading claims in their second level of appeal onwards i.e. those handled in forums external to the employing organisation.

The Electricity branch had the highest level of curtailment of its job regulation activities. The reason here being management's insistence (wherever possible) on observance of the provisions of existing agreements.

In the case of the Gas branch, a very low index figure was obtained. Here irrespective of the provisions of existing agreements, management were content to deal almost solely with the branch.

THE OUTSIDE TRADE UNION

For this variable a number of measures were developed, all of which were combined into a single index of outside trade union influence.

These were as follows:-

1 - Restraining Influence on Freedom of Action

For this measure, responses to interview items 71 and 73 were used, scored as shown in Appendix M4.1.

Question 71 asked what procedures the branch would follow to take industrial action. This established the extent to which branches were constrained by parent union requirements.

Question 73 established the extent to which the branch was constrained by wider trade union policies in its adoption of issues.

Multiplication of the two scores gave a sub-index the value of which could theoretically be between 0 and 20; the higher figure representing maximum restraint.

2 - Influence on Communications with Employer

Here responses to interview items 72 and 74 were used.

Question 72 established the extent to which the branch placed itself under the direction of the outside trade union in conducting written correspondence with the employer. In Question 74, the extent to which the branch and outside trade union kept each other informed of their correspondence with the employer.

The two scores were multiplied to produce a sub-index which could theoretically fall between 0 and 20; the higher figure representing maximum subordination of the branch to outside trade union.

3 - Influence on Issue Definition and Adoption

For this, data was gathered from a scrutiny of branch records across an eighteen month period; one year prior to the study plus six months of fieldwork. This gave information on the total number of issues emanating from the outside union asking for (or recommending) branch adoption and pursuit. It also revealed the number actually adopted. The sub-index was created by:-

$$\frac{\text{Number of Issues Adopted}}{\text{Number of Issues to which Exposed}} \times 10$$

Scores could theoretically fall between 0 and 10; the high figure representing maximum influence.

4 - Influence Arising from Involvement of Outside Trade Union Officers to Pursue Issues within the Branch (Internal Support).

With this measure, responses to interview items 46, 49, 55 and 57 to 59 were used.

Question 46 asked for details of the types of issues in which the branch became involved; question 49 their approximate proportions of total workload. By use of a rating scale, question 55 obtained respondent estimates of the perceived difficulty of handling each issue type. Questions 57 to 59 established in terms of case preparation, presentation and channels of pursuit, how each issue

type was normally handled i.e. by branch official or full-time officer.

To simplify data analysis, the number of issue types was collapsed to a maximum of five, taking care that each one had common scores for responses to the above questions. A type score for each one was calculated by:-

$$\begin{array}{rcc} \text{Question 49} & \times & \text{Question 55} & \times & \text{Questions 57-59} \\ \text{(Proportion)} & & \text{(Difficulty)} & & \text{(Handling Mode)} \end{array}$$

This reflected the extent to which support had been called-for and obtained on a proportion of the branch workload weighted for its perceived difficulty in handling. The five type scores were summed to produce a sub-index, the theoretical extremes of which were 0 and 40. On this index the greater the branch score, the greater was the extent to which support was sought from outside trade union. Derivation of sub-indices is shown in detail in Appendix S37.

5 - Influence Arising from Passing Issues to Outside Trade Union for Pursuit (External Support)

Data for this measure was obtained from scrutiny of branch minutes, correspondence records and minutes of District Service Conditions committees. From these were obtained the number of internal job regulation issues which branches had taken to outside trade union forums to obtain support, together with those on which support was given. A sub-index was created by:-

$$\frac{\text{Issues where Support Obtained}}{\text{Total Issues where Support Sought}} \times 10$$

Scores on this index could theoretically fall between 0 and 10, the higher figure representing maximum external support.

Overall Index

Sub-index scores for each branch were summed to give the total index of outside trade union influence. Theoretically scores on this index could fall between 0 and 100; the higher figure representing a situation where the outside trade union exerted influence on the branch in all the aspects measured in 1 to 5 above. Derivation of scores is shown in detail in Appendix S38 and total index scores in table 11.4 below:-

<i>Gas Branch</i>	<i>Electricity Branch</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 1</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 2</i>
10.040	48.599	31.657	32.000

Table 11.4 Index of Outside Trade Union Influence

Overall the branch least influenced by the outside trade union was Gas. Electricity was the most influenced and both local authority branches had very similar scores. It can also be noted that rank orders on the total index were paralleled by those on the majority of sub-index scores. Nevertheless, several features of the more detailed picture shown in Appendix S38 are noteworthy.

- i. On restraint on freedom of action, Gas showed itself to be virtually uninfluenced whilst all others were strongly influenced.
- ii. Influence on communications with the employer was generally low for all branches.

- iii. Influence over issue definition was much higher for Electricity and Local Authority 1 than for the other two branches
- iv. Internal support was very low for Gas and high for Electricity.
- v. Electricity was the only branch which had sought and gained external support, both Gas and Local Authority 1 having been rejected in their external appeals for help.

FACTORS EXTERNAL TO THE BRANCH AS PARTIAL EXPLANATIONS OF APPROACHES TO JOB REGULATION

All the factors discussed above can be seen to have had an impact on one or more dimensions of approaches to job regulation. Their effects, however, were complementary rather than discrete. Thus it is more appropriate to consider their combined influence on each branch.

Gas Branch

In this branch the outside trade union was not a source of either internal or external support. There was little influence between the branch and outside union, or in the reverse direction. Indeed the outside union had the lowest level of influence found in any branch studied. It is hardly surprising to find that the branch was the most independent of all those investigated. Neither is it surprising that it adopted few externally focused issues brought to its attention by the parent trade union.

Any reciprocity that existed was probably between the branch and organisational management (the adaptive-cooperative industrial relations climate) and the climate itself can be seen to have facilitated independence of the branch e.g. Without the cooperation of management, it would have been difficult to avoid limitation of its job regulation activities as prescribed in industry collective bargaining structures.

It is possible that part of the price paid for management cooperation was the branch's low degree of issue initiation (the lowest of all branches studied). It is also possible that the climate facilitated a degree of workplace level initiation and issue handling which removed the necessity for issue adoption at branch level (see Chapter 10).

Intensity of action for this branch was second only to Electricity. In view of the climate this is difficult to explain. However, reference to figure 11.1 will show that whilst the climate was adaptive cooperative, it was only just above the borderline with uninhibited antagonism. To some extent it can be expected that climate would be issue specific and could very easily change on a number of occasions to produce interludes of intense action.

The effect on representativeness in the eyes of the membership (the second highest score of all branches) is also hard to explain directly. A possible indirect effect could have arisen from the combined effects of focus and climate i.e. non-activists could

well have perceived that their workplace issues were the major preoccupation of activists.

Electricity Branch

More than for any other branch, in Electricity the outside trade union was a source of both internal and external support. Here a collective bargaining structure which prescribed a very restricted role for activists together with a climate of uninhibited antagonism, gave a situation almost completely the reverse of that in the Gas branch. Management had every incentive to hide behind the provisions of industry collective bargaining structure by involving the outside trade union. Thus the branch was the most dependent of all studied. As a corollary, its reciprocity with outside trade union was high. It adopted more externally focused issues originated by the outside union than any other branch, a feature likely to make it even more dependent for their pursuit.

Initiation of issues in this branch was only slightly higher than in Gas. This feature can partly be explained by the adoption of additional externally focused issues.

Intensity of action was the highest in all branches studied and in view of the industrial relations climate this is hardly surprising. Moreover it can be noted that activists valued informality in industrial relations largely for its opportunity to exercise an

oppositional role to:

"get one over"

(Purcell 1979, p 10)

Again representativeness is hard to explain directly. However, it is possible that adoption of externally focused issues together with a somewhat antagonistic relationship between activists and management combined to make the rank and file feel they were mere pawns in a game of power politics.

Local Authority Branch 1

In this branch a loose set of national agreements supplemented by many locally negotiated agreements, had established a strong role in job regulation. However, industry collective bargaining structures required a proportion of cases to be heard in appeal outside the employing organisation. This established a degree of dependence higher than in Gas but lower than in Electricity.

In this branch whilst a high proportion of outside union originated issues were adopted, the number was lower than in Electricity. It was however, the most externally focused branch. This was because focus was more than simply adopting issues originating from the outside union in repayment for its aid. There was some concern with wider social issues and focus was more satisfactorily explained by other factors.

The industrial relations climate for the branch was strongly located in the area of cooperative constitutionalism. The high levels of trust and formality were conducive to initiation of issues (the highest of all branches). As a corollary this climate was not conducive to high intensity of action.

Once more representativeness in the eyes of the rank and file is hard to explain directly. It is possible that climate was a contributory factor. It should be noted that the more highly activists evaluated the rank and file, the more highly they endorsed formality. Since on the whole the rank and file were evaluated higher than elsewhere, activists tended to opt for methods which allowed rank and file concerns to be dealt with in a formal way that removed the necessity for militant action. Moreover, the climate was itself conducive to frank discussion of these concerns with management.

Local Authority Branch 2

Here the influence of outside trade union and effect of the collective bargaining structure were both similar to those for the other local authority branch. Thus the degree of dependence on outside trade union was very similar.

The external focus in this branch was a little higher than that of Electricity, but much lower than that for Local Authority branch 1. Thus it is unlikely that external factors had a strong influence.

Industrial relations climate was located slightly above antagonistic constitutionalism in the area of cooperative constitutionalism. Although it was probably more conducive to issue initiation than for either nationalised industry branch, it was somewhat less so than for Local Authority branch 1. This was, in fact, the relative position of branches for initiation.

As with Local Authority branch 1, a partial explanation of intensity of action can be given in similar terms. In addition, formality (the highest endorsement of all branches) was probably embraced because rank and file backing was seen not to be forthcoming, a situation giving a very low propensity towards intense action. For this reason, endorsement of formality also provides a possible explanation of why the branch was seen as the least representative in the eyes of its members. It tended to remove the majority of negotiations from the workplace into forums invisible to the rank and file, and indeed, to the majority of activists. Thus there was seldom any evidence to the rank and file that their interests were being safeguarded.

CHAPTER 12

PROCESSES OF INTRA-ORGANISATIONAL BARGAINING AND DECISION MAKING

INTRODUCTION

This chapter commences with general considerations concerning the use of data obtained from observation of branch meetings. Details of results and measures derived from observational data are then given in which differences between branches are highlighted. Finally for each branch, processes of intra-organisational bargaining and decision making are described and conclusions drawn on the effects of these processes on approaches to job regulation.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

For a six month time period in each branch observation took place of all meetings of its executive committee plus any general meetings open to all branch members. Summary details are given in Appendix S39.

Both types of meeting yielded useful information, but it was only from observation of executive meetings that measures enabling strict comparison of branches could be obtained. For these the recording scheme described in Appendix M5 was used and for open meetings comprehensive notes were taken.

Data from both types of meeting had two uses:

- i. as partial explanations of branch positions on the dimensions of approaches to job regulation given in chapter 6
- ii. as supporting evidence for conclusions drawn with respect to some of the other factors described in chapters 7 to 11.

Because of the dual (but complementary) use for the same data, measures and results will be presented first. Following this a description will be given of intra-organisational bargaining and decision making in each branch, using the data to support conclusions drawn.

DATA AND MEASURES FOR EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETINGS

Allocation of Time

This measure was designed to provide an overall picture of how branch executive committees spent their time on discussion of various items. Matters discussed were classified into one of seven types i.e.

Meeting Formalities

Routine Internal Administration Issues

Non-routine Internal Administration Issues

Internal Job Regulation Issues

Industry Job Regulation Issues

Issues Promoted by Wider Trade Union in which support for another NALGO organised service was sought.

Wider Social Issues.

For each type, the number of issues and times of discussion were totalled for all meetings of each branch. From this were derived mean numbers per meeting and proportions of total meeting time. The detailed results of the analysis are shown in Appendix S40 where it can be seen that differences between branches were statistically significant. The following points may be noted:

- i In all branches meeting formalities occupied similar proportions of time, as did items of a routine internal administrative nature.
- ii. Neither Electricity or Local Authority 2 branches spent any time on non-routine internal administrative items. Conversely both Gas and Local Authority 1 devoted in excess of 11% of their time in discussing improvements to their internal effectiveness.
- iii. Both Gas and Local Authority 2 spent major proportions of their time discussing internal job regulation issues. For Electricity a comparatively low proportion of time was devoted to these matters.
- iv. National Job Regulation issues took up nearly one-quarter of meeting time in the Electricity. In both Local Authority branches these issues warranted less than 2% of meeting time and in Gas were not even mentioned.
- v. In all branches except Gas issues promoted by the wider trade union plus those of a wider social nature accounted for over 18% of meeting time. In Gas these issues occupied less than 4% of the time.

Interactions between Executive Members

For these measures, executive committee members were for analytical purposes, divided into two groups; Opinion Leaders and Non-opinion Leaders. Classification was made on the basis of supplementary notes on patterns of non-verbal communication between participants. Opinion leaders were defined as those individuals who:

- i. Could, if so desired, interrupt and become the focus of attention for participants.
- ii. When speaking, were listened to in silence and became a visual focus of attention.
- iii. At the point of voting on controversial issues, became a visual focus of attention to non-opinion leaders who were observed to vote fractionally after and in the same way as opinion leaders.

The number of opinion leaders in each branch varied; a feature which had effects on both bargaining/decision making.

From details recorded for all issues, the following were computed with respect to frequency and duration of contributions:

1. The mean number of contributions per issue by non-opinion leaders and opinion leaders according to whether they were moving/supporting a proposal made by either an opinion leader or non-opinion leader.
2. The proportions of contributions made in three relational modes
 - as bids to dominate or control the discussion
 - deference or submission to another individual

- equivalence: either talking to another person as an equal or
- a bid for mutual identification.

These were also computed separately for opinion leaders and non-opinion leaders and whether used in moving/supporting or opposing.

Detailed results are given in Appendices S41.1 to S41.4 where it can be seen that there were notable differences both between and within branches. These were analysed by statistical testing using simplified categories. The results of these are shown in Appendices S42.1 to S42.5 and the following features can be noted.

Between Branches (Appendix S42.1)

In terms of time contribution per issue, differences between branches for opinion leaders were not statistically significant. For non-opinion leaders differences were statistically significant. In Electricity they said little and in Local Authority branch 1 their time contribution in opposing was as large as when they were moving/supporting.

With respect to the relational content of contributions differences between branches were large and statistically significant for both groups. In Local Authority branch 2, all but 8% of opinion leader contributions were control bids. Conversely in Local Authority branch 1, opinion leaders made control bids less frequently and for one third of their statements used an equivalence mode. Non-opinion leaders in all branches used control bids less frequently. In Electricity over 70% of their statements were deferential. In

Local Authority Branch 2, they used control bids almost as much as opinion leaders and in both Gas and Local Authority branch 1 higher proportions of equivalence statements were used.

Within Branches (Appendices S42.2 to S42.5)

Only in Local Authority 1 were differences in time contribution statistically significant. Here opinion leaders contributed most when moving/supporting and non-opinion leaders when opposing.

In relational content, differences were statistically significant in both nationalised industry branches. For Gas this was due to the higher proportion of control utterances by opinion leaders; non-opinion leaders using roughly equal proportions of control and non-control bids. With Electricity, opinion leaders almost always made control bids whilst non-opinion leaders did so very infrequently.

In each local authority branch opinion leaders and non-opinion leaders had similar patterns of relational content, but here the similarity ends. With Local Authority branch 2, both spent most of their time making control bids. In Local Authority branch 1 both used non-control statements far less frequently.

Proposals and Decisions

This measure also distinguished between opinion leaders and non-opinion leaders. Data was extracted from recording schedules to examine:

1. The numbers of proposals for action made by opinion leaders and non-opinion leaders.

- ii. Whether these were supported or opposed by opinion leaders or non-opinion leaders.
- iii The outcome; whether the proposal was carried or lost.

A proposal was defined as the first definite occurrence in an issue debate of a suggested course of action by the branch. Tentative exploratory remarks were not counted as proposals. A proposal rejected or heavily modified in debate was counted as lost; a proposal accepted or modified only slightly as carried.

Detailed results are shown in Appendix S43.1 and a test for the statistical significance of differences between branches in Appendix S43.2.

In all branches opinion leaders made the highest percentage of proposals but the difference between branches was large enough to be statistically significant. Branches also differed in the extent to which an opinion leader proposal was carried or lost. For Gas and Electricity, proposals emanating from opinion leaders were carried irrespective of who opposed them. In the two local authority branches approximately 10% of opinion leader proposals were not carried.

With non-opinion leader proposals, a somewhat more complex situation existed. In the Gas and Local Authority 1 a proposal was invariably carried if supported by an opinion leader and lost if opposed. In Electricity if an issue was opposed by either group

it was lost. For Local Authority branch 2 proposals emanating from non-opinion leaders were lost and carried almost equally, irrespective of who opposed or supported.

Themes Emerging in Issue Discussion

For this measure only discussions of job regulation issues were used. The aim was to obtain a picture of the drift of the discussion irrespective of its topic; thus providing supplementary evidence on attitudes and viewpoints prevalent in activists. Statements and themes used in issue discussion were noted and for analysis, were categorised as falling into one of five thematic groups concerning:-

Issue Pursuit

Themes concerning tactics and strategies for issue handling.

The Wider Trade Union

Themes involving references to the outside trade union, its policies and their relevance to the item under discussion.

Wider Social Items

Themes where reference was made to the desirability of the branch becoming involved in matters beyond employing organisational issues.

The Rank and File Representative Processes

Themes concerning rank and file views, actions or branch processes of representation.

Management

Themes concerning views held of management.

The total number of times a particular statement or theme emerged was divided by the total number of issues discussed in all meetings, to give a mean frequency per issue. Results, together with typical thematic statements, are given in Appendix S44.1 and a comparison of frequencies in major groups in S44.2 where the following can be noted.

- i. In all branches there was a fairly high frequency of statements advocating that the issue should be pursued in some way. (Items P3 to P6 on Appendix S44.1). In both local authority branches these were counterbalanced in some degree by themes advocating non-pursuit (items P1 and P2). In Local Authority branch 2 the frequency of statements for non-pursuit actually exceeded that for pursuit.
- ii. Occurrence of themes concerning the Wider Trade Union were much more frequent in the Gas branch than elsewhere. The vast majority of these were anti rather than pro the parent body. In the Electricity Branch there was a high frequency of themes concerning policies of the Wider Trade Union as a guide to branch action (item O1).
- iii. Only in Local Authority branch 1 did themes emerge which advocated adoption of a wider social role. In all other branches statements were against this stance.
- iv. The frequency of themes advocating militant issue pursuit but perceiving the rank and file as a distinct inhibition to this were much higher in Gas and Electricity than elsewhere.

- v. For both Gas and Local Authority branch 1, pro rank and file statements were more frequent than those disparaging non-activists; particularly so in Local Authority branch 1. In the other two branches the position was reversed, especially so in Electricity.
- vi. In Gas and Local Authority branch 1 there were high frequencies of themes emphasising rank and file interests or representative processes (items R4 and R5). Conversely in Local Authority branch 2 there was a somewhat higher than normal frequency of blame stories indicating breakdown of these processes (item R6).
- vii. With respect to themes referring to management, both Gas and Electricity had high frequencies of anti-management statements. For Gas this was counterbalanced by some pro-management themes. In Electricity there was both suspicion and deprecation of management. Only in Local Authority branch 1 did pro management themes outnumber either suspicion or anti-statements.

MEETING PROCESSES AS PARTIAL EXPLANATIONS
OF APPROACHES TO JOB REGULATION

Gas Branch

Executive committee meetings were held monthly. They were formally organised in terms of agenda; background papers and written reports all being sent out some ten days prior to the event. Here formality was used mainly to ensure effective use of time and did not extend into processes of issue discussion.

The meetings had three main purposes:

- i. For branch negotiators and specialist officers to update stewards on matters in hand. Usually this was triggered by written reports but with the necessity on many issues to redefine objectives and tactics.
- ii. Reporting by the branch secretary of any impending new issues notified by management and to highlight items of correspondence.
- iii. For stewards to discuss in open forum any issues they had dealt with at constituency level and, if so desired, to enlist support by formally moving the case for branch adoption. In this branch, a case remained the property of a steward until this had occurred.

Activists were on the whole unfavourably disposed towards open meetings, low attendance made them a somewhat demoralising experience. Either balloting or the steward system itself were felt to be more effective methods of sensing and informing the members. Nevertheless, whilst fieldwork was in progress, two open meetings were held, both called by the executive committee. These were used for different purposes to executive meeting, namely:

- i. Fulfilment of the constitutional necessity of annual re-election of the executive committee.
- ii. To obtain formal ratification of an executive evolved policy.
- iii. Where the executive had been unable to evolve a policy to test the climate of rank and file opinion.

Within the executive committee there were three clear opinion leaders; branch secretary, chairman and a past chairman. All had worked together for some time and were in daily contact. The majority of proposals in committee meetings emanated from opinion leaders; usually because their advice was requested. Indeed their allotted role at meetings was largely that of experienced constitutional and technical experts rather than persons holding positions of power. At open meetings where a policy had to be sold to the membership, it was invariably one of these three that acted as advocate for the executive committee.

Executive meeting processes could be classified as problem solving. There was a distinct air of a discussion group seeking a solution for which collective responsibility would be held. Typically any issue brought forward prompted a chain of free discussion in which the issue itself was fully clarified before any course of action was proposed. Towards the end of the discussion, tentative proposals would emerge from several sources, one of which would be adopted.

It can be noted here that because of this extensive exploratory chain, few firm proposals were ever rejected. Indeed, issues introduced without sufficient information to permit informed discussion were usually deferred for someone (invariably an opinion leader) to prepare a detailed report.

Although opinion leaders spoke twice as much as others and usually in a control mode, this was due to their allotted roles of advisors. It can further be noted that they were seldom addressed deferentially. Decision making in executive committees was therefore often a lengthy but thorough and egalitarian process. The outcome was decisions with high participant commitment and sufficiently well thought through to avoid adoption of negotiating albatrosses. The branch operated a steward system where workplace representatives were in daily contact with their constituents to explain and sell executive decisions. In addition a broadsheet describing the content and decisions of meetings was produced and circulated to most members shortly afterwards. Thus very positive steps were taken to keep the membership well informed.

A well informed membership was a feature apparent in open meetings. Here when an executive proposed policy was moved, rank and file members were sufficiently well briefed as to be able to take-up some 30% of meeting time with questions. An adopted policy therefore became their policy. In addition the testing of the climate of opinion at open meetings, allowed rank and file members to instruct their executive with respect to matters with which it should concern itself. An example of this is given in chapter 7 where the executive was instructed to avoid wider social causes.

In summary, processes of intra-organisational bargaining and decision making in the branch were likely to create an impression of representativeness amongst its members. Moreover they were also

likely to ensure some measure of support in the event of intense pursuit of an issue.

The content of executive meetings also provides some evidence of activist values. Indeed it has been noted that such events provide activists with opportunities to test and re-affirm their values in discussion with their peers (Batstone et al. 1979). For example full time officers were never invited to attend executive meetings. Discussion was almost exclusively concentrated on internal issues. The mere mention of a wider social or outside union promoted cause was enough to invite derisory comments. Thus independence of outside union and a highly internal focus were reflected in the narrowness of agenda.

Although militant issue pursuit was frequently advocated, the rank and file as an inhibitory influence on aggressive action was also a constantly recurring theme. This provides some support for conclusions drawn in chapter 9 and explains why, in the face of relatively militant activist attitudes, this was only the second most intense branch in action.

Statements with respect to management are also revealing. Here a high frequency of anti-management statements was recorded. There were a smaller number indicating pro-management views but virtually none indicating suspicion. This provides some support for conclusions given in chapter 11 indicating a degree of trust in management. It is probable here that activists simply accepted

that management had a different set of values or objectives to themselves; a perspective which would make it difficult to open a dialogue in initiating issues.

Finally, anti-rank and file statements were comparatively rare and those in which non-activist will or opinion was brought forward were frequent. There was a high emphasis on representative processes and few signs of any factionalism. This, together with the pattern of interactional processes, gives some explanation of why the branch was considered relatively representative in the eyes of its members.

Electricity Branch

Here executive meetings were also held monthly and were formalised both in content and interactive processes. The major purposes of meetings were:-

- i. For either the branch secretary or full time officer to give an update on local, district or national issue negotiation.
- ii. For stewards to bring cases forward and either pass them to the secretary for pursuit or receive instructions on how they should be progressed at workplace level.

Open meetings were called willingly and three were held during the period of fieldwork. Their purposes were:

- i. To fulfil the constitutional requirement of annual executive re-election.

- ii. To debate issues affecting all the branch membership and obtain ratification of either negotiating objectives or agreements made by the branch executive.
- iii. To sell a nationally negotiated issue to the membership.

Only one clear opinion leader existed within the executive committee; the branch secretary. However the chairman exercised a semi opinion leading position. In addition a full time officer of the union was often present who also exerted a strong opinion leading influence. Here any liaison between opinion leaders outside the meeting was mainly between full time officer and secretary.

As in Gas, the vast majority of all proposals emanated from opinion leaders but here their roles were somewhat different. Just as the Gas executive could be likened to a discussion group this one could be compared to a privy council. Opinion leaders were monarchs who received advice from councillors and handed down judgement which only sometimes took cognizance of the advice. Typically an issue raised by an opinion leader would be introduced together with a proposal for action. Those raised by non opinion leaders would be answered with a proposal by opinion leaders with little intervening exploration or debate.

Branch opinion leaders dominated the topic of conversation and unless speaking to the full-time officer (in a deferential mode) were clearly exercising control. Non-opinion leaders spoke

infrequently and in very short statements. When supporting opinion leaders (which they did most of the time) they spoke deferentially. Only when opposing did non-opinion leaders use a control mode and then they had a tendency to be deferential and almost apologetic for being in opposition.

Executive decision making processes can be seen to reflect a strong unity of command. This carried over into open meetings where members were exhorted by opinion leaders not only on how to act, but told how to think. Indeed at open meetings there was almost an atmosphere of opinion leaders informing the rank and file that their wisdom was ignored at some peril. The rank and file for their part mainly listened in silence.

On the whole whilst decision making clearly took place, bargaining was largely absent. It would have been quite possible for the rank and file to interpret these processes as containing more than a note of elitism and arrogance. A situation which explains in part their view of the branch as relatively unrepresentative of their interests.

As with the Gas branch, the content of processes provides some evidence of reaffirmation of values which could have prompted approaches to job regulation. A full time officer was present at, and contributed heavily, to a large number of meetings. Internal job regulation issues took up only slightly in excess of 40% of meeting time; a high proportion being devoted to national issues

and causes promoted by the outside union. These matters were inserted as distinct agenda items around which discussion centred. In addition statements referring to NALGO policy, solidarity with other branches and advocating issue pursuit via outside union were extremely frequent. The whole process was therefore geared to produce dependence on the outside union plus a degree of external focus.

Statements advocating militant pursuit of issues had the highest frequency of all branches. In contrast to the Gas branch, the inhibiting effect of the rank and file on militant action was less frequently expressed, and decision making was geared more towards speed than weighing alternatives. The branch's position as the most intense in action is therefore understandable.

Anti-management statements were frequent, as were those expressing suspicion. This provides some support for conclusions drawn in chapter 11 with respect to the industrial relations climate as perceived by activists. The high frequency of anti-rank and file statements coupled with the comparative rarity of the will or interests of the rank and file being mentioned supports the idea of elitist activist attitudes introduced in chapter 9.

Local Authority Branch 1

This executive committee also met monthly. Since it was allowed time during the day to hold its meetings these were extremely well attended. It should first be noted that the difference between opinion leaders and non-opinion leaders was nowhere near as

distinct in this branch as in others. For the purposes of comparison, however, certain executive members did occupy roles of greater influence within the branch. In so far as there were people whose role approximated to that of opinion leader, these were four members, all of whom also sat on the trade union side of the employing organisation's negotiating committee. They were Secretary, Chairman, Health and Safety/New Technology secretary and a past branch secretary. All were in daily contact with each other. Perhaps because of the numbers attending, meetings were characterised by a high degree of procedural formality i.e. departure from the rules of debate was not tolerated. Four major meeting purposes could be detected.

- i. Verbal progress reports by branch officers on current negotiations.
- ii. Opinion leaders could bring forward proposals for branch action or policy which were then debated; sometimes over two or three meetings.
- iii. Workplace representatives reported on matters in their constituencies and cases were passed to negotiators for pursuit.
- iv. Reconciliation of differences in matters on which there were divergent and factional interests within the branch. Here the task was to evolve compromise goals for branch negotiators.

Open meetings were willingly called but had the lowest attendance of all branches. Two were held in the period of fieldwork and had the following purposes:

- i. To elect the following year's executive committee.
- ii. To bring to the attention of the membership the content of proposed agreements and/or policies. These matters were usually complex e.g. Transfer of Assets and Privatisation as described in chapter 7. Here the executive sought ratification before making an agreement with the employer.
- iii. To mandate delegates to conferences and special meetings e.g. pay claim.

In this branch, the number of proposals made by non-opinion leaders was much higher than in either nationalised industry situation. Usually when a workplace representative brought an issue forward he/she had some idea of the desired outcome of the debate. Similarly opinion leaders had solutions as well as problems to bring to the attention of the meeting. There was, however, little dissent about ends. Discussion was mainly concerned with the means to those ends and, as in the Gas branch, solutions emerged via a gradual (but somewhat more formal) process of elimination of alternatives.

In this sense the whole process could be characterised as somewhat akin to a policy making party conference. Proposals by opinion

leaders and non-opinion leaders were just as likely to be opposed. Differences between the two groups in both the time for which they spoke and the way they addressed others were much smaller than in other branches. Compromise always emerged in the end and this gave a clear mandate to negotiators. However, the focal roles of negotiators, which in some respects gave them positions of opinion leaders, by no means ensured that they always got their own way. Indeed at times they were given negotiating objectives they felt unattainable.

On the whole, processes were characterised by both bargaining and compromise decision making. These were well reported to the rank and file by those present. Thus it is not surprising that the branch was considered representative in the eyes of its members.

As with other branches the content of these processes provided evidence of the role of beliefs and values on approaches to job regulation. A high proportion of time was devoted to debate of both wider social issues and causes promoted by the outside trade union. These discussions were treated seriously and the desirability of involvement in wider social issues was a statement occurring with high frequency. An external focus far higher than in other branches is therefore not surprising.

Militant pursuit of issues was seldom mentioned and was outnumbered in frequency by cautionary statements. This provides some support for attitudinal evidence given in chapter 9 that these activists

did not favour intense action. Conversely, the frequency of statements advocating that the initiative be taken in opening up negotiations was the highest of all branches. This in combination with a high frequency of pro-management statements and a low number of anti-management or suspicion themes, lends credence to the idea that the branch perceived its industrial relations climate to be one in which it could initiate with some ease.

Finally anti-rank and file remarks were extremely rare. Pro-rank and file statements and those expressing their will or interests were quite frequent; as were those stressing the use of representative processes. Moreover, as in Gas, a high proportion of meeting time was devoted to exploring improvements in internal effectiveness. All of these provide evidence supportive to conclusions drawn in chapter 9 with respect to activist attitudes and how these were likely to engender representativeness.

Local Authority Branch 2

As with the other local authority branch, executive meetings were held monthly, during working hours and were well attended. They were characterised by a very high degree of procedural formality. Purposes (but not processes) were broadly the same as for Local Authority branch 1.

Open meetings were not called readily. With the exception of the constitutionally necessary annual general meeting, open meetings which occurred during the period of fieldwork were summoned by rank

and file requisition. In both cases these had the manifest purposes of

- i. allowing the rank and file to express their displeasure at lack of progress towards some desired outcome.
- ii. instructing the executive on negotiating objectives.

These however were merely the manifest purposes. There were signs that open meetings were also used by some activists to continue in a more public arena factional struggles waged in the executive committee. Indeed, it is possible that activist lobbying was behind rank and file requisitions for meetings.

On this executive committee there were six highly forceful individual opinion leaders; secretary, president, vice president, health and safety secretary, publicity officer and education secretary. This was some 30% of the executive committee and all sat on the trade union side of the organisation's negotiating committee. So far as could be determined there was no pattern of consistent liaison between individuals outside meetings. Rather there were loose and very fluid alliances on specific issues.

In meetings, proposals made by opinion leaders were more frequent than those made by non-opinion leaders. However the number of firm proposals by non-opinion leaders was much higher in this branch than elsewhere; almost 40% of the total. Problematically almost all proposals made by either opinion leaders or non-opinion leaders

were firm proposals in the form of a formal motion. Seldom, if ever, was a motion debated without the appearance of a counter motion and a series of amendments. At times it was obvious that participants were unclear about which motion or amendment was under discussion. Quite frequently, the matter had to be deferred to another meeting to allow clarification.

The whole process was akin to a hung parliament with continual battles for control. Opinion leaders and non-opinion leaders both opposed and supported in a very fluid situation which at times degenerated to near the level of personal insults. Both used the control mode when addressing the meeting. Rarely did one person speak to another as an equal. Accusations and blame stories were more frequent themes in this branch than elsewhere. Taken as a whole meetings were characterised by a great deal of bargaining but little decision making.

Executive committee processes carried over into open meetings where some branch officers argued with (and on one occasion publically hurled insults at) each other. Indeed, the annual general meeting was used to unseat and replace the branch president. Neither open meetings or those of the executive committee were conducive to decision making. Executive factionalism, lobbying of the rank and file and public hostility between branch officers all combined to produce an atmosphere of internecine warfare. This atmosphere could well have created in the minds of non-activists the

impression that activists were more concerned with arguing amongst themselves than with management.

With this branch, the proportions of meeting time used for different issue types probably had very little connection with the branch's approach to job regulation. Whatever the issue or proposal that emerged, it was inevitably disputed by someone. However, the occurrence of themes emerging in debate does provide some indications of approaches.

Both militant issue pursuit and adoption of a proactive stance were infrequently mentioned. Conversely caution or decision avoidance had the highest frequency of all branches. A low ability to agree about either issue adoption or pursuit methods gives some indication of why the branch was neither intense in action or high on initiation.

Anti-rank and file statements were comparatively rare and pro-rank and file statements even less frequent. Expressions of rank and file interests or will were at the lowest frequency of all branches and references to representative processes rare. The notion of an activist group more concerned with internal warfare than opposing management thus receives some support. This warfare was on occasion visible to the rank and file and, therefore, probably affected views of representativeness.

Finally, anti-management remarks were fairly frequent. Whilst these were balanced to some extent by pro-management statements, themes indicating suspicion were the most frequent of all branches. This provides evidence to support conclusions drawn in chapter 11 that activist perceptions of industrial relations climate hovered between cooperative and antagonistic constitutionalism.

CHAPTER 13

INTEGRATION OF RESULTS AND EXPLANATION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter commences with a number of general observations with respect to the way in which influencing factors were found to affect approaches to job regulation. Following this, results from previous chapters are integrated into explanations of relative branch positionings on each dimension of approach to job regulation and generalised conclusions drawn. Finally, tentative conclusions are drawn on the effects of dimensions upon each other.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON FACTORS INFLUENCING JOB REGULATION

Before commencing detailed explanations, it is necessary to make a number of general points on dimensions of approach to job regulation and their influencing factors.

The Effects of Industry Collective Bargaining Structures and the Framework of Existing Agreements

For local authorities, national agreements were on many matters framed loosely. This established firm local job regulation roles for branches. Nationalised industry agreements were far more specific and in many cases officially precluded from negotiation anyone other than full-time officials. This, as will be seen, had very fundamental effects on approaches to job regulation. For the present two points can be made:-

- i. Only in the nationalised industry branches were internal structures found which were directed towards some measure of autonomous workplace bargaining. It is tentatively concluded that this was (at least partially) a result of the restrictive implications of industry structures. In the face of managements who initiated most of the issues, together with agreements and structures which made job regulation formally a matter for the outside trade union, activists could only obtain involvement for themselves by circumventing the restrictions. They did this by concentrating their efforts in the first instance at constituency level which then brought some measure of legitimacy to the branch role in job regulation. Conversely in local authorities where the role of the branch was more legitimized in structures and agreements there was little imperative for circumvention of restrictions. Job regulation activities remained a branch level matter.
- ii. A corollary of this was that the industrial relations climate for nationalised industry branches was characterized by an informality in relationships between trade union and management. This contained the attendant risks of instability and potential volatility (Purcell 1979).

Multiple Causality

Each dimension of approach to job regulation was influenced by a number of factors. Detailed explanations of both positionings

on each dimension and influencing factors have been given in preceding chapters (6 to 12). However, for convenience a summary table of all the relevant factors for each dimension is presented in a simplified form in this chapter (tables 13.1 to 13.5). Nowhere was it possible to single out an influencing factor which alone completely explained positioning on a dimension. However, two general observations can be made:-

- i. In many cases the effects of factors were cumulative i.e. a branch exhibiting two positive factors would be further towards a particular end of the continuum than a branch with only one.
- ii. Factors were found in clusters; a branch having a given characteristic had other compatible characteristics.

Generalisations from Explanations

Each branch was unique in the sense that it had its own combination of influencing factors responsible for its position on a particular dimension. However, since some influencing factors could be grouped together in clusters, and from these the relative positionings of branches explained, generalisations were possible. These are given in diagrammatic form as networks of influences for each dimension (figures 13.1 to 13.5).

DIMENSIONS OF APPROACH TO JOB REGULATION AND INTEGRATED EXPLANATIONS

Dependence on Outside Trade Union

Here the rank order of branches in dependence on outside trade union was:-

<i>Gas Branch</i>	<i>Electricity Branch</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 1</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 2</i>
4	1	3	2

A summary of factors explaining dependence on outside trade union is presented in table 13.1. The dimension was one where collective bargaining structures and agreements affected branch positionings. As such it is more appropriate to consider nationalised industry and local authority situations separately and explain differences between branches in each one.

Both local authority branches had very similar dependence on the outside trade union and had strong similarities in a number of influencing factors. In each branch activists considered the preclusion of the branch from the same issues of job regulation to be legitimate. Thus, in both cases, any restraining influence of agreements was the same. Workplace bargaining was relatively undeveloped in both. However, Local Authority branch 1 was marginally less dependent, which can be traced to the effect of two connected factors:-

1. As a result of past bargaining activity a large number of local agreements existed. This established a more prominent current role in local job regulation.

SUMMARY TABLE OF FACTORS EXPLAINING DEPENDENCE ON OUTSIDE TRADE UNION

FACTOR	REFERENCE FOR FACTOR SCORE	RANK ORDER OF FACTOR SCORES AND/OR NOTES			
		CAS BRANCH	ELECTRICITY BRANCH	LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 1	LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 2
Outside trade union: Influence on branch	Chapter 11 and Appendix S4.0	4	1	3	2
Agreements and bargaining structures: formal restriction of branch job regulation role.	Chapter 6 Appendices S2.1 to S2.4	2	1	4	3
Agreements and bargaining structures: activist acceptance of degree of restriction.	Chapter 11 Appendix S37	4	3	1 (Joint)	1 (Joint)
Agreements and bargaining structures: actual effect on restriction of branch job regulation role.	Chapter 11 Appendix S37	4	1	1 (Joint)	1 (Joint)
Industrial relations climate	Chapter 11 Figure 11.1	Adaptive Cooperative	Uninhibited Antagonism	Cooperative Constitutionalism	Cooperative Constitutionalism (Just)
Bargaining autonomy of shop stewards	Chapter 10 and Appendix S31 (Perceived Stewardship Opportunity)	1	2	3	4
Membership dispersion effects	Chapter 10 and Appendices S33.1 to S33.4	2	1	3	4
Favourable view of NALGO and trade unions in general	Activists - Chapter 9 and Appendix 23.2	4	1	2	3
	Non-activists: Chapter 9 and Appendix 23.1	4	2	1	3

11. The industrial relations climate within which the branch operated was highly conducive to the continuance of this role.

Thus although its dispersed membership put a greater strain on the ability to service the rank and file, it was less necessary than in Local Authority branch 2 to make use of the outside trade union as a source of internal or external support.

Both nationalised industry branches had similar degrees of formal preclusion from job regulation but differed widely in their dependence on the outside trade union.

In Gas the effects of collective bargaining structures and agreements were far less pronounced. Both activists and non-activists had relatively unfavourable views of the outside trade union. This can in some measure be traced back to a single prominent issue which, at a stroke, diminished the influence of the parent body and made independence a matter of branch policy (see chapter 7). However, the declaration of independence is one thing; realising it can be another. Here it can be noted that there were other differences between the branches that made independence a far more practical proposition for Gas than Electricity.

Gas activists considered exclusion of the branch from almost any aspect of job regulation to be unwarranted and the branch had a more highly developed system of workplace bargaining. These

factors, together with an industrial relations climate conducive to both a continuing dialogue with management and a degree of facilities for stewards, made it far less necessary to use the outside trade union to service a dispersed membership. Moreover these factors also allowed some circumvention of the restrictive provisions of agreements.

Conversely, in Electricity a more tense relationship with management together with a less developed steward system made membership dispersion a greater problem. Here there was greater necessity to use the outside trade union for internal support, so reducing branch involvement in some job regulation activities. Because they received high levels of support, activists evaluated the outside trade union more favourably and so its influence increased; a cycle of self-perpetuating dependence.

Overall, for the four branches, it may be concluded that the most powerful influences on dependence were:-

- i. Collective bargaining structures and agreements which set formal limits on branch job regulation roles.
- ii. The nature of workplace representative systems which together with industrial relations climate influenced ease of involvement in job regulation activities.
- iii. Attitudes of activists towards the outside trade union which legitimized (or otherwise) its involvement in domestic issues.

Although these were not present in the same way in each branch, their effects can be generalised into a network of influences. This is shown in figure 13.1.

Focus in Issues

The rank order of branch positions on degree of external focus in issues was:-

<i>Gas Branch</i>	<i>Electricity Branch</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 1</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 2</i>
4	3	1	2

It can further be noted that Local Authority 1 had a conspicuously more external focus than the other branches and Gas was almost totally internally focused and the remaining two were very similar. A summary of factors explaining focus in issues is presented in table 13.2. It is convenient first to consider the two branches occupying the polar positions.

In Gas, both activists and non-activists perceived pecuniary advancement to be locally attainable and the need for branch involvement was seen to be greatest at departmental and individual levels. Moreover, the representative system was organised for activity at these levels to a greater extent than in other branches. Opinions of the outside trade were the lowest encountered and the branch was, as a matter of policy, independent of the parent. Neither activists or non-activists were inclined to be sympathetic to externally focused issues promoted by the

**DIAGRAM OF MAJOR INFLUENCES ON BRANCH
DEPENDENCE ON OUTSIDE TRADE UNION**



Illustration removed for copyright restrictions

SUMMARY TABLE OF FACTORS EXPLAINING FOCUS IN ISSUES

FACTOR	REFERENCE FOR FACTOR SCORE	RANK ORDER OF FACTOR SCORES AND/OR NOTES			
		CAS BRANCH	ELECTRICITY BRANCH	LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 1	LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 2
Emphasis on internal issue involvement High score equates to lower (i.e. towards individual level) issues	Activists: Chapter 8 and Appendix S15.2 (Cumulative percentage of issues at below organisation level)	4	3	1	2
	Non-activists: Chapter 8 and Appendix S15.1 (Cumulative percentage of issues at below organisation level)	4	3	2	1
Pecuniary advancement: Perceived locally possible	Chapter 8: from table 8.11 % Local Pecuniary Issues % Total Pecuniary Issues	1	2	4	3
	Chapter 10 and Appendix S31 (Perceived stewardship opportunity)	1	2	3	4
Bargaining autonomy of shop stewards	Chapter 11 and Appendix S40	4	1	3	2
Outside trade union: influence on branch	Chapter 11 and Appendix 40	4	1	2	3
Outside trade union's influence on activists issue definition	Activists: Chapter 9 and Appendix 23.2	4	1	2	3
	Non-Activists: Chapter 9 and Appendix 23.1	4	2	1	3

outside trade union. The branch was locked into a cycle of mutually reinforcing internally focused attitudes and activities.

In Local Authority branch 1, pecuniary advancement was seen as virtually unattainable locally. The relatively inactive bargaining role of workplace representatives, together with a perceived need for the trade union involvement to be greatest at organisation level and above, gave an emphasis on more broadly focused issues. Both activists and non-activists were very favourably disposed towards NALGO as a whole and trade unions in general. Thus although the overall influence of the outside trade union was no higher than in the other local authority branch, its influence on issue definition was greater. Perhaps most important of all, activists had identified a prominent non-political, wider social issue with which the rank and file could readily identify, (see chapter 7). This served as a first step to involvement in a wider range of externally focused issues.

Of the remaining branches, Local Authority 2 was marginally more external in focus than Electricity. Here a number of factors operating in contrary directions can be seen to have influenced relative positionings.

Electricity was much more dependent on the outside trade union for internal support; giving the parent higher overall influence, particularly on issue definition. This influence however, was primarily exerted on branch activists. These had the highest

opinions of NALGO and trade unions encountered in the study and were therefore strongly predisposed to adopt issues promoted by the outside trade union as a form of reciprocity in return for internal support.

Non-activists in the Electricity branch, however, had opinions of the outside trade union much less favourable than those of activists. These non-activists perceived the greatest need for trade union involvement at lower levels of the employing organisation. This orientation was reinforced by a steward system which had some capability to deal with these issues. In addition, a single prominent issue had arisen in the recent past, in which non-activists had specifically instructed activists to direct their attentions to internal matters (see chapter 7). The more internal focus of Electricity was therefore a result of the exertion of rank and file will over that of activists.

In Local Authority branch 2 trade union involvement was seen as most necessary at organisational level and above. Non-activists had no more favourable opinions of the outside trade union than those in Electricity, but activists had not been fettered with an instruction to avoid external issues. Thus activists, who were more externally focused than the rank and file, were freer to engage in a modest level of support for external issues.

In the branches studied the most powerful influences on focus can be identified as:-

- i. The influence on branch activists of the outside trade union.
- ii. A cluster of attitudes for both activists and non-activists concerning levels of issue involvement seen as most desirable, together with systems of workplace representation facilitating (or not) issue pursuit at these levels.
- iii. The occurrence of significant single issues which acted as a focus for prevailing clusters of attitudes and provided an opportunity for the direction of branch action to be established.

These can be generalised into a network of influences which is shown in figure 13.2.

Initiation of Issues

The rank order of branches in terms of initiating issues was:

<i>Gas Branch</i>	<i>Electricity Branch</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 1</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 2</i>
4	3	1	2

Nationalised industry branches had noticeably lower levels of initiation than those in local authorities.

A summary of factors explaining differences in extent of initiation is presented in table 13.3. The pattern of differences between nationalised industry and local authority branches can, to some extent, be explained by two interconnected factors:-

DIAGRAM OF MAJOR INFLUENCES ON BRANCH
FOCUS IN ISSUES



SUMMARY TABLE OF FACTORS EXPLAINING INITIATION OF ISSUES

FACTOR	REFERENCE FOR FACTOR SCORE	RANK ORDER OF FACTOR SCORES AND/OR NOTES			
		CAS BRANCH	ELECTRICITY BRANCH	LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 1	LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 2
Agreements and bargaining structures: formal restriction of branch job regulation role	Chapter 6 and Appendices S2.1 to S2.4	2	1	4	3
Importance of management initiated issues	Chapter 8: Table 8.10 Activists Non-activists:	1 1	2 3	4 4	3 2
Bargaining autonomy of shop stewards	Chapter 10 and Appendix S31 (Perceived Stewardship Opportunity)	1	2	3	4
Industrial relations climate	Chapter 11, figure 11.1	Adaptive Cooperative	Uninhibited Antagonism	Cooperative Constitutionalism	Cooperative Constitutionalism (Just)
Activists: adoption of oppositional role	Chapter 9 and Appendix 25.1	3 2	4 1	1 4	2 3
Intra-organizational bargaining: incorporation of rank and file view	Chapter 12	1½ (Joint)	¾ (Joint)	1½ (Joint)	¾ (Joint)
Activists: confidence of rank and file support	Chapter 9 - interaction between attitude dimensions Appendices S25.3, S25.7, S25.11, S25.15	3 (Joint)	3 (Joint)	1	3 (Joint)

- i. Industry collective bargaining structures and agreements which gave local authority branches more constitutional freedom to initiate and, as a consequence, resulted in an industrial relations climate more conducive to initiation.
- ii. Management in local authorities initiated less, and the few issues they did initiate were of lower salience to both activists and non-activists. Local authority branches could adopt a stance directed towards improvements, rather than defending the status quo.

Nevertheless within each industrial group there were differences between branches.

Local Authority branch 1 initiated much more than branch 2. Historically it had been far more active in negotiating local agreements. This not only established its role in job regulation but probably in some measure influenced perception of that role as one of seeking incremental improvements. Its industrial relations climate was more conducive to initiation and activists did not see management as an enemy. Thus they probably had few inhibitions with respect to seeking improvements.

To some extent the favourability of climate in Local Authority branch 1 can be seen to have been strengthened by two very salient issues. In these, an integrative approach to bargaining between trade union and management was adopted. Moreover the issues themselves prompted the necessity for the branch to pursue

further claims (see chapter 7). In addition, branch processes of intra-organisational bargaining strongly facilitated emergence of rank and file opinions. Thus activists had a clearer view of the importance of issues to the rank and file, and were consequently more confident of their support.

In Local Authority branch 2 there was no tradition of initiation. A single issue, highly salient to the rank and file, prompted abandoning of other claims. To some extent these other claims were abandoned because activists' perceptions of the industrial relations climate were such that they did not see management as being prepared to give away several advantages at the same time. Perhaps more important, there was often considerable disagreement amongst activists in regard to the relative importance of issues. Abandoning almost all other claims in favour of the one issue that the rank and file had stressed as important avoided some of the disputes about priorities.

In both the nationalised industry branches there was equal scepticism amongst activists with respect to rank and file support. However, the Electricity branch initiated slightly more issues than Gas.

In Electricity, management initiated issues were of somewhat lower salience to both activists and non activists than they were in the Gas Branch. The industrial relations climate was one of low trust where trade union and management were not receptive to each

other's ideas. Indeed, activists saw their role primarily in terms of making management fair and trustworthy and were to a large extent, reliant on outside trade union support to do this. All these factors induced a slightly higher tendency for issues to be formally initiated at branch level.

In contrast, gas activists had higher autonomy in workplace bargaining within an industrial relations climate that allowed some circumvention of written procedural agreements. There was a degree of issue initiation and handling by stewards at workplace level, which removed the necessity for the branch to become formally involved.

A final contrast between the two nationalised industry branches was in intra-organisational bargaining processes. In Gas, these strongly facilitated the emergence of the rank and file viewpoint. A clear picture of non-activist salience and the issues they would or would not support emerged. In Electricity, activists had elitist attitudes and were more inclined to believe they knew what was best for the rank and file and initiated accordingly.

In conclusion the major influences on initiation of issues by branches were:-

1. Industry collective bargaining structures and agreements which established the limits of branch job regulation.

- ii. The industrial relations climate which influenced a branch's perceptions of the ease of issue initiation.
- iii. As a corollary to (ii) a cluster of activist attitudes towards their role.
- iv. The representative system or centralisation of authority which influenced the level within the branch at which issue initiation could occur.
- v. Intra-organisational bargaining processes which facilitated (or not) the emergence of rank and file views with respect to issue salience and potential support for initiation.

These factors, although having somewhat different effects in each branch are portrayed in figure 13.3.

Intensity in Action

On this dimension the rank order of branch positionings on intensity in action was:

<i>Gas Branch</i>	<i>Electricity Branch</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 1</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 2</i>
2	1	3	4

A summary of factors explaining differences between branches is present in table 13.4. Both local authority branches had lower levels of intensity than those exhibited by the nationalised industry branches. The difference can largely be explained by the following inter-related factors:-

- 1. Arising from their more pronounced roles in formal job regulation, the climate of industrial relations in both

**DIAGRAM OF MAJOR INFLUENCES ON BRANCH
INITIATION OF ISSUES**



SUMMARY TABLE OF FACTORS EXPLAINING INTENSITY IN ACTION

FACTOR	REFERENCE FOR FACTOR SCORE	RANK ORDER OF FACTOR SCORES AND/OR NOTES			
		CAS BRANCH	ELECTRICITY BRANCH	LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 1	LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 2
Relationship: issue salience to intensity	Chapter 8, Table 8.9 Non-activists: Activists:	2	1	3	4
		2	1	3	4
Activists: desire for issue involvement	Chapter 8, Table 8.8	1	2	3	4
Agreements and bargaining structures: Restriction of branch job regulation role	Chapter 6 and Appendices S2.1 to S2.4	2	1	4	3
Activists: adoption of oppositional role	Chapter 9 and Appendix S25.1	2	1	3	4
Non-activists: view of branch as consultant of interests	Chapter 9 and Appendix S24.1	2	3	1	4
Existence of mechanisms to inform and sense rank and file opinion	Chapter 10 and Appendix S29	1	3	2	4
Bargaining autonomy of shop stewards	Chapter 10 and Appendix S31 (Perceived stewardship opportunity)	1	2	3	4
Industrial relations climate	Chapter 11, Figure 11.1	Adaptive Cooperative. 3	Uninhibited Antagonism 4	Cooperative constitutionalism: 1	Cooperative constitutionalism (Just) 2

SUMMARY TABLE OF FACTORS EXPLAINING INTENSITY IN ACTION (CONT.)

FACTOR	REFERENCE FOR FACTOR SCORE	RANK ORDER OF FACTOR SCORES AND/OR NOTES			
		CAS BRANCH	ELECTRICITY BRANCH	LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 1	LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 2
Intra-organisational bargaining: incorporation of rank and file view	Chapter 12	1½ (Joint)	Elitism towards rank and file 3½	1½ (Joint)	Interrecive warfare between activists 3½
Non-activists: attitudes to management	Chapter 9 and Appendix S21.1	2	3	1	4
Non-activists: attitudes to collective aggression	Chapter 9 and Appendix S24.1	1	2	4	3
Activists: commitment to remaining with employer	Chapter 9 - interaction between attitude dimensions in Appendices S22.4, S22.8, S22.12, S22.16.	2 (Joint)	2 (Joint)	2 (Joint)	4
Activists: confidence of rank and file support	Chapter 9 - interaction between attitude dimensions in Appendices S25.3, S25.7, S25.11, S25.15	3 (Joint)	3 (Joint)	1	3 (Joint)

local authority branches was broadly cooperative. Differences between trade union and management were more regulated and militant action made less likely (Flanders and Fox 1969).

In the nationalised industries, formal negotiating forums for branches were far more limited in their ability to handle differences between trade union and management (see chapter 4). Thus job regulation tended to be handled informally outside negotiating committees, with the attendant risks of volatility and instability.

- ii. As a corollary, militant action was not so readily applied in local authority branches; even for issues equally as salient as those in nationalised industries. Thus in the local authorities the relationship between intensity and issue salience was much weaker.

- iii. Local authority systems of workplace representation were less appropriate for mobilisation of the rank and file. Bargaining authority was more centralised and workplace representatives essentially represented their members views to the branch, rather than management. As such these representatives were much more likely to be followers of rank and file opinion than moulders of it. In contrast in nationalised industry branches, there was a higher degree of workplace stewardship and thus potential

leadership in conflict situations.

- iv. In local authorities, activists held optimistic expectations of work. In nationalised industries activists' experiences were largely of thwarted expectations and they had less to lose by taking the lead in acts of collective opposition.

In addition to differences between the two industrial situations, there were differences between the two Local Authority branches. Local Authority branch 1 was very slightly more intense in action than branch 2, and the most important explanations lie in the attitudes of activists.

In Local Authority branch 1 activists had a somewhat stronger desire for branch (rather than outside trade union) handling of issues. They were more strongly in favour of an aggressive stance by the branch and prepared if necessary, to adopt an oppositional role. Perhaps most important of all, activists in this branch had a stronger commitment to staying with the employer and improving their lot. Those in Local Authority 2 were careerist and more committed to seeking personal improvement by moving elsewhere.

In the two nationalised industry branches there were a number of strong similarities in influencing factors, i.e. restrictiveness of collective bargaining structures, rank and file associations between the fairness of management and the presence of the

trade union. In addition, activists in both branches were sceptical with respect to rank and file support for activist initiatives.

Notwithstanding these similarities, the Electricity branch was more intense in action than Gas and a number of factors, both attitudinal and structural, can be seen to have influenced positions.

Activists in Electricity had a stronger tendency to see collective opposition as a suitable posture to be maintained continuously to obtain fairness and trustworthiness from management.

In Gas, although activists felt far more strongly that any restriction of their job regulation role lacked legitimacy, the industrial relations climate permitted some degree of circumvention of any restrictions enshrined in agreements. Stewards were given far more freedom to work out bargains with their individual managers; a situation where mutual accommodation without militancy could result. They saw collective opposition as a way of responding to any management unfairness or untrustworthiness, if and when it occurred.

Finally, although non-activists in both branches endorsed collectivism and aggression to a similar extent, those in Gas had more favourable opinions of management and were less likely to endorse militancy. Coupled with this, the Gas branch had more

effective mechanisms to sense and inform its rank and file and incorporate their viewpoint into decisions on action.

In conclusion the major influences on intensity in action by branches were:

- i. Collective bargaining structures and agreements and their effect in creating climates for the orderly regulation of conflict.
- ii. Systems of workplace representation in terms of a cluster of inter-related structures and process which affected capability to sense and inform the rank and file and/or mobilise them for collective opposition.
- iii. A cluster of non-activist attitudes towards the branch and collectivism.
- iv. A cluster of activist attitudes to both work and trade union roles which influenced their reasons for use of intense action.

These factors are portrayed as a network of influences in figure 13.4.

Representativeness

This dimension expressed non-activist perceptions of their opportunity to influence branch policy and action. The rank order of branch positions was:

<i>Gas Branch</i>	<i>Electricity Branch</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 1</i>	<i>Local Authority Branch 2</i>
2	3	1	4

**DIAGRAM OF MAJOR INFLUENCES ON BRANCH
INTENSITY IN ACTION**



One branch (Local Authority 1) was considered much more representative than the others. Indeed, the difference between this branch and the highest of the other three was greater than the difference between the highest and lowest of these three branches. For this reason it is more convenient to explain positionings by comparing branches in pairs. Factors explaining representativeness are summarised in table 13.5

The least representative branches (Electricity and Local Authority branch 2) had three strong similarities. They had the lowest formal provisions of those investigated to inform the rank and file or sense their opinions. In neither branch was the rank and file viewpoint likely to emerge via activists at executive committee meetings. Neither branch devoted any of its executive meeting time to examining its internal effectiveness and methods by which this could be improved.

Electricity, however, was considered slightly more representative, which can be explained by a number of factors. Perhaps because its membership was more dispersed, authority in the branch was less centralised and workplace representatives more autonomous in relationships with their constituents. Recent sensing and informing of the rank and file in terms of open meetings or ballots had been far more effective than in Local Authority branch 2, where it had only occurred because the rank and file had requisitioned meetings to voice their opinions.

SUMMARY TABLE OF FACTORS EXPLAINING REPRESENTATIVENESS

FACTOR	REFERENCE FOR FACTOR SCORE	RANK ORDER OF FACTOR SCORES AND/OR NOTES			
		CAS BRANCH	ELECTRICITY BRANCH	LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 1	LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 2
Issue salience: closeness of activists and non-activists	Chapter 8, table 8.12	3	4	1	2
Perceived need for rank and file involvement in decisions on issues: closeness of activist and non-activist views.	Chapter 8, table 8.12	3	1	2	4
Non-activists: relationship between perceived need for involvement and issue salience	Chapter 8, table 8.12	2	1	4	3
Activists: relationship between perceived need for rank and file involvement and activist issue salience	Chapter 8, table 8.12	3	1	2	4
Non-activists: perceived influence in recent issues	Chapter 8 and Appendix S12.1	3	4	1	2
Formal provision to sense and inform rank and file opinion	Chapter 10 and Appendix S29	1	3	2	4
Effectiveness of recent sensing and informing processes	Chapter 10 and Appendix S32	1	3	2	4
Bargaining autonomy of shop stewards	Chapter 10 and Appendix S31 (Perceived stewardship opportunity)	1	2	3	4
Membership dispersion effects	Chapter 10 and Appendices S32.1 to S32.4	2	1	3	4
Outside trade union: influence on branch	Chapter 11 and Appendix S40	4	1	3	2

SUMMARY TABLE OF FACTORS EXPLAINING REPRESENTATIVENESS (CONT.)

FACTOR	REFERENCE FOR FACTOR SCORE	RANK ORDER OF FACTOR SCORES AND/OR NOTES			
		GAS BRANCH	ELECTRICITY BRANCH	LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 1	LOCAL AUTHORITY BRANCH 2
Activists: concern for internal effectiveness of branch	Chapter 12 and Appendix S41	1½ (Joint)	not discussed ¾ (Joint)	1½ (Joint)	not discussed ¾ (Joint)
Intra-organisational bargaining; incorporation of rank and file view	Chapter 12	1½ (Joint)	Elitism towards rank and file ¾ (Joint)	1½ (Joint)	Intermecline warfare between activists ¾ (Joint)
Non-activists: attitudes to branch as consulter of interests	Chapter 9 and Appendix S24.1	2	3	1	4
Non-activists: attitudes to activists as consulters/informers	Chapter 9 and Appendix S24.1	2	3	1	4
Non-activists: confidence in activists	Chapter 9 and Appendix S24.1	1	4	2	3

Notwithstanding these advantages, other factors operated to prevent Electricity being considered more representative. Whilst non-activists had an issue focus directed largely towards matters within the employing organisation, activists, because of the influence of the outside trade union, were far more externally focused. Indeed activist and non-activist issue saliences were less concordant here than in any other branch. Perhaps most important, activists perceived the need for rank and file involvement to be greatest on the issues that were of highest salience to themselves. Thus although the rank and file had been given more opportunity (than in Local Authority branch 2) for involvement in recent issues, their perceptions of the influence they exerted on the issues were the lowest of any branch.

The Gas branch was evaluated by its rank and file as somewhat more representative than was Electricity. Its formal provisions to inform and sense rank and file opinion were much higher, and its recent sensing and informing had been more effective. Attitudes to the branch and its activists were more favourable. There was also lower centralisation of authority in the branch and a steward system more visibly attuned to rank and file concerns in the workplace.

In contrast to Electricity, the influence on Gas activists of the outside trade union was very low and issue saliences of activists and non-activists were closer. Moreover, cognizance of the rank and file view was much more likely in executive meetings together

with a reflection of this in decisions. In contrast to both Electricity and Local Authority branch 2, there was also an element of introspection and self criticism by activists i.e. meetings were used to examine, discuss and suggest ways of rectifying shortcomings in the branch.

Perhaps most crucial, in Gas, activist perceptions of the need for rank and file involvement were unrelated to the importance of issues to activists. The rank and file were therefore more likely to have been involved in issues which had higher importance for them. It can also be noted that the rank and file had more confidence in their activists than in Electricity and perceptions of their influence in recent issues was higher.

In Local Authority branch 1, rank and file evaluations of the branch and its activists as consulters of non-activist interests were even higher than in Gas. Although centralisation of authority in the branch was higher, the workplace representative role was largely that of a communication channel. Thus the rank and file view was just as likely to emerge in intra-organisational bargaining, and to be incorporated into decisions. Moreover, as in Gas, there was a strong concern for internal effectiveness and meetings were used to explore ways of improving branch performance.

Although the influence of the outside trade union on branch activists was somewhat higher than in Gas, this did not (as in Electricity) result in a set of activist issue saliences widely

different from those held by the rank and file. Since the latter were favourably disposed to outside trade unionism and its concerns, the relative importance of issues for activists and non-activists had more concordance in this branch than elsewhere.

In Local Authority branch 1 although the formal provisions to inform and sense rank and file opinion were not as extensive as in Gas, the effectiveness of recent sensing and informing processes had been almost as high. Activist perceptions of the need to involve the rank and file were not linked to their own (activist) issue saliences and the rank and file perceived their influence on recent issues to be higher than in any other branch.

Finally, and perhaps most important, there was a difference between this branch and the others in terms of non-activist attitudes. In other branches rank and file perceptions of the importance of their involvement in decision making were linked quite strongly to the importance of issues i.e. they only felt a strong need for involvement where the issue was important to them. In Local Authority branch 1, the rank and file expressed a desire for participation in decision making on most issues irrespective of their salience. This made it all the more unlikely that activists would alone have to take decisions which the rank and file subsequently felt were against their interests.

In conclusion the major groups of influences on representativeness may be summarised as:-

- i. A cluster of non-activist evaluations of the branch and its activists in terms of the extent to which they (the rank and file) perceived themselves to be kept informed and their opinions consulted.
- ii. The extent to which the branch had developed (and continued to evolve) structures and processes which facilitated informing and sensing of the rank and file. Again these structures and processes hung together in a cluster and their adoption hinged crucially on the third group of influences.
- iii. Attitudes of activists in terms of the extent to which they perceived rank and file involvement in decision making to be important, together with their reasons for wanting non-activists to be involved. These factors were particularly important where the salience of issues was different for activists and non-activists.
- iv. Attitudes of non-activists themselves. Here it must be recognised that representativeness was a perceptual dimension and to some extent independent of how representative branches actually were. Thus even if the opportunity to participate in decision making were extended to the rank and file, unless the opportunity was taken-up, they could have perceived themselves excluded. Rank and file willingness to participate irrespective of the salience of issues can, therefore, be seen to have affected perceptions of representativeness.

These are generalised into a network of influences shown in figure 13.5.

OVERVIEW

From the foregoing explanations it can be seen that some factors influenced more than one dimension of approach to job regulation. It is therefore possible to draw a tentative conclusion that some dimensions were related; a possibility acknowledged in chapter 6. The identifiable interconnections are noted below.

Dependence on Outside Trade Union and Focus in Issues.

Both dimensions were strongly affected by:-

- i. The influence on the branch of the outside trade union.
- ii. Attitudes of activists and non-activists to outside trade union and wider trade unionism.
- iii. The degree of development of workplace bargaining.

Based on the evidence of Gas and Electricity branches it is possible to state that the relationship was positive and flowed from dependence on the outside trade union to focus in issues. The relationship however was weak, primarily because dependence was powerfully influenced by collective bargaining structures and agreements; a factor having no direct effect on focus.

DIAGRAM OF MAJOR INFLUENCES ON BRANCH REPRESENTATIVENESS



Focus in Issues and Initiation of Issues

Here the relationship was again weak, but it can be noted that the rank order of branches on both dimensions was the same. Moreover, both dimensions were strongly influenced by:-

- i. The salience of internal issues.
- ii. The salience of management initiated issues (Initiation)
- iii. Bargaining autonomy of shop stewards.

In addition initiation of issues was shown to be strongly affected by industrial relations climate.

It can be postulated that where bargaining autonomy of stewards was low and the climate was conducive to initiation, branch activists were more inclined to indulge their own values and adopt a more external focus. The relationship flows, therefore, from initiation of issues to focus in issues.

Initiation of Issues and Intensity of Action

Here the evidence is somewhat firmer. The two dimensions were affected, in contrary directions, by several factors.

- i. Collective bargaining structure and framework of agreements and, as a corollary, industrial relations climate. Where the climate and framework of agreements were conducive to branches initiating issues, their actions were less intense in issue pursuit.

- ii. A cluster of structures and processes concerned with sensing and informing rank and file opinion and/or mobilising non-activists for action. Where processes maintained high levels of contact with the rank and file either intensity or initiation could be facilitated.
- iii. A cluster of activist attitudes to work, their trade union roles and issues of job regulation. Here attitudes which made intensity of action more likely also lowered the likelihood of initiating issues.
- iv. A cluster of non-activist attitudes to work, the branch and its activists. These operated in much the same way as activist attitudes.

Although in this case the direction of influence between the two dimensions cannot be stated, it can be seen that they were negatively related i.e. intensity rose as initiation of issues fell.

Representativeness and Other Dimensions

The evidence for inter-relatedness of representativeness with other dimensions was somewhat weak. However, it had at least one influencing factor (the nature of the system of workplace representation) in common with all other dimensions. Representativeness is essentially a measure of non-activist views on branch action and the other dimensions are measures of action

itself, it is most sensible to predicate a circular influence i.e. action affected views of representativeness, which in turn affected action.

CHAPTER 14

CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

In this final chapter the results of the study are presented as a set of general conclusions which are related to prior work in the area. The extent to which the findings can be generalised to other situations is also discussed and areas for further research identified. Finally, implications of the findings for both organisational managements and trade unions are examined, and an outline description is given of an organisational development intervention, based on the study results, which was carried out in one of the branches investigated.

A SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF FACTORS INFLUENCING APPROACHES TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION

In the previous chapter, a model of influencing factors was given for each dimension of job regulation. Direct combination of all models would produce one which would be extremely complex. A simplified composite model is therefore presented which identifies positive and negative influences on dimensions and permits major conclusions to be drawn. This is shown in figure 14.1.

SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF FACTORS INFLUENCING BRANCH APPROACHES TO ISSUES OF JOB REGULATION



GENERALISED CONCLUSIONS

Industrial Relations Climate and Structures of Representation

At the beginning of the previous chapter it was noted that industry collective bargaining structures together with frameworks of industry and local agreements had effects on two very important variables; industrial relations climate and structure of representation within each branch. Since these two variables were found to have pronounced effects on all dimensions of approach to job regulation, it is necessary to examine a general conclusion.

Conclusion 1

The greater the extent to which collective bargaining structures and agreements formally restrict branch job regulation roles, the lower the tendency for the industrial relations climate to be characterised by formality. As a corollary, the more informal the industrial relations climate, the higher the tendency for workplace representatives to bargain autonomously from the branch.

There is little prior work to provide direct evidence to support these findings. Industrial relations climate although acknowledged as important, still remains a largely unexplored topic; particularly in terms of its antecedants. With respect to bargaining by different levels of the representative system the major concern of previous work has been to establish whether bargaining took place within or outside the employing establishment (e.g. Boraston et al. 1975). Differences in

bargaining levels within organisations have largely been ignored. Nevertheless there are a number of threads in prior work which support the conclusions from this study.

The structure of collective bargaining is very different between local government and nationalised industries. Local Authorities are in reality autonomous, independent employers which voluntarily cede negotiating rights over certain issues to a central body (Walsh 1981). As such the status of national agreements is the same as in many other situations where employers' associations negotiate nationally on behalf of employers. Basic terms and conditions are set, while implementation is left to individual employers. Different authorities do not have common managerial structures or identical administrative procedures so the primary requirements for an extremely tight industry wide agreement are largely absent (Boraston et al. 1975). The scope for local bargaining is high and this, coupled with a strong commitment to Whitley type machinery, creates a need for formal, employer based regulatory forums.

There is in addition, a political context to local authority industrial relations. Strictly speaking elected councillors are the employer with whom negotiations take place. Dealings between trade union and employer are under public scrutiny and must be seen to be fair; a further pressure for formality.

Centralisation of bargaining within the workplace trade union arises from other factors. In reality a great deal of bargaining is left to senior organisational managers who seek later ratification of their decisions from the policy making elected councillors (Kochan 1974 and 1975). Managements almost everywhere will, if given free reign, choose the level of bargaining at which the activities of trade unions can be controlled (Purcell and Sisson 1983). In local authorities there is evidence to suggest that this is most easily achieved by restricting dealings to a small number of trade union leaders (Kessler 1982, Terry 1982). As such, bargaining by the domestic trade union in local authorities is centralised into a few hands and characterised by formality.

Evidence of this in the Local Authority branches studied can be seen in chapter 10. Authority in decision making and negotiation was concentrated into the hands of a relatively small number of senior branch officers. Neither branch designed the constituencies of its workplace representatives in a way that would facilitate the emergence of workplace (as opposed to branch level) bargaining. Most significant of all, workplace representatives perceived themselves to have little or no bargaining autonomy.

A contrast with Local Authority bargaining structures is provided by the Nationalised industry agreements. Although negotiated nationally within a Whitley structure, the latter are, in effect, company wide agreements for very large multi-plant firms (Bell

1975). All the requirements for very tight national agreements are present (standardised administration, accounting and managerial structures) leaving little bargaining scope at plant level.

For many years prior to this study and also whilst it was in progress, both the Electricity and Gas industries had been subject to high degrees of structural and technological change, involving many adjustments at departmental or workplace levels. To a large extent the emergence of a degree of autonomous workplace bargaining can be seen as a trade union attempt to cope with these management initiated changes. Indeed it has been argued in a more general context that the rise in British shopfloor bargaining has occurred not as a demand for power sharing but as a defensive reaction to an increasing rate of change (Hawkins 1979).

Thus although the industry wide agreements in the nationalised industries formally acknowledged little bargaining role for the domestic trade union, branches had an incentive to develop capabilities to represent their members at the level where they were subject to the most pressure; the department or workplace. The emergence of workplace bargaining is only one side of the story; informality is the other.

At the levels at which change took place, the responsibility for successful implementation rested with junior or middle managers but an obligation existed, enshrined in the vesting acts of both industries (Chester 1954), to consult with trade unions. A

tendency for line managers to develop close bargaining relationships with those who can influence their success is well documented. It has been characterised by an element of rule-breaking and circumvention of agreements as managers pursue more immediate operational goals at the expense of higher order industrial relations policies (Terry 1977, Batstone et al. 1977). To some extent this is what had happened in both nationalised industry branches. An increasingly strong trade union presence at department or workplace level, coupled with a set of agreements which formally precluded dealing with issues at that level, encouraged managers to engage in a measure of circumvention of agreements.

The evidence of this can be seen in Chapter 10. In both nationalised industry branches there was a definite attempt by the union to design shop steward constituencies to follow management structures and so facilitate workplace bargaining. Authority for decision making and negotiation was far less centralised into the hands of a few branch officers than in Local Authorities. Perhaps most importantly stewards perceived themselves to have a degree of bargaining autonomy. Indeed, the branch with the most autonomous stewards (Gas) was the one with the highest degree of informality in relationships between stewards and management.

In summary, a tentative but potentially useful contribution to the body of knowledge in industrial relations is made. It links bargaining levels in domestic trade union organisations to the

formality/informality aspects of industrial relations climate. In addition it traces the antecedents of both to management patterns of action within industry bargaining structures.

Dependence on Outside Trade Union

As illustrated in figure 14.1, the major conclusions with respect to factors affecting this dimension were:-

Conclusion 2

Dependence of the branch on the outside trade union rises with the favourability of opinions of branch activists towards it and the extent of influence which it exerts on these activists.

Conclusion 3

The greater the experienced effects of membership dispersion, the greater the influence of the outside trade union on the branch.

Conclusion 4

The lower the quality of relationships between branch activists and management as reflected in industrial relations climate, the higher the experienced effects of membership dispersion.

At a general level, the results are in accordance with prior empirical work which indicates that domestic trade union organisations vary in their independence (Boraston et al. 1975).

The study supplements this work by demonstrating that independence is derived in part from the desires of activists which, in turn, are connected to their opinions of the outside union. In the case of one branch, unfavourable opinions were traced to the perceived failure of the outside trade union to provide the external support to which the branch believed itself entitled. This has some parallels in prior empirical work (Hemingway 1978).

Prior findings have linked the exercise of independence to the degree of development of shop stewards and the ability to bargain at workplace level: particularly where full-time stewards have emerged (Brown, Ebsworth and Terry 1978, Boraston et al. 1975).

In dispersed membership situations, attention has been drawn to other factors. Terry, for example, has concluded for local authorities that centralised branch dominated negotiation gives focal lay officers a freedom of mobility that allow them to replace full-time officers (Terry 1982).

The results of this study indicate that these previous findings may need to be qualified in some respects. The most independent branch (Gas) had the highest degree of development of bargaining at the workplace. However, both local authority branches, where workplace bargaining was almost completely non-existent were more independent than Electricity even though this branch had some degree of development of workplace bargaining. In addition, Terry's conclusions, whilst broadly supported by the two local

authority branches, are contradicted by Gas, the most physically dispersed and at the same time the most independent branch.

All these results can be reconciled if the more specific notion of bargaining competence and resources at the workplace is replaced by the more general concept of trade union competence and resources at the level at which bargaining normally occurs. In both local authorities, patterns of negotiation were centralised into the hands of branch officers and the more independent branch was the one with the highest level of competence and resources at this level. Conversely in the nationalised industries, bargaining had to some extent devolved to the workplace and the most independent branch was the one with the higher degree of development at this level. The results from this study further indicate that the definition of resources used in prior work could usefully be expanded. In addition to the crucial trade union resources of competence, cohesion and bargaining experience distinguished, for example by both Batstone and Boraston (Batstone et al. 1977, Boraston et al. 1975) could be added that of industrial relations climate.

For reasons given above, on the formality dimension of climate, there were distinct differences between local authority and nationalised industry situations. However, on the other dimension of climate (trust), the more independent branch in each case was the one where the quality of relationships between trade union and management were the highest. It is, therefore, possible to

regard a benign industrial relations climate as a resource of the domestic organisation affecting dependence. This does not contradict prior empirical work which, at a conceptual level, acknowledges that climate probably affects dependence (i.e. Boraston et al. 1975, p 195). Rather by treating climate as an operationalised variable this study provides some empirical support for the hitherto conceptual level assertion.

In summary the contribution of this study is to demonstrate that:-

- i. The link between development of workplace bargaining and independence from outside trade union is not universally applicable. Competence and development of the domestic organisation at the level at which bargaining normally takes place may well have the greater explanatory potential.
- ii. A benign industrial relations climate can be regarded as a resource which facilitates independence by the domestic trade union.
- iii. Activist opinions of the outside trade union as a factor crucially affecting desire for independence have an effect on the level of independence exercised.

Focus in Issues

As illustrated in figure 14.1 the major conclusions with respect to factors influencing focus were:

Conclusion 5

The more favourable were activists opinions of the outside trade union, the greater its influence and the more salient to them were externally focused issues.

Conclusion 6

The higher the level of bargaining autonomy of workplace representatives, the lower the tendency for externally focused issues to be salient to the rank and file.

Conclusion 7

The higher the level of bargaining autonomy of workplace representatives, the more easily rank and file views on issue salience permeate into decisions on issue adoption.

An almost exclusive concentration by trade unions on matters confined to the immediate employment context is a feature noted in a great deal of literature (e.g. Hyman and Brough 1975, Scase 1974, Mann 1977). In addition, prior empirical studies demonstrate that activists are frequently far more favourably disposed than the rank and file to the adoption of issues beyond the workplace (Fosh 1981, Batstone et al. 1977, Nicholson, Ursell and Blyton 1980). The findings of this study are broadly in accord with this prior evidence. This study also provides some further insights with respect to two branches in which opinions of the outside trade union can be seen to have had strong effects on activist focus. In Gas very unfavourable opinions of the outside

trade union prompted a highly internal focus by activists, whilst for Electricity activists had favourable opinions and were far more externally focused.

In prior work there is, however, a shortage of evidence which explains why activists, who are generally more externally focused than the rank and file, manage in some circumstances to adopt external issues, and in others not. For the situations covered in this study it is possible to postulate tentative explanations.

Relative deprivation studies indicate that comparisons with other workers will tend to be made to the most proximate situation (Runciman 1966, Gartrell 1982). When management set the structural boundaries of the bargaining unit they play a part (perhaps unwittingly) in establishing horizons of worker comparison (Brown and Sisson 1975). This could well have been a factor contributing to the focus in issues adopted.

In the two nationalised industry branches there was a great deal of management initiated change; largely at workgroup/departmental levels. Comparisons by the rank and file were mainly between their current situation and the new one proposed by management. Both branches had a degree of steward autonomy where groups of members had their own bargainer to pursue their own issues. Moreover the rank and file could readily pressurise activists to give these issues priority. For their part, activists in these branches largely saw their roles in terms of opposing management which

would give some predisposition to temporarily abandon their more external focus.

With local authorities, almost the reverse position existed. Management were relatively inactive in initiating any changes and the structural definition of the bargaining unit was the whole employing establishment. Reference groups for both activists and the rank and file were therefore much more likely to be other local authorities; a factor which took focus somewhat beyond the boundaries of the immediate employer. Moreover, branch decision making took place in forums to which the rank and file did not normally have direct access.

There was however a difference between the two local authority branches. In Local Authority branch 2, a single prominent issue, initiated by management and highly salient to the rank and file, produced a situation in which internal comparisons came to dominate. Activists in the other branch found an externally focused issue with which the rank and file had some sympathy and gave the signal that with care, others could be adopted for pursuit.

In summary this study contributes by:-

1. Affirming the results of prior empirical studies that activists are more favourably disposed to externally focused issues than non-activist trade union members.

- ii. Providing some evidence that the more favourable are activist opinions of the outside trade union the more favourably disposed are activists to the adoption of external issues.
- iii. Providing some evidence that decentralisation of bargaining authority to the workplace allows the emphasis of activists to be directed towards domestic issues.

Initiation of Issues

As illustrated in figure 14.1 the major conclusions with respect to factors influencing branch initiation of issues were:-

Conclusion 8

The lower the bargaining autonomy of workplace representatives, the less they endorse an aggressive approach to job regulation and oppositional roles for themselves.

Moreover the lower the degree of activist endorsements of aggression and oppositional roles, the higher the level of branch initiation of issues.

Conclusion 9

The higher the quality of relationships between activists and management as reflected in industrial relations climate the higher the level of branch initiation of issues.

Conclusion 10

The more effective the processes of sensing and informing rank and file opinion and importing these opinions into intra-organisational processes of bargaining and decision making, the greater the branch's capability to initiate issues.

Conclusion 11

The more externally focused the branch in issue adoption, the higher its initiation of issues.

To a large extent prior empirical work has concentrated on the volume of workload of domestic trade union organisations, not the trade union as a source of initiated issues. Thus there is little direct evidence in the area of these conclusions. Nevertheless there are a number of discrete studies to which these conclusions can be related.

With respect to activist attitudes, a small scale study of shop stewards by Dalton and Todor concluded that needs for dominance found some satisfaction in raising grievances with management and then handling them informally i.e. outside formal grievance procedures. Moreover the need for dominance was to some extent driven by needs for achievement and autonomy (Dalton and Todor 1979).

In the branches that initiated least in this study (nationalised industries) stewards had, and highly valued, autonomy in

bargaining. In addition an aggressive approach to job regulation was strongly endorsed by activists in both these branches. Aggressiveness and dominance have strong psychological connections (e.g. McGuire 1969b, Argyle 19678, Carmett et al. 1965). As noted in the previous chapter, in these two branches, stewards almost certainly initiated and handled a number of issues independently in their constituencies. These issues remained unregistered at branch level. Conversely in local authorities, workplace representatives neither had nor valued autonomy, nor did they endorse an aggressive approach to job regulation. Here activists brought issues to branch negotiators for pursuit. Patterns of action arising out of attitudes were therefore commensurate with predictions that could be made from Dalton and Todor's findings.

These explanations are only part of the story. Reference can be made to what was said earlier in the chapter with respect to industrial relations climate as a trade union resource. It is noticeable that the most initiating branch was the one with a climate conducive to activists feeling that they could initiate. Whilst there is no prior empirical evidence which demonstrates a direct link between climate and trade union initiation, at a conceptual level at least, the idea has found some support (Derber et al. 1960, Purcell 1979, Martin 1974, Martin 1980).

With respect to the effectiveness of processes for sensing and informing rank and file opinion and the subsequent effect on tendency to initiate, there is a weak level of support for the

findings here from a study comparing American locals (Miller, Zeller and Miller 1965). These authors found that all five locals adopted patterns of action which were reactive and grievance centred. They identified this with the failure of union leaders to seek to influence their members and involve them in decisions on issue adoption. This has some parallels with the results of the present study. The most initiating branch (Local Authority 1) took great pains to consult and inform its membership. However, since the Gas branch also took similar steps with respect to its members and this branch was much more reactive, it cannot be concluded that the measures did more than give a capability to initiate i.e. the process told branch activists what issues the rank and file wished to see initiated. Activist attitudes to aggression/opposition and industrial relations climates probably had far stronger effects on actual initiation levels.

Finally, from the previous section (Focus in Issues) it could be expected that the local authority branches would initiate to bring their own gains up to the level of other local authorities. Indeed both local authority branches did initiate more than the branches in nationalised industries.

In summary this study makes a contribution by demonstrating:-

1. That low initiation of issues at branch level was in part attributable to bargaining autonomy and a concomitant set of attitudes to issue pursuit in shop stewards. Autonomy facilitated the informal raising and handling of issues

at constituency level and attitudes promoted these patterns of action. Conversely, higher levels of branch initiation were found where issue pursuit was essentially a branch matter.

- ii. That industrial relations climate is an important resource promoting feelings of freedom to initiate by trade unions.
- iii. That the effectiveness of processes for sensing and informing branch memberships give a capability to initiate issues.
- iv. That external focus is linked to higher levels of issue initiation.

Intensity in Action

As illustrated in figure 14.1 the major conclusions with respect to factors affecting intensity of action were:

Conclusion 12

The higher was activist endorsement of an aggressive approach to job regulation and oppositional roles for themselves, the greater the tendency for the branch to show intense action in issue pursuit.

Conclusion 13

The higher the level of rank and file endorsement of collectivism and aggression, the higher the potential for branch intensity in action. However, the more

effective were branch processes of sensing rank and file viewpoints for incorporation into decisions the lower the potential for intense action. Furthermore, the greater was activist perceived need for rank and file involvement in decision making the more likely were these processes to be effective.

Conclusion 14

The higher the quality of relationships between activists and management as reflected in industrial relations climate, the lower the tendency for the branch to be intense in action. As a corollary, the lower the formal restriction of branch job regulation role by collective bargaining structures and agreements, the more likely an industrial relations climate which reflected a high quality of relationships between activists and management.

Conclusion 15

The higher the level of initiation of issues by the branch, the lower the tendency for it to be intense in action.

At a general level, it can be noted that the two most intense branches were, compared to the remaining two, more generally intense across most issues. This gives a weak measure of support to a prior empirical finding that the additive hypothesis of industrial conflict probably has most validity; a hypothesis which

implicitly links the occurrence of conflict with industrial relations climate (Kelly and Nicholson 1980).

In regard to activist attitudes, there is some general support for the findings here in prior work reflected in Routh's note that lay activists rather than outside full-time officials are the spur to action (Routh 1966, p 201). More specifically the conclusions here are supported by empirical findings which note that market dissatisfactions (e.g. dissatisfaction with pay, security and prospects) are strong antecedants to internal grievance raising behaviour (Blyton, Nicholson and Ursell 1981, Schatt 1982). In the most intense branches studied here, activists were dissatisfied and had continual opportunities to work this out, not by raising grievances for themselves, but by leading opposition to a fairly large number of management initiated changes.

The more detailed results of branch processes of intra-organisational bargaining and decision making amongst activists support Shirom's finding that attitudinal militancy leads to behavioural militancy (Shirom 1977). At a somewhat broader level, the conclusions are also supported by empirical work which demonstrates a link between bargaining autonomy of shop stewards and their capability to mobilise the rank and file (Batstone et al. 1977).

With respect to non-activists the effects of differences in attitudes between nationalised industry branches (where

collectivism and aggression were more highly endorsed) and local authority branches (where endorsement was lower) also receives some support from earlier work. In nationalised industry branches, the rank and file were subject to a high degree of management initiated change that might pose a threat to their work related ambitions. Their willingness to embrace collective aggression is in accordance with the notion that dissatisfaction only represents a potential for collective action (Gurr 1970). Not only is it necessary to be able to attribute blame for the predicament to management (Nelson and Grams 1978) but in addition the trade union must be perceived as being able to remedy the situation (Bowen 1976, Bowen and Shaw 1972, Bowen, Elsy and Shaw 1979).

Some support for the conclusion that cognizance of the rank and file view in decision making has an effect on intensity in action, comes from the distinction drawn between Batstone and his colleagues between populist and leader stewards (Batstone et al. 1977). In the nationalised industry branches where intensity of action was generally higher, the most intense branch was the one in which stewards displayed more of a tendency towards Batstone's leader characteristics. In the local authority branches where intensity was lowest, workplace representatives were strongly populist.

For reasons given above there is no specific support from the literature for the conclusion on the effects of industrial relations climate. However, this study does provide some

empirical evidence to support Dubin's hitherto untested assertion regarding the link between restriction of job regulation role, climate, and militancy i.e. the greater the number of issues over which management is prepared to bargain, the less likely is militant action (Dubin 1973).

Finally, the conclusion that initiation and intensity were inversely related, with intensity more likely in defensive situations, also receives some support in prior work. To some extent this is implicit in Dubin's assertion and finds further support in a study of rising militancy amongst teachers (Roy 1964) and an investigation of car workers (Beynon 1973).

In summary this investigation makes a contribution as follows:

- i. It has provided confirmatory evidence that intensity of action in pursuit of issues of job regulation was influenced strongly by attitudes of workplace representatives.
- ii. It has shown that non-activists vary in their endorsement for collective action; thus import of rank and file views into decision making by populist workplace representatives could affect intensity.
- iii. It has provided tentative evidence of an inverse relationship between intensity and initiation of issues arising in industrial relations climate.

Representativeness

As illustrated in figure 14.1 the major conclusions with respect to factors influencing rank and file perceptions of representativeness were:

Conclusion 16

The more favourable the rank and file opinions of the branch and its activists, the greater the tendency for the branch action to be regarded as representative of their interests.

Conclusion 17

The more comprehensive the branch provisions to inform and sense non-activist viewpoints, the more favourable the rank and file opinion of the branch and its activists.

Conclusion 18

The higher the perceived need by activists for rank and file involvement in decision making, the higher the tendency for the existence of comprehensive provisions to sense and inform non-activists.

Conclusion 19

The greater the willingness of the rank and file to participate in decision making on all issues, the greater the tendency for non-activists to have high opinions of the branch and its activists.

At a general level these conclusions are supported by prior empirical work which demonstrates a strong connection between rank and file satisfaction with trade union and perceived influence over decisions (i.e. Rosen and Rosen 1955, Miller et al. 1965, Glick et al. 1977). Similarly, a link between participation of the rank and file and perceived influence is supported by the same work. More important however, the results shed new light on mechanisms of participation and influence.

The majority of prior work linking participation and influence has largely used measures of highly visible direct participation; usually attendance at open meetings (i.e. Anderson 1977). Other methods of participating have received scant attention.

Participation can (at least theoretically) cover a whole range of behaviours ranging from tacit assent to active involvement (Nicholson 1978). Prior work, which is confirmed by the results of this study, has demonstrated that there may be little desire for direct participation unless the issue is perceived as highly important (Spinrad 1960, Perline and Lorenz 1970, Harrison 1979, and Anderson 1979).

Perhaps more important, there are grounds for reasoning that in British trade unions, the opportunities for direct participation are comparatively rare. In the private sector where branches are less frequently employer based, decisions are often taken by shop steward committees (Daniel and Millward 1983). In the public

sector where branches are usually employer based, decision making is largely by branch executive committees (Nalco 1976, Drake et al. 1982). Opportunities to attend open forums such as branch meetings can be infrequent.

This however, is not to infer that the rank and file do not wish to influence decisions. Indeed attention has been drawn to the fact that they do and that attendance at meetings is not their only method of exerting control (Tannenbaum 1956). The subject of indirect participation is a crucial one and there has been some acknowledgement, at least at the theoretical level, of its importance. For example Kahn and Tannenbaum considered the essence of involvement to be the link between stewards and members (Kahn and Tannenbaum 1957); a theme which has emerged again in more recent work (Nicholson et al. 1981, Schuller and Robertson 1983).

It can be noted that in this study, the branches considered most representative by their members were those where activists attitudes strongly predisposed them to take pains to involve the rank and file in decisions via indirect participatory methods. In a sense they refused to allow the rank and file to avoid participating. In so doing they also avoided what has been called bureaucratic elitence in their decisions (Ursell et al. 1981). In the most representative branch there were signs that this continual involvement of the rank and file may have promoted in them (the non-activists) an increased desire for involvement; a

feature which itself has some parallel in prior findings (Anderson 1979).

In summary this study adds to the body of knowledge by:-

- i. Supplementing information from prior studies which demonstrates that, for the majority of rank and file trade union members, the desire for direct participation in decision making is conditional on the perceived importance of issues.
- ii. Demonstrating that irrespective of their conditional desire to directly participate, rank and file members evaluate their trade unions according to their perceived opportunity to influence decisions over a wide range of issues.
- iii. Demonstrating that in situations where the opportunity for direct involvement of the rank and file in decision making processes is infrequent, branches are judged as more or less representative by their members according to the extent to which provision is made for involvement by indirect methods.

GENERALISATIONS FROM FINDINGS

The study was confined to medium sized white collar branches in nationalised industry and local authority situations in the public sector. In strict terms all findings need to be restricted in application to similar settings. However, it can be argued that the findings have wider applicability.

The public sector is an area in which considerable numbers of people are employed; many of them in white collar work. Evidence presented in chapter one demonstrates that in terms of the size of branches and their employer based nature, the situations investigated here are fairly typical of the white collar public sector. Since blue-collar trade unionism in the public sector follows parallel patterns of organisation, some degree of generalisation to this situation is also a possibility.

The study covered both non-market and market segments of the public sector and distinct differences were found between the two. Certain findings could, with care, be extrapolated to the white collar situation in the private sector. Similar factors influencing approaches to job regulation are all likely to be present and there is evidence to suggest that the crucial factor of management ideology is similar in both the public and private sectors (Poole et al. 1982).

Some caution is however necessary in making generalisations to the private sector situation. Multi-unionism is far more common and trade union densities are generally much lower. These are probably factors of considerable importance which will be discussed in the next section; areas for future research.

AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Needs for further research arise from two main sources. First the design of the study itself which was limited to four branches.

Secondly a number of its findings have highlighted areas in which further work could make a potentially valuable contribution to the body of knowledge.

In the first category, limited resources necessitated confining the study to branches of medium size in situations where there was very high trade union density and no other trade unions with whom representational rights were shared. To improve the degree of generalisability, replication of the methodology in situations selected to investigate the effect of these variables is needed.

A further limitation of the research design is that it largely represents a picture frozen in time. An attempt to overcome this was made by including patterns of branch action across an eighteen month period. The utility of this longitudinal data was, however, limited by the data collection method which relied to a large extent on actor perceptions of events. Since patterns of action can change quite radically over even a short time span, a longitudinal study which took account of the variables could have value in portraying their relative effects on approaches to job regulation.

Several further areas for research arise from the conclusions of this study. A major finding has been that industrial relations climate has a strong effect, either directly or indirectly, on all dimensions of approach to job regulation. Whilst climate

probably manifests itself as a set of interpersonal or intergroup relationships, it has been tentatively concluded that it could have some structural antecedents. The explanations given are limited to possible influences of collective bargaining structures and the framework of agreements. These are just some of the potential factors. A pressing need is to know far more about industrial relations climate, its antecedents and effects. This is important because not only would it enrich the explanatory potential of much future research, it could also provide information of vital concern to the industrial relations practitioner.

A useful start to work in this area has been made by Purcell whose typology of climate has been used in this investigation (Purcell 1979). Nevertheless, it is possible that the concept could be further refined to take in dimensions other than trust and formality. Nicholson for example, has demonstrated that a difference between issues climate and interpersonal climate can sensibly be made (Nicholson 1979).

To investigate the antecedents of climate would need a fairly wide study. This would have to include organisations in different market circumstances as well as those subject to differing degrees of technological change and subject to a variety of industrial relations agreements.

A second area identified by the results is the effects of workplace trade union structures on some of the dimensions of approach to job regulation. A tentative conclusion of the study is that centralisation or decentralisation of negotiating authority shapes intensity of action and initiation of issues. This also suggests the need for a fairly wide cross sectional study in which a number of workplace organisations are investigated to give a range in degrees of decentralisation of bargaining authority.

A final area for further research arising from the results is that of the relationship between participation of the rank and file and perceived representativeness and goal attainment. This study has related participation to representativeness but has made no attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the branches investigated in terms of goal attainment. However, there are strong arguments that goal attainment is acutely dependent on the effectiveness of representative systems (e.g. Child et al. 1976). Further work is needed to identify the extent to which different forms of participation are related to rank and file support and attainment of goals. An investigation of this topic need not be all embracing in scope and could well be covered by a number of small case studies.

IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS FOR MANAGERMENTS AND TRADE UNIONS

For Managements

A pressing need is to examine, in the light of organisational circumstances, the relevance of collective bargaining structures

and agreements. These, as the study demonstrates, can strongly influence trade union action and the climate of industrial relations.

A collective bargaining structure acknowledging a role for the domestic trade union in job regulation may well encourage it to initiate more issues. However, on the basis of the findings here, it also avoids some of the drawbacks of fragmented bargaining and the likelihood of intense action.

A structure formally denying a job regulation role to the domestic trade union has a number of pitfalls and can become largely irrelevant where management initiated change is prevalent at departmental and workgroup levels. Trade unions have to serve their members on these as well as wider issues. An inevitable consequence may be that to protect their members, workplace representatives develop bargaining competences and a degree of autonomy which lies outside the formal procedures of organisational industrial relations.

How management deals with an increased level of workplace activism can itself have repercussions. Workplace activism probably increases the trade union consciousness and cohesion of the rank and file. Where management are continually initiating change, this cohesion can bring with it an element of defensiveness and the capability to mobilise members for intense action. If the legitimacy of workplace activism is denied by refusing to engage in

bargaining, climates can become inconducive to resolution of differences and intense action become inevitable.

To acknowledge the legitimacy of workplace bargaining brings its own attendant problems. A degree of informality and rule-breaking may well become inevitable and in a sense management have legitimised the challenge to their own authority.

For Trade Unions

For trade unions the major implications are at two levels; that of the outside trade union and that of the domestic organisation.

The outside trade union is the second party (with management) to bargain which, in circumstances of organisational change, can become highly irrelevant. Moreover there can be vested interests in maintaining the sovereignty of higher level decisions. In these circumstances it is possible that there could at worst be attempts to deny the role of domestic organisations or attempts to use steward systems merely for top-down implementation of higher level policies. A foreseeable implication, particularly where autonomy at the workplace has become highly valued, is a degree of divorce from the outside trade union; and the paying of lip service to its policies.

A second implication for the outside trade union is that it runs risks if it fails to give to domestic trade union organisations the external support to which they feel constitutionally entitled.

As one branch in the study has demonstrated, this can lead to rather extreme forms of independence which can be almost impossible to counteract. To quote:

"There is little a union can do to stop a self-reliant workplace organisation settling for itself, without reference to anyone else besides the plant management, those items of business which are left for decision in the plant. So long as the decision suits the workers and managers in the plant, full-time officers, district committees and national headquarters usually have little choice but to accept it".

(Boraston et al. 1975, p 195)

This poses a problem because not all issues are workplace or branch issues. Inevitably, some require an initiative and action on a wider front, in which unity is vital. Avoiding alienation of domestic organisations is, therefore, crucial.

Fostering cohesion between different parts of the union can be almost as important as avoiding alienation. This raises the third implication for the outside trade union; that of finding relevant issues which transcend domestic situations as a means of promoting unity. Here it can be noted that none of the branches in this study embraced more than a small fraction of the externally focused issues promoted by the outside trade union. In most cases these issues were considered largely irrelevant. Adoption when it happened was either a facade or took an extremely passive form.

Implications for domestic level trade unions are somewhat more pragmatic. Many of these implications have similarities to those given above for management and will not be elaborated. An

important point however, can be made with respect to shop steward systems. In some trade unions where shop steward systems have hitherto been the exception, it has become fashionable to move in the direction of this form of organisation. The trade union which has been the subject of this study is an example.

It may be impossible (and undesirable) to maintain a system of centralised branch based negotiation in situations where considerable management initiated change occurs at workplace level. However, shop steward systems are not a panacea. This study indicates that where organisational circumstances are appropriate, a centralised branch based negotiating system may well have climatic benefits that outweigh any advantages of autonomous workplace bargaining.

A second point can be made with respect to defensive trade unionism. This might well increase the capability for intense action in defense of frontiers of control, but can also lower the capacity to make further advances to benefit the membership. To quote:

"Local unions which take the role of providing insurance on the job may expect inevitably to have problems in stimulating solidarity and group feeling. In a very real sense, local unions which take this role lose the quality of groups or organisations and become instead collections of individuals."

(Miller et al. 1965, P 115)

A related implication concerns participation of the rank and file in decision making. This study demonstrates that the fundamental

dimension along which members judge their branches is probably the extent to which are kept informed and given an opportunity to influence decisions. Nonetheless the willingness of the rank and file to participate directly is contingent on the issue itself. The channel of indirect participation via stewards or workplace representatives is one that needs to be developed and exploited to the fullest extent.

Finally, attention is drawn to the notion that industrial relations climate can be a powerful trade union resource. There can, of course, be no single appropriate set of steps towards creation of a climate conducive to resolution of differences. To a large extent it will depend upon the willingness of the parties concerned. However the benefits of a climate where differences can be worked out makes it a desirable goal.

POSTSCRIPT: RESULTS FEEDBACK AND ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN BRANCHES

An agreement with each branch was that on completion of fieldwork and analysis, findings with respect to that branch would be made available. In all cases this took the form of a presentation of results to the branch executive committee. In two cases this resulted in decisions to make use of the information for programmes of branch development. Moreover the author's aid was requested for these programmes; a request that was met with a positive response but with the caveat that any aid would be non-prescriptive and confined to helping branches identify their own development needs.

One of these interventions has progressed some distance and the other is in its early stages. The more advanced programme will be described.

After the first general level presentation, two weekend seminars for all interested members of the executive committee were arranged; programmes for which were drawn-up in conjunction with the branch education secretary. The first seminar consisted of a number of sessions in which the results of the study were explored in greater depth and data from other branches (with their anonymity protected) was used for comparison. The whole process was keyed to enabling participants to identify what they felt were the strengths and weaknesses of their branch.

Following this, the second seminar was used to identify behavioural goals for the branch; both short and long term. The goals initially were inevitably couched in general terms e.g. improve attendance at open meetings. Some effort was devoted to encouraging participants to set time horizons and quantifiable limits to goals e.g. within two years achieve an attendance of 50% of branch at open general meetings. Because of the somewhat time consuming nature of the process, the overall aim of the seminar of developing an action plan was not completed. However small working parties were formed, each charged with producing a full report and action plan for a definite area in which the branch saw a need for improvement of its performance. The areas were:-

- Relationships with employer and negotiating structures

- Communications with and involvement of the wider branch membership.

- Relations with the outside and wider trade unions.

These separate findings and recommendations were reported back at a shorter (one-day) seminar. Since they contained many areas of overlap, they were integrated into an overall plan together with appointment of a steering committee composed of executive members to oversee its implementation. In line with the philosophy of the intervention, the author's active involvement rapidly decreased from this point onwards. It has since then been confined to providing occasional tutoring resources for skills training on internal courses run by the branch.

LITERATURE REFERENCES

- Abelson R.P. (1972) "Are Attitudes Necessary?", in King B.T. and McGinnies E. (Eds). Attitudes, Conflict and Social Change, New York: Academic Press.
- Adams R.J. (1975) "The Recognition of White Collar Worker Unions". British Journal of Industrial Relations 13(1) pp 102-6.
- Aiken M. and Hage I. (1966) "Organisational Alienation: A Comparative Analysis", American Sociological Review. V31 pp 497-507.
- Ajzen I. and Fishbein M. (1977) "Attitude-Behaviour Relations: A Theoretical Analysis and Review of Empirical Research", Psychological Bulletin V84, pp 888-918.
- Allen V.L. (1964) "Trade Unions in Contemporary Capitalism" in The Socialist Register. Miliband R. and Saville J. (Eds) London: Merlin Press.
- Allen V.L. (1971) "The Sociology of Industrial Relations" London: Longman.
- Allen P.T. and Stephenson G.M. (1983) "Inter-Group Understanding and Size of Organisation" British Journal of Industrial Relations 21(3) pp 312-29.
- Allport G.W (1935) "Attitudes", in Murchisen C. (Ed.) Handbook of Social Psychology. Worcester Mass: Clark University Press.
- Anderson N.H. (1961) "Scales and Statistics: Parametric and Non-Parametric." Psychological Bulletin V58, pp 305-15.
- Anderson J.C. (1977) "A Comparative Analysis of Local Union Democracy", Industrial Relations 17(4) pp 278-293.
- Anderson J.C. (1979a) "Local Union Participation: A Re-examination", Industrial Relations 18(1) pp 18-31.

- Anderson J.C. (1979b) "Bargaining Outcomes: An Industrial Relations System Approach", *Industrial Relations* 18(2) pp 127-43.
- Annable J.E. (1974) "A Theory of Wage Determination in Public Employment", *Quarterly Review of Economics and Business* 14(4) pp 43-58.
- Anthony P. and Crichton A. (1969) "Industrial Relations and the Personnel Specialist", London: Batsford.
- Antos J.R. (1983) "Union Effects on White Collar Compensation", *Industrial and Labour Relations Review* 36(3) pp 461-79.
- Argyle M. (1967) "The Psychology of Interpersonal Behaviour", Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Bailey K.D. (1978) "Methods of Social Research", New York Free Press.
- Bain G.S. and Clegg H.A. (1974) "A Strategy for Industrial Relations Research in Great Britain", *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 12(2), pp 91-113
- Bain G.S (1970) "The Growth of White Collar Unionism", Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Bain G.S. and Elsheikh F. (1976) "Union Growth and Business Cycle", Oxford: Blackwell 1976.
- Bain G.S. and Price R. (1972a) "Who Is a White Collar Worker", *British Journal of Industrial Relations*. 10(3) pp 325-39
- Bain G.S. and Price R. (1972b) "Union Growth and Employment Trends in the United Kingdom 1964-1970", *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 10(3) pp 366-81
- Bain G.S. and Price R. (1980) "Profiles of Union Growth: A Comparative Statistical Portrait of Eight Countries", Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bain G.S., Coates D. and Ellis V. (1973) "Social Stratification and Trade Unionism", London: Heinemann.
- Baker B.O. (1966) "Weak Measurement vs Strong Statistics." *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, V26 pp 291-309.

- Baker M. and Robeson M.A. (1981) "Trade Union Reactions to Women Workers and their Concerns", Canadian Journal of Sociology 6(1) pp 19-31.
- Bales R.F. (1958) "Task Roles and Social Roles in Problem Solving Groups" in Maccoby E.E. Newcomb M., and Murlley E.L. (Eds.) Readings in Social Psychology, 3rd Edition, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Banks A.J. (1978) "Some Comments on Rosemary Crompton's Approach to the Study of White Collar Unionism", Sociology V12 pp 141-2.
- Bannister D. and Fransella F. (1971) "Inquiring Man". Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Bannister D. and Mair J.M. (1968) "The Evaluation of Personal Constructs" London: Academic Press.
- Bamber G. (1976) "Trade Unions for Managers" Personnel Review 5(4) pp 36-41.
- Bass B.N. and Mitchell C.V. (1976) "Influences on the Felt Need for Collective Bargaining by Business and Science Professionals", Journal of Applied Psychology 61(6) pp 770-73.
- Bate S.P. and Murphy A.J. (1981) "Can Joint Consultation become Employee Participation", Journal of Management Studies 18(4) pp 389-409.
- Batstone E, Boraston I. and Frenkel S. (1977) "Shop Stewards in Action: The Organisation of Workplace Conflict and Accommodation". Blackwell: Oxford.
- Beaumont P.B. (1980) "The Safety Representative Function: Consultation or Negotiation", Personnel Review 9(2) pp 17-20.
- Beaumont P.B. (1981) "The Nature of the Relationship between Safety Representatives and their Workforce Constituencies", Industrial Relations Journal 12(2) pp 53-60.
- Bednar D.A. and Currington W.P. (1983) "Interaction Analysis: A tool for Understanding Negotiations", Industrial and Labour Relations Review V36(3) pp 389-401.

- Bellaby P. and Oribabor P. (1977) "The Growth of Trade Union Consciousness Among General Hospital Nurses viewed as a Response to Proletarianisation", Sociological Review 25(4) pp 801-21.
- Bell J.D.M. (1975) "The Development of Industrial Relations in Nationalised Industries in Postwar Britain". British Journal of Industrial Relations 13(1) pp 1-13.
- Beynon H. (1973) "Working for Ford". Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Beynon H. and Blackburn R.M. (1972) "Perceptions of Work", Cambridge University Press.
- Biasatti L.L. and Martin J.E. (1979) "A Measure of the Quality of Union-Management Relationships", Journal of Applied Psychology 64(4) pp 387-90.
- Bieri J. (1955) "Complexity - Simplicity and Predictive Behaviour." Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology V51, pp 263-68.
- Bieri J., Atkinson A.L., Briars S., Leaman R.L., Miller H. and Tripondi T. 1966. "Clinical and Social Judgement: the Discrimination of Behavioural Information", New York: Wiley.
- Blackburn R.M. (1967) "Union Character and Social Class", London: Batsford.
- Blackburn R.M. and Mann M. (1979) "The Working Class in the Labour Market", London: Macmillan.
- Blackburn R.M. and Prandy K. (1965) "White Collar Unionisation: A Conceptual Framework". British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 16 pp 111-122.
- Blalock H.M. (1964) "Causal Inference in Non-Experimental Research", Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Blank R.M. (1985) "An Analysis of Workers Choice Between Employment in the Public and Private Sectors". Industrial and Labour Relations Review V 38(2) pp 211-24
- Blauner R. (1964) "Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker and Industry", Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Blum A.A. (1971) "White Collar Workers", New York: Random House.
- Blumberg H.H., Desoto C.B. and Kueth J.L. (1969) "Evaluating Rating Scale Formats", Personnel Psychology, V 19, pp 243-59.
- Blyton P. (1981a) "The Influence of Job Grade Differences in White Collar Shop Steward Committees", Industrial Relations Journal 12(3) pp 72-74.
- Blyton P. (1981b) "Managers as Union Activists", Employee Relations 3(4) pp 2 and 3.
- Blyton P., Nicholson N. and Ursell G. (1981) "Job Status and White Collar Members Union Activity", Journal of Occupational Psychology 54(1) pp 33-45.
- Blyton P. and Ursell G. (1982) "Vertical Recruitment in White Collar Trade Unions: Some Causes and Consequences", British Journal of Industrial Relations 20(2) pp 186-94.
- Boraston I., Clegg H. and Rimmer M. (1975) "Workplace and Union": A Study of Local Relationships in Fourteen Trade Unions", London: Heinemann.
- Bowen P. (1976) "Social Control in Industrial Organizations", London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Bowen P. and Shaw M. (1972) "Patterns of White Collar Unionisation in the Steel Industry", Industrial Relations Journal 3(2) pp 8-34.
- Bowen P., Elsy V. and Shaw M. (1979) "The Attachment of White Collar Workers to Trade Unions", Personnel Review 3(3) pp 22-32.
- Boyle R.P. 1970 "Path Analysis and Ordinal Data." American Journal of Sociology V75 pp 461-80.
- Britt D. and Galle O.R. (1972) "Industrial Conflict and Unionisation", American Sociological Review V37, Feb. pp 46-57.
- Britt D. and Galle O.R. (1974) "Structural Antecedants of the Shape of Strikes: A Comparative Analysis", American Sociological Review V39, Oct. pp 642-51.

- Brosnan P. (1973) "Predicting Worker Preferences", British Journal of Industrial Relations 11(2) pp 291-6
- Brown R. (1973) "Sources of Objectives in Work and Employment", in Man and Organisation, Child J. (Ed.) London: Allen and Unwin pp 17-38.
- Brown W.A. (1972) "A Consideration of Custom and Practice", British Journal of Industrial Relations 10(1)pp 42-61.
- Brown W., Ebsworth R. and Terry M. (1978) "Factors Shaping Shop Steward Organisation in Britain", British Journal of Industrial Relations 16(2) pp 139-58
- Brown W. and Sisson K. (1975) "The Use of Comparisons in Workplace Wage Determination", British Journal of Industrial Relations 13(1) pp 23-51.
- Budd R. and Spencer C. (1984) "Latitude of Rejection, Centrality and Certainty: Variables Affecting the Relationship Between Attitudes, Norms and Behavioural Intentions." British Journal of Social Psychology V23 pp 1-8.
- Burke C.J. (1953) "Additive Scales and Statistics" Psychological Bulletin V60 pp 330-38
- Burton J.F. (1972) "Local Government Bargaining and Management Structure," Industrial Relations 11(2) pp 123-39.
- Campbell D.T. (1963) "Social Attitudes and Other Acquired Behavioural Dispositions" in Koch S. (ed) Psychology: A Study of Science Vol 6. New York; McGraw Hill.
- Cangemi J.P., Clark L. and Marrayman M.E. (1976) "Differences Between Pro-Union and Pro-Company Employees" Personnel Journal, September pp 451-53.
- Carlsson R.J. and Robinson J.W. (1969) "Towards a Public Employment Wage Theory", Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Jan. pp 243-48.
- Carmett D.W., Miles C.G., and Cervin V.B. (1965) "Persuaviness and Persuasability as Related to Intelligence and Extraversion", British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychiatry V4, pp 1-7

- Carrell M.R. and
Dittrich J.E. (1976) "Employee Perceptions of Fair Treatment", Personnel Journal Oct. pp 523-24.
- Carter R. (1979) "Class, Militancy and Union Character: A Study of the Association of Scientific Technical and Managerial Staffs". Sociological Review. V27, pp 297-316.
- Champion D.J. (1970) "Basic Statistics for Social Research" Scranton Pa.: Chandler
- Chell E. (1977) "Analysing Committee Meetings: A New Approach. Industrial Relations Journal V8(3) pp 59-69
- Chester T.E. (1954) "Industrial Conflicts in British Nationalised Industries" in Kornhauser A., Dubin R. and Ross A.M. (Eds), Industrial Conflict, New York: McGraw Hill, pp 454-66.
- Child J., Loveridge R. and Warner M. (1976) "Towards and Organisational Study of Trade Unions", Sociology V7, pp 71-91.
- Childs P (1985) "Work and Career Expectations of Insurance Company Employees and the Impact of Unionisation". Sociology 19(1), pp 125-135.
- Chilton R.J. (1966) "Computer Generated Data and the Statistical Significance of Scalogram Analysis". Sociometry V29, pp 175-81.
- Cicorel A. (1964) "Method and Measurement in Sociology", New York: Free Press
- Clegg H.A. (1979) "The Changing System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain", Oxford: Blackwell.
- Cohen L. and Derrick T. (1970) "Occupational Values and Stereotypes in a Group of Engineers", British Journal of Industrial Relations 8(1) pp 100-104
- Cohen H. (1971) "Dimensions of Restriction of Output", Personnel Journal 50(2) pp 938-43.
- Cook F., Clark S., Roberts K. and Semenov E. (1978) "Are White Collar Trade Unionists Different", Sociology of Work and Occupations 5(2) pp 235-245.

- Cook S.W. and Selltitz C. (1964) "A Multiple Indicator Approach to Attitude Measurement". Psychological Bulletin V62, pp 36-55.
- Couch A. and Keniston K. (1960) "Yeasayers and Naysayers: Agreeing Response Sets as a Personality Variable", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology V60 pp 151-74.
- Crompton R. (1976) "Approaches to the Study of White Collar Unionism", Sociology V10, pp 407-26.
- Crompton R. (1979a) "White Collar Unionism: A Reply to Banks", Sociology V13, pp 103-104.
- Crompton R. (1979b) "Trade Unionism and the Insurance Clerk", Sociology V13, pp 403-25.
- Crompton R. (1980) "Class Situation, White Collar Unionisation and the Double Proletarianisation Thesis: A Reply to John Heritage", Sociology V14, pp 449-55.
- Cronbach L.J. (1950) "Further Evidence on Response Sets and Test Design", Educational and Psychological Measurement V10, pp 3-31.
- Cronbach L.J. (1951) "Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests", Psychometrika V16, pp 297-334.
- Cronbach L.J. (1960) "Essentials of Psychological Testing", New York: Harper.
- Cuthbert N.H. and Whitaker A. (1977) "The Rehabilitation of Joint Consultations: A Recent Trend in the Participation Debate", Personnel Review 6(2) pp 31-36.
- Dalton D.R. and Todor W.D. (1979) "Manifest Needs of Stewards: Propensity to File a Grievance". Journal of Applied Psychology 64(1) 654-59.
- Daniel W.W. (1973) "Understanding Employee Behaviour in its Context: Illustrations from Productivity Bargaining" in Man and Organisation, Child J. (Ed.) London: Allen and Unwin 1973, pp 39-62.
- Daniel W.W. and Millward H. (1983) "Workplace Industrial Relations in Britain: The DE/PSI/SSRC Survey". London: Heineman.

- DeFleur M.L. and
Weslie F.R. (1963) "Attitude as a Scientific Concept",
Social Forces, V42, pp 17-31.
- Derber M, Chalmers W.E.
and Stanger R. (1958) "Collective Bargaining and Management
Functions: An Empirical Study",
Journal of Business V31, pp 107-20.
- Derber M., Chalmers W.E.
and Stagner R. (1960) "The Local Union Management
Relationship", Urbana: University of
Illinois Press.
- Deutsch M. (1949) "An Experimental Study of the Effects
of Competition and Cooperation upon
Group Processes". Human Relations
V2, pp 199-231.
- Dickson J. (1981) "The Relation of Direct and Indirect
Participation", Industrial Relations
Journal 11(4), pp 27-35.
- Dohnrenwend B. and
Richardson S. (1963) Directiveness vs Non-directiveness in
Research Interviewing: A Reformulation
of the Problem", Psychological Bulletin
V60, pp 475-85.
- Drake P., Fairbrother P.,
Fryer B. and Murphy J.
(1980) "Which Way Forward?: An Interim Review
of Issues for the Society of Civil and
Public Servants", University of
Warwick.
- Drake P., Fairbrother P.,
Fryer B. and
Stratford G. (1982) "A Programme of Union Democracy: A
Review of the Organisation and
Structure of the Society of Civil
and Public Servants". London: C.P.S.A.
- "Dubin R. (1973) "Attachment to Work and Union
Militancy", Industrial Relations
V12, pp 51-64.
- Duncan O.D. (1966) "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples"
American Journal of Sociology V72,
pp 1-16.
- Dubin R., Champoux J.E.
and Porter L.W. (1975) "Central Life Interests and
Organisational Commitments of Blue
Collar and Clerical Workers",
Administrative Science Quarterly 20(3),
pp 411-21.
- Duffy N.F. (1981) "A Typology of Shop Stewards",
Industrial Relations Journal 12(4),
pp 65-70.

- Dyar D.A. (1977) "Analysis of Negotiating Interaction and Behaviour", *Industrial Relations Journal* V8(4), pp 61-72.
- Dyer L., Lipsky D.B. and Kochan T.A. (1977) "Union Attitudes Towards Management Co-operation", *Industrial Relations* 16(2), pp 163-72.
- Edelstein J.D. (1967) "An Organisational Theory of Trade Union Democracy", *Amercian Sociological Review* V37, pp 19-31.
- Edelstein J.D. and Warner M. (1971) "On Measuring and Explaining Union Democracy: A Reply to Dr. Martin's Critique", *Sociology* V5, pp 398-400.
- Edelstein J.D. and Warner M. (1975) "Comparative Union Democracy: Organisation and Opposition in British and American Unions", London: Allen and Unwin.
- Edelstein J.D. and Warner M. (1977) "Research Areas in National Union Democracy", *Industrial Relations* 16(2), pp 186-98.
- Edelstein J.D., Warner M. and Cook W.F. (1970) "The Pattern of Opposition in British and American Unions", *Sociology* V4, pp 145-63.
- Edwards A.L. (1957) "Techniques of Attitude Scale Construction", New York: Appelson, Century, Crofts.
- Edwards A.L. and Kenney K.F.P. (1946) "A Comparison of Thurstone and Likert Techniques of Attitude Scale Construction", *Journal of Applied Psychology*, V30, pp 72-83.
- Egan A. (1982) "Women in Banking: A Study in Inequality", *Industrial Relations Journal* 13(3), pp 20-31.
- Fairchild H.P. (1964) "A Dictionary of Sociology", Littlefield: Adams.
- Fairhurst D.W. and Bean R. (1976) "Industrial Relations in a British Municipal Passenger Transport Undertaking", *Industrial Relations Journal* 7(2), pp 60-72.
- Farnham D. (1978) "Sixty Years of Whitleyism", *Personnel Management*, July pp 29-32.

- Fazio R.H. and Zanna M.P. (1978) "Direct Experience and Attitude Behaviour Consistency", in Berkowitz L. (Ed.) *Advances in Experimental and Social Psychology*, New York: Academic Press.
- Fishbein M. and Ajzen I. (1974) "Attitudes Towards Objects as Predictors of Single and Multiple Behavioural Criteria", *Psychological Review* V81, pp 59-74.
- Fishbein M. and Ajzen I. (1975) "Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behaviour", Reading Mass., Addison-Wesley.
- Flanders A. (1965) "Industrial Relations: What is Wrong with the System? an Essay on its Theory and Future", London: Faber.
- Flanders A. (1970) "Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations", London: Faber.
- Flanders A. and Fox A. (1969) "The Reform of Collective Bargaining: From Donovan to Durkheim", *British Journal of Industrial Relations* V7, pp 151-180.
- Fosh P. (1981) "The Active Trade Unionists: A Study of Motivation and Participation at Branch Level". Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fox A. (1974) "Man Mismanagement", London: Hutchinson
- Fransella F. and Bannister D. (1967) "A Validation of Repertory Grid Techniques as a Measure of Political Construing", *Acta Psychologica*, V26, pp 97-106.
- Fryer B., Fairclough A.J., and Manson T.B. (1975) "Democracy in Trade Unions", *Personnel Management*, April, pp 20-23.
- Fryer B., Manson T.B. and Fairclough A.J. (1978) "Employment and Trade Unionism in the Public Services: Background Notes to the Struggle Against the Cuts", *Capital and Class*, Spring, pp 70-77.
- Gallie D. (1978) "In Search of the New Working Class: Automation and Social Integration within the Capitalist Enterprise", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Gartrell C.D. (1982) "On the Visibility of Wage Referants", Canadian Journal of Sociology 7(2), pp 117-43.
- Gibson B. L. and Klein S.M. (1970) "Employee Attitudes as a Function of Age and Length of Service: A Reconceptualisation", Academy of Management Journal, V13 1970, pp 411-425
- Giddens A. (1977) "The Class Structure of Advanced Societies", London: Hutchinson & Co.
- Glaser B.G. and Strauss A.L. (1968) "The Discovery of Grounded Theory", London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
- Glenn E.N. and Feldburg R.L. (1977) "Degraded and Deskilled: The Proletarianisation of Clerical Work", Social Problems 25(1), pp 52-64.
- Glick W., Mirvis P. and Harder D. (1977) "Union Satisfaction and Participation", Industrial Relations 16(2), pp 145-51.
- Goldthorpe J.H., Lockwood D., Bechofer F. and Platt J.H. (1968) "The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour", Cambridge University Press.
- Goodman J.F.B., Armstrong E.A.G., Wagner A., Davis J.E. and Wood S.J. (1975) "Rules in Industrial Relations Theory: A Discussion", Industrial Relations Journal, 6(1) pp 14-30.
- Gordon M.E., Philpot J.W. Burt R.E., Thompson C.A., and Spiller W.E. (1980) "Commitment to the Union: Development of a Measure and an Examination of its Correlates", Journal of Applied Psychology 65(4), pp 479-99.
- Gottschalk A.W. (1973) "A Behavioural Analysis of Bargaining" in Warner M. (Ed.), The Sociology of the Workplace, pp 36-81, Woking: Allen and Unwin.
- Greenwald H.W. (1978) "Politics and the New Insecurity: Ideological Changes of Professionals in a Recession", Social Forces, 57(1), pp 103-108.
- Guidford J.P. (1954) "Psychometric Methods", New York: McGraw Hill.
- Guidford J.P. and Fruchter B. (1978) "Fundamental Statistics in Education and Psychology", 6th Edition, New York: McGraw Hill.

- Gurr T.R. (1970) "Why Men Rebel", Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Guttman L. (1944) "A Basis for Scaling Qualitative Data" American Sociological Review, V19, pp 139-50.
- Guttman L. (1950) "The Basis for Scalogram Analysis", in Stouffer S. (Ed.) Measurement and Prediction, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Guttman L. (1968) "A General Non-metric Technique for Finding the Smallest Coordinate Space for a Configuration of Points", Psychometrika V33, pp 469-506.
- Hamner W.C. and Smith F.J. (1978) "Work Attitudes as Predictors of Unionisation Activity", Journal of Applied Psychology 63(4), pp 415-21.
- Hammermesh D.S. (1971) "White Collar Unions, Blue Collar Unions and Wages in Manufacturing", Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Jan. pp 159-70.
- Harrison M. (1979) "Participation of Women in Trade Union Activities: Some Research Findings and Comments", Industrial Relations Journal 10(2), pp 41-55.
- Hawkins K. (1979) "The Institution of Collective Bargaining" Stephenson G.M. and Brotherton C. (Eds), Industrial Relations: A Social Psychological Approach, Chichester: Wiley.
- Hays W.L. (1963) "Statistics for Psychologists", New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Heider F. (1946) "Attitudes and Cognitive Organisations", Journal of Psychology, V21, pp 107-12.
- Heise D.R. (1975) "Causal Analysis", New York: Wiley.
- Hemingway J. (1978) "Conflict and Democracy": Studies in Trade Union Government", Oxford University Press.

- Heritage J. (1980) "Class Situation, White Collar Unionisation and the Double Proletarianisation Thesis: A Comment". *Sociology* V14, pp 283-94.
- Herding R. (1972) "Job Control and Union Structure", Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press.
- Herrick N. (1980) "Work in America: A Comparison of Industrial and Municipal Worker Attitudes", *Employee Relations* 2(2), pp 6-10.
- Hesmondhalgh S. (1978) "Controlling Trade Unionists Time Off" *Personnel Management*, May, pp 26-29.
- Hinrichs J.R. (1969) "Corrolates of Employee Evaluation of Pay Increases", *Journal of Applied Psychology* 53(6), pp 481-89.
- Hill S. (1974) "Norms, Groups and Power: The Sociology of Workplace Industrial Relations". *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 12(2), pp 213-35.
- Hovland C.I. and Sheriff M. (1952) "Judgemental Phenomena and Scales of Attitude Measurement: Item Displacement in Thurstone Scales", *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, V47, pp 822-32.
- Howells J.M. and Brosnan P (1972) "The Ability to Predict Workers Preferences: A Research Note", *Human Relations* 25(3), pp 265-81.
- Howells J.M. and Woodfield A.E. (1970) "The Ability of Managers and Trade Union Officers to Predict Worker Preferences", *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 8(2), pp 237-51.
- Hughes J. (1968) "Trade Union Structure and Government", London: H.M.S.O.
- Hunt J.W. and Saul P.N. (1975) "The Relationship of Age, Tenure and Job Satisfaction in Males and Females", *Academy of Management Journal* 18(4), pp 690-702.
- Hyman R. (1975) "Industrial Relations: A Marxist Introduction", London: Macmillan.

- Hyman R. (1979) "The Politics of Workplace Trade Unionism: Recent Tendencies and Some Problems for Theory", *Capital and Class*, Summer, pp 54-67.
- Hyman R. and Brough I. (1975) "Social Values and Industrial Relations", Oxford: Blackwell.
- Ingham G.K. (1969) "Plant Size: Political Attitudes and Behaviour", *Sociological Review* 17(2), pp 235-49.
- Jenkins C. and Sherman B. (1979) "White Collar Unionism: The Rebellious Salarariat", London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Jones P. (1978) "Incomes Policy and the Public Sector: Ten Years of Turmoil", *Personnel Management*, Feb. pp 38-41.
- Jones P.R. (1981) "Membership of Associations and Free-Riders", *Industrial Relations Journal* 12(b), pp 34-44.
- Kahn R.L. and Cannell C.F. (1957) "The Dynamics of Interviewing: Theory, Technique and Cases", New York: Wiley.
- Kahn R.L. and Tannenbaum A.S. (1957) "Union Leadership and Membership Participation", *Personnel Psychology* 10(3), pp 277-292.
- Kassalow E.M. (1977) "White Collar Unions and the Work Humanisation Movement", *Monthly Labour Review*, May pp 9-13.
- Katz D. (1960) "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes", *Public Opinion Quarterly* V24, pp 163-77.
- Katz D., McClintock C. and Sarnoff I. (1957). "The Measurement of Ego Defence as Related to Attitude Change", *Journal of Personality*, V25, pp 465-74.
- Katz D. and Stotland E. (1959). "A Preliminary Statement to a Theory of Attitudes Structure and Change", in Koch S. (Ed.) *Psychology: A Study of a Science* V3, New York: McGraw Hill, pp 423-75.
- Kelly A. (1984) "In support of the New Working Class Thesis: The Case of the Irish White Collar Worker", *Industrial Relations Journal* 15(1), pp 82-89.

- Kelly G. (1955) "The Psychology of Personal Constructs", V1, London: Routledge.
- Kelly M.P. (1981) "White Collar Proletariat: The Industrial Behaviour of British Civil Servants", London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Kelly J. and Nicholson N (1980) "Strikes and Other Forms of Industrial Action", Industrial Relations Journal 11(5), pp 20-31.
- Kelman M.C. (1974) "Attitudes are Alive and Well and Gainfully Employed in the Sphere of Action: American Psychologist, V21, pp 310-24.
- Kendall M. and Stuart A. (1979) "The Advanced Theory of Statistics: V2, Inference and Relationships", 4th Edition, London: Griffin.
- Kerlinger F. (1969) "Foundations of Behavioural Research", New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Kerr C. and Siegal A. (1954) "The Inter Industry Propensity to Strike in Industrial Conflict", Kornhauser A. Dubin R. and Ross A. (Eds.) New York: McGraw-Hill, Chpt.14.
- Kessler I. (1986) "Shop Stewards in Local Government Revisited", British Journal of Industrial Relations 24(3), pp 419-441.
- Kim J. (1975) "Multivariate Analysis of Ordinal Variables", American Journal of Sociology, V81, pp 261-98.
- Kirsch B.A. and Longerman J.J. (1972) "An Empirical Test of Robert Blauners Ideas on Alienation in Work as Applied to Different Jobs in a White Collar Setting", Sociology and Social Research 56(2), pp 180-94.
- Kissler G.D. (1977) "Grievance Activity and Union Membership: A Study of Government Employees", Journal of Applied Psychology, 62(4), pp 459-62.
- Kleinke C.L. (1984) "Two Models for Conceptualising the Attitude - Behaviour Relationship", Human Relations V37 (4), pp 333-50.

- Knudeson D.D., Pope H. and Irish D. (1967) "Response Differences to Questions on Sexual Standards: An Interview - Questionnaire Comparison", Public Opinion Quarterly, V31, pp 290-97.
- Kochan T.A. (1974) "A Theory of Multilateral Collective Bargaining in City Governments", Industrial and Labour Relations Review 27(4), pp 325-42.
- Kochan T.A. (1975) "Determinants of the Power of Boundary Units in an Interorganisational Bargaining Relation", Administrative Science Quarterly 20(3), pp 434-52.
- Kochan T.A. and Wheeler H.H. (1975) "Municipal Collective Bargaining: A Model and Analysis of Bargaining Outcomes", Industrial and Labour Relations Review 24(4), pp 46-66.
- Koziara K.S. and Peterson D.A. (1981) "The Lack of Female Union Leaders: A Look at Some Reasons", Monthly Labour Review 104(5), pp 30-33.
- Kuhn J.W. (1961) "Bargaining in Grievance Settlement", New York: Columbia University Press.
- Labovitz S. (1967) "Some Observations on Measurement and Statistics. Social Forces, V46, pp 151-60.
- Labovitz S. (1970) "The Assignment of Numbers to Rank Order Categories", American Sociological Review, V35, pp 515-24.
- Landsberger H.A. (1955) "Interaction Process Analysis in the Mediation of Labour-Management Disputes", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, V51(3), pp 552-58.
- Lane R.E. (1969) "Political Thinking and Consciousness", Chicago: Markham.
- Lansbury R. (1975) "Professionalisation and Unionisation Among Management Services Specialists", British Journal of Industrial Relations. 13(2), pp 292-302.
- Lawler E.E. and Levin E. (1968) "Union Officers Perceptions of Members Pay Preferences", Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 24(4), pp 509-17.
- Lemon N. (1973) "Attitudes and Their Measurement", London: Batsford.

- Lewin D. and Feuille P. (1983) "Behavioural Research in Industrial Relations", *Industrial and Labour Relations Review* 36(3), pp 341-60.
- Lewin D. and Peterson R.B. (1982) "A Model for Measuring the Effectiveness of the Grievance Process", *Monthly Labour Review*, 105(4), pp 47-49.
- Likert R. (1932) "A Technique for the Measurement of Attitudes", *Archives of Psychology* V21(1), p 40.
- Lockwood, Baroness (1980) "Women in Industrial Relations", *Manchester Business School Review*, Spring pp 2-4.
- Lockwood D. (1958) "The Black-Coated Worker", London: Allen and Unwin.
- Lockwood D. (1960) "The New Working Class", *Archives of European Sociology* VI, pp 248-59.
- Lockwood D. (1966) "Sources of Variation in Working Class Images of Society", *Sociological Review* V14, pp 249-67.
- London M. and Howat G. (1978) "The Relationship Between Employee Commitment and Conflict Resolution Behaviour", *Journal of Vocational Behaviour*, V13, pp 1-14.
- Long J. (1975a) "Attitudes to Work: Local Authority Personnel Responses", *Local Government Studies* 1(3), pp 13-25.
- Long J. (1975b) "The Impact of Scale on Management Structure and Processes", *Local Government Studies* 1(2), pp 45-59.
- Lovelace J. (1982) "A Mans World", *Local Government Chronicle*, 14th May, p 2.
- Loveridge R. (1972) "Occupational Change and the Development of Interest Groups Among White Collar Workers in the United Kingdom: A Long Term Model", *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 10(3), pp 340-65.
- Low-Beer J.R. (1978) "Protest and Participation: The New Working Class in Italy", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Lukacs G. (1971) "History and Class Consciousness", London: Merlin.
- Maitland I. (1980) "Disorder in the British Workplace: The Limits of Consensus," British Journal of Industrial Relations 18(3), pp 353-64.
- Mallet S. (1975) "The New Working Class", Nottingham, Spokesman Books.
- Mant A. (1977) "The Rise and Fall of the British Manager", London: Macmillan.
- Mann M. (1977) "Consciousness and Action Among the Western Working Class", London: Macmillan.
- Marchington M.P. (1975) "A Path Model of Power Generation", Aston University Working Paper No.36.
- Marchington M. and Armstrong R. (1981a) "Employee Participation: Problems for the Shop Steward", Industrial Relations Journal 12(1), pp 46-61.
- Marchington M. and Armstrong R. (1981b) "A Case for Consultation", Employee Relations 3(1), pp 10-16.
- Marchington M. and Armstrong R. (1983) "Shop Steward Organisation and Joint Consultation", Personnel Review 12(1) pp 24-31.
- Margerison C.J. (1969) "What Do We Mean by Industrial Relations": A Behavioural Science Approach", British Journal of Industrial Relations 7(2), pp 273-86.
- Margerison C.J. and Elliott C.K. (1970) "A Predictive Study in the Development of Teacher Militancy", British Journal of Industrial Relations 18(3), pp 408-17.
- Marsh R. and Pedler M. (1979) "Unionising the White Collar Workers", Employee Relations 1(2), pp 2-6.
- Martin J.E. (1976) "Application of a Model from the Private Sector Labour Relations", Quarterly Review of Economics and Business V16, pp 69-78.

- Martin J.E. (1980) "A Framework for Analysing Public Sector Union-Management Relations: An Exploration with Six Cases", Quarterly Review of Economics and Business 20(1), pp 49-62.
- Martin R. (1965) "Class Identification and Trade Union Behaviour: The Case of Australian White Collar Unions", Journal of Industrial Relations V7, pp 131-48.
- Martin R. (1968) "Union Democracy: An Explanatory Framework", Sociology V2, pp 205-20.
- Mastenbroek W.F.G. (1980) "Negotiating: A Conceptual Model", Group and Organisation Studies 5(3) pp 324-39.
- McGuire W.J. (1969) "The Innate and Physiological Aspects of Attitude", Lindzey G. and Aronson E. (Eds.) Handbook of Social Psychology V3, Reading Mass: Allison Wesley.
- McGuire W.G. (1969) "The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change in Lindzey G. and Aronson E. (Eds.) Handbook of Social Psychology, 2nd Edition, Reading Mass: Allison Wesley.
- McLean R.A. (1979) "Interindustry Differences in Strike Activity", Industrial Relations V18(1) pp 103-109
- McNemar Q. (1969) "Psychological Statistics", 4th Edition New York: Wiley.
- Mercer D.E. and Weir D.T.M. (1972) "Attitudes to Work and Trade Unionism Among White Collar Workers", Industrial Relations Journal V3, pp 49-60.
- Merton R.K., Fiske M., Kendall P.L. (1956) "The Focused Interview", Glencoe: Free Press.
- Methe D.T. and Perry J.L. (1980) "The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Local Government Services: A Review of Research", Public Administration Review 40(4), pp 359-71.
- Miller D.C. and Form W.H. (1964) "Industrial Sociology: The Sociology of Work Organisations", New York: Harper and Row.

- Miller R.W., Zeller F.A. and Miller G.W. (1965) "The Practice of Local Union Leadership: A Study of Five Local Unions", Ohio: Ohio State University Press.
- Miles R.E. and Ritchie J.B. (1968) "Leadership Attitudes Among Union Officials", Industrial Relations V8, pp 108-17.
- Mills C.W. (1951) "White Collar", New York: Oxford University Press.
- Moore R.J. (1980) "The Motivation to Become a Shop Steward", British Journal of Industrial Relations 18(1), pp 91-98.
- Moran M. (1974) "The Union of Post Office Workers: A Study in Political Sociology", London: Macmillan.
- Mottaz C.J. (1981) "Some Determinants of Work Alienation", Sociological Quarterly V22, Autumn, pp 515-29.
- N.A.L.G.O. (1976) "The Working Party Report on Communications Between Headquarters, Districts and Branches, and Membership Participation."
- N.A.L.G.O. (1978) "Whitleyism"
- N.A.L.G.O. (1980) "Representation of Branches at Conference"
- N.A.L.G.O. (1983a) "Constitution and Rules"
- N.A.L.G.O. (1983b) "Model Rules for Branches"
- N.A.L.G.O. (1983c) "Branch Membership Survey"
- Nash R. (1973) "Classrooms Observed", London: Routledge.
- Neill C.G.E. (1979) "NALGO and the Development of Occupational Interest Associations in Local Government", Industrial Relations Journal, 10(2), pp 31-40.
- Nelson J.I. and Grams R. (1978) "Union Militancy and Occupational Communities", Industrial Relations 17(3), pp 342-46.

- Newcomb T.M., Turner R.N. and Converse P.E. (1964) "Social Psychology", New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Newman G. (1982) "Path to Maturity", London, N.A.L.G.O.
- Nicholson N. (1976) "The Role of the Shop Steward: An Empirical Case Study", Industrial Relations Journal 7(1), pp 15-26.
- Nicholson N. (1978) "Mythology, Theory and Research on Union Democracy", Industrial Relations Journal 9(4), pp 33-41.
- Nicholson N. (1979) "Industrial Relations Climate: A Case Study Approach", Personnel Review 8(3) pp 20-25.
- Nicholson N., Ursell G. and Blyton P. (1980) "Social Background, Attitudes and Behaviour of White Collar Shop Stewards", British Journal of Industrial Relations 18(3), pp 231-39.
- Nicholson N., Ursell G. and Blyton P. (1981) "The Dynamics of White Collar Unionism", London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Obradovic J. (1975) "Workers Participation: Who Participates", Industrial Relations V14(1), pp 32-44.
- Oppenheim A.N. (1978) "Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement", London: Heinemann.
- Oskamp S. (1977) "Attitudes and Opinions", Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Pack S.M. (1963) "The Rank and File Leader", New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Parker S.R. (1973) "Research into Workplace Industrial Relations: Progress and Prospects", in Varner M. (Ed.). The Sociology of the Workplace, Working: Allen and Unwin, pp 19-35.
- Parker S.R. and Bynner J.M. (1970) "Correlational Data Obtained from a Survey of Shop Stewards", Human Relations 23(4), pp 345-59.
- Parker S.R. and Scott M.H. (1971) "Developing Models of Workplace Industrial Relations", British Journal of Industrial Relations 9(2) pp 214-24.

- Partridge B. (1977) "The Activities of Shop Stewards", Industrial Relations Journal, 8(4), pp 28-42.
- Perline M.M. (1971) "Organised Labour and Managerial Prerogatives", California Management Review, Winter, pp 46-50.
- Perline M.M. and Lorenz V.R. (1970) "Factors Influencing Member Participation in Trade Union Activities", American Journal of Economics and Sociology, October, pp 425-38.
- Perlman S. (1949) "A Theory of the Labour Movement", London: Macmillan.
- Peterson K. and Dutton J.E. (1975) "Certainty, Extremity, Intensity: Neglected Variables in Research on Attitude Behaviour Consistency", Social Forces V54, pp 393-414
- Peterson R.B. and Tracy L.M. (1976) "A Behavioural Model of Problem Solving Labour Negotiations", British Journal of Industrial Relations 14(2), 159-73.
- Petty R.E. and Cacioppo J.T. (1982) "Attitudes and Persuasion: Classic and Contemporary Approaches", Dubuque I. A.; Brown.
- Ponack A.M. and Fraser C.R. (1979) "Union Activists Support for Joint Programmes", Industrial Relations 18(2), pp 197-209.
- Poole M. (1969) "A Power Approach to Workers Participation in Industry", Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sheffield.
- Poole M., Mansfield R., Blyton P. and Frost P. (1982) "Managerial Attitudes and Behaviour in Industrial Relations: Evidence from a National Survey", British Journal of Industrial Relations 20(3), pp 285-307.
- Poole M., Mansfield R., Frost P. and Blyton P. (1983) "Why Managers Joint Unions: Evidence from Britain", Industrial Relations 22(3), pp 426-44.

- Prandy K., Steward A. and Blackburn R.M. (1974) "Concepts and Measures: The Example of Unionateness", *Sociology* 8(3), pp 427-46.
- Price W. (1977) "Who Speaks for the Manager", *Personnel Management*, October, pp 27-31.
- Price R. (1983) "White Collar Unions: Growth Character and Attitudes in the 1970's", in Hyman R. and Price R. (Eds) *The New Working Class: White Collar Workers and Their Organisations*, London: Macmillan, pp 147-83.
- Price R. and Bain G.S. (1976) "Union Growth Revisited: 1948-1974 In Perspective", *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 14(3), pp 339-355.
- Price R. and Bain G.S. (1983) "Union Growth in Britain: Retrospect and Prospect", *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 21(1), pp 46-68.
- Purcell J. (1979) "The Lessons of the Commission on Industrial Attempts to Reform Workplace Industrial Relations", *Industrial Relations Journal* 10(2), pp 4-22.
- Purcell J. and Sisson K. (1983) "Strategies asnd Practice in the Management of Industrial Relations", in Bain G.S. (Ed.) *Industrial Relations in Britain*: Oxford, London.
- Purcell J., Lonsdale L., Dalgleish L., McConaghy I., Harrison J. and Robertson A. (1978) "Power from Techology: Computer Staff and Industrial Relations", *Personnel Review* 7(1), pp 31-39.
- Purcell T. (1953) "The Worker Speaks His Mind on Company and Union", Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Rallings C. (1983) "White Collar Workers, Unionisation and Political Behaviour", *Industrial Relations Journal*, 14(1), pp 60-73.
- Ramswarmy E.A. (1977) "The Participatory Dimension of Trade Union Democracy: A Comparative Sociological View", *Sociology* Vll, pp 465-80.

- Reid F.J.M. and Sumiga L. (1984) "Attitudinal Politics in Intergroup Behaviour: Interpersonal vs Intergroup Determinants of Attitude Change", *British Journal of Social Psychology*, V23, pp 335-40.
- Reynolds H.T. (1973) "The Multivariate Analysis of Ordinal Measures", *American Journal of Sociology*, V78, pp 1513-16.
- Reynolds H.T. (1977) "The Analysis of Cross Classifications", New York, Free Press
- Riley M.W. (1963) "Sociological Research: A Case Approach", New York: Harcourt, Bruce and World.
- Rim Y. and Mannheim B.F. (1964) "Factors Related to Attitudes of Management and Union Representatives", *Personnel Psychology* V17, pp 149-65.
- Roberts B.C., Loveridge R. and Gennard J. (1972) "Reluctant Militants", London: Heinemann.
- Robinson, A.S. (1976) "Collective Bargaining in Technical and Professional Fields", *Personnel Journal* June, pp 278-81.
- Rokeach M. (1973) "The Nature of Human Values", New York: Free Press.
- Ronan W.W. (1963) "Work Group Attributes and Grievance Activity", *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 47(1), pp 38-41.
- Roomkin M. (1976) "Union Structure, Internal Control and Strike Activity", *Industrial and Labour Relations Review*, 29(2), pp 198-217.
- Rosen H.J. and Rosen R.A.H. (1955) "The Union Member Speaks", New York: Prentice Hall.
- Routh G. (1966) "White Collar Unions in the United Kingdom", in *White Collar Trade Unions*. Sturmthal A. (Ed.) Urbana: University of Illinois Press, pp 165-204.
- Roy W. (1964) "Membership Participation in the National Union of Teachers", *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 2(3), pp 189-208.

- Runciman W.G. (1966) "Relative Deprivation and Social Justice", London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Sarnoff I., Katz D., and McClintock C. (1954) "The Motivational Basis of Attitude Change", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, V49, pp 115-24.
- Sayles L.R. (1958) "Behaviour of Industrial Workgroups", New York: Wiley.
- Scase R. (1974) "Relative Deprivation: A Comparison of English and Swedish Manual Workers", in Poverty, Inequality and Class Structure. Wedderburn D, (Ed.) London: Cambridge University Press, pp 197-216.
- Schatt R.K. (1982) "Models of Militancy: Support for Strikes and Work Actions Among Public Employees", Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 35(3), pp 406-22.
- Scheibe K.E. (1970) "Beliefs and Values", New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Schooler C. (1968) "A Note of Extreme Caution on the Use of Guttman Scales", American Journal of Sociology, V74, pp 296-301.
- Schriesheim C.A. (1978) "Job Satisfaction, Attitudes Towards Unions and Voting in a Union Representation Election", Journal of Applied Psychology, 65(5), pp 458-62.
- Schuller T. and Robertson D. (1983) "How Representatives Allocate Their Time: Shop Steward Activity and Membership Contact", British Journal of Industrial Relations, 21(3), pp 330-42.
- Schuman H. and Johnson M.P. (1976) "Attitudes and Behaviour" in Inkoles A., Coleman J. and Smelser N. (Eds), Annual Review of Sociology, V2, Palo Alto California: Annual Reviews.
- Schwab B. and Thompson M. (1974) "Unionism in Data Processing", Datamation, October, pp 61-69.

- Scott W.A. (1968) "Attitude Measurement" in Lindzey G., and Aronson E. (Eds.) Handbook of Social Psychology, 2nd Edition, V2, Reading Mass: Addison Wesley.
- Senders V.L. (1953) "A Comment on Burke's Additive Scales and Statistics", Psychological Bulletin, V60, pp 423-24.
- Selltiz C., Jahoda M., Deutsch M. and Cook S. (1976) "Research Methods in Social Relations", New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Sherif C.W., Kelly M. Rodgers H.L., Sarup G and Tittler B.L. (1973) "Personal Involvement, Social Judgement and Action", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology V27, pp 311-328.
- Shimmin S. and Singh R. (1973) "Industrial Relations and Organisational Behaviour: A Critical Appraisal", Industrial Relations Journal 4(3), pp 36-44.
- Shirom A. (1977) "Union Militancy: Structural and Personal Determinants", Industrial Relations 16(2), pp 152-62.
- Silverman D. (1968) "Clerical Ideologies: A Research Note", British Journal of Sociology V19, pp 326-33.
- Silverman D. (1970) "The Theory of Organisations", London: Heinemann.
- Simon H.A. (1957) "Models of Man: Social and Rational, New York: Wiley.
- Smith M.B., Bruner J., and White R.W. (1956) "Opinions and Personality", New York: Wiley.
- Spoor A. (1967) "White Collar Union", London, Heineman.
- Sprinrad W. (1960) "Correlates of Trade Union Participation: A Summary of Literature", American Sociological Review, V25, Apr. pp 237-44.
- Stephenson G.M. and Morley I. (1977) "The Social Psychology of Bargaining", London: Allen and Unwin.
- Stewart A., Prandy K. and Blackburn R.M. (1980) "Social Stratification and Occupations", London: Macmillan

- Sturmthal A. (1966) "White Collar Unions: A Comparative Essay" in White Collar Unions. Sturmthal A. (Ed.) Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
- Storey J. (1976) "Workplace Collective Bargaining and Managerial Prerogatives", Industrial Relations Journal 7(3), pp 40-55.
- Sykes A.J.M. (1965) "Some Differences in the Attitudes of Clerical and Manual Workers", Sociological Review, V8, pp 297-310.
- Sykes A.J.M. (1967) "The Cohesion of a Trade Union Workshop Organisation", Sociology V1, pp 141-63.
- Tannenbaum A.S. (1956) "Mechanisms of Control in Local Trade Unions", British Journal of Sociology V7, pp 306-13.
- Terry M. (1977) "The Inevitable Growth of Informality", British Journal of Industrial Relations V15, pp 75-90.
- Terry M. (1982) "Organising a Fragmented Workforce: Shop Stewards in Local Government", British Journal of Industrial Relations 2092, pp 1-19.
- Thompson B. (1982) "Nursery Teachers Perceptions of their Pupils: An Exploratory Study" in Whitehead J.M. (Ed.) Personality and Learning, London: Hodder and Stoughton.
- Thompson D.E. and Borglum R.P. (1973) "A Case Study of Employee Attitudes and Labour Unrest", Industrial and Labour Relations Review, October, pp 74-83.
- Thompson A. and Weinstock I. (1967) "White Collar Employees and Unions at T.V.A.", Personnel Journal V46, pp 14-21.
- Thomson A.W.J. and Beaumont P.B. (1978) "Public Sector Bargaining: A Study of Relative Gain", Westmead: Saxon House.
- Thorndike R.L. and Hagen E.D. (1977) "Measurement and Evaluation in Psychology and Education", 4th Edition New York: Wiley.
- Thurstone L.L. and Chave E.J. (1929) "The Measurement of Attitudes", Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Tracy L. and Peterson R.B. (1977) "Differences in Reactions of Union and Management Negotiators to the Problem Solving Process", *Industrial Relations Journal*, 8(4), pp 43-53.
- Triandis H.C. (1959a) "Cognitive Similarity and Interpersonal Communication in Industry". *Journal of Applied Psychology* V4(5), pp 321-26.
- Triandis H.C. (1959b) "Categories of Thought of Managers, Clerks and Workers About Jobs and People in an Industry", *Journal of Applied Psychology* V43(5), pp 328-34.
- Triandis H.C. (1959c) "Differential Perceptions of Certain Jobs and People by Managers, Clerks and Workers in Industry" *Journal of Applied Psychology* V43(4), pp 221-25.
- Tripodi T. and Bieri J. (1963) "Cognitive Complexity as a Function of Own and Provided Constructs", *Psychological Reports*, V13, p26.
- Torgerson W.S. (1958) "Theory and Methods of Scaling", New York: Wiley.
- Turner H.A. (1962) "Trade Union Growth, Structure and Policy", London: Allen and Unwin.
- Turner M.E. and Stevens C.D. (1959) "The Regression Analysis of Causal Paths", *Biometrics*, V15, pp 236-58.
- Undy R., Ellis V. McCarthy W.E.J., and Halmos A.M. (1981) "Change in Trade Unions: The Development of United Kingdom Unions since the 1960's", London: Hutchinson.
- Ursell G. (1979) "Shop Steward's Attitudes Towards Industrial Democracy", *Industrial Relations Journal*, 10(4), pp 22-30.
- Ursell G., Nicholson N., and Blyton P. (1981) "Processes of Decision Making in a Trade Union Branch", *Organisation Studies* 2(1), pp 45-72.
- Volker D. (1966) "NALGO's Affiliation to the T.U.C.", *British Journal of Industrial Relations* 4(1), pp 59-76.
- Wall J.A. and Virtue R. (1979) "Women as Negotiators", *Business Horizons* 19(2), pp 67-8.
- Walker J.M. and Lawler J.J. (1979) "Dual Unions and Political Processes on Organisations", *Industrial Relations* 18(2), pp 32-43.

- Walker J.E. and Tausky C. (1982) "An Analysis of Work Incentives", Journal of Applied Psychology, V116, pp 27-39.
- Walsh W. (1974) "Flexible Working Hours: Time for Second Thoughts", The Accountant, April, pp 425-26.
- Walsh K. (1981) "Centralisation and Decentralisation in Local Government Bargaining", Industrial Relations Journal 12(5), pp 43-54.
- Walton R. and McKersie R. (1965) "A Behavioural Theory of Labour Negotiations: an Analysis of Social Interaction System", New York: McGraw Hill.
- Webb E.J. Campbell D.T. Schwartz R.D. and Sechrest L. (1966) "Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences", Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Weir D. (1976) "Radical Managerialism: Middle Managers Perceptions of Collective Bargaining", British Journal of Industrial Relations, 14(3), pp 324-37.
- Wellington H.H. and Winter R.K. (1971) "The Unions and Cities", Washington, The Brookings Institution.
- Wertheimer B. and Nelson A. (1974) "The American Woman at Work" Personnel Management, March, pp 20-24.
- Whelan C.T. (1976) "Orientations to Work: Some Theoretical and Methodological Problems", British Journal of Industrial Relations 14(2), pp 142-58.
- Wicker A.W. (1969) "Attitudes vs Actions: The Relationship of Verbal and Overt Responses to Attitude Objects". Journal of Social Issues V25, pp 41-78.
- Wicker A.W. (1971) "An Examination of the 'Other Variables' Explanation of Attitude-Behaviour Inconsistency", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, V19, pp 18-30.
- Wilders M.G. and Parker S.R. (1975) "Changes in Workplace Industrial Relations 1966-72", British Journal of Industrial Relations, 13(1), pp 14-22.

- Winchester D. (1983) "Industrial Relations in The Public Sector", in Bain G.S. (Ed.) Industrial Relations in Britain, Oxford: Blackwell, pp 155-78.
- Wood S. & Elliot R. "A Critical Evaluation of Fox's Radicalisation of Industrial Relations Theory", Sociology 11(1), pp 105-24
- Wright S. (1960) "Path Coefficients and Path Regressions: Alternative or Complementary Concepts", Biometrics, V16, pp 189-202.